The Social-Economic Situation of Middle East Youth on the Eve of the Arab Spring

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Are the Youth or the Middle Class Driving Change in the Middle East?

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Age or Class?

Leading Opinions in the Wake

of Egypt's 2011 Popular Uprisings

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Abstract. I look at public opinion in Egypt, using the two waves of 2000 and 2008 World Value Survey, and find that there has been a major increase in popular support for democracy, a moderate increase in concerns about inequality, and a sizable fall in the support for political Islam. I examine how these opinions are clustered along class and age lines. The main findings are that while in 2000, younger Egyptians were more progressive than their parents, by 2008, Egyptian society had become much more organized around class interests and showed little inter-generational differentiation. I argue that this is not inconsistent with an important role for the youth in the shaping of the observed shifts in opinions over time. The data suggest that the increased support for democracy has come mainly from two groups -- middle class economically conservative Islamists, and middle class secular leftists.

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Introduction

MENA's demographic bulge is among the largest in the word – but instead of a demographic dividend, it seems to have been a curse so far, largely because of weaknesses on the supply side, which have been partly related to the system of cronyism that had developed in the recent neo-liberal era. Given that education has increased in the past decade, but that higher skills have coexisted with high youth unemployment, we would expect that youth with blunted aspiration would have high level of grievances, and also, a will to mobilize. Indeed, this has been offered as one of the social phenomena that can explain the onset of the Arab Spring revolutions (eg. Campante, 2011). But was that the case in Egypt?

There is surprisingly little knowledge about the youth as a political force in the Middle East. Various theories do attribute a large role to the youth, but it is not clear if any of these theories applies to the region, especially given that family values and conservative social attitudes have long been seen as specificities of Arab and Muslim societies, and that such values would breed conformism and prevent differentiation by the youth from their families' opinions. It is therefore equally credible, a priori, that the anger that the youth displayed on Tahrir square and elsewhere in the past years was reflecting a broadly held social anger, and was thus not reflective of a generational split.

In this article, I try to discriminate between two main theories of change and democratization – modernization vs. distribution -- based on the analysis of public opinion in Egypt, how it changed in the years leading to the uprisings, and whether the agents of change, if any, were concentrated among a particular class or age group, or among those espousing political Islam. Revolutions and uprisings are not necessarily *caused* by changes on public opinion, but they may be, and their sustainability would be doubt if they went against the winds of public opinion.

The article is organized in three parts. In part 2, I present and discuss the various theories of transition to democracy, and explore whether they tend to operate mostly on age or class basis. In section 3, I look at public opinion in Egypt, using the two waves of 2000 and 2008, and find that there have been major shifts in opinions relating to core issues such as democracy, distributional

policies, and the desirability of political Islam. I examine whether these were concentrated along class or age groups and we find that by 2008, the Egyptian society had become much more organized around class interests, but that it showed little inter-generational differentiation. In section 4, these results are confirmed using regression analysis. Section 5 concludes.

2. Theories of change

In this section, I go over what existing theories tell us about the particular role of youth in democratic transitions. There is a rich global literature on transition to democracy which has emerged in the shadow of the "third wave" of democratization that has engulfed Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe in the past two decades. There are four major theories that are of interest as possible explanations of the social phenomena that led to the uprisings in Egypt (and elsewhere in the Middle East): modernization, the related youth bulge, distributional conflict, and splits within the governing coalition. There are also many claims about the role of political Islam in leading, shaping, or slowing change that need to be put to the data.

A popular theory, developed under the umbrella of the World Value Survey (WVS) enterprise, views democratization as a long term phenomena that is driven by social "modernization". Various analyses of the WVS data-sets have found that there are two main dimensions of cross-cultural variation in the world: (i) traditional values vs secular rational values; (ii) survival values vs self expression values. The former emphasizes modernity as a move away from religion, family ties, and deference to authority towards greater rationality, while the latter emphasizes a move away from economic and physical insecurity towards rising levels of agency, trust and tolerance. This literature shows that greater emancipation from traditional and survival values foster democracy. This is typically accomplished through generational replacement, with younger generations usually leading the change (Tilley, 2002). In the WVS sample of countries, Muslim and Arab countries tend to have the highest scores on traditional and on survival values (Inglehart and Welzel, 2010). When structural variables, including connections with globalization are taken into account, one still finds that the Muslim countries of the Middle East have been lagging on this emancipation path, but much more on gender equality rather than on democratic values (Esmer 2002, Norris and Inglehart, 2004), leading some authors to argue that the social dominance of Islam accounts for much of this specificity, although it is also found that higher education does have some impact in closing the emancipation gap (Alexander and Welzel, 2011). In this view of the world, the current wave of democratization in the Arab world would be related to the weakening of traditional authority and

religion, driven by education, urbanization, and economic growth, which would have made these societies "ready" for democracy, and awaiting a political opportunity to coordinate social efforts towards democratization, which was provided by the Uprisings.

Hypothesis 1. Testing such a theory basically revolves around finding a rise in the support for democracy and other modern values, as well as inter-generational differences in opinions. In particular, we would expect differences on the main issues of desirability of democracy, the role of political Islam (PI), gender, trust, and possibly, the role of the state – with modernization usually connected with a larger role for individual agency and thus a lower reliance on the state, including in terms of redistributive policies.

A related theory, the "youth bulge theory of change", developed by Cincotta and Doces (2011), predicts that youthful societies tend to be anti-democratic. Their arguments builds on the bulge thesis developed by various demographers, which asserts that states with youthful populations face a high risk of political violence and armed conflict (see Henrik 2006 for a summary of this literature). In such a context, citizens will tend to have a preference for an authoritarian bargain where they trade-off their political and civil liberties for guarantees of security (as la Ghandi and Prezeworski 2006). The work of Cincotta and Doces find that the cut-off for the onset of democracy is around a medium age of 25 years. In their sample, more than half the countries with a median age between 25-35 years are democratic according to a Freedom house definition; in the sample where median age is 25-35, the proportion rises to 90%. In the context of the Middle East then, it would be the aging and increased maturity of the population, with median age increasing above 25 years in the 2000s that would explain the impulse for democratization.

H2. If this theory is true, we would see a rising support for democracy as a society ages. We would also expect to see rising levels of trust in society, in the sense that the impulse for change would not be driven by grievances but rather by a rising belief that governance along democratic lines becomes more feasible and credible.

The main alternative theory of democratization is based on a distributional drive supported by the poor (and possibly the middle class, (MC)). In these models, the poorer segments of the population favor taxation and redistribution, which the rich oppose. As a result, there is an incentive for the rich

elite to govern in an autocratic way, and for the poorer segment to attempt to take over and form a democracy where policy is determined by the median voter. Starting from a socio-political equilibrium, when inequality rises, the system comes under stress. The equilibrium can shift to either a more repressive authoritarianism, or to a democratic order to which elites will sign on, or some elements of the previous ruling coalition will split to the new democratic coalition (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2003). In models of democratic transitions, the distributive motive for change is expanded to endogeneize the very existence of democratic governments. When elites are confronted with mobilization from below, they can make short term concessions to diffuse the threat, but they can also be expected to default on these promises when mobilization subsides. Democratic institutions provide therefore a means for the elite to commit credibly to a more equal distribution of income in the future (because reversals are costly) when faced with credible challenges. As a result, when low income groups mobilize in favor of redistribution, they do so by militating for a more democratic order. In a recent wide-ranging empirical review of the past two decades, Kaufman and Haggard (2012) show that more than one half of recent transitions are explained by distributional concerns – the other half is divided between cases where it was driven by splits within the ruling elites, and cases where elites perceived democracy to serve their own interests.

In this account, revolutions are driven by a rise in inequality, which makes it more desirable for the poor and the middle class to support taxing the rich. There is however no direct evidence that inequality has risen in the recent past in Egypt, on the basis of income distribution data. Generally, household surveys reveal that inequality (as measured by Gini coefficients for example) has risen moderately in Egypt, from about 0.3 in the 1990s, to 0.35 in the 2000 (Bibi and Nabli, 2010). But while the increase seems small relative to other regions, household surveys are however notorious for under-counting the rich. There is a presumption of a rise in the incomes of the 10% richest in society, which are perceived to have benefited from the regime of crony capitalism which had replaced over time the old socialist-nationalist state starting in the 1980s, and accelerating after 2000. More importantly, a focus on the needs of the MC rather than the whole income distribution seems called for. Diwan (2012) has argued that the main driver of the uprisings was a split of the MC, which abandoned the autocratic coalition in favor or a democratic bet. The reasons for the split include the rise in skilled unemployment, very much a middle class phenomenon, which hurts their aspirations more than their current incomes. We would also expect a decline in social trust over time, leading to the uprising, as social forces become increasingly frustrated with the unequal distribution of income under autocracy (Jamal 2007).

H3. The main implication of a distributional theory of transition is that opinions would increasingly lean towards democracy, and that this would be accompanied by a shift in opinions towards redistributive policies and a decline in social trust. These opinions would normally be formed along class lines.

An important set of concerns revolves around issues related to Political Islam (PI). The tenets of PI include some social values which are strongly espoused by some and not by other members of society (such as beliefs related to the role of Shari'a in legislation, gender issues, freedom of speech as it relates to the "sacred" ect). PI has been in the past the main organized opposition movement, militating at various points in time against autocracy, secularism, unpopular foreign alliances, or corruption – and it was at times severely repressed and it operated largely outside the formal system. More recently, some groups within the broad range of parties espousing PI (and in particular the Muslim Brotherhood) have moderated their messages and came to accept the democratic game, and had become more popular among the middle class and the richer classes. Indeed, it was only in 2004 that the Muslim Brotherhood managed to commit publicly to abide by a constitutional and democratic system, calling for the recognition of "the people as the source of all authority", and committing itself to the principles of the transfer of power through free elections, the freedom of belief and expression, the freedom to form political parties, and the independence of the judiciary (Shahin 2005).[1] At the same time, other insurgent groups have declined, and recent elections have revealed the existence of a large minority of Salafists, who seem to be more popular among the poor, and who espouse more populist views.

In which ways could political Islam be connected to the uprisings and transitions? There are many possibilities, and rather than forming hypotheses, our approach will be to explore what the data says. As a mobilizing force, PI can resolve coordination problems around the forum provided by Mosques, as this is typically a central constraint in social movements. As an ideology, there are several competing narratives. It can counter modernization with conservative values – for example on gender issues, and it can be used to neutralize distributional concerns by favoring quietism (values promoted by Sufi and Salafi groups). But it can instead be supporting middle class redistributive goals (as the Youth branch of the Muslim Brotherhood), or supporting middle class

[1] Similar processes of moderation through participation (Schweddler 2006) took place in other neighboring countries, notably Turkey and Tunisia. Demiralp (2009) describes the process leading to AKP's increased moderation by a combination of lessons from repression, opportunism, and the growth of a friendly MC. In Tunisia, Al-Nahda committed publicly in 1981 that: "we have no right to interpose between the people and those whom the people choose and elect" (quoted in Osman, 1989).

devout but economically conservative private sector oriented individuals (which seems to be the attitude of the Muslim Brotherhood).[2] An altogether different possibility is that the moderation of PI facilitated the defection of the MC – Diwan (2012) argues that democratization was delayed in many countries of the MENA because PI scared secularist MC and threw them into a coalition of fear with autocrats. So to read the recent political changes as a "victory of PI" does not constitute a theory of change in itself, and could be taken to mean many different things.

H4. The empirical implications are different for the hypotheses outlined above, and they can be differentiated by looking at the evolution of opinions towards PI and how they correlated at the individual level (and within well define class and age groups) with attitudes towards democracy and redistribution.

Finally, some see the success of the uprising in Egypt in toppling the Mubarak regime as mainly driven by the support it ended up receiving from the army and its western backers. This view would suggest that the main driver was a split within the elites, especially among those supporting the group of cronies which has been in power since 2005 or so and the traditional army/security complex elites. That these actors were influential is beyond doubt, but the question is rather whether their actions was a driving force, or whether they decided to side with existing social forces for change.

H5. In terms of implications, finding little empirical support for the two main theses described above (modernization and distribution) in public opinion would advantage the view of a contingent role for the army and its foreign supporters.

Before closing this section, it is useful to characterize more the MC, given that it appears to be the main competitor to the youth as the main actor for change in Egypt and the Middle East. Arab autocrats had valued keeping the mainly secular MC led parties in the governing "political settlement" in the past, either within the governing coalition, or as part of the legal opposition, due to both their important legitimizing role. For the regimes in place, secular and liberal ideology was at the center of their Arab national ideologies of the 1950s, which ushered leaders such as Bourguiba and Nasser, bringing in the Attaturkian model of modernization based on secular and nationalist ideologies. For the Arab autocrats, losing their MC anchors is tantamount to losing all legitimacy and turning into naked dictatorship with no operational narrative. In this broader frame, the

[2] Many authors have argued that a weakening of religiosity is necessary for modernization, but others (eg Tarik Ramadan 2011) argues that modernization requires a reformation of religion itself (2011).

authoritarian bargain in the Arab world in the past decade can be best characterized as an alliance between elite capital and elements of the MC that delivered economic benefits to the coalition members, including in the form of subsidies (this does not applies to Iran, which is an autocracy of the poor). The poor in the meantime were denied economic advantages and their political movements were severely repressed.

The MC has changed after the economic liberalizations of the 1990s. Until recently, Middle Eastern scholars did not seem to believe that the MC could play an active role in leading political change. Its effective influence on policies was low as it was mainly made up of civil servants and employees of state owned enterprises, which reduced its ability to play the role of an autonomous actor. Indeed, the interests of this group have not been protected in the past and it became poorer as a result of the rolling back of the state. Low public sector wages also fueled petty corruption in areas such as health and education, generating another important source of discontent.[3] A new market oriented MC rose in late 1990s in response to economic liberalization. The newcomers tended to be small merchants and industrialists that have benefited from the market oriented reforms as well as the small but expanding skilled labor of the formal private sector labor market. This group has been politically more active than the old (see Nasr 2009) -- for example, it played an important role in securing the success of the Iranian revolution in 1979, and the rise of the AKP in Turkey.[4]

A rapid exploration of household level data reveals that it is indeed the composition rather than the size of the MC that has changed over time in Egypt. To provide a sense of magnitude, I have estimated the size of the income classes using World Bank data on income distribution, and utilizing reasonable assumptions on the definition of classes. The results are striking: throughout the period, the size of the MC in Egypt remained around 30% of the population, that of the rich at about 10%, and that of the poor (using an expansive definition of having an income of less than $4 a day) at about 60%.

In concluding this section, I summarize the implications of the theories presented in Table 1 below.

[3] In Egypt, for example, real wages in the public sector declined over time. The minimum wage, which anchors all wages, has declined from 60% of per capital GDP in the early 1980s to a mere 13% in 2007 (Abdel Hamid and El Baradei, 2009). This can be also seen very sharply at the macro level – by 2019, 30% of the Egyptian labor force worked for the state but earns a total wage bill of less than 9% GDP, implying that average wages were in the neighborhood of one third of GDP/capita, which is extremely low by international standard.

[4] Indeed, it benefitted handsomely from the alliance with the support provided to SMEs and the rise of what became known as the Anatolian tigers, SMEs that drove growth in Turkey in the past decade (Demiralp 2009, Gumuscu 2009).

Table 1. Theories of democratization and empirical implications

Theory	Testable implications
H1: Youth bulge	Rising support for democracy Rising trust
H2: Modernization theory	Rising support for democracy, more trust, low support for distribution, more support for gender, low support for PI. In all cases, effects should be stronger among the youth
H3: Distributional conflict	Rising support for democracy, low trust, high support for distribution. In all cases, effects should be stronger for the poor and the MC
H4: Elites fight	No rise in support for democracy
H5 : how PI effects various theories	Examine how the support for PI at the individual level is connected to age and class on the one hand, and to democratic and economic orientation on the other.

3. Attitudes towards democracy, distribution, and Political Islam

I now attempt to test which of the theories described above applies best to Egypt by looking at the structure and evolution of opinions as collected by the 4th and 5th waves of the World Value Survey, in 2000, and in 2008, two years before the uprisings. The data and the questions that I use from the surveys are outlined in Annex 1. I focus principally on questions that measure attitudes to democracy, redistributive economic policy, and role of religion in politics, and to a lesser extent on issues surrounding trust and gender. Four groups of questions are of particular interest: those about opinion on democracy/order; those related to opinions on redistribution (a progressive/ conservative political economy axis); those connected to the role of PI in solving social problems (a progressive/conservative social issues axis). We also have information on individual characteristics of respondent such as their (self-declared) social class, education, and age.

The use of opinion polls to test the theories described above needs to be justified. Looking at evidence from opinion polls to understand popular uprisings is an attractive proposition. Uprisings are about change. Popularity should mean that many hold similar opinions about the desirability of change. By looking at micro data, and over time, one should be able not just to observe the rise of "revolutionary" fervor, but also, to pinpoint who the leading agents of change are, and possibly, what drove them to change. That the last poll we use is in 2008, two years before the uprisings can raise concerns, as opinions in 2008 may not be similar to those in early 2011. The next survey will be available in early 2013, and it would be important to update this study then. In the meanwhile, it is also important to note that the 2008 survey was taken before Egypt was hit by the global financial

crisis, which led in time to a large fall in real wages (Roushdy and Gadallah, 2011). One can thus argue that the 2008 survey is representative of long term trends, compared to opinions during and after the uprisings which would be noisy and possibly more transient.

The main characteristics of the opinions on the 3 issues of central interest – democracy, redistribution, and PI are summarized in Table 1, which calculate average opinions in Egypt and contract them with those of neighboring countries for the 4th and 5th waves of the WVS.

Table 2: Average Opinions on Democracy, Redistributive Policies, and PI

(% of population)	Prefers Democracy over Order		"Incomes should be made more equal"		Supports Political Islam	
	4th Wave	5th Wave	4th Wave	5th Wave	4th Wave	5th Wave
Egypt, Arab Rep.	24.0	52.1	9.2	31.7	82.6	60.0
Iran, Islamic Rep.	35.9	39.8	38.8	68.9	61.9	49.7
Jordan	25.7	28.1	25.6	31.1	66.2	67.9
Morocco	35.6	36.8	25.1	52.9	90.7	89.4
Turkey	60.1	37.0	67.7	57.7	--	42.3

Source: WVS; the variables are defined in Annex 1.

Let us look first at the extent of support for democracy. Opinions are surprisingly diverse among these countries. There is a very significant shift of opinions in Egypt, with support for democracy jumping from 24% to 52% of the population over the period. In Morocco and Iran, support is initially a sizable minority at 36%, but it only improves marginally over time (to 37 and 40%). If uprisings happen on the basis of big changes in opinions relating to the desirability of democracy in autocratic environments, then these figures would suggest that by 2008, one could say that a revolution could be expected in Egypt, but had limited prospects in Iran, Jordan, and Morocco. These figures suggest that the uprisings in Egypt do seem to represent a deep social wave that is specific to the country. There may be many reasons for these changes. Some are circumstantial, such as the upcoming 2011 presidential election (and fear of the constitution of a Mubarak/crony capitalist's dynasty). But others may be related to longer terms social trends such as economic inequalities, or the rise of education among the youth, of the transformations of PI.

The other columns are equally informative: between the two periods, the concern about inequality rose a lot in Egypt. And the attitude towards P showed an increased moderation. In both respects, these are similar to changes experienced in Iran, but are unlike changes that took place in the other countries – in Morocco, we do observe a rise in the support more equality, but no change in attitude towards PI. In Jordan, there is little change on both scores. It is interesting to note that the similarities between Iran and Egypt on these scores coincide with a similar social movement revolution in Iran – however, Iran's "green" revolution after its 2009 elections was repressed successfully by the old guard, perhaps because the support for democracy there was weaker than in Egypt.

Now that we have seen that the evolution of opinions in revolutionary Egypt are quite different from those in neighboring countries where revolts did not take place or were not successful, the rest of the analysis focuses on Egypt. Let us also look at trust, as this would allow us to verify if H1 holds.

Figure 1. Trust by class and age



Figure 1 shows a large decline in trust between the two periods, with richer people and younger exhibiting lower levels of trust than the rest of the population.

Taken together, the increased support for democracy, lower trust, and reduced support for PI rule out H1, and H4. We are left essentially with the two core hypotheses of modernization vs. distribution, plus a need to understand how the moderation of PI fits into the ongoing social transformation. In order to look into these issues, we need to examine the evolution of group opinions – by class and age -- to both develop a better feel for the identity of the leading social forces (if any), and then see how their economic and social preferences evolves.

Let us start by looking at how opinions towards democracy evolved in Egypt by class and age (Figure 2). We construct this variable from responses to a question where respondents are asked to choose their first and second choice from a list of four options that include democracy, order, fighting inflation, and more civil liberties (see Annex 1 for details). Because they had to make a choice, respondents tended to rank democracy lower than in other unconstrained questions that simply ask whether they like democracy - -the latter are not very informative and tend to show an over-whelming support for democracy. An examination of the data reveals three striking regularities.

First the rise in the support for democracy appears very much like a class phenomenon, with the middle class playing a lead role in the change of opinions. This seems to suggest a distribution explanation for change, but it would need to be confirmed by an examination of opinions towards redistribution.

Figure 2: Support for Democracy, by Class and Age



Second, the youth do not seem to hold opinions in 2008 that are much different from their parents on the desirability of democracy, unlike the situation in 2000, when they were much more democratic than their elders. This seems to suggest that their opinions may have paved the way for a catch up by their parents. In this story, the closeness of the Arab family plays a positive role. To the extent that the underlying forces driving opinions are connected to skilled youth unemployment, a major phenomenon for the MC, it seems that Egyptian MC parents became as unhappy as their children about the lack of job opportunities – and this pushes them to favor regime change and democracy. The closeness of the Arab family has been recognized by the literature (Alexander and Welzel, 2011) – but here, it facilitates change, in opposition to the usual view of the "backwardness" of patriarchal societies (Alesina and Giuliano 2007).

Third, the poor remains by 2008 less favorable to democracy than the MC, which contradicts the simple redistribution story where the poor among social classes the biggest incentives for taxation and redistribution. It is instead the MC that emerges as the clear champion for democracy, with more than 50% of this class supporting it.

I look next at individual preferences relative to inequality. The question used asks respondents to rank on a scale of 1 to 10 whether income inequality is good for incentives (low scores), or incomes should be made more equal (large scores). Answers to the question thus reveal perceptions of income inequality, and the possible role of policy in redistribution. Caricaturally, we can refer to people that prefer equality as "leftists", and people that prefer inequality as "rightists". Examining this variable along class and age dimensions reveals evidence that the shift of opinion towards a more equal society also appears to be a class rather than a generational phenomenon. But rather than the MC, it is the poor that champions redistribution by 2008, at levels much higher than the MC, unlike in 2000 when the opinions of these two classes were similar.[5] This shift in opinions should be related to the large drop in financial satisfaction experienced by the poor, but not by the MC – the satisfaction of the rich on the other hand shoots up, bolstering claims about increased inequality during the decade starting in 2000 (see Annex 2. However, in spite of this turn to the "left", opinions about a more activist role for the state turn more negative (including among the poor), suggesting that equality is to be achieved by a disengagement of the state, rather than by a more pro-active state. Again, these opinions are supported mainly by the poor, and to a lesser extent by the MC, by not by the rich, who favor a larger role for the state (see Annex 2). This suggests that state activism had been seen to be benefitting the rich. So we are left with a mystery: what explains the surge of support for democracy among the MC, given that it is not largely distributive reasons?

Figure 3: Preferences for a Ditributional State, by Class and Age

[5] Note that the exact level of this indicator depends on how we code the information. Here, we consider that any score above 5 indicates support for "equality". The results are robust to a change in cut-off point, but the point is that one should not take the level of these variables too seriously, as they can be increased or reduced depending on the cut-off selected.



Note. The graphs above indicate the proportion of respondents who choose 5 or less in Question 116, which asks respondent to what degree they prefer incomes should be made equal on a 1-10 scale.

To complete the picture on modernization, let us look more carefully at opinions on gender and on religiosity, both well known emancipative values. Views on gender (Figure 4) actually deteriorate, (possibly because of high unemployment). If anything, views are more progressive among the rich, and to a small extent, among the youth.

So far then, the data does not support much the distribution theory of change. On the other hand, the other variables examined suggest that there are at the same time both positive and negative forces at play on the modernization front. Thus, while the shift away from PI and from an activist state support a modernization view of the recent transformations in Egyptian society, one needs to recognize that this shift is only partial, as other values which are typically seen as central to modernity – and in particular, gender and trust, do not change, and even deteriorate over the period under consideration – seemingly confirming Norris's view that Muslims societies are different in terms of "Eros, much more than on Demos".

Figure 4. Opinions on Gender, by class and age





Finally, let us explore in more detail the drivers of the changing public opinions towards PI. We have noted above a decline in the support for PI although it remains a majority view. The decrease in support for PI is concentrated especially among the poor, followed by the MC, but not among the rich (Figure 5, see also Annex 3). It seems a priori surprising given that education, which goes up with classes, is usually connected with a fall in religiosity – we will try to disentangle these effects in the regressions below.

Figure 5: Whether Religious Authorities Give Answers to Social Problems, by Class and Age



To get a sense of how views towards PI connect with view towards democracy, we divide the sample in four cells along religiosity/democratic lines. Somewhat surprisingly, this reveals that while adherents of PI favored autocracy in the past, they became, like the secularists, about equally divided between autocracy and democracy by 2008. This suggests that the Brotherhood conversion to democracy, which was initiated in the 2005 elections, did have a profound effect in boosting popular support for democracy. This is another theme that we will explore more fully in the regression analysis below.

Table 3: Cross tabulation of support for democracy and PI, both periods

2000 (%)	Secular	Religious	Total	2008 (%)	Secular	Religious	Total
Autocract	11.8	62.3	**74.1**	Autocract	18.9	28.6	**47.5**
Undecided	0.6	0.9	**1.5**	Undecided	0.0	0.0	**0.0**
Democract	5.0	19.4	**24.4**	Democract	21.0	31.5	**52.5**
Total	**17.4**	**82.6**	**100.0**	Total	**40.0**	**60.0**	**100.0**

Finally, can we find evidence in the Egyptian data for Diwan (2012) thesis that in the past, the secular MC was kept in the autocratic coalition by a fear of a takeover by proponents of PI? This hypothesis is not supported by the data from Egypt. In both 2000 and 2008, PI was not more popular among the poor than among the MC, and so, could not have been a force that scared the MC then from defecting from the autocratic coalition. Instead, the reason for their recent defection has to be found elsewhere, and indeed, possibly in their espousal of a more moderate and democratically oriented PI!

Figure 6. Opinions in Egypt on democracy, distribution, and PI -- by classes



Notes. The first letter refers to class, threw second to whether the group prefers autocracy or democracy. Figures on the side refer to the size of this group in the total population, while those in the circles refer to the size of the group in the relevant class..

4. Regression analysis

To confirm the results found above, and explore in more detail the co-variation between democracy, distribution, and PI, I now turn to regression analysis. I use logit functional forms, examining which RHS variables maximize the chances of predicting individual choices. For each of the three key 3

variables of interest, I use "reduced models" by looking at the effects of age, class, and education, and then explore the individual effect of PI and distribution on opinions towards democracy. To account for class structure, rather than using an ordered variable, given the discontinuities observed in the behavior of the MC, I use dummies for the MC and for the Rich, relative to the Poor. In all cases, dummies for the Rich are not significant (because the group is so small) and are not reported.

First, I run the following regression:

(1) Probability of support for Democracy, Eq., PI = f (MC dummy, Rich dummy, age, education).

Table 4. Logit regression for Preference for Democracy

Dependent Variable: Ordering of Democracy (var1)	2000	2008
Age	-0.344***	-0.102
	(0.073)	(0.066)
MC	0.012	0.208**
	(0.092)	(0.075)
Education	0.205***	0.152**
	(0.060)	(0.056)
N	2893	3050

The results which were apparent in the graphs are confirmed: there is initially a strong age effect, with the youth more supportive of democracy that older individuals, but this effect goes away by 2008 and is replaced by a strong class effect, which did not exist in 2000. In addition, it is apparent that education also matters, as in the modernization view of the world.

Let us turn our attention next to the role of distribution vs. PI in explaining the surge in support for democracy. I run the following regression:

(2) Probability of supporting democracy = f (PI, PI*MC, Eq, Eq.*MC)

Table 5. Logit Regression for Preference for Political Islam

Dependent Variable: preference for democracy	2000	(2009)	2000	(2009)
PI	-0.349**	-0.246**		
	(0.130)	-0.095		
PI*MC	0.055	0.390***		
	(0.102)	-0.097		

Equity			0.10	-0.113*
			(0.121)	-0.054
Equity*MC			0.02	0.155***
			(0.154)	-0.04
N	2789	2976	2789	3009

The results are in Table 5. They reveal some rich complexities. Adherents of PI did not support democracy in 2000. By 2008, the overall effect is the same, except for the MC group that espouses PI, who becomes a force for democratization! It seems as if PI acts as a conservative veil, preventing the poor from expressing their class interests, but this effect goes away for the MC, either because they are better educated, and/or because they are more likely to be influenced by more moderate parties within the PI umbrella, such as the MB. This supports and refines Tessler's (2011) findings that support for PI is congruent with rising support for democracy – what we find is that this applies to the MC – but the new finding here is that the poor who supports PI generally does not seem to support democracy.

We also find that support for equality did not translate into support for democracy in 2000. In 2008, support for equality again is congruent with different attitudes to democracy among the social classes: for the poor, a desire for equality tends to go with a preference for order and autocracy, which suggest that this group is comfortable with populist methods. For the MC however, support for equity goes hand in hand with support for democracy, which thus supports a variant of the distribution hypothesis in the sense that it applies only to the MC.

We are thus left with one important question—are there interceptions between the two progressive groups from the MC who are supporting PI and Equity (the left). I run the following regression:

(3) Probability of support for PI = g (age, class, Eq, education).

Table 6. Logit regression for preference for PI

Dependent Variable: PI	(2000)	(2009)
Age	-0.186*	-0.157*
	(0.087)	(0.069)
Class	0.325**	0.368***
	(0.108)	(0.078)
Left vs. Right	-0.019	-0.058
	(0.092)	(0.052)
Education	-0.154*	-0.115*
	(0.072)	(0.058)
Observations	2788	2940

The results in Table 6 confirm earlier findings – that attraction to PI rises with age and with class but falls with education. That the poor have a lesser tendency to espouse PI can seem surprising but confirms that PI has become more of a MC phenomenon. In relation to leftist tendencies, the results reveal that in both periods, individuals espousing PI tend to be on the right (i.e preferring inequality), but this effect is not significant, although it becomes stronger over time. This suggests that while they intersect to some extent, there seems to be two distinct groups evolving within the democratic middle class: leftist secularists, and rightist Islamists. Ironically, it is the second that is driven by modernizing motives, while the first is more focused on traditional distributional motives.

5. Conclusions (to be completed)

The results in this paper point to a thesis of partial modernization, rather than distribution, as the main explanation for the Uprisings in Egypt. While the movement towards democratization was initiated by the youth, it spread among the poor and especially the MC by 2008. The main driving force for this shift of opinions seems to be the moderation of PI, rather than re-distributional motives. It remains to be seen if democracy can be consolidated. There is a risk of polarization over identity between Islamists and secularists, which could set the clock back. How PI evolves in the future will be key. Will it dissolve in the polity, as has happened in Indonesia and Turkey, or will it harden in a process of polarization around identity issues? Polarization can create a dynamic of its own that blocks the forces of modernization. But there are also forces of "moderation through participation" that could push for a social resolution of divisive issues that had not been tackled openly by most autocrats in the past.

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ANNEX 1:

The World Values Survey (WVS) is a research project that aims to understand and measure people's perceptions, opinions and beliefs all over the world. The survey's almost standardized set up since 1981 allow us to evaluate the change in perceptions, opinions and beliefs in a systematic way. Although the WVS encompasses opinion on a wide spectrum of issues relating to social life, such as religiosity, globalization, happiness, financial satisfaction and environment, our study focuses on the questions about attitudes towards democracy, economic policies, trust, perceptions of gender differences and role of religion in politics. A relatively large sample size (~3,000 respondents in each survey) and careful sampling methods along dimensions of urbanization, age, gender, and income allows us to exploit the micro-information contained in the database in ways that are not possible in other surveys.

Table: Summary Statistics of Countries Included

	Wave 0		Wave 1	
	Survey Year	Sample Size	Survey Year	Sample Size
Egypt, Arab Rep.	2000	3,000	2008	3,051
Iran, Islamic Rep.	2000	2,532	2007	2,667
Jordan	2001	1,223	2007	1,200
Morocco	2001	2,264	2007	1,200
Turkey	2001	3,401	2007	1,346

Source: World Values Survey

The questions from the survey and generated variables from these questions used in the analysis are as follows:

a. Democracy

Our core variable in the paper, preference for democracy, is generated by ordering of V71 and V72 (see below). If a respondent chooses 1 in V71 over other choices in V72, s/he is taken to prefer autocracy; group, if chooses 2 or 4 in V71 over other choices, s/he is categorized as preferring democracy.

V71. If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important? (Code one answer only under "first choice"):

V72. And which would be the next most important?

1. Maintaining order in the nation
2. Giving people more say in important government decisions
3. Fighting rising prices
4. Protecting freedom of speech

b. Distribution and economic policy:

V116. Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the left (*Incomes should be made more equal*); 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the right (*We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort*); and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.

V117. Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left (*Private ownership of business and industry should be increased*); 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right (*Government ownership of business and industry should be increased*); and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.

V118. Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the left (*The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for*); 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the right (*People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves*); and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.

c. Religiosity and Political Islam:

V187. Independently of whether you attend religious services or not, would you say you are

1. A religious person
2. Not a religious person
3. An atheist

V188. Generally speaking, do you think that the religious institutions in your country are giving adequate answers to *the moral problems and needs of the individual* (Y/N)

V189. Generally speaking, do you think that the religious institutions in your country are giving adequate answers to *the problems of family life* (Y/N)

V190. Generally speaking, do you think that the religious institutions in your country are giving adequate answers to *the people's spiritual needs* (Y/N)

V191. Generally speaking, do you think that the religious authorities in your country are giving adequate answers *the social problems facing our society* (Y/N)

d. Trust:

V23. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? (Y/N)

e. Gender:

For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?

V60. Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay.

V62. A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.

f. Socio-economic groupings:

V252. People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the:

1. Upper class

2. Upper middle class
3. Lower middle class
4. Working class
5. Lower class

Classes are redefined in the analysis as “Rich” (1), “Middle Class” (2+3) and “Poor” (4+5).

g. Education:

V238. What is the highest educational level that you have attained?:

1. No formal education
2. Incomplete primary school
3. Complete primary school
4. Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type
5. Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type
6. Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type
7. Complete secondary: university-preparatory type
8. Some university-level education, without degree
9. University-level education, with degree

h. Other:

V7. How important it Politics in your life on a scale of 1 to 10?.

V68. How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? Choose from 1 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied).

ANNEX 2: Other Changes in Perceptions Supporting Redistribution[6]



[6] All these graphs give a picture of binary recalculations of the corresponding questions that are in 1-10 scale.

ANNEX 3: Selected Variables on Religiosity[7]

[7] All the questions below are binary in original format. The graphs depict proportion of respondent who answer yes.

ANNEX 4: Selected Variables of Social Mobilization