All of the Above: Identity Paradoxes of Young People in Israel

The 3rd Youth Study of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Changes in National, Societal and Personal Attitudes

2010

Published by: Dr. Ralf Hexel and Dr. Roby Nathanson Editor: Hagar Tzameret - Kertcher

Researchers: Prof. Eppie Ya'ar, Dr. Mina Zemach, Dr. Taghreed Yahia-Younis, Dahlia Scheindlin, Yasmin Alkalai, Ziv Rubin Commentators: MK Isaac Herzog, Minister / MK Michael Eitan, Minister / MK Shlomo Molla David Hadari / Sha'anan Streett / Ibtisam Mara'ana / Prof. Bernard Avishai Prof. Natan Sznaider / Prof. Mathias Albert / Boris Zaidman

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Introduction

The 2010 Youth Study of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung constitutes the third survey conducted by the Foundation in collaboration with the Macro Center for Political Economics. Its purpose was to examine the attitudes and ideological perceptions of adolescents and young adults in Israel. The impetus for the first study was the occasion of Israel's fiftieth Independence Day in 1998. The second survey of the series took place in 2004, in the very midst of the Second Intifada, and the third and final one took place in 2010. Thus the results of the third survey, in this book that appears before you, enable us to examine changes and trends that took place over twelve years in the attitudes and ideological perceptions of Israeli youth. All three surveys polled members of the same age groups and asked questions that belonged to the same subject groupings: the situation and status of Israel in general, the personal expectations of the respondents regarding their futures and personal happiness, and their attitudes toward the following issues: Zionism, the State's democracy and institutions, minorities in Israel, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Germany and the Holocaust. For the first time, in-depth interviews were conducted with 80 youths in the 2010 Youth Study to complement the survey and provide a more profound understanding of its findings.

The main goals of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung activities involve strengthening of democracy and encouraging the active involvement of citizens in molding politics and society. To promote these goals, the Foundation is assisted by its representatives in Israel (since 1978). The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung uses a broad variety of methods and resources such as conventions and workshops, international dialogue programs, publications, training courses, research studies and surveys. In its activities, the Foundation places an emphasis on training adolescents and young adults and providing them with the

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knowledge, educational, and discussion skills they need in order to to take part in social and political processes while expressing their aspirations and attitudes. The results of the study in front of us document the reality of the lives of youth who face a world that lacks security and clarity. Their attitudes and values are influenced by life in the State of Israel: after 62 years of existence, Israel still feels threatened by its neighbors and is far from making peace with the Palestinians and Arabs in general. To this mix we add the financial and general global crisis of 2008–2009, as well as the challenges that accompany climate changes and globalization. All these serve to demonstrate just how limited is the scope of the nation-state and its institutions, with regards to spheres of action and influence. Thus we ask: What can youth rely on, in our day and age? What can possibly inspire them? Where will they find stability and security? Who can serve as role-models in the formative years of their lives? Their values, attitudes and identities are fashioned when they wrestle with these questions and others.

From the youths' points of view we can extrapolate how our society is likely to look in the not-too-distant future. These viewpoints serve as seismographs for societal changes and future developments. The third youth survey (2010) of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung shows that our youth have developed a dialectic response to the reality of a complex, contradiction-laden world. In general, they have created a basic pattern of "All of the above": this worldview does not resolve the contradictions in their perceptions of reality, but integrates them into their personal attitudes. Basically, while the youth are in favor of peace with the Palestinians, many reject compromises in the peace process and prefer the status quo. They view democracy as an important basic value, yet about half would prefer that Arab Israelis were not represented in the Knesset. The complex and emotionally charged circumstances of their country do not arouse their general fear or apathy. Instead, the youth display robustly positive, optimistic attitudes vis-á-vis everything connected to their hopes for the future and their personal welfare, future marital partner, family and profession.

Their attitude toward politics and politicians is patently negative. This trend was accompanied by a progressive *decrease* in trust in liberal-democratic

values and government institutions; simultaneously, Jewish-national outlooks progressively *increased*. According to religious youth, mainly *haredi* ones, the Jewish nature of the State and society are significantly more important than democracy. With regards to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the conventional wisdom among Jewish youth is that the Arabs do not acknowledge the existence of the State of Israel and if they had the opportunity, they would destroy it.

The attitudes of the young Arabs are very different than those of their Jewish contemporaries. They feel that acquiring a higher education is of greatest importance; they, like minority groups in other societies, view education as the springboard to social advancement and economic welfare. At the same time, the young Arabs feel that they are not sufficiently integrated into Israeli society. They exhibit worrisome levels of alienation, especially in the in-depth interviews that were conducted.

These attitudes of youth in Israel do not portend well for the chances of peace-making between Israel and its Arab neighbors. With regard to Israel's future as a democratic and pluralistic society, the attitudes described above represent a major challenge to those social and political agents who are committed to the values and goals of the founding fathers of the State of Israel.

Israeli youth of 2010 evinced more interest in the Holocaust than did their corresponding age-group in 1998. While 68% of youths in 1998 said they were personally interested in the Holocaust, that figure went up to 81% twelve years later, in 2010. Thus it seems that the Holocaust has become an important unifying force in Israeli society. It should be noted that this Holocaust interest is not directly connected to modern-day Germany. While the youth are aware of the role played by the Germans in the genocide, today's Germany is generally viewed as a different country, one that is friendly to Israel.

Yet, though the attitudes of Israeli youth vis-á-vis Germany have undergone a significant improvement since 1998, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has no intentions of attempting to sideline the Holocaust memory in its activities. As expressed by Germany's former president Johannes Rau, in his speech to the Knesset in 2000 – it is important that lessons from the past continue to serve as the firm basis of the mutual shaping of the future.

The study in front of us is composed of two parts. In the first part, well-known researchers and pollsters (including Professor Eppie Ya'ar) analyze the findings of the survey conducted by the Dahaf Institute under Dr. Minah Zemach. In the second part, the survey results are explicated and elucidated by salient representatives of politics, society and cultural life-including ministers Isaac Herzog and Michael Eitan, and MK Shlomo Molla. Other voices who contribute authentic information about the inner lives of young Israelis and also interpret the survey results include pop singer Sha'anan Streett, movie producer Ibtisam Mara'ana, and author Boris Zaidman. Sociology Professor Natan Sznaider analyzes the results from a broad perspective. The American journalist Professor Bernard Avishai and co-author of the German Youth Study Mathias Albert place the results of the survey in the international context.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank all those who were involved in preparing and conducting this survey. I convey special thanks to our publisher partner, Dr. Roby Nathanson, and the book's editor, Hagar Tzameret-Kertcher as well as the entire staff of the Macro Center for Political Economics for their outstanding cooperation. I would also like to thank Dr. Mina Zemach and Professor Eppie Ya'ar who contributed a great deal to this project from the wealth of their experience and expertise in the field of opinion polls, and Dr. Taghreed Yahia-Younis and Dahlia Scheindlin for their important contribution to the analysis of the survey results.

The survey data was not included in this volume. They may be viewed on the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Israel website (www.fes.org.il) and the Macro Center for Political Economics website (www.macro.org.il).

Finally, I would like to make it clear that the opinions presented in the various analyses and commentaries do not necessarily reflect the attitudes of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the Macro Center for Political Economics, but only the personal opinions of the writers and analysts themselves.

Dr. Ralf Hexel, Representative of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Israel Part One

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Analysis of Findings

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Chapter 1

Preface and Summary

Introduction

The large quantity and scope of research material found in the volume you hold in your hands does not allow us to present our work in a short, thorough summary that lists all the results and analyses. The results that appear here reflect complexities and contradictions; to a certain extent, these ambiguities express the reality of the lives of youth everywhere. Young people all over the world grapple with the need to define their own identities and find clear direction in life. They are forced to do this at an age in which both 'identity' and 'direction' are hard to come by, in a global post-modern world in which more and more once-accepted truths are being shattered. From the day they were born, the daily lives of young people in our generation are full of changes: changes in social orders, in national and gender identities, and in technology-as well as instability in the employment world. In contrast to us, the adults, the world around them does not offer them the vision of a clear life trajectory, predictable and foretold. What do they have to say about the dichotomous patterns and categories that we created in the "stable" world in which we grew up: Left or Right, Jewish state or democratic state? Privatization, or welfare support of the poor? The results of the present survey show that, in the hands of our youth, these categories fall apart; instead they create a unified picture composed of the fragments. The "either-or" gives way to "as well as" (as Natan Sznaider writes in his chapter), or what we also call "all of the above." The old categories still exist, but not dichotomously. We have been tracking these changes in our research since the earlier surveys of 1998 and 2004, and now, in this book, we address 2010 as well.

Background of the Study

This study was conducted in order to understand what young Israelis (aged 15–18 and 21–24) think. The research spheres were meticulously selected and in general, the study dealt with life in the public space: the relationships between youth and their community, their nation, their country-and between the various communities of Israeli youth. We asked questions dealing with the lives and personal habits of youth, but mainly questions regarding those domains that mold the public consciousness. For example, we examined habits of news and media consumption, as well as reading habits, of the younger generation in order to understand how political and social attitudes are formed. We examined subjects such as personal optimism and life-goals in order to place personal aspirations within a broader vision regarding Israeli society.

Quantitative research: The lion's share of the present study is based on comparing the results of identical surveys we conducted in 1998 and 2004. We dealt with the following subjects:

- Assessing the state of the country, hopes and feelings toward Israel, the sense of security.
- Assessing the general mood, goals and sense of personal safety
- Media and news-types of news that were consumed, quantity and sources
- The attitudes toward the meaning of 'Israel' and 'Judaism'
- Viewpoints toward democracy and the level of support for democratic values
- Attitudes toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
- Attitudes toward social and economic policy; the capitalist versus socialist approach vis-á-vis society
- Attitudes toward Germany and the Holocaust

In light of the research tools at our disposal, we determined our most important, basic question to be as follows: What has changed over the last twelve years? The earlier surveys we had conducted, allowed us to conduct a comparison over time.

The Dahaf Institute conducted the survey on a representative sample of

young Israeli youth in July 2010. The sample was especially large: 800 adolescents (aged 15–18) and 800 young adults (aged 21–24) were interviewed by telephone, as part of a quantitative study. Some of the members of the older group, many of whom were only available by mobile phone, were interviewed via an internet-based survey; the survey was first tested and verified for consistency. The 18- to 21-year-old age group is missing from the study throughout the three years because these youth are generally in the army, and it is impossible to interview soldiers in active service.

Each age group included 600 Jewish and 200 Arab respondents. The stratified sampling was based on strata reflecting the data that we received from the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) regarding the country's population groups. In light of the fact that the CBS does not provide full data regarding all the age groups in each sector, we constructed the sample according to the relative representation of all the sectors in the adult population-including their classification by geographic placement and religious affiliation. Also, new immigrants (*olim chadashim*) were differentiated from veteran Israelis.

The complete results of the survey are available for viewing on the site of the Macro Center for Political Economics: www.macro.org.il, and on the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung site: www.fes.org.il

What do they think about?

This study compared the present survey with the two earlier ones (in 1998 and 2004). Prof. Eppie Ya'ar and Yasmin Alkalai discerned a clear trend in the study: the overall mood of Israeli youth today, regarding personal optimism and other issues, is better than it was in 2004. Nevertheless, this is not a consistent improvement from the past, but a U-curve: the national state of mind declined significantly in 2004 compared to 1998. In other words, the atmosphere today is closer to the positive approach that characterized youth with 1998. Another consistent pattern is the gap between the answers of the younger adolescent 15- to 18 year-old respondents (who were more optimistic) and the stances of the young adults (aged 21–24). Many

additional gaps between these two age groups are reported in this book.

What do the youth think about? Dr. Mina Zemach, in her chapter devoted to a review of the in-depth interviews (Chapter 6, "Face To Face: Interviews with Adolescents and Young Adults in Israel"), states that the young interviewees, particularly the 15- to 18-year-olds (pre-army) are busy with many things that occupy their age-group all over the world. They like to get together with their friends, at home or in neighborhood coffee shops; the boys talk about girls and the girls talk about boys.

Young Jews and Arabs spend many hours on the internet, on Facebook and surfing various sites. Only a few of them read books. In fact, none of the interviewees reads books for enjoyment. The survey data, as analyzed by Dr. Mina Zemach, show that few read for their enjoyment in the week preceding the interview, and about half read in the preceding weeks. They hardly ever concern themselves with politics. According to the young interviewees, political issues simply do not arise in their conversations. Why? The youth say that they have already learned (from their parents and the general surroundings) that politics is a dirty business. They already understood that one cannot expect great accomplishments from people who serve in management levels, because these are perceived as people who consider their own interests first.

A prominent phenomenon, according to several results, is the youths' **acceptance** of the current situation. The young interviewees talked about accepting the negative status quo of the past regarding two major examples: political life in Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The young interviewees stated that in their opinion, politicians will always be corrupt. It should be noted that these strong views regarding politicians are identical to the views of the adult population (as we will see over and over in the various surveys). In other words: the youth view political corruption as a permanent state of affairs (a constant), while researchers note that this overall negative view of politicians in Israel is shared by adults as well.

One of the important findings, analyzed in several of the in-depth chapters in this book, testifies to the reality that the older respondents (aged 21–25) express far less trust (in statistically significant terms) in governmental institutions than the adolescents, according to the 2010 survey. Perhaps the

young adults have come to develop their negative attitudes toward the state and its politicians due to opportunities over time when they came in contact with official institutions or have read more, thus joining the adult reality of life in Israel.

A similar sense of acceptance is also revealed regarding the relationship between the Jewish and Arab sectors, and also toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the peace process. The interviewees viewed the tension between Jews and Arabs and between Israelis and Palestinians as a kind of permanent state of affairs (a constant), in the reality of their lives. This can be understood in light of the cyclical traumatic events of the last decade, the decade in which the youth of 2010 developed their political awareness. While the youth may have heard of "the Oslo years" from the adults in their lives, any shreds of optimism from this era had dissipated in their adolescent years. The political negotiations that had begun between the two sides, failed twice-under the governments of Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert. The first failure led to the intifada and the second was accompanied by two wars: in Lebanon and in Gaza. Israel's one-sided withdrawals (from Lebanon and from Gush Katif) did not halt the violence, and the attitudes of both sides hardened progressively. In other words, the growing shift of youth toward the political Right over the last decade evidently stemmed from a reality in which the situation remained static.

In summary, it seems that the current atmosphere does not lead toward social change. Youth are aware of the problems, but do not see themselves as the bearers of tidings of change.

Socio-democratic values: Social?

Society and community: What significance does society have in the lives of Israeli youth today? In their opinion, does an overall Israeli community exist which involves all its citizens? An examination of the data on various levels does not testify to the existence of many "collective" elements. The interviewees and respondents pointed to different realities for different sectors.

Yes despite the potential for the development of increasingly self-centered

perspectives among the youth and despite the commonly held belief that youth do not take an interest in politics, it is a fact that Israeli youth are avid consumers of the news (resembling the adult population in Israel). More than half of the Israeli adolescent respondents (aged 15–18) said that they listen to news and current-events programs at least once a day, and more than 80% of them claim to update themselves about current events at least several times a day. The numbers are even higher in the Arab sector; more than 80% of the young Arabs interviewees update themselves with the news every day, and 95% of them do this several times a week. Similar data was received from the young adult respondents. This implies that interest in societal issues is one characteristic shared by most of the respondents while at the same time, the different sectors of the population view their place in society from completely different angles. Below are some examples: Religious youth who were individually interviewed feel that the secular world is much less restrictive than theirs, and that secular youth do not have enough discipline or respect toward authority figures. Some of them argued that most Israelis view religious Jews as a monolithic entity connected directly to the radical settler movement, and thus religious Jews are not adequately represented in the country's social and political mainstream. In addition, the survey data shows that religious youth are more connected to their communities while the older respondents (the young adults in their twenties) volunteer in their communities a bit more than their secular, traditional, and haredi counterparts. However, the discrepancies are much smaller with regards to volunteerism in the younger teen years.

The *olim chadashim* (new immigrants from the FSU) that we interviewed are highly aware and sensitive to stereotypical attitudes exhibited toward them from the entire Israeli population. They still feel that cultural gaps exist; for example, they are disappointed in the level of local education in comparison to the educational background from whence they came.

It is superfluous to say that the Arabs experience reality very differently than the Jews. Their status as a national minority causes them to adopt different perspectives regarding the goals of the State of Israel and their vision for it. Chapter 5, "Social and Political Viewpoints and Attitudes of Arab-Palestinian Youth in Israel" by Dr. Taghreed Yahia-Younis, describes

how these perspectives are typical for minority groups that live within other national majority groups. The Arab youth long for equality and believe in coexistence and integration more than respondents from the Jewish sector. They are acutely aware of their limited opportunities, the lack of resources in education as well as in infrastructure. As a rule, they feel that they have to struggle to survive and realize their goals in life. As a result, the data shows that they are a bit less optimistic than their Jewish counterparts regarding their abilities to realize their goals in Israel – though about two-thirds of them do feel that this option exists for them (in contrast to 80% of the Jews). Nonetheless, the personal interviews revealed great negativity on their parts.

In light of the very different life experiences of the various sectors of Israeli youth, it is logical that different social-economic policies would reflect the needs of different respondents. Thus, for example, many youth from geographic areas in the country that are populated by low socio-economic sectors said (in interviews) that the state does not do enough to narrow social gaps. One interviewee from the center of the country said, "I really don't understand much about economics, but it's clear to me that there are always people who have less. That's not OK, but that's the way of the world." Another interviewee defended the state by saying, "When you take into account the fact that that Israel only exists around sixty years, we truly are an exceptional country."

Socio-economic policy: The interviewees' approaches ranged from the socialist-democratic demand that the state assist economically disadvantaged members, to the neo-liberal outlook that scorns those who exploit the country's economic security net. This response may be partially attributed to anger toward members of the *haredi* sector who do not join the workplace yet receive government stipends so that they can continue their Torah studies. Thus the youth disagree on the type of social-economic policy best suited for Israel, depending on their outlooks. In fact, Israel's economic basis has undergone great changes from the socialist roots at its founding, and has undergone several stages of privatization.

When the interviewees were asked about their attitude toward governmental intervention in the marketplace, about half agreed that the government does not need to be involved in economic processes. Dr. Mina

Zemach's data shows that a greater proportion of the Arab youth in Israel agree with this principle over their Jewish counterparts (more than four times as many "strongly agree"). The results were tied among the supporters of "there is not enough privatization," "the level of privatization today is correct," and "privatization today is too deep." Here, too, many more Arab respondents feel that there is not enough privatization.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that many respondents chose "Don't know" in answer to questions on these issues-between ten and twenty percent of adolescents and young adults said they have no answer to these questions. In other words, basic dilemmas regarding a preferable economic policy are not well-defined in youth's awareness in contrast to their opinions on other subjects; we find this phenomenon among adults as well. In Israel, economics are not at the focus of the public discourse, and alternatives to neo-liberal economic policies are not always presented and discussed.

On the other hand, the youths' answers to this question express an "all of the above" approach, an approach that we find throughout the entire survey. On the one hand, some youth prefer an economic neo-liberal approach; yet on the other hand, they also express commitment to the socialist principle that it is the state's duty to ensure that even its poorest citizens enjoy a basic, minimal standard of living. A significant proportion of respondents-about half-rejected the claim that people will take unfair advantage of governmental financial safety nets.

Sense of community? Joint problems: Does a sense of community exist among Israeli youth? No doubt, youth share common problems: all the young interviewees said that they had encountered negative phenomen such as violence, drugs, irresponsible behavior, egocentrism, and hostility from their peers. These shared problems seem to typify problems among all youth in the twenty-first century, and perhaps even earlier.

There is another, surprising shared element: a high level of optimism, even among the Arabs despite their higher level of alienation. The optimism rate in all population groups was high and reached about 80%. Yet the single question relating to optimism does not mitigate the general impressions of fear, hostility, and difficulties that appear in other sections of the research. Here, again, we see the "all of the above" approach: the youth are optimistic

and anticipate a good future for themselves while they also identify difficulties in society and in the opportunities available to them.

Social-democratic values

The discussion of the democratic nature of the State of Israel begins with questions about the relations between the various population sectors, and issues of group identity. The way people define the characteristics of the State affects the characteristics of the country's democracy. There is a direct correlation between whether people are willing to grant equal rights to other sectors of the population, and their perception of threat from those sectors. This fear affects the public's willingness to accept or reject certain democratic values. Therefore, the relations between the groups serve as an introduction to understanding the changes in the approaches in Israel toward democracy.

Chapter 3, "Political and Social Attitudes of Israeli Youth: Trends over Time" by Professor Eppie Ya'ar and Yasmin Alkalai, presents an interesting finding: Most of the youth today think that the Jew-Arab schism poses the greatest threat to the State of Israel. This was not always the case: in the past, most of the youth felt that the religious-secular divide was most dangerous to the State, and was the greatest chasm in Israeli life. In 1998, the large majority of the survey respondents stated that the religious-secular schism was the greatest threat (44%), and only 27% considered the Jew-Arab schism to be most severe. Naturally, this may be connected to the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin that had taken place only three years before the survey. The great impact of the assassination on the youth of that period is well known and documented. These numbers were literally reversed between 2004 and 2010. Today, 42% feel that the Jew-Arab schism is most dangerous compared to only 23% who feel that the religious-secular schism is the most significant internal threat to Israel.

In other words, perceptions of the relations between Jews and Arabs changed completely between 1998 and 2004. It is likely that this was caused by a combination of the influence of the intifada on the Jews, the influence of the October 2000 events on the Israeli Arabs, together with an increase in ultra-nationalistic rhetoric in politics of those years, which caused the feeling

that this schism was dangerous and threatening to both communities. Whether this was the reality, or only the **perception** of reality, there is a direct connection between these perceptions and the drop in the support for values-democratic values-that should ensure equal rights to the Arab population in Israel.

If so, what do the young respondents think about democracy itself when they are asked directly, or when their attitudes are examined via questions that relate to democratic values?

Eppie Ya'ar and Yasmin Alkalai uncover mixed trends over time, but indicate that in general, there is a drop in support for democratic values. When the respondents were asked to rank democracy as a subject of national preference out of a list of eight topics, it became evident that the percentage of the Jewish youths who support democracy declined with each survey: from 26% in 1998 to 17% in 2004 until a low of 14% in 2010. This was in contrast to the U-shaped curve that typified most of the topics, where survey results of 2004 reflected the effects of the intifada on the answers of the young respondents while the results of the 2010 survey returned to the 1998 level. Only about 19% of the Arabs ranked democracy as the most important value and this too reflects a drop in support from 1998, though an increase over the datum of 2004. In 1998, three-quarters or more of the Arab and Jewish respondents chose "very important" when asked to rank democracy among the characteristics of the identity of the state. A significant change took place in 2004 when only 67% of the Jewish youths chose "very important" as the answer to this question, while the corresponding percentage of Arabs who chose this option rose to 82%. A similar level of support exists today-70% of the Jews and 76% of the Arabs.

In the three surveys conducted between 1998 and 2010, about 60% or more of the Jews chose **"a strong leader"** over **"all these laws and discussions"** in a reverse U-shaped curve: about 60% were in favor of a "strong leader" in 1998; the number rose to 69% in 2004 and returned to 60% in 2010. This fact is attributed to what Ya'ar and Alkalai term the "intifada effect," which they say is typified by a rightward trend in 2004 that was partially reversed in 2010.

Another index-the willingness to rebel against government policy by

means of breaking the relevant law or policy-points to a slightly different trend, also negative. A growing number of Jewish youths support violent or non-violent civil resistance against government policy, mainly with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The respondents were asked what type of resistance they would choose if they felt that government policy regarding the conflict was harming the state. In this case no U-shaped curve emerged. Instead, a significant increase in supporters for civil resistance between 1998 and 2004-support that continued to climb, though more slowly in 2010, instead of returning to the former 1998 level. Today, about a quarter of the youths will support violent resistance. It is important to note that the effect of Rabin's assassination reduced the percentage of supporters of these forms of resistance in the first survey.

An even more important issue is the consistent, deep ruptures and schisms that emerge when democracy questions are posed to various sectors of Israeli society, not only to Jews and Arabs. For example:

- The percentages of religious youths who ranked democracy as the most important goal, are lower than corresponding percentages among the secular youths (6% and 21%, respectively).
- About 67% of the religious respondents say that equal political rights for all sectors are important or very important, in contrast to 80% of the secular youths and 90% of the Arab youths. Among Right-wing respondents, 73% say that equal political rights is important or very important, in contrast to 84% of the Left respondents.
- Three-quarters of the religious respondents prefer a strong ruler who will make decisions over educated laws and discussions. In contrast, only 53% of the secular youths preferred this option. In addition, say Eppie Ya'ar and Yasmin Alkalai, support for a strong leader among the religious youth has increased steadily over the last decade, in contrast to the U-shaped curve that emerges from the answers of other population groups.
- The number of Right-wingers who are in favor of violent civil resistance against government policy on issues connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is greater by a factor of three than the corresponding number in the Left-wing group (17.3% versus 6.4%).

The likelihood that adolescents (15- to 18-year-olds) will refuse to support this kind of violent civil resistance, is higher than the corresponding rate within the young adult group (aged 21-24). This noticeable trend has existed since 2004.

- Regression analysis in Eppie Ya'ar and Yasmin Alkalai's article reveals a direct correlation between the age of the respondents and the level of trust they have for government authorities – a phenomenon that did not appear in earlier surveys. The adolescents are more inclined to trust government institutions (including the IDF, police, the courts, political institutions such as the Knesset, and the political parties) while the young adults tend to trust them less.
- The focus of the dissension between religious and secular Israeli youth, and between the right- and left-wing respondents, falls squarely on the legal system. A bit more than half of the religious and right-wing respondents say that they have confidence in the courts, while about 70% of the secular, traditional and Arab respondents trust the Israeli legal system.

These findings remind us that another controversy exists besides the Jew-Arab divide in Israel-a discord with perhaps equal intensity. The variances in the perceptions of democracy were expressed in large gaps between adolescents and young adults, between Right and Left, and between religious and secular.

Israelis and Palestinians-Conflict and Peace

Despite the conventional wisdom according to which the Israeli population has turned more and more to the right regarding the peace process, mainly among the youth-the chapter by Eppie Ya'ar and Yasmin Alkalai shows that the U-curve pattern more closely characterizes the situation. That is, the attitudes of youth toward most of the issues connected to the conflict were very negative in 2004, but then rebounded in the survey of 2010 to more closely resemble the former, more positive levels of 1998.

The chapter by Minah Zemach shows that when asked to rank the

importance of six characteristics of the State of Israel, the Jews ranked "peace" as fifth on the scale while 61% of them selected "very important." The only characteristic that was less important to them was "equal political rights to all sectors," which was chosen by 39% of the Jewish youths, while 75% of the Arabs felt that equality was very important (on a level similar to that of the importance of democracy, economic equality and gender equality).

The chapters by Eppie Ya'ar, Yasmin Alkalai, and Dahlia Scheindlin (Chapter 4, "Youth in Israel-Where To? Analysis of Political Trends through Quantitative Research") observe a gap in support for peace between adolescents (before the age of army service) and the young adults (after army service), where the young adults attribute less importance to peace than the adolescents. In general, this gap exists regarding all the questions connected to the regional conflict. The writers think that army service might be a factor in the increasing disbelief in achieving peace, or if peace is even desirable.

The lack of faith in the ability to achieve peace is evident in the attitudes of both sectors. In 2004, about three-quarters of all the Arab youths supported the peace process; about 15% more than the Jewish youths. Today, the percentage of Arab youths supporting the process (53%) is lower than the corresponding percentage of Jews who believe in it (57%). However, three-quarters of the Jews don't believe that negotiations will be successful (in contrast to more than half of the Arab respondents, who think there is a chance for the process to succeed).

What is the source of disbelief in peace? The Jews feel that the Arabs have hardened their positions. And in fact, when asked (in 2010), almost half of the Arabs felt that the Arab community has not recognized the existence of the State of Israel and would destroy it if they had the chance. This percentage is significantly higher than in the 1998 survey. Regarding the Arab youth, a significant percentage of 40% also agree that the Arab nations would destroy Israel if they could.

There is an additional, obvious reason: The youth don't even remember a time when peace talks yielded positive results. The older young adult respondents (aged 21–24) were still small children when the Oslo Agreements caused a burst of optimism in 1993, while the adolescents only remember the intifada. From their point of view, the conflict is an ongoing

reality, a permanent fixture in their lives. The youth who were interviewed expressed powerlessness, but also willingness to accept the status of life in the shadow of an eternal conflict. They perceive it as an ancient conflict that cannot be solved, or in the new variant: There is no one *with whom* it can be solved (in the words of one young *oleh* from the FSU).

In-depth interviews with the young adult religious youth showed that they think the problem is not conflict or peace-in their view, those are of lower priority. They feel that Israel has a security problem and in light of this assessment the youth express many statements that are essentially very similar to those made by peace activists, with the exchange of the word "security" (or defense) for the word "peace": "The **security** issue spoils people's moods and stresses the simple citizen. It affects people's relations with each other, including their driving habits," said one of the interviewees. Another interviewee said that the sums of money invested in defense, perpetuate other problems. "If less money was invested in defense, then we could solve problems in education, infrastructure, sport... and close social gaps" (from Chapter 6, "Face to Face: Interviews with Adolescents and Young Adults in Israel").

The existential threat-then and now: Evidently the intifada cast a giant shadow over the formative years of Israeli youth, since more than 60% of the Jewish youth today feel that the state is under threat. According to Eppie Ya'ar and Yasmin Alkalai, this is higher than the corresponding percentage of Arab youth.

Yet these fears are not only rooted in the present. We are talking about a generation with an acute awareness of the Holocaust, as increasingly larger numbers of youths go on expeditions to Poland with the encouragement of the Education Ministry. The results are clear and dramatic: Twelve years ago, 61% of the youths said they take a personal interest in the Holocaust, while in 2010 the number grew to 81% of the respondents. This is a very important fact that affects almost the entire population of young Jews.

We can assume that this trend will be emphasized even more in the future because youth take an interest in the Holocaust significantly more than adults do. Natan Sznaider (in his chapter in this book) attributes this phenomenon to the increasing influence of the expeditions of youth to Europe. Thus, the

Holocaust is becoming one of the strong unifying factors in Israeli lives. Members of all the religious groupings evince equal levels of interest in the Holocaust; even the *haredim*, who usually express other priorities, have also shown increased levels of interest over the years: from 59% in 1998 to about 70% in 2010-only 10% less than the corresponding rates in the general population. It is also clear that throughout the survey years, Israeli youth have created an almost complete separation in their attitudes toward Nazi Germany (the Holocaust) and modern Germany. This does not imply that they ignore the **historic** context-the great majority is aware of the fact that the German nation also played a central role in the murder of the Jewish nation. But Minah Zemach's chapter states that a large, solid majority of Jewish youth view today's Germany as a friend of Israel. They view modern Germany as different than it used to be, a democratic state no different than other Western democracies. They feel that the forces that led to the Holocaust phenomenon could appear in any country in the world.

Thus, Israeli youth bear a double load – an historical existential threat and a contemporary threat – even though the historical worries about destruction are not pointed toward today's Germany. On the other hand, these worries become intermingled with fears that arise in Israeli hearts with every war, army campaign, or terror attack. Evidently this is one of the main reasons for deterioration of the attitudes toward the Arabs; according to Dahlia Scheindlin, the emotions range from fear to hatred.

These are some of the immediate but also deeper reasons that young Jewish Israelis don't exhibit forgiveness toward the Palestinians, or desire for social proximity with them, or for the peace process. The existential fears, rooted in war experiences in their formative years, in addition to the high awareness of tension between Jews and Arabs in Israel (see below), evidently contribute to a reality in which most Israeli youth prefer to preserve the status quo rather than supporting other solutions to the conflict that would require concessions on their part.

And how do we explain the drop in support for the peace process among Arabs? Eppie Ya'ar and Yasmin Alkalai theorize that the Arab youth oppose the peace negotiations so long as the Hamas does not participate, since the Peace Index shows that the Arabs feel that Hamas should be part of the

process. But perhaps there is another reason, and that is the topic of exchange of territories that has recently entered the public discourse. The idea of turning the Arab population in Israel into citizens of the Palestinian state has been voiced recently in many discussions – even though Arab citizens of Israel do not have a voice in the negotiations, and have not given their agreement to such an idea. Perhaps the worry over these kinds of developments is one of the reasons for the decline in support for the peace process among the Arabs, in comparison with their own attitudes only a few years ago, and in contradistinction to the attitudes of Jews today. Clearly, in order to fully understand the reasons for the present approaches to peace, there is the need for a more focused study of the Arab citizens of Israel, and an in-depth observation of this group population.

The Palestinians, the Arabs in Israel, and their relationships with the Jews

The survey findings and their analyses ultimately point to three aspects connected to the Arab sector:

- Events, developments and changes that took place in the Palestinian community in Israel
- Its relationship with the Jewish sector
- The approaches and experiences of the Israeli Palestinians regarding the conflict and the peace process.

Dr. Taghreed Yahia-Younis focuses on interesting trends in the Palestinian-Arab community that testify to their empowerment. For example, the issue of highest importance and priority to young Arabs who were polled in this survey was that of a higher education. This is mainly true for the young adult females, who ranked this issue much higher than their Jewish counterparts did. In parallel, they ranked the importance of "creating a family" much lower than the young Jews did. Dr. Taghreed Yahia-Younis explains that in most cases, minority groups tend to believe that higher education will pave the way to economic and social success in society in general. This is even truer with regard to Arabs in Israel, whose lives are

currently undergoing change from agricultural communities in villages in the past, to industrial urban communities in the present.

It seems that gaps in priorities between them and the Jewish respondents, together with gender gaps (as young women are more interested in higher education than in creating a family), are likely to cause changes in the inner dynamics of the sector as the younger generation matures. If the Arab community in Israel will be more educated, more involved in industry, and white-collar employment, if the women will occupy a growing sector of the labor force and become more independent – then social processes will change in the Arab sector, and in Israel in general.

Nevertheless, it is clear from the material above that the relations between the Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel have reached a painfully low nadir. Dr. Taghreed Yahia-Younis says that radical trends among the Arabs are gaining strength, as evidenced by the fact that a high percentage of the Arab sector agree that the Arab nation has never acknowledged the existence of the State of Israel and will try to destroy it if possible.

In addition, the Arabs are pressured by an abundance of legislative initiatives which they perceive as insulting at best, or devastating at worst. In light of the attitudes of the Jewish community, this reaction is justified. For example, Dr. Minah Zemach refers to the fact that about half of the Jewish youth (who reflect the majority opinion), feel that Arabs should not be allowed to be elected to the Knesset.

At the same time, the Arab youth are more interested in integration and coexistence than their Jewish counterparts. This phenomenon, says Dr. Zemach, is consistent with the behavior of national minorities all over the world. It is interesting to note that the tendencies among the two sectors are reversed with regards to the age of the respondents: The older the Arab respondents, the more they are open to peaceful coexistence (more than the younger Arabs). The situation among the Jewish respondents is, as we know, exactly reversed.

Yet the in-depth interviews, in contrast, reveal a painful, deep perception of estrangement. It is clear that the young Arabs feel that many doors are closed to them and that they lack opportunities for advancement. The youth describe discrimination that waits for them at every turn. A survey conducted

by the Brookings Institute in November 2010 shows that the Arabs in Israel feel that even if a peace agreement is signed with the Palestinians, the rights of Arab citizens of Israel would not change for the better and might even worsen. Taghreed Yahia-Younis thinks that part of the cause of the estrangement is that Arab Israeli citizens do not take part in the integration and social-solidarity processes intrinsic to service in the army or national service. But it is possible that they simply do not believe that these institutions would enable them to fully integrate in the system, provide opportunities, or give them rights.

Attitudes toward Germany and the Holocaust

The survey examined the various approaches and attitudes toward Germany via questions that already appeared in previous surveys. Thus, we received a picture of a positive trend in the attitudes of youth vis-á-vis the traumatic history of the Jews in the twentieth century. This positive perception among Jewish youth was reflected by their answers to all the Germany-related questions: the perception that Germany is a friend of Israel, that it is a civilized and democratic state like most of the Western world, and that the intensity of hatred of foreigners (xenophobia) in Germany is no greater than the hatred that exists in every other country in the world – these positive opinions have gained strength in the last 12 years among Israeli youth. Similarly, over the years, less and less young Jews believe that Germany is likely to return to its Nazi past.

It is interesting to note the one datum that has not changed significantly over the twelve-year survey range: Most of the respondents (almost three quarters) still agree that most of the German nation, not only the leaders, supported the annihilation of the Jews. However, positive references to modern Germany in the other questions show that the respondents view this as an historical fact that is relegated to the past, and not the source for ongoing anger.

It is also important to note the demographic gaps cited by Eppie Ya'ar and Yasmin Alkalai. In general, the more religious the respondents, the more mistrustful they are of Germany. For example, when asked regarding the

chances of a Nazi regime rising to power in today's Germany, the number of those agreeing with this opinion has been gradually declining since 1998. By 2010 only 17% of the secular group agreed with the statement, but more than 60% of the *haredim* and 48% of the religious felt that this was still a realistic possibility. Youth from higher income areas view Germany in a more positive light than youth from the lower-income groups. In general, the Left is more positive regarding Germany than the Right. This is clearly evident regarding the question about Germany being one of Israel's friendliest countries. (76% of the Left said yes, but only 57% of the Right answered in the positive).

It is likely that these gaps stem from the fact that the higher income groups are still mainly composed of Jews from Ashkenazi backgrounds, in other words – European. Thus, secular youth from higher income families would feel more of an affinity for Germany as a country because they identify with the European culture and traditions.

Other Issues

The following chapters provide a wealth of information on a wide variety of survey-related subjects, and there is not enough space in this Preface to give an overview of them all. Suffice is to say that these topics include the new habits and variables of mass media consumption; detailed behavioral patterns connected to coexistence; numerous details about overall optimism levels; the respondents' pride in the state and in their Jewish and Israeli identities; attitudes toward draft evasion, and more. The sum total of these data provides a complex and varied picture.

Summary

To summarize the data presented here, we can say that Israeli youth appear to be optimistic and confident on a personal level. Despite the well-known problems of the modern age – high prices and stiff competition – the present is good, and even better than good. In light of a changing world and the archaic categories that divide their world, they choose "All of the above."

They want it all – a Jewish state and also a democratic one, a country with economic equality among its citizens as well as one with a high standard of living. Despite the inherent limiting factor of a survey that provides a limited attitudinal range of motion – youth in Israel exhibit contradictory attitudes. But though it may seem contradictory to us adults, the picture they create of their world is a collage composed of fragments of the outdated categories, a picture that is more appropriate to a chaotic existence. It is a world in which definitions change almost daily, as do the possibilities open to them – as well as the dangers.

The solution of Israeli youth (and youth around the world) in coping with uncertainty in a world lacking stability and consistency is to return to the family support network. Almost 65% of Jewish youth (adolescents and young adults) stated that the most important goal in life is to create a happy family. Only 10% chose economic success as the primary objective that drives them.

In the political domain, it appears that the adolescents and young adults accept the status-quo. The adolescents choose an extension of the current situation without a solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, showing us that they are more robust than we are in situations of ambiguity. By choosing the status-quo, they choose risk and uncertainty as a way of life. In this sense, Israeli youth are the real adults, the ones who don't believe in quick magical solutions. If we espouse the typical dichotomous world outlook, if we believe that we must always choose – between Left and Right, between democracy and totalitarianism, between privatization and providing a safety net for the poor – then yes, we will view the findings as evidence of radicalization of our youth. But if we understand that these dichotomous categories are not relevant to our youth, then we will learn to interpret the study results altogether differently.

Chapter 2

Attitude Survey Results: Social-Political Identities of Israeli Youth

Dr. Mina Zemach

This chapter describes the results of a survey conducted among Israeli youth aged 15–18 and 21–24, and examined issues connected to their political identity, their attitudes regarding the state, and ideological issues on the national as well as personal levels. The survey is the third in a series of follow-up surveys on the attitudes of youth in Israel. This chapter will present the results of the most recent survey that was conducted in 2010, including statistical analyses.

The following topics are addressed in the survey: personal identity and feelings of belonging; perspectives and attitudes regarding: society and state, Arab-Israeli coexistence, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (political stances), social and economic issues, religion and state, Germany, and the mass media. For each of the topics, an attitudes-index was calculated based on questions yielded by factor analysis to be connected to the same universe content.

The research population and sampling method

The research goal was to examine the identity of adolescents and young adults. The range of ages to be included in the study was determined in 1998 when the project began, and these age groups were preserved in subsequent surveys in order to facilitate comparison. It was decided that three age groups – 18, 19 and 20 – would not be included, since most Israeli youth of these ages serve in the army after high school. Therefore, we defined the two research populations according to the following age-groups:

Adolescents (teenagers) aged 15 to 18 – Jews and Arabs who are residents of the State of Israel; and young adults aged 21 to 24, also Jews and Arabs who are residents of the State of Israel.

Representative samples of each of these two populations were formed, with about 800 incidents per sample. The size of the adolescent sample was 802: 597 Jews and 205 Arabs. The size of the young adult sample was 816: 609 Jews and 207 Arabs.

The stratified sample method was used, according to the following four criteria for determining each stratum:

- Population Sector *olim* (immigrants to Israel) from the 1990s and on from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and their children; *haredim* (ultra-Orthodox), settlers, kibbutzniks, the 'rest of the Jews,' and Arabs.
- **2. Place of residence** geographic area and type of settlement according to the break-down of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics;
- 3. Gender; and

4. Availability of respondents by **landline telephone or only a mobile phone**.

After we defined the criteria, we had difficulty in constructing a stratified sample in the present survey because it is limited to specific age groups. While it is possible to access data about the size of each stratum (that are defined by the criteria above in relation to the entire population), we did not have information about the weight of each stratum in the specific age-group populations with which the study deals: adolescents (15-18) and young adults (21-24). We overcame the problem by filtering a sample of adolescents and young adults out of a much larger representative sample (greater than the ratio between the age-group under discussion to the adult population) of the adult population. In other words, a stratified sample was created of the adult population in which every stratum was represented in the sample in the appropriate ratio to its weight within the general population. Then, all individuals in the sample were asked whether they shared their home with adolescents or young adults of the ages in the population study, and the appropriate samples were created based on the information received for each of the research groups.

It should be noted that only one person from each family was interviewed, even if more than one youth of the appropriate age lived in that household. Thus, if for correct sampling purposes more than one person per family should have been interviewed, he/she was exchanged for another interviewee from the same stratum.

The weight of the group whose members only had access to mobile phones was tested via a special internet survey.

The research questionnaire

As explained above, the present survey is part of a series of follow-up surveys that were conducted in 1998 and 2004. The surveys were carried out in both years in the two age groups and the respondents were asked a large cluster of identical questions. The core questions were repeated in this survey as well. The cluster of questions for each year was adapted to the events of the relevant time period. Thus, questions relating to the internet and social networks appeared in the 2010 survey though not in 1998, the pre-internet era. In fact, the influence of the internet and personal computer on components of national identity arose in 2010 when the research staff had their very first brainstorming session. On the other hand, it was important to us to avoid preconceptions regarding the inner worlds of Israeli youth, thus we conducted interviews with scores of youths in search of additional themes connected to the research topics, themes we had not uncovered ourselves. (The issues we gleaned from the interviews appear in Chapter 6, "Face to Face: Interviews with Adolescents and Young Adults in Israel.")

Adolescents and young adults of the relevant age groups were interviewed, sub-divided into the sectors below:

- Veteran secular Israelis of the middle and upper classes, residents of central Israel
- Veteran traditional Israelis of the middle and lower classes, residents of Israel's periphery
- Children of the FSU *olim* who arrived in the 1990s or later
- Religious Jews
- Arabs

Data Collection

Data was collected from most of the respondents by way of telephone interviews. Youth in the Jewish sector aged 21 to 24, who only had access to a mobile phone, were interviewed over the internet. We carried out a pre-test to ensure that internet questionnaires would yield the same results as telephone interviews, and found that the distribution of the answers on both mediums was indeed the same.

The Arabs were interviewed in Arabic; the questionnaire was translated into Arabic and the translation was validated by back-translation of two translators.

The interviews were conducted in July, 2010.

Methodology

Classification of variables into sections

After receiving the answers, we sorted the survey questions into sections and sub-chapters dealing with different subjects, according to two criteria: The first, a-priori-internal validity; this means that the set of questions do refer to the subject under consideration, and relate to the same universe content. Secondly, the questions were sorted by empirical criteria. Factor analysis was performed in order to group together those questions with a common factor, or similar empirical distribution of answers. It is important to note that there was no inconsistency between the divisions according to the two criteria cited here. However, there were instances in which the internal validity criteria initially determined that a certain item be grouped with a different section than the one determined by factor analysis (though internal validity also confirmed that the item was correlated to same **subject** as indicated by factor analysis). In these kinds of cases, we followed the empirical criteria.

Creating indexes

Results of factor analysis were the basis for creating indexes. An index was created from items that, according to factor analysis, belonged to the same universe content; **and** whose alpha Cronbach (internal reliability test) showed a reliability coefficient of ≤ 0.60 . (It is accepted that this value justifies the

creation of an index based on factor analysis). The testing of internal reliability of an index that is the result of two questions, was performed on the basis of the Guttman scale. Questions were attached to the index where the percentage of consistency (or percentage of fit) was from ≤ 0.70 .

Data analysis was performed on the entire group of youths in each national group and also on sub-groups, according to the following characteristics: age group, gender, and among the Jews-level of religiosity (affinity for the Jewish religion) and political identity. These two types of analyses were not performed in the Arab sector for several reasons: one, because the relatively small number of incidents (i.e. Arab respondents) did not allow for the relevant analyses; and two, (regarding political identity) because a large percentage of Arab youths did not answer the political identity question at all.

Correlation with socio-demographic characteristics

We tested the correlation between the socio-demographic characteristics and each of the indexes or each of the questions that were not added to the index. The following socio-demographic characteristics were tested: nationality, age group, gender, religiosity (divided into: *haredi*, national religious, traditional and secular) and political identity (aggregated division into: Right, Center, Left). In order to test the correlation between the socio-demographic characteristics and answers to the questions or the indexes, we used the analysis of variance (ANOVA) test and the t-test. We used the CHI square test to establish the statistical significance of correlations with discrete items.

Notes on data legends

In this chapter, tables display answer distributions for each of the research questions. These tables display data for the entire sample of Jews and Arabs, and also sub-divide the data according to nationality, age, and level of religiosity (for the Jewish sector alone). In order not to burden the reader, some of the answers from the answer scale have been narrowed down or aggregated (for example, "Strongly agree" and "Tend to agree" are merged). For example: when the empirical distribution showed that the correct cut-off point is between "strongly agree" and "somewhat agree." However, in

empirical terms there is no cut-off point between "strongly disagree" and "somewhat disagree" - the two last categories were aggregated, whereas the first two were presented separately.

The aggregation of responses may mislead the reader into thinking that some of the response scales were not balanced. Therefore, it is important to emphasize that the answer scales of the questions were, indeed, balanced: that is, the number of answers in both directions-positive and negative-were identical. In each of the sections of the report, the findings are divided into sub-chapters, and in each sub-chapter the tables are displayed with the questions relevant to that section. The insights gained from the answers are displayed in an integrated fashion in the summary-chapter for each subject. The summary of each section also includes a verbal summary of the correlation between the attitudes examined and the socio-demographic characteristics in it. Only statistically significant correlations are displayed. In other words, if a certain correlation does not appear, that means that the relationship was not statistically significant. The summary of the correlations is sometimes presented according to the type of the correlation (e.g., ascending positive correlation, a U-shaped correlation, etc.) and sometimes only by the strata in which the responses differed significantly from the responses in the other strata. In this context, it should be noted that when a specific figure in a given stratum is higher or lower than the corresponding data in other strata, this does not necessarily mean that the figure in that stratum is low or high in absolute terms.

The report does not indicate the exact significance level of the various correlations or differences. Hence, if it is indicated that the correlations or differences are significant, that means that the significance level is less than. 05.

Some of the research questions were determined on the basis of the in-depth interview study.

Note that the entire file of survey results can be downloaded from the Macro Center for Political Economics website (URL: www.macro.org.il) and from the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung in Israel site (URL: www.fes.org.il).

Findings

The questions were clustered into nine topics or subjects as a result of the statistical analysis of the answer distribution (described above). The number of questions on each topic was changed, and was determined according to factor analysis which showed consistency among the characteristics of the youth who responded. Thus, the answers under each subject express several aspects of the same core issue. The analysis revealed that the survey covered the following core issues: personal identity and feelings of belonging; perspectives and attitudes regarding society and state, Arab-Israeli coexistence, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (political stances), social and economic issues, religion and state, Germany, and exposure to the mass media.

Each of the nine core issues-with the items belonging to each issue and the associated answer distributions-appear below in tables according to the various population groups.

1. Personal identity and sense of belonging

Factor analysis found the following items to be classified together: personal goals, perceptions regarding the future, perceptions of Israeli-ness and of belonging to the Jewish nation.

Personal goals

The following question was posted to the interviewees: "I will read out a list of different goals that people typically aspire to achieve in their lifetimes. Please tell me the ones that are most important to you." The goals were presented in changing orders.

Table No. 1: Percentages attributed to each of the most important goals
A. According to sector and age group

Goals	Entire sam	ple	Jewish sect	or	Arab sector	
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
To succeed economically	9	11	9	11	12	12
To create a happy family	54	64	63	67	28	54

Goals	Entire sam	ple	Jewish sect	or	Arab sector	
Goals	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
To contribute to the state or society	9	6	11	6	2	4
To acquire a higher education	19	11	9	8	48	21
To have good friends	8	7	7	6	10	8
Did not answer	1	1	1	2		1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

B. Jews: According to age group and level of religiosity

Goals	Ages: 15-	18	0		Ages: 21-	24		
Goals	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular
To succeed economically	2	7	11	9	4	3	15	15
To create a happy family	82	68	59	61	87	82	61	57
To contribute to the state or society	2	16	14	9	2	10	5	6
To acquire a higher education	14	3	8	12	4	4	9	12
To have good friends		5	7	8		1	8	9
Did not answer		1	1	1	3		2	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Perceptions of the respondents regarding their personal futures: pessimism vs. optimism.

The respondents were asked about their levels of optimism or pessimism regarding their personal futures. First they (the interviewees) ranked the life-goals that were important to them, and then they were asked, "What are the chances for people like you to fulfill their aspirations in Israel?"

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A. According to sec	tor and a	ge group				
	Entire	sample	Jewish	sector	Arab	sector
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
	a	. Pessimism o	r Optimism			
Pessimistic/Fairly pessimistic/Not optimistic and not pessimistic	8	10	8	9	7	14
Fairly optimistic	48	41	52	44	34	31
Very optimistic	43	48	39	46	57	55
Don't know	1	1	1	1	2	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	b. Like	elihood of fulf	illing aspirati	ons		
Very low/fairly low	18	21	12	17	35	31
Fairly high	56	50	62	52	40	43
Very high	24	27	25	27	24	26
Don't know	2	2	1	4	1	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	c	. Sense of pers	sonal safety			
Feels strongly threatened	4	5	4	5	3	5
Feels moderately threatened	15	18	18	21	6	7
Feels slightly threatened	34	33	41	40	12	15
Does not feel threatened at all	47	43	37	33	78	72
Don't know		1		1	1	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table No. 2: Perceptions regarding the personal future A. According to sector and age group

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Another question regarding the respondent's perception of the future, which statistical analysis found to be connected to previous questions, was the issue of perception of threat. The question is, "Do you feel that your personal safety, and that of your family, is threatened?" Statistical analysis pointed to a common factor underlying all three questions (regarding optimism-pessimism

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and personal safety). It is likely that this factor is connected to the individual's emplacement on the optimism-pessimism continuum. Nevertheless, internal reliability testing of the responses to the various questions shows that a joint index may be created only for the first two questions.

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B. Jews: Acc			: 15-18		Ages: 21-24			
	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular
	Harcu	Ken gious				Religious	Trautional	beculai
			a. Pessimism	or Opun	lism	1	[
Pessimistic/Fairly pessimistic/Not optimistic and not pessimistic	4	6	8	9	9	12	8	8
Fairly optimistic	54	51	48	57	31	36	47	51
Very optimistic	40	41	44	33	57	51	45	41
Don't know	2	2		1	3	1		
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		b. L	ikelihood of fu	ulfilling as	pirations	•		
Very low/fairly low	2	4	15	16	6	9	24	23
Fairly high	63	75	54	62	43	53	50	57
Very high	30	20	30	21	42	38	23	18
Don't know	5	1	1	1	9		3	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
			c. Sense of p	ersonal sa	fety			
Feels strongly threatened		4	5	4	3	5	5	5
Feels moderately threatened	26	20	17	16	19	20	26	21
Feels slightly threatened	19	37	39	49	25	42	42	43
Does not feel threatened at all	54	39	39	31	49	33	26	31
Don't know	1				4		1	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

B. Jews: According to age group and level of religiosity

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Involvement in Israeli society

The three questions that examine the respondent's sense of Israeli-ness and contribution to the Israeli society were the following:

"Do you feel yourself part of the Israeli society or not?"

"Have you served in the army or do you plan to do army service?"

"Are you involved in a civilian volunteer organization that operates on behalf of society such as an organization that assists olim (immigrants), women, disabled people, disadvantaged elements of society, foreign workers or refugees, environmental protection or the like?"

Factor analysis and alpha Cronbach internal reliability tests show that the three behavioral and perceptual patterns above (army service, sense of societal belonging and activity in volunteer organizations) belong to the same universe content that can be labeled 'involvement in the Israeli society.' However, these three cannot be joined together in one index.

It should be noted that although the survey also examined the respondents' level of social activity on the internet, this type of activity was not found to 'belong' to the same universe content of societal involvement because the internet component is much stronger than the societal activities. There are youth who are involved in society but do not surf the web and vice versa-some are only involved in social action restricted to the internet.

	Entire	Entire sample		sector	Arab sector				
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24			
a. Perception of feeling part of Israeli society									
To a great extent	41	45	49	54	18	19			
To a certain extent	40	32	40	31	42	35			
To a small extent/ Not at all	18	22	11	15	39	45			
Did not answer	1	1			1	1			
Total	100%	100%	100% 100% 100% 1						

Table No. 3: Indicators of involvement in Israeli societyA. According to sector and age group

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	Entire	sample	Jewish	sector	Arab	sector
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
		b. Army	y service			
Served or serves in the army	1	36	2	46	1	9
Plan to serve in the army, including a Garin Nachal group	63	2	82	2	10	4
I served/or serve in Sherut Leumi (National Service)	2	19	3	25	2	
Exempt from army service for health reasons	1	2	1	2		1
Exempt for religious reasons	7	11	8	14	4	2
Exempt as a conscientious objector	1	1		1	3	
Do not intend on serving in the army	22	23	3	3	79	81
Refuse to answer	1	2		2	1	3
Serving now	2	4	1	5		
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	c. Activ	vity in a volu	inteer organ	ization		
Currently active	23	20	24	18	21	24
Was active in the past	13	19	14	21	9	12
Was not active in the past or the present	64	61	62	61	70	64
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

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B. Jews: According to age group and level of religiosity

		Ages	s: 15-18		Ages: 21-24				
	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	
	a. Sense of feeling part of Israeli society								
To a great extent	21	45	56	50	28	66	56	58	
To a certain extent	54	47	34	39	43	26	33	26	

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		Ages	s: 15-18		Ages: 21-24				
	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	
To a small extent/ Not at all	20	7	10	11	26	8	11	15	
Did not answer	5	1			3			1	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
			b. A	rmy servi	ce				
Served or serves in the army		1		2	6	26	49	62	
Plan to serve in the army, including a Garin Nachal group	9	67	92	93	6	2			
I served/or serve in Sherut Leumi (National Service)		10	2		9	42	29	23	
Exempt from army service for health reasons	2	2		1		1	1	4	
Exempt for religious reasons	56	16	3		60	12	4	1	
Exempt as a conscientious objector	3						2	1	
Do not intend on serving in the army	30	2		1	12	1	3	1	
Refuse to answer		1	2	2	7	2		2	

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		Ages	:: 15-18		Ages: 21-24			
	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular
Serving now		1	1	1		11	7	4
In career army service (Keva)						3	5	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		c	. Activity in a	volunteer	organizat	ion		
Currently active	16	24	29	22	31	19	14	15
Was active in the past	16	11	14	14	12	32	21	19
Was not active in the past or the present	68	65	57	64	56	49	65	66
Refuse to answer					1			
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Sense of belonging to a nationality: Jews – to the Jewish nation, Arabs – to the Arab nation

Jews – The sense of belonging to a national entity was examined from three aspects.

One, **sense of belonging to the Jewish nation**. This was tested via three similar questions relating to the youths' perception of their connection to the Jewish people around the world. The questions are:

- "On a personal level, to what extent does your Jewish identity affect your feeling of being part of the Jewish nation (or Jewish people) around the world?"

- "To what extent do you feel closeness toward Jews who live in other countries besides Israel?"

- "To what extent do you agree or disagree with this sentence: 'I consider all the Jews around the world to be family?"

The second aspect testifying to the feeling of belonging to a nationality is the

perception of the need to encourage associations between Jews in Israel and Jews living abroad. The questions asked of the respondents in this context are:

- "Are you for or against using public funds of the State of Israel for bringing Jewish youth living abroad to visit in Israel, and to encourage Jewish youth living abroad to make aliya (immigrate to Israel)?"

Arabs – In the Arab sector, the survey only examined the sense of belonging to the entire Arab nation:

- "On a personal level, to what extent does your identity as an Arab affect your perception of being part of the Arab nation around the world?"

It was found (via factor analysis) that all the items examining the sense of belonging to the Jewish nation were part of the same universe content and thus they were combined in one joint index. It should be noted that we hypothesized a-priori that the level of interest in the Holocaust would also be connected to the sense of belonging to the Jewish nation. However, factor analysis revealed that Holocaust awareness actually belongs to another universe content: the belief that Jews can only live a full Jewish life in Israel. Table 4 below displays the responses of the interviewees.

	Entire	sample	Jewish	sector	Arab sector					
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24				
	a. Belong	ing to the Je	wish nation							
1) Sense of be	ing part of t	he entire nat	ion						
To a very great extent	48	51	54	57	27	34				
To a great extent	26	21	26	22	24	18				
To a certain extent	16	12	12	10	28	20				
To a small extent/ Not at all	8	14	6	8	21	27				
Don't know	2	2	2	3		1				
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%				
2) Closeness (affinity) to Jews in other countries										
To a very great extent	21	27	23	28	17	24				
To a great extent	28	24	29	27	25	14				

Table No. 4: Sense of national belonging

A. According to sector and age group

	Entire	sample	Jewish	sector	Arab sector	
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
To a certain extent	27	24	28	24	25	22
To a small extent/Not at all	24	24	20	20	33	40
Don't know		1		1		
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
3) Attitude	s regarding vie	wing all mer	nbers of the	nation as far	nily	•
Strongly agree	38	38	34	36	49	44
Tend to agree	39	37	43	42	27	21
Tend to disagree/Disagree	21	23	21	20	22	34
Don't know	2	2	2	2	2	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
4) Attitudes reg	arding investin	g in connect	ions with Jev	ws in other c	ountries	•
Strongly in favor			41	47		
Tend to be in favor			45	39		
Against/Strongly against			11	11		
Don't know			3	3		
Total			100%	100%		
b. Desire t	hat Jewish yout	h from all o	ver the world	l come to Isr	ael	
1) Attit	udes regarding	investing in	bringing the	m for a visit		1
Strongly in favor			38	39		
Tend to be in favor			41	42		
Against/Strongly against			18	15		
Don't know			3	4		
Total			100%	100%		
2) Attitud	es regarding en	couraging a	liya (immigr	ation to Isra	el)	
Strongly in favor			54	54		
In favor			33	33		
Against/Strongly against			10	9		
Don't know			3	4		
Total			100%	100%		

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		Ages	: 15-18			Ages	: 21-24	
	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular
		a.	Belonging to t	he Jewish	nation			
	1	1) Sens	e of being par	rt of the e	ntire natio	on		1
To a very great extent	67	63	65	41	74	75	58	43
To a great extent	23	24	21	32	19	21	21	24
To a certain extent	7	7	10	17	5	3	11	14
To a very small extent/ Not at all		3	3	8	2	1	5	18
Don't know	3	3	1	2			5	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	•	2) Closene	ess (affinity) to) Jews in (other cou	ntries		•
To a very great extent	54	31	20	17	60	37	27	12
To a great extent	28	34	33	24	22	39	26	24
To a certain extent	7	23	30	33	14	20	26	30
To a small extent/ Not at all	11	12	17	26	3	4	19	34
Don't know					1		2	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	3) Attit	udes regard	ing viewing al	l member	s of the n	ation as fam	ily	•
Strongly agree	58	55	35	21	64	51	34	20
Tend to agree	40	32	44	48	30	39	48	45
Tend to disagree/Disagree		10	20	30	4	8	14	34
Don't know	2	3	1	1	2	2	4	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
4)	Attitudes	regarding i	nvesting in co	nnections	with Jew	s in other co	untries	
Strongly in favor	49	41	47	37	51	56	49	39
Tend to be in favor	37	45	43	48	36	39	32	43

B. Jews: According to age group and level of religiosity

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		Ages	: 15-18		Ages: 21-24				
	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	
Against/Strongly against	10	10	8	13	10	4	14	14	
Don't know	4	4	2	2	3	1	5	4	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
	b. Desi	re that Jewi	sh youth from	all over t	he world	come to Isra	nel		
	1) A	ttitudes reg	arding investi	ng in brin	ging ther	n for a visit			
Strongly in favor	35	41	43	34	31	48	40	38	
Tend to be in favor	47	41	40	41	42	42	38	44	
Against	16	13	15	22	21	10	18	13	
Don't know	2	5	2	3	6		4	5	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
	2) Atti	itudes regar	ding encourag	ging aliya	(immigra	tion to Israe	l)		
Strongly in favor	56	62	62	44	47	76	58	46	
Tend to be in favor	35	26	27	42	36	21	28	39	
Against	5	8	10	12	11	3	9	11	
Don't know	4	4	1	2	6		5	4	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

Summary

1) Goals of the youth

The most important and salient goal among Jewish youth was to create a happy family. About two-thirds of both age groups indicated this goal. The answers of the rest of the respondents are split evenly between the other goals of the survey without noticeable concentrations in any one area.

The happy-family goal was also prevalent among the young adult Arab sector; it was cited by a little more than half of them. However, they registered a significant concentration in another goal-acquiring a higher education. Thus the most prominent goal among both Arab adolescents and young adults, is acquiring an education. About half (48%) stated that this was the most important objective in their lives, in contrast to about a quarter

(28%) who chose the happy family response. A possible explanation for this preference is that Arab youth, like other minority groups in the world, view higher education as a unique vehicle that facilitates social mobility and advancement. Thus this goal becomes so important that it squeezes the happy family option to second place. Or perhaps the youth view marriage and family as a far-off option, while acquiring an education is the more pressing need in their present lives.

2) Level of optimism

- a) The vast majority of Israeli youth, Jews and Arabs, are optimistic regarding their chances at fulfilling their goals. A correlation was found between the important goals of the respondents and the perception of their ability to achieve them. In the Jewish sector, two goals perceived as having relatively high chances of achievement were: creating a family and contributing to the state or society; there were no differences in the chances of actualizing the other goals. In the Arab sector, the highest likelihood was in acquiring friends and the lowest-economic success and contribution to society.
- b) Only a minority (between a fifth and a quarter) of the Jewish sector and a tenth of the Arab sector feel that their personal security is threatened. No correlation was found between perception of personal safety threat and perception of threat on the entire country.

3) Perceptions of belonging

While a large majority of the Jewish youths feel some connection to Israeli society and the Jewish people, their sense of belonging (both to society and to the nation) is not absolute. Only about a half feels this way 'to a great extent.'

The sense of belonging among Arab youth is much lower. About a half feel a connection on some kind of level to Israeli society and to their own nation. However, only about a fifth feel a great extent of belonging to Israeli society and a third feels a great extent of belonging to the Arab nation.

In both sectors, a correlation was found between the respondents' perceptions of ability to achieve their goals, with their sense of societal belonging. The higher the confidence in goal actualization, the greater the

sense of belonging. However, the correlation does not necessarily imply causality; the significant correlation between the two variables may be mediated by another, as yet unknown variable. Between a fifth and a quarter of the Jews and Arabs reported during the interview that they are presently active in a volunteer organization. A total of about 40% of the Jews and a third of the Arabs are either active in the present or were active in the past in such organizations.

It was found in both sectors that the greater the sense of belonging, the greater the desire to contribute to society and assume volunteer activities. This correlation is not surprising and conforms to our initial hypothesis: that the more an individual feels 'connected' to society, the more he or she will be involved in volunteer activities and want to contribute to his or her society.

4) The answers according to socio-demographic characteristics

a) Gaps between national groups

Significant differences were found in the answers given by Jewish and Arab youth to the topics surveyed in this part of the questionnaire. The Arabs scored much lower than the Jews in their assessment of their chances of achieving long-term goals. In addition, the Arabs exhibited a lower level of belonging than the Jews-both to Israeli society and the Arab nation.

The relatively low sense of belonging of the Arabs to Israeli society stems from various characteristics of their geo-political and socio-economic status, which also affects their perception of ability to achieve their goals. However, the finding regarding their relatively low sense of belonging to the Arab nation is surprising. This may be the result of the influence of Israeli culture, perhaps subconscious or involuntary. It may also be related to their internalization of distrustful attitudes exhibited to them by Arabs in other nations.

Nevertheless, the Jews and Arabs report similar optimism levels. This may be because the optimism threshold of the Arabs is lower than that of the Jews. It may also stem from the efforts made by the Arabs to increase their chances of actualizing their aspirations. One of the indications of these efforts is the high ranking of the education goal among the young Arabs, especially the adolescents, much more than among their Jewish counterparts.

b) Gap between age groups:

The findings indicate that, regarding answers given to questions in this part of the questionnaire, there are no significant gaps in the Jewish sector between age groups. On the other hand, a significant difference was found among the Arab respondents regarding their important goals. At this point in their lives, the young adult sub-group aspires more than the adolescents to create a happy family and the adolescents aspire more than the young adults to acquire an education.

c) Gender gaps:

In the Jewish sector, the male respondents are more optimistic than the females regarding their futures while the females perceive higher levels of threats to their personal safety than the males. (It should be noted that gender-related gaps are not evident in the dichotomous division here but only when a more sensitive scale is used: The proportion of males who do not feel threatened at all, is higher than the corresponding proportion of females.) In addition, the females choose the happy-family goal more than the males while the males choose the higher-education goal more than females. In the Arab sector, the proportion of males who feel connected to Israeli society is higher than that among the females. Arab females, on the other hand, aspire more than males to acquire a higher education. This stems from their perception of education as a tool for social mobility and economic independence, in a society in which they suffer double discrimination: first by the Jewish majority and second by the traditional Muslim society which does not always support gender equality.

d) Connection to level of religiosity (Jews alone)

In both age groups, a higher proportion of religious Jews (including *haredim*) claimed that creating a happy family was their most important goal-more than traditional and secular Jews.

Secular Jews were found to be more pessimistic than Jews who were higher on the religiosity scale.

The goal of contributing to the State was higher among the non-haredi religious and traditional Jews, and lower among the *haredim*.

e) Connection to political identity:

A higher proportion of adolescents and young adults who map themselves on the Left of the political spectrum say that their most important aspirations are to contribute to the State and acquire an education. On the other hand, they are more pessimistic than the others.

2) Perceptions and attitudes regarding society and the state

In this section we describe those attitudes that are connected or interrelated (according to factor analysis), on the following subjects: in what country the respondents would prefer to live; whether they believe that only Israel is the Jewish homeland (to the Jewish respondents), the importance attributed by the Israeli Arabs to the definition of Israel as being 'a nation of all its citizens' (to the Arab respondents), trust in governmental institutions, type of democratic characteristics the youth would like the State of Israel to have, and perceptions of threat to the country.

In what kind of country would they like to live?

Several questions examined the democratic characteristics that the youth want Israel to possess. The first question directly asked the respondents what importance should be assigned to the following list of characteristics: a high standard of living, more economic equality among the citizens, a democratic state, a Jewish state (to the Jewish sector) 'a nation of all its citizens' (to the Arab sector), a country that lives in peace with its neighbors, full equality of political rights to all groups, and gender equality. The youth were asked to indicate "how important or unimportant" was each characteristic of the state. After they related to each characteristic separately, they were asked, "Of all the characteristics (listed above), which is most important to you regarding the State of Israel?" Another question was, "Do you agree or disagree with the view that the government must ensure a minimum standard of living for each citizen?"

Factor analysis shows that all the above items belong to the same universe content – except for the 'Jewish state' / 'nation of all its citizens' dichotomy. This

finding is interesting because it verifies the assumption that all the other characteristics of the state on the list are universally viewed as being positive, while the concept of the 'Jewish state' is controversial among Jewish Israelis, just as the 'nation of all its citizens' construct is controversial among Arab Israelis.

Table No. 5 below displays the responses of the interviewees.

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Table No. 5: Importance attributed to various characteristics of the state
A. According to sector and age group

	Entire	sample	Jewisł	n sector	Arab sector		
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	
	a. A state	with a high s	tandard of l	iving			
Not important/fairly unimportant	4	4	2	3	14	11	
Fairly important	26	16	26	16	27	17	
Very important	70	66	72	66	59	69	
Don't know		14		16		3	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
Percentage of respondents who ranked this as most important of all	10	11	11	12	8	10	
b. <i>A</i>	state whose c	itizens enjoy	more econo	mic equality			
Not important/fairly unimportant	6	4	4	3	14	11	
Fairly important	19	18	18	19	24	15	
Very important	71	69	73	68	61	73	
Don't know	4	9	5	10	1	1	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
Percentage of respondents who ranked this as most important	7	10	6	10	10	8	
	c	. A democra	tic state				
Not important/fairly unimportant	3	4	2	4	12	7	
Fairly important	19	16	19	17	16	11	

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	Entire	sample	Jewish	sector	Arat	sector
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
Very important	76	66	77	63	71	81
Don't know	2	14	2	16	1	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Percentage of respondents who ranked this as most important	18	13	17	11	20	17
d	. A state that	t lives in pea	ce with its no	eighbors		
Not important/fairly unimportant	7	10	6	10	14	13
Fairly important	24	19	26	21	14	8
Very important	69	58	68	54	72	78
Don't know		13		15		1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Percentage of respondents who ranked this as most important	21	18	20	16	22	23

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B. Jews:	According t	o age group and	level of religiosity

	Ages: 15-18				Ages: 21-24			
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular
		a. A s	state with a hi	gh standa	rd of liviı	ıg		
Not important/fairly unimportant	9	4	1	1	9	1	4	1
Fairly important	44	29	23	24	23	22	14	12
Very important	44	67	76	75	55	52	68	74
Don't know	3				13	25	14	13
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Percentage of respondents who ranked this as most important		9%	10%	14%	3%	7%	12%	17%

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		Ages	s: 15-18			Age	es: 21-24	
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular
	b	. A state wh	ose citizens e	njoy more	economie	c equality		
Not important/ fairly unimportant	26	11	3	9	10	8	7	10
Fairly important	30	40	6	39	27	25	28	33
Very important	42	49	38	52	44	47	54	47
Don't know	2		53		19	20	11	10
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Percentage of respondents who ranked this as most important	2%	5%	7%	7%	9%	6%	15%	10%
c. A democratic state								
Not important/ fairly unimportant	7	3	3	1	10	8	1	3
Fairly important	42	33	17	12	23	22	19	12
Very important	49	64	80	87	52	48	70	70
Don't know	2				15	22	10	15
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Percentage of respondents who ranked this as most important	5%	7%	21%	22%		5%	7%	21%
		d. A stat	e that lives in	peace wit	h its neigl	nbors		
Not important/ fairly unimportant	18	8	4	5	11	16	12	5
Fairly important	21	39	27	20	13	25	28	20
Very important	56	52	69	75	57	39	50	60
Don't know	5	1			19	20	10	15
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Percentage of respondents who ranked this as most important	14%	14%	18%	26%	11%	6%	11%	25%

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		Ages	s: 15-18			Age	es: 21-24	
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular
		e. A sta	te that grants	political o	equality to	o all		
Not important/ fairly unimportant	15	23	15	8	22	29	24	15
Fairly important	44	42	42	40	28	25	36	35
Very important	37	34	42	51	29	32	34	38
Don't know	4	1	1	1	21	14	6	12
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Percentage of respondents who ranked this as most important	5%	1%	7%	9%	2%	2%	3%	3%
		f. /	A state with fu	ıll gender	equality			
Not important/ fairly unimportant	30	7	4	2	30	6	7	1
Fairly important	33	34	19	14	27	28	16	12
Very important	28	59	77	84	26	50	63	69
Don't know	9				17	16	14	18
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Percentage of respondents who ranked this as most important	2%	1%	5%	7%		4%	8%	5%
	g. A state	with minir	nal governme	ntal interv	vention in	the market	place	
			(free-mark	et econon	ny)		[]	
Strongly agree	21	7	12	10	17	9	15	13
Tend to agree	40	43	43	36	30	36	33	36
Tend to disagree/ Strongly disagree	28	34	38	41	31	43	36	43
Don't know	11	16	7	13	22	12	16	8
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

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Trust in government institutions

Trust in government institutions is one of the preconditions for maintaining a democratic regime. Therefore, one question about the level of trust in these institutions was included in the three surveys that were conducted among the youth. The specific institutions that were queried among youth are the following: the IDF (Israel Defense Forces), force, legal system, Knesset, political parties, media, religious institutions (such as the rabbinate), and the Histadrut.

The respondents were asked the following question for each of the institutions above, "To what extent do you trust it?" Factor analysis and internal reliability Cronbach testing shows that trust in all the institutions above – except for religious institutions – all belong to the same universe content, thus we were able to link together the relevant items of the questions in one joint index.

The finding regarding religious institutions (as belonging to a different universe content) is very interesting. In fact, trust in religious institutions belongs to the belief that only Israel is the homeland of the Jews. This finding is connected to another finding: that the socio-demographic variable that best predicts voting patterns is level of religiosity. More information appears below.

Table No. 6 below displays the responses of the interviewees.

	Entire	sample	Jewisl	n sector	Ara	ab sector
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
			The IDF			
Complete trust	53	41	66	48	17	20
Trust	28	36	29	41	25	20
Very little trust	7	9	3	7	19	15
Distrust	11	12	2	3	37	40
Don't know	1	2		1	2	5
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
			Police			
Complete trust	23	12	22	9	25	20
Trust	49	42	53	45	39	35

Table No. 6 - Trust in government institutions
A. According to sector and age group

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	Entire	sample	Jewish	sector	Ara	b sector
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
Very little trust	17	27	16	30	20	16
Distrust	10	18	8	15	15	26
Don't know	1	1	1	1	1	3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		The	legal system			
Complete trust	19	15	17	11	26	26
Trust	53	41	55	41	44	42
Very little trust	17	23	17	27	18	12
Distrust	9	18	8	19	10	14
Don't know	2	3	3	2	2	6
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		Т	he Knesset			
Complete trust	9	5	7	3	17	10
Trust	44	28	46	28	35	28
Very little trust	28	36	30	41	24	22
Distrust	16	26	14	26	20	28
Don't know	3	5	3	2	4	12
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		Pol	itical parties			
Complete trust	5	3	3	2	10	6
Trust	37	22	38	21	34	24
Very little trust	37	38	40	44	28	19
Distrust	16	32	14	29	23	41
Don't know	5	5	5	4	5	10
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
]	The media			
Complete trust	8	5	5	3	15	10
Trust	53	41	57	40	46	45
Very little trust	28	30	30	34	22	17
Distrust	11	21	8	21	17	23
Don't know		3		2		5
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

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	Entire	Entire sample		Jewish sector		b sector
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
		Th	e Histadrut			
Complete trust	8	7	7	4	13	17
Trust	45	34	49	37	34	26
Very little trust	19	21	16	22	26	16
Distrust	14	19	13	17	16	26
Don't know	14	19	15	20	11	15
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

B. Jews: According to age group and level of religiosity

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			s: 15-18			Ages	: 21-24	
	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular
				The IDF				
Complete trust	30	68	73	68	28	59	58	48
Trust	47	32	23	29	47	36	36	42
Very little trust	14		2	2	11	5	4	7
Distrust	9		2	1	8		2	2
Don't know					6			1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
			Р	olice force				
Complete trust	12	23	24	23	5	6	16	9
Trust	51	53	50	56	38	56	38	47
Very little trust	26	15	19	13	34	28	23	33
Distrust	9	7	7	8	21	10	21	11
Don't know	2	2			2		2	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
			The	legal syste	m			
Complete trust	7	12	18	21	2	8	17	13
Trust	28	50	58	60	19	37	40	52

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		Age	s: 15-18			Ages	: 21-24			
	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular		
Very little trust	39	21	17	11	29	29	26	25		
Distrust	26	13	6	5	45	24	15	9		
Don't know		4	1	3	5	2	2	1		
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
The Knesset										
Complete trust	2	6	7	8	3	5	4	1		
Trust	30	51	47	47	21	28	27	32		
Very little trust	35	25	28	33	32	46	39	43		
Distrust	26	14	17	10	39	20	28	23		
Don't know	7	4	1	2	5	1	2	1		
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
			Pol	itical partie	s					
Complete trust		1	4	5	1	4	1	1		
Trust	40	38	35	41	21	22	23	21		
Very little trust	30	44	42	37	34	51	39	49		
Distrust	23	12	15	13	35	23	33	26		
Don't know	7	5	4	4	9		4	3		
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
			1	he Media						
Complete trust	5	2	7	6	1	2	5	4		
Trust	28	38	57	68	15	25	42	56		
Very little trust	46	45	28	22	38	40	32	32		
Distrust	21	14	8	4	41	32	20	8		
Don't know		1			5	1	1			
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		

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		Age	s: 15-18		Ages: 21-24					
	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular		
The Histadrut										
Complete trust		5	10	7	1	5	6	3		
Trust	32	56	52	45	31	42	33	40		
Very little trust	26	9	15	19	12	20	27	26		
Distrust	21	8	13	13	27	10	20	14		
Don't know	21	22	10	16	29	23	14	17		
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		

Desired ideal characteristics of Israel's democracy

In the previous section we saw how most of the youths, Jews as well as Arabs, attribute great importance ("highly important" or "fairly important") to the democratic nature of the State. In this section we examine what democratic type or form they feel is best for the country. The questions in this context are related to the following topics: system of government, democracy versus security, equal rights for the various sectors, and attitudes toward civil resistance.

Factor analysis indicates that these four topics are not from the same universe content. For example, attitudes toward equal rights are not in the same universe content as the desired system of government. The following question examined **preference of government system**: "Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 'A few strong leaders could fix the situation in the country better than all the laws and public discussions."

The question that examined the **choice between democratic values or security needs** was, "Sometimes, democratic values clash with the security needs of the State. When this happens, what should take precedence – the security needs of the State, or democratic values?"

Importance of **equal rights for all sectors of the population** was also examined in the first section of this unit. The respondents were asked how much importance they attribute to the following characteristics, "a state that grants political equality to all." and "a state with full gender equality."

Attitudes of the respondents toward civil resistance were examined in two contexts: the peace process and army service. The following questions examined the youths' views concerning different types of civil resistance, non-violent and violent: "Assume that some citizens feel that government policy regarding the peace process harms Israel's national interests. In your opinion, are these citizens permitted or forbidden to do the following:

'To adopt non-violent civil resistance methods (for example: to demonstrate without a license, to refuse to pay taxes, to refuse to serve in the army), or: to adopt violent civil resistance methods (such as using force to resist evacuation of settlements, or alternatively, using force to resist the construction of a security fence)."

The survey examined attitudes toward military dissension (or conscientious objection) with the following questions. "Is it justified or not for a soldier to refuse to carry out an order that goes against his conscience? Examples: a soldier who opposes evacuation of settlements is ordered to participate in an evacuation; or, a soldier who opposes the presence of IDF troops in Judea and Samaria is ordered to serve in the territories."

Tables no. 7 and 8 below display the responses of the interviewees.

Table No. 7: The importance attributed to Israel as a democratic nation – general attitudes as well as reference toward specific situations *

	Entire sample		Jewish	sector	Arab sector				
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24			
Security needs of the State versus democratic values									
Security needs take preference	60	65	70	77	32	33			
Democratic values take preference	35	30	25	19	64	60			
No opinion	5	5	5	4	4	7			
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			

A. According to sector and age group

^{*} The data related to attitudes regarding importance of democracy and equality between the various sectors appears in Table No. 5 in this chapter.

	Entire sample		Jewish	sector	Arab sector			
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24		
Are strong leaders more effective than laws and public discourse								
Strong leaders are not more effective than laws and discourse	40	41	37	39	47	46		
Strong leaders are more effective than laws and discourse	58	55	60	57	52	52		
Don't know	2	4	3	4	1	2		
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		

B. Jews: According to age group and level of religiosity

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		Age	s: 15-18			Age	s: 21-24	
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular
		Security	needs of the S	tate versus	democrat	ic values		
Security needs take preference	77	77	73	64	78	89	76	71
Democratic values take preference	21	21	23	31	14	10	20	27
Don't know	2	2	4	5	8	1	4	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	Are	e strong lead	lers more effec	tive than l	aws and p	ublic discou	rse	
Strong leaders are not more effective than laws and discourse	26	28	37	44	44	24	44	43
Strong leaders are more effective than laws and discourse	74	69	61	54	51	73	56	52
Don't know		3	2	2	5	3		5
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

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	Entire	sample	Jewish	sector	Arab	sector
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
a. Percentage of those who justify nonviolent civil resistance in the context of the peace process	26	36	20	35	44	40
b. Percentage of those who justify violent civil resistance in the context of the peace process	26	24	23	22	35	31
Justification of mil	itary dissens	sion (conscie	entious obje	ction) in the	army	
Justifies refusal to evacuate settlements and also refusal to serve in the territories			41	31		
Only justifies refusal to evacuate settlements			21	19		
Only justifies refusal to serve in the territories			4	2		
Does not justify either scenario			31	42		
Did not answer			4	6		
Total			100%	100%		

Table No. 8: Attitudes toward civil resistance

A. According to sector and age group

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B. Jews: Ac	cording to age group ar	nd level of religiosity

		Ages	s: 15-18		Ages: 21-24			
	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular
a. Percentage of those who justify nonviolent civil resistance in the context of the peace process	33	16	16	23	38	41	39	30
b. Percentage of those who justify violent civil resistance in the context of the peace process	30	29	27	17	29	22	30	15

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		Ages: 15-18				Ages: 21-24			
	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	
	Justification of military dissension (conscientious objection) in the army								
Justifies refusal to evacuate settlements and also refusal to serve in the territories	42	37	44	37	43	30	31	27	
Only justifies refusal to evacuate settlements	19	38	19	15	29	33	20	9	
Only justifies refusal to serve in the territories	5	5	4	5	2	1	2	2	
Does not justify either scenario	23	17	30	40	19	31	40	56	
Did not answer	11	3	3	3	7	5	7	6	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

Perceived threats to the country

This section examines the youths' perceptions of threats to the State. The first question, regarding the perception of security threats on the State, is phrased thusly: "Do you feel today that the existence of the State is under threat?" The second question, relating to optimism or pessimism regarding the future of the State, is worded, "To what extent are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future of the State?"

Factor analysis has shown that these two questions are, indeed, from the same universe content. However, the analysis also found another item that belongs to this same universe content – the question, "Do you feel that the State is doing enough or not enough to economically assist the disadvantaged population?" It seems that problems resulting from lack of governmental attention to disadvantaged population are also perceived by the youth as dangerous to the country as a whole.

The current section also examines attitudes toward controversies and

disputes that endanger Israeli society. A list of controversies (among population groups) was read to the respondents who were then asked, "Which controversy most endangers the fabric of Israeli society?"

Table No. 9 below displays the responses of the interviewees.

Table No. 9: Perceptions regarding the future of Israel,and what factors threaten the State

A.	According	to	sector	and	age	group	
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	Entire	sample	Jewish	sector	Arab sector							
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24						
a. W	a. Which controversy most threatens Israeli society?											
Between religious and secular			18	28								
Between Left and Right			21	17	14	16						
Between rich and poor			3	3	12	12						
Between Jews and Israeli Arabs			48	37	47	44						
Between Mizrahim (Sephardim) and Ashkenazim			7	3	17	15						
They are all the same			1	7	1	2						
None of the above/Don't know			2	5	9	11						
Total			100%	100%	100%	100%						
	Perception of	of existential	threat to the	State								
Strong threat perception/ Fairly strong	57	56	63	60	41	48						
No threat perception/Low threat perception	41	42	36	39	56	49						
Don't know	2	2	1	1	3	3						
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%						
	Summariz	zing assessme	ent of the fut	ure								
Pessimistic/ Fairly pessimistic	31	36	29	33	37	44						
Not optimistic and not pessimistic	3	8	3	8	4	8						

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	Entire sample		Jewish	sector	Arab sector	
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
Fairly optimistic	47	38	52	42	33	27
Very optimistic	17	14	15	13	23	18
Don't know	2	4	1	4	3	3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Does the	e State do eno	ough for its d	isadvantageo	d population	?	
Does enough	24	17	17	11	45	32
Does not do enough	73	80	80	85	52	67
Don't know	3	3	3	4	3	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

B. Jews: According to age group and level of religiosity

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	Ages: 15-18					Ages: 21-24				
	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular		
		a. Which co	ontroversy mo	st threater	ıs Israeli s	ociety?				
Between religious and secular	30	19	15	18	32	28	12	35		
Between Left and Right	14	28	22	19	20	26	17	12		
Between rich and poor		3	4	2	2	3	5	3		
Between Jews and Israeli Arabs	40	40	49	50	27	34	51	35		
Between Mizrahim (Sephardim) and Ashkenazim	9	9	7	7	4	4	4	3		
They are all the same		1	1	2	8	3	7	7		
None of the above/ Don't know	7		2	2	7	2	4	5		
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		

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	Ages: 15-18				Ages: 21-24				
	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	
		b. Percep	tion of existen	tial threat	on the co	untry			
Strong threat perception/ Fairly strong	59	61	66	60	59	52	65	61	
No threat perception/ Low threat perception	38	37	34	39	36	46	34	39	
Don't know	3	2		1	5	2	1		
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
		c. S	ummary asses	sment of t	he future				
Pessimistic/ Fairly pessimistic	37	18	26	34	27	28	32	38	
Not optimistic and not pessimistic	5	4	3	2	9	9	6	8	
Fairly optimistic	33	53	54	54	39	42	42	43	
Very optimistic	16	25	15	9	11	20	19	9	
Don't know	9		2	1	14	1	1	2	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
	d. D	oes the State	e do enough fo	r its disad	vantaged	population?			
Does enough	9	19	16	17	4	16	12	12	
Does not do enough	84	77	82	79	95	78	86	84	
Don't know	7	4	2	4	1	6	2	4	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

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Belief that only Israel is the Jewish national home

Factor analysis demonstrated that the topics below belong to the same universe content that we call "belief that only Israel is the Jewish national home." However, internal reliability (alpha Cronbach) analysis shows that they cannot be combined into one joint index.

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The topics are:

- Level of interest in the Holocaust. "Do you take a personal interest in the Holocaust?"
- Centrality of Israel in Judaism. "Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 'Jews can only live fully Jewish lives in Israel'?"
- The importance of the State of Israel as a Jewish state. "How important or unimportant is it that the State of Israel be a Jewish state?"
- Trust in the country's religious institutions. "To what extent do you have trust in the country's religious institutions?"

Table No. 10 below displays the responses of the interviewees.

	Entire	sample	Jewish	1 sector	Arab sector	
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
	a. Opening p	osition: Inte	rest in the Ho	olocaust		
To a slight extent or not at all			15	24		
To a great extent			43	42		
To a very great extent			42	34		
Total			100%	100%		
b. How impor			Jewish state ((to the Arab		i sector)/	
Not important at all/fairly unimportant	13	17	12	19	16	11
Fairly important	37	35	21	17	18	13
Very important	49	40	66	53	66	75
Don't know	1	8	1	11		1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
c. Level of agreeme	nt with the v	iew that Jews	s can only live	e fully Jewish	lives in Israe	el
Strongly agree			22	24		
Tends to agree			29	21		
Tends to disagree			26	23		

Table No. 10: Belief that only Israel is the Jewish national homeA. According to sector and age group

	Entire	Entire sample		n sector	Arab sector	
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
Strongly disagree			21	30		
Don't know			2	2		
Total	100% 100%					
	d. Tr	ust in religio	is institution	s		
Complete trust	27	18	23	14	37	28
Trust	41	38	42	39	39	36
Very little trust	16	18	17	20	13	13
Distrust	15	22	17	24	10	19
Don't know	1	4	1	3	1	4
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

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B. Jews: According to age group and level of religiosity

	Ages: 15-18					Ages: 21-24			
	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	
			a. Interest in	the Holoc	aust				
To a slight extent or not at all	35	14	14	13	30	20	23	24	
To a great extent	33	43	42	46	38	40	39	44	
To a very great extent	32	42	44	41	31	40	37	32	
Did not answer		1			1		1		
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
t	o. How im	portant is it	that Israel be	a Jewish	state (to t	he Jewish se	ector)		
Not important at all/fairly unimportant	5	11	11	13	16	29	18	16	
Fairly important	9	12	18	30	7	5	13	29	
Very important	81	77	70	56	60	48	62	48	
Don't know	5		1	1	17	18	7	7	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

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	Ages: 15-18					Ages: 21-24			
	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	
c. Leve	l of agree	ment with th	ne view that J	ews can or	ly live fu	lly Jewish liv	ves in Israel		
Strongly agree	14	40	23	14	19	48	29	14	
Tends to agree	11	26	32	30	17	29	27	17	
Tends to disagree	35	24	22	29	22	8	22	29	
Strongly disagree	35	8	20	25	41	15	19	37	
Don't know	5	2	3	2	1		3	3	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
		d.	Trust in relig	gious instit	utions				
Complete trust	44	47	26	7	30	22	17	4	
Trust	39	40	53	36	50	63	37	24	
Very little trust	7	6	10	28	13	8	23	27	
Distrust	5	6	10	28	3	4	23	41	
Don't know	5	1	1	1	4	3		4	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

Summary

1) The State of Israel and democracy - the ideal situation

A significant percentage of both sectors attribute great importance to the fact that Israel is a democracy. However, when the various aspects of democracy are expressed in concrete examples, only the example of complete gender equality receives full support. About three-quarters of the Jewish respondents assign precedence to security needs over democracy. As expected, the greater the perceived military threat to the State the greater the tendency toward security needs (over democratic principles). Only 44% of Jewish adolescents and about a third of the young adults attribute great importance to full political rights and equality to all sectors; in the Arab sector, on the other hand, the corresponding percentages are 69% and 75%. About 60% of the Jewish respondents and half of the Arabs think that strong leaders are more effective than laws.

Another problem that is likely to have a negative effect on democracy is

the lack of trust that youth reveal toward the Knesset and political parties. In the Jewish sector, 44% of the adolescents and 67% of the young adults distrust the Knesset; 54% and 73% respectively distrust the political parties. In the Arab sector, 44% of the adolescents and 50% of the young adults distrust the Knesset and 51%–60% of them respectively distrust the parties. Perhaps that is the reason that about 60% of the Jewish respondents and about half of the Arab respondents believes that strong leaders are more effective than laws in the country. On the other hand, only a minority (between a fifth to a third) of the young Jews favor non-violent civil resistance in the context of a peace process. It should be noted that unwillingness to actualize democratic principles is connected to the perception of security threat on the country, and is likely to result from this perception.

2) Sense of threat hovering over the State

Most of the Jewish youth (63%–60%) and a large minority of the Arab youth (48%–41%) report a sense of security threat or danger hovering over the country. Regarding internal threat, it seems that the Jew-Arab dispute was viewed by the respondents in both sectors as the greatest internal threat endangering the State of Israel today.

Within the Jewish sector there are two additional important disputes: between religious and secular, and Right and Left. Within the Arab sector, the second most common dispute is between the supporters and opposers of integration in the Israeli society. Although only a minority of both sectors said that the gap between rich and poor is the most dangerous to Israeli society, it was found that attitudes toward the government's actions on behalf of the underprivileged elements, belong to the universe content of threats to the State. Thus it appears that neglect of the underprivileged societal elements is also viewed as a threat to the entire country. In addition, most of the Jewish respondents (two thirds of the adolescents and a bit more than half of the young adults) are optimistic regarding the future of the state. Among the Arab interviewees, optimism rates are a bit lower though even in this sector, a small majority of the adolescents and almost half of the young adults are optimistic as well.

3) Belief that Israel is the homeland of the Jews

Despite the fact that many of the respondents feel that Israel is under threat, about half of the Jewish adolescents and almost half of the young adults also feel that Jews can only live full Jewish lives in Israel. Not surprisingly, the greater the sense of belonging to the Israeli society and to the nation, the greater the trust in governmental institutions, the more the youth tend to believe that Israel is the home of the Jews. A more surprising finding is that the greater the perception of **threat** hovering over Israel, the **stronger** is the belief in Israel as the national homeland.

4) Correlation with socio-demographic characteristics

a. Gaps between national groups:

There is almost complete agreement between the Jewish and Arab youth in the survey regarding the ranking of the various characteristics of the State. Even when relating to each characteristic separately (that is, a dichotomous division between important-unimportant), the degree of importance attributed to the various characteristics are similar – with the one exception of equal political rights to the different national groups. However, when there is a conflict between security needs and democratic principles, a gap emerges between the two national groups: the Jews give priority to security needs at the expense of democracy, while the Arabs give preference to democracy at the expense of security. With regards to trust in government institutions, the situation is more complicated. In a dichotomous division the two sectors seem to be very similar, but in fact the trust index is higher among the Jews. This is because a large proportion of Arab youth who lack faith in government institutions go to the extreme of expressing deep distrust.

b. Correlation with age:

In the Jewish sector: more adolescents than young adults rank the Jew-Arab dispute to be the most dangerous controversy that threatens Israeli society. In contrast, the young adults emphasize the rift between religious and secular Jews. Adolescents have greater trust in government institutions than do the young adults; they express stronger feelings of Jewish-ness, and are more

optimistic regarding the future of the country. On the other hand, adolescents justify soldiers' refusals to evacuate settlements more than the young adults. In the Arab sector, adolescents have slightly higher levels of trust in government institutions than do young adults.

c) Gender:

In the Jewish sector, females are more sensitive to a security threat hanging over the country than the males. In the Arab sector, there were no gender-related gaps with one exception: females expressed more trust in the police than males.

d) Religiosity level:

The more the religiosity level rises, the lower the importance-ranking of the following characteristics of the state: high standard of living, democracy, political equality, gender equality. Those who are more religious tend to express less trust in the media, and to give precedence to security needs over democratic values when there is a clash between the two.

A U-shaped correlation was found between religiosity and pessimism regarding the future of the state. This means that religious respondents expressed very low levels of pessimism regarding the future of the state, while secular and haredi Jews recorded relatively high percentages of pessimism.

There was an inverted U-shaped correlation between level of religiosity and preference of strong leaders over laws; the peak of preference for strong leadership was registered among the religious. The following correlations were also found with higher levels of religiosity: *haredim* feel that the religious-secular discord is much more dangerous to the country than do other sub-groups. Among the other three groups, the Jew-Arab discord was perceived as most threatening to the state.

Haredim also score higher than other groups in tolerating non-violent civil resistance and military dissension. The religious youth justify military dissension in the case of evacuating settlements more than other groups.

e) Political identity:

When we move from Right to Left on the political spectrum, we find an increase (usually gradual but sometimes sharp) in the following attitudes: the importance attributed to the democratic nature of the state, political equality, trust in the media, importance attributed to preserving democratic ideals over security needs, justification of non-violent civil resistance. On the other hand, as we move from Left-Center-Right, there is a gradual increase in the following attitudes: justification of military dissension (refusal to evacuate settlements); preferring strong leaders over rule of law; and perceiving a greater sense of threat hovering over the state.

Respondents who identified themselves as belonging to the Right view gender equality and peace as of less importance than do members of the Center and Left. On the other hand, youth who define themselves as affiliated with the political Center attribute greater importance than others to: higher standard of living, economic equality, and a democratic state.

3. Attitudes regarding Arab-Israeli coexistence

The present section deals with the following issues: Opinions about the options for Arab-Israeli coexistence in Israel, feelings toward members of the other national group (Jews vis-á-vis Israeli Arabs and Arabs vis-á-vis Jews in Israel) and willingness for social proximity with members of the other nationality.

Attitudes toward Arab-Israeli coexistence

This issue was examined through the following two questions:

"Do you believe in the possibility for peaceful coexistence of Jews and Arabs in Israel?" The second question was asked only of Jews. "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Arab citizens of Israel should not be allowed to be elected to the Knesset."

Factor analysis establishes that the two questions are from the same universe content. However, the alpha Cronbach internal reliability test shows that they cannot be combined in one joint index.

Table No. 11 below displays the responses of the interviewees.

	Entire	sample	Jewish	sector	Arab	sector
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
a. Att	itudes towa	rd Jewish-A	rab coexiste	ence		
Believes in the possibility for peaceful coexistence	59	51	53	42	75	74
Does not believe in the possibility for peaceful coexistence	41	47	46	55	25	25
Don't know		2	1	3		1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
b. Attitudes toward mem	bership of A	Arab citizen	s in Knesset	(only Jews	were asked)	
Arabs should be denied membership in the Knesset			45	47		
Not sure if they should be denied membership or not			21	17		
Arabs should not be denied membership in the Knesset			33	33		
Did not answer			1	3		
Total			100%	100%		

Table No. 11: Attitudes toward Jewish-Arab coexistence A. According to sector and age group

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B. Jews: According to age group and level of religiosity

		Age	s: 15-18		Ages: 21-24				
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	
Believes in the possibility for peaceful coexistence	16	27	55	70	20	20	42	62	
Does not believe in the possibility for peaceful coexistence	82	72	45	30	77	77	56	38	
Don't know	2	1			3	3	2		
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
b. Attitud	les towar	d members	hip of Arab c	itizens in]	Knesset (only Jews w	vere asked)		
Arabs should be denied membership in the Knesset	70	59	48	32	73	61	49	29	

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		Ages	s: 15-18		Ages: 21-24				
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	
Not sure if they should be allowed membership	16	20	21	23	11	20	16	20	
Arabs should not be denied membership in the Knesset	12	21	30	44	13	17	34	50	
Did not answer	2		1	1	3	2	1	1	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

Feelings toward members of the other nationality

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The following question was posed to the interviewees: "From the following emotions, choose the one that best expresses your feelings toward Arabs/Jews citizens of Israel: Fear, hatred, closeness, sympathy, or that you have neither positive nor negative emotions toward them?" The list of emotions was read to them in changing order. Table No. 12 displays the responses of the interviewees.

Table No. 12: Feelings toward members of the other nationalityA. A. According to sector and age group

	Entir	e sample	Jewis	sh sector	Arab	sector
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
Fear	8	11	10	13	2	3
Hatred	25	22	28	26	14	11
Sympathy	3	6	2	3	9	16
Closeness	7	5	3	2	17	12
Neither positive nor negative emotions	56	52	56	51	58	55
Don't know	1	4	1	5		3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

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		Ages	: 15-18		Ages: 21-24			
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular
Fear	21	14	9	7	24	17	9	10
Hatred	47	49	27	17	38	35	30	16
Sympathy			2	1	1		2	5
Closeness		2	2	5	3	1	2	3
Neither positive nor negative emotions	31	32	60	69	28	39	54	64
Don't know	1	3		1	6	8	3	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

B. Jews: According to age group and level of religiosity

Willingness for social interaction among people of two national groups

The respondents were asked about their willingness to engage in different types of social interactions with members of the other national group. The framework of each question was, "Would you be willing...

- to have a family of Arab citizens of Israel/Jews live in your neighborhood?
- to be friends with an Arab citizen of Israel/ or Jew your age?
- to invite an Arab citizen of Israel or Jew who is your age to your home?
- If an Arab citizen of Israel or Jew your age invited you to their home, would you accept the invitation?

Factor analysis shows that all the questions in this section are from the same universe content. The Cronbach alpha internal reliability test shows that these questions may be combined into a single index. Table No. 13 below displays the responses of the interviewees.

Before viewing the results, it is important to note that many studies have shown that there is a gap between a person's theoretical readiness to do a certain behavior and actually performing that behavior, if and when it ever becomes possible. Studies show that even those who profess absolute readiness to do X, do

not always carry through completely on X, and those who profess *qualified* readiness are even less likely to do so. Therefore, we did not consolidate the two categories of positive answers ("Completely ready" and "Think I am ready").

Table No. 13: Readiness for social interactionwith a youth from another national sector

	Entire	sample	Jewish	sector	Arab	sector
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
	a	. Living in the	same neighbo	rhood		
Completely ready	21	21	20	17	23	33
Think I am ready	29	23	28	22	31	28
Think I'm not ready or sure I'm not ready	50	55	52	60	46	38
Did not answer		1		1		1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		b. Persor	al friendship			
Completely ready	30	31	25	24	45	53
Think I am ready	31	27	30	26	35	28
Think I'm not ready or sure I'm not ready	38	41	44	49	20	19
Did not answer	1	1	1	1		
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	c	. Inviting the	other to one's l	nouse		
Completely ready	28	29	24	23	40	48
Think I am ready	28	26	26	26	32	25
Think I'm not ready or sure I'm not ready	43	44	49	50	28	27
Did not answer	1	1	1	1		
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		d. Visiting t	he other home	's		
Completely ready	18	25	13	16	34	49
Think I am ready	24	23	22	23	30	22

A. According to sector and age group

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	Entire	sample	Jewish	sector	Arab sector		
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	
Think I'm not ready or sure I'm not ready	56	51	63	59	36	29	
Did not answer	2	1	2	2			
Total	100%	100%	100% 100%		100%	100%	

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B. Jews	According to	o age group and	l level o	f religiosity
D . OC D .	, the column of the	, age group and		i i chigi obicy

		Ages	: 15-18				: 21-24	
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular
		a	Living in the	same neig	hborhood			
Completely ready		5	18	31	4	2	10	33
Think I am ready	5	14	30	36	6	18	29	27
Think I'm not ready or sure I'm not ready	93	81	52	31	89	79	61	38
Did not answer	2			2	1	1		2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
			b. Person	nal friends	hip			
Completely ready	2	7	18	39	6	13	17	38
Think I am ready	5	20	28	32	12	23	30	31
Think I'm not ready or sure I'm not ready	93	71	52	28	81	62	53	30
Did not answer		2	2	1	1	2		1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		с	. Inviting the	other to on	e's house			
Completely ready	2	7	18	39	5	10	18	38
Think I am ready	5	20	28	32	16	24	27	31

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		Ages	: 15-18		Ages: 21-24						
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular			
Think I'm not ready or sure I'm not ready	93	71	52	28	78	64	54	30			
Did not answer		2	2	1	1	2	1	1			
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			
	d. Visiting the other's home										
Completely ready	2	6	9	21	7	7	16	25			
Think I am ready		8	20	33	8	13	26	32			
Think I'm not ready or sure I'm not ready	98	82	69	45	84	78	58	40			
Did not answer		4	2	1	1	2		3			
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			

Summary

1) Coexistence in Israel

A bit more than half of the adolescents in the Jewish sector (53%) believe that peaceful coexistence is possible, but the percentage among young adults is lower (41%). Among the Arabs, on the other hand, a large majority (about three quarters) believe in the possibility of Arab-Israeli coexistence. However, despite the positive rhetoric (or lip service) in favor of coexistence, only a third of Jewish youths clearly say that Israeli Arabs should **not** be barred from membership in the Knesset. The other two-thirds either don't have a clear opinion on the issue or think that Arabs should be barred from membership in the Knesset.

2) A cold peace and hatred

The overall relationship between Israeli Arabs and Jewish Israelis seems to be characterized by a coexistence of cold peace. A small majority (between 51–58%) of the youths, Jews as well as Arabs, express emotional indifference toward members of the other nationality. Among the Jewish

respondents who do express some kind of emotion, that emotion tends to be hatred (a bit more than a quarter express hatred).

The Arabs, meanwhile, reported two major emotions: a positive emotion (closeness) and a negative one (hatred). Results of the social proximity scale also show that only 13 to 25% of the Jewish respondents and a quarter to half of the Arab respondents express unqualified readiness to have relationships with the members of the other nationality. (The highest readiness in both sectors is for personal friendship; the lowest among Jews is to visit the home of an Arab contemporary. The Arabs reported the lowest readiness to live in the same neighborhood.)

3) Correlation with socio-demographic characteristics

a) Gaps between national groups:

The Israeli Arab youth believe in the prospects for peaceful coexistence at statistically significant higher rates than do their Jewish counterparts in the study. In addition, the Arabs are more amenable to express this belief in concrete, functional ways. The Arabs are also more willing than the Jews for social proximity with members of the other nationality. In addition, more Jews express hatred toward the Arabs than the reverse. Instead, the Arabs express more emotions of closeness and sympathy. In this study we cannot know what is the cause and what is the effect.

b) Age gaps:

In the Jewish sector: More adolescents believe in the peaceful coexistence option than do the young adults.

In the Arab sector: More of the young adults are ready for social proximity with Jews, than are the adolescents.

c) Gender gaps:

In the Jewish sector: No gender gaps were found.

In the Arab sector: Females are more likely than males to exhibit indifference toward the Jews. Also, male Arabs are more likely to visit youth in Jewish homes than female Arabs.

d) Correlation with religion (Jewish sector):

Regarding the Jewish sector: The higher were the Jewish youth on the religiosity scale, the less likely were they to believe in peaceful coexistence and the more they tended to express hatred to Arabs and believe that Arabs should be banned from Knesset membership.

e) Correlation with political identity

As we move toward the Right on the Left-Center-Right political spectrum, there is a sharp increase in the beliefs that most of the Arabs have not recognized the existence of the State of Israel and that Israeli Arabs should be banned from Knesset membership. Simultaneously, there is a gradual decline in the belief that Arab-Israeli peaceful coexistence is possible. Also, hatred toward Arabs is more frequently expressed by members of the Right than those in the Center or Left.

4. Political attitudes on the subject of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

The questions in this section examine two things: political identities, and attitudes regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict:

"From a political viewpoint, with what faction do you most identify: Right, the moderate Right, Center, moderate Left, or Left?"

"What is your stance regarding peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority?"

"Do you believe that negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority will bring peace in the coming years to Israel and the Palestinians?"

"Do you support or oppose a peace agreement based on 'two states for two nations' even if that involves significant concessions on Israel's part?"

"Pick one of the following options that you most prefer: implementation of the 'two states for two nations' concept; a binational state, extension of the current status, or another option?"

A question that served as background for the views on the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict was agreement or disagreement with the following statement: "Most of the Arabs have not recognized the existence of the State of Israel and would destroy it if they could."

Factor analysis shows that all the questions in this section are from the same universe content. The Cronbach alpha internal reliability test shows that all these attitudes – except for political identity – can be combined into one index that examines attitudes toward possible solutions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Tabled 14–15 display the responses of the interviewees.

Table No. 14: Opinions of the respondents on the question: Would most of the Arabs destroy the State of Israel if they could? A. According to sector and age group

	Entire	sample	Jewish	sector	Arab sector	
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
Strongly agree or agree with the opinion	55	60	59	68	44	37
Not sure or Don't know	19	20	20	18	17	26
Strongly disagree or disagree with the opinion	26	20	21	15	38	37
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

B. Jews: According to age group and level of religiosity

		Ages: 15-18				Ages: 21-24			
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	
Agree with the opinion	84	72	61	47	82	81	74	56	
Not sure or Don't know	14	18	22	21	12	12	14	22	
Disagree with the opinion	2	10	17	32	6	7	12	22	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

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A. According	Entire		Jewish	sector	Ara	b sector
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
		a. P	olitical identity			
Right	32	34	40	42	9	12
Moderate Right	15	20	17	24	7	8
Center	18	12	18	12	18	15
Moderate Left	8	5	8	5	9	5
Left	8	9	5	5	16	19
A-political/ unaffiliated	4	4	4	3	7	5
Don't know	15	16	8	9	34	36
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		-	g the Israeli-Pa otiating with th			
For	58	53	62	52	48	54
Against	40	42	35	43	51	40
Did not answer	2	5	3	5	1	6
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	2) Do	you believe tha	t negotiations v	vill lead to peac	æ?	
Believe	33	25	29	17	44	48
Do not believe	65	72	69	80	55	50
Did not answer	2	3	2	3	1	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	3) A	ttitudes regard	ing 'two states i	for two nations	'	•
For	58	57	70	69	73	78
Against	39	37	27	24	27	19
Did not answer	3	6	3	7		3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table No. 15: Political positions of the interviewees A. According to sector and age group

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	Entire	sample	Jewish	sector	Arab	sector
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
	4) Preferred so	olution to end th	he conflict-re: '	two states for t	wo nations'	
Actualization of 'two states for two nations'	25	32	22	27	33	49
Binational state	21	15	20	13	24	20
Extension of the current status	42	33	52	40	12	11
Did not answer	12	20	6	20	31	20
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	5) Is it possible	to reach a pea	ce agreement w	vithout a Palest	inian state?	
Possible	50	37	44	33	64	50
Impossible	48	57	51	60	36	49
Did not answer	2	6	5	7		1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

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B. Jews: According to age group and level of religiosity

	Ages: 15-18					Ages: 21-24					
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular			
	a. Political identity										
Right	44	67	48	22	50	67	46	25			
Moderate Right	26	21	14	17	19	21	28	24			
Center	9	6	18	25	5	3	11	18			
Moderate Left		1	3	16	1		2	10			
Left	5	2	4	8			2	12			
A-political/ unaffiliated	7		3	3	8	1	3	4			
Don't know	9	3	10	9	17	8	8	7			
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			

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		Age	s: 15-18			Age	s: 21-24				
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular			
		b. Position	s regarding th	ne Israeli-F	alestiniar	conflict					
	1) At	ttitudes rega	arding negotia	ting with t	he Palesti	nian Author	ity				
For	26	32	63	79	33	27	53	72			
Against	68	62	34	19	56	71	45	25			
Did not answer	6	6	3	2	11	2	2	3			
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			
2) Do you believe that negotiations will lead to peace?											
Believe	8	12	33	38	11	9	15	24			
Do not believe	89	87	65	60	85	90	83	72			
Did not answer	3	1	2	2	4	1	2	4			
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			
		3) Attitu	des regarding	'two states	s for two n	ations'					
For	68	86	72	61	12	7	18	39			
Against	26	10	27	36	75	91	76	54			
Did not answer	6	4	1	3	13	2	6	7			
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			
	4) Prefe	erred solution	on to end the c	onflict-re:	'two state	s for two na	tions'				
Actualization of 'two states for two nations'	7	14	21	29	13	9	23	42			
Binational state	19	6	15	29	5	12	11	19			
Extension of the current status	61	67	62	39	51	43	49	30			
Did not answer	13	13	2	3	31	36	17	9			
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			
	5) Is it p	possible to r	each a peace a	greement	without a	Palestinian	state?				
Possible	23	34	51	48	33	43	31	31			
Impossible	66	59	46	48	52	50	65	64			

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		Age	s: 15-18		Ages: 21-24			
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular
Did not answer	11	7	3	4	15	7	4	5
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Summary

1) Political identity of the youth

Youth in the Jewish sector lean significantly toward the Right (57% among the adolescents and 66% among the young adults). Only 13% (of adolescents) and 10% (young adults) define themselves on the Left; 18 and 12% respectively define themselves as Center and about 10% did not know how to map themselves on the political spectrum.

It is very interesting to note that about a third of the Arabs did not identify themselves politically. This might be because they don't share the Israeli political identity in terms of Right or Left; or because they are afraid to identify themselves politically.

The rightward leaning of the Jewish youth is mainly expressed in the opinion that most of the Arabs would destroy the State of Israel if they could, and less in terms of unwillingness for a peace process and paying a price for peace. Most of the Jewish youths (58% of the adolescents and 68% of the young adults) believe that most of the Arabs would destroy the State of Israel if they could. About a fifth (20% and 18%, respectively) are not sure, so that only about a fifth of the adolescents and 15% of the young adults explicitly disagree with this statement. It is interesting to note that even a large minority of the Arab sector (44% of the adolescents and 37% of the young adults) agree explicitly with this statement. While it is likely that this is an expression of the atmosphere in their (Arab) environments, it might also be true that they are influenced by arguments of Jewish leaders.

Despite these perceptions and beliefs of the Jewish youth as detailed above, or perhaps **because** of these views, the youth expressed a willingness to negotiate with the Palestinians and establish a Palestinian state in exchange for peace. Even though most of the Jewish respondents (about 70–80%) do not believe that negotiating with the Palestinians will lead to peace, most want to conduct negotiations with the Palestinians and are willing to pay a price for peace. Almost two-thirds of the adolescents and half of the young adult Jews, think that negotiations should be held with the Palestinians. A small majority of the Jewish sector (51% of the adolescents and 60% of the young adults) believe that a peace agreement cannot be reached without a Palestinian state; and a larger majority (about 70% of both age groups) favor a solution of 'two states for two nations.'

There is also a significant percentage (about half) of the Arab sector that favors negotiations. Most of the Arab youth (about three-quarters) support the 'two states for two nations' solution, but some (between a fifth and a quarter) prefer a binational state.

2) Correlation with socio-demographic characteristics

a) Gaps between national groups:

The proportion of Arabs who do not identify themselves politically is greater than the corresponding percentages of the Jews. Yet the proportion of the Arabs who identify themselves in the Left is greater than the corresponding percentages among the Jews (the gap is even larger if we only relate to those who do identify themselves politically). The Arabs do score higher than the Jews on the index that examines readiness for a peace process (in all its variations).

Within the Arab sector, there is a higher proportion of those who feel that peace can only be achieved via a Palestinian state, and such a state must be approved. Yet a lower proportion of Arab youths favor peace negotiations, when compared to Jewish youths.

b) Age gaps:

In the Jewish sector: As the age of the respondents increase, so does the proportion of those who believe that most of the Arabs would want to destroy the State of Israel. In parallel, the adolescents are in favor of negotiations with the Palestinians and have greater faith than the young adults have in the chances that negotiations will indeed lead to peace.

In the Arab sector: The adolescents believe that a peace agreement can be reached without a Palestinian state, more than the young adults. This is

evidently because they (the younger adolescents) are in favor of a binational state more than the 'two states for two nations' solution that is preferred by the young adults. (The adolescents express this opinion in the earlier question asking for their "preferred solution to end the conflict.")

c) Gender gaps:

Gender gaps were not found in either sector (Jews or Arabs).

d) Correlation with level of religiosity:

The higher the level of religiosity, the lower the frequency of the following opinions: support for conducting negotiations with the Palestinians, belief that such a step can lead to peace, support of the 'two states for two nations' solution, and the belief that a peace agreement can be reached without a Palestinian state.

e) Correlation with political identity

The correlation between political identity to political attitudes or positions, is identical to the correlation between level of religiosity and political attitudes: as we move from Right to Left on the political spectrum there is a gradual increase in the proportion of those who support negotiations with the Palestinians, who believe that such a step can lead to peace, who support the 'two states' solution, and who believe that a peace agreement can be achieved without a Palestinian state.

5. Social-economic attitudes

This section deals with the following subjects: general attitudes regarding the desirable economic system, and attitudes regarding society's responsibility to the individual.

Attitudes regarding the desirable economic system -

the ideal and reality

The following two questions examined this subject:

"Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 'Marketplace

forces should be allowed to operate with minimal government intervention'?"

"Privatization is the transfer of various companies and services from the state to private hands. Do you feel that the privatization process is being carried out to the appropriate degree, too much, or too little?"

Factor analysis shows that the two questions are from the same universe content, and the result of the internal reliability (Cronbach) test show that the two questions may be combined in one joint index.

Table No. 17 displays the responses of the interviewees.

	Entire	sample	Jewish	sector	Arab	sector
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
a. Allow the free man	ket to operat	e with mini	mal governi	ment interv	ention	
Strongly agree	20	23	11	14	48	51
Tend to agree	39	32	40	34	37	24
Tend to disagree/Strongly disagree	32	35	37	39	15	23
Don't know	9	10	12	13		2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
b. Assessme	nt of the priv	atization pr	ocess in the	country		
Too little	34	30	30	25	47	47
At the appropriate level	22	25	18	24	32	30
Too much	28	24	32	28	15	11
Did not answer	16	21	20	23	6	12
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

 Table No. 17: Attitudes toward government intervention in the economy

 A. According to sector and age group

В.	Jews:	According	to age	group	and	level	of	religiosity

		Age	s: 15-18		Ages: 21-24						
	Haredi Religious Traditional Secular Haredi Religious Trad						Traditional	Secular			
a. Al	a. Allow the free market to operate with minimal government intervention										
Agree	Agree 21 7 12 10 17 9 15 13										
Tend to agree	40	43	43	36	30	36	33	36			

		Age	s: 15-18		Ages: 21-24			
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular
Tend to disagree/ Strongly disagree	28	34	38	41	31	43	36	43
Don't know	11	16	7	13	22	12	16	8
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	b. As	ssessment o	f the privatiza	tion proc	ess in the	country		
Too little	33	33	32	26	21	27	29	24
At the appropriate level	21	17	15	21	22	23	20	26
Too much	16	27	35	36	18	24	32	31
Don't know	30	23	18	17	39	26	19	19
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Society's responsibility toward the individual The following questions were asked:

"Do you agree or disagree with the following statements: The government should ensure that all citizens meet a certain minimum standard of living; and, If the government would ensure a minimum standard of living for each citizen, people would take unfair advantage; and, Does the State do enough economically for the underprivileged elements of the population?

Factor analysis shows that these three questions are from the same universe content, but the results of the internal reliability (Cronbach) test show that the questions may not be combined in one joint index.

Table No. 18 displays the responses of the interviewees.

Table No. 18: Viewpoints regarding responsibilityof society toward the individual

8	U	J				
	Entire	sample	Jewish	sector	Arab	sector
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
a. The government should	ensure that a	all citizens m	eet a certain	minimum s	tandard of li	ving
Agree	71	72	69	69	77	82
Tend to agree	20	20	21	22	14	12

A. According to sector and age group

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	Entire	sample	Jewish	sector	Arab	sector
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
Tend to disagree/Disagree	7	6	7	7	7	5
Don't know	2	2	3	2	2	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
b. If the government	would ensur	e a minimun	n standard o	f living for e	ach citizen,	•
	people wou	ıld take unfa	ir advantage	9	-	_
Agree	13	15	11	12	20	20
Tend to agree	33	29	38	33	21	16
Tend to disagree/Disagree	50	52	47	50	57	61
Don't know	4	4	4	5	2	3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
c. Does the State do	enough for t	he underpriv	vileged eleme	ents of the p	opulation?	
Does enough	24	17	17	12	45	32
Does not do enough	73	80	80	85	53	67
Don't know	3	3	3	3	2	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

B. Jews: According to age group and level of religiosity

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		Ages: 15-18 Ages: 21-24										
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular				
a. The government should ensure that all citizens meet a certain minimum standard of living												
Agree	79	65	70	68	78	58	70	70				
Tend to agree	16	23	21	23	13	34	18	24				
Tend to disagree/Disagree	2	8	8	7	5	7	9	6				
Don't know	3	4	1	2	4	1	3					
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%				
b. If the	b. If the government would ensure a minimum standard of living for each citizen, people would take unfair advantage.											
Agree	12	8	12	11	8	8	16	17				
Tend to agree	42	36	37	38	26	38	33	33				

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		Ages	s: 15-18		Ages: 21-24			
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular
Tend to disagree/Disagree	38	50	50	47	58	49	45	50
Don't know	8	6	1	4	8	5	6	3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
c. Does	the State	e do enough	for the under	privilegeo	l element	s of the pop	oulation?	
Does enough	9	19	16	17	4	16	12	12
Does not do enough	84	77	82	79	95	78	86	84
Don't know	7	4	2	4	1	6	2	4
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Summary

1) Reference to the economic system - the ideal and reality

It is important to note that it is likely that some of the respondents did not understand the connection between allowing the market to operate freely and privatization (11% of all the Jewish respondents and 9% of the Arabs were not in favor of allowing the market to operate freely, but they also said that the level of privatization in Israel is too low). Regarding the other findings: in the Jewish sector – about half of the respondents agree with the capitalistic approach, but 30% of them (comprising 15% of the entire sample) think that there is too much privatization in Israel; about 38% disagree with the capitalistic approach, but about a fifth of them (comprising 18% of the entire sample) think that privatization in Israel is being carried out properly, at the right level. In other words, about an additional quarter of those who disagree with the capitalistic approach think that the level of privatization is lower than what is needed.

In the Arab sector, about 80% support the capitalistic approach and only a short percentage of them (13%, comprising 10% of the entire sample) feel that the level of privatization is too high.

2) Society's responsibility toward the individual

There is no correlation between attitudes for or against capitalism and attitudes toward societal responsibility toward the individual: Most of the respondents think that the State must provide for its citizens. This is despite the fact that many of the respondents feel that people would take unfair advantage of the government if it ensured a minimum standard of living for all (about half of the Jewish respondents and more than a third of the Arab respondents feel this way). Thus more than 90% of the entire sample, and 90% of those fearing unfair exploitation, still believe in the state's responsibility toward its citizens.

3) Correlation with socio-demographic characteristics

a) Gaps between national groups:

More Arabs than Jews are in favor of a free economy and exhibit a greater tendency to view privatization as being on a lower level than it ideally should be.

b) Gaps between age groups:

No significant gaps were found in the different age-groups in either sector (Jewish or Arab).

c) Gender gaps:

In the Jewish sector: A higher proportion of males than females think that people will unfairly take advantage of government efforts to provide a minimum standard of living to all.

In the Arab sector: No gender gaps were found.

d) Correlation with level of religiosity (in the Jewish sector):

A higher proportion of haredim feel that the government does not do enough for society's underprivileged elements, in comparison with the other groups.

e) Correlation with political identity (in the Jewish sector):

Although Israeli conventional wisdom holds that there is no correlation between people's location on the political Right-Left spectrum and their location on the parallel social-economic spectrum, there was such a correlation in this survey. The proportion of those who claimed that too much privatization has taken place,

is significantly higher among those who identify themselves as members of the Left (over those who identify themselves as Center or Right). In addition, as we move from Left-Center-Right there is an increase in support for a free economy.

6. Religion and State

This topic was examined only in the Jewish sector. The associated questions refer to one aspect of religion and state: the state's recognition of the different types of marriages. A preliminary question examined the personal preference of the interviewee regarding his/her model of marriage or relationship with a partner.

"If the couples getting married in Israel could choose among a number of types of marital unions (as in Western countries), what type would you personally prefer?" The survey offered the following choices: marriage by a rabbi recognized by the Israeli rabbinate; marriage by a rabbi who is not recognized by the Israeli rabbinate (Reform or Conservative); civil marriage; or cohabitation (living together without formal marriage).

Then three forms of marital unions were offered to the respondents who were asked, "In your opinion, should the State of Israel recognize this type of marriage?" The three options were: marriage by a Reform or Conservative rabbi; civil marriage; and single-sex marriages.

Factor analysis shows that the marriage-related questions are from the same universe content. However, the results of the internal reliability (Cronbach) test show that a joint index may be comprised only of the questions examining attitudes, not personal preference.

Table No. 19 displays the responses of the interviewees.

Table No. 19: Personal preference and attitudes regarding various types of marital unions

A. According to age group (Jews only)

	15-18	21-24
a. Personal preferences among types of marital unions		
Marriage by a rabbi recognized by the Israeli rabbinate	76	70
Marriage by a rabbi who is not recognized by the Israeli rabbinate (Reform or Conservative)	4	8
Civil marriage	16	18

	15-18	21-24
Cohabitation (living with a partner without getting married)	4	3
Don't know		1
Total	100%	100%
b. For or against recognition of the different types of n 1) Reform or Conservative rabbi	narriages	
Should be recognized	50	51
Should not be recognized	45	46
Don't know	5	3
Total	100%	100%
2) Civil marriage		
Should be recognized	55	54
Should not be recognized	41	43
Don't know	4	3
Total	100%	100%
3) Same-sex marriages		
Should be recognized	52	51
Should not be recognized	45	47
Don't know	3	2
Total	100%	100%

B. According to age group and level of religiosity

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	Ages: 15-18					Ages: 21-24			
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	
a. Personal preferences among types of marital unions									
Marriage by a rabbi recognized by the Israeli rabbinate	96	92	91	54	95	96	83	43	
Marriage by a rabbi who is not recognized by the Israeli rabbinate (Reform or Conservative)		2	3	8	1	2	7	14	

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		Age	s: 15-18		Ages: 21-24				
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	
Civil marriage	2	2	5	32	2		5	37	
Cohabitation (living with a partner without getting married)						1	2	1	
Don't know	2	4	1	6	2	1	3	5	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
	b. For o	r against re	cognition of t	he differe	nt types o	of marriages	5		
		1) R	eform or Con	servative	rabbi				
Should be recognized	16	18	49	70	9	16	50	81	
Should not be recognized	78	75	47	25	87	82	45	18	
Don't know	6	7	4	5	4	2	5	1	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
			2) Civil m	arriage					
Should be recognized	14	20	52	80	9	19	56	87	
Should not be recognized	77	74	44	17	86	77	41	13	
Don't know	9	6	4	3	5	4	3		
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
			3) Same-sex	marriage	s				
Should be recognized	12	18	52	75	4	10	54	85	
Should not be recognized	81	75	47	23	92	86	43	15	
Don't know	7	7	1	2	4	4	3		
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

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Summary

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1) Preferences regarding Religion and State

About three-quarters of Jewish adolescents and more than two-thirds of Jewish young adults would personally prefer to be married by a rabbi recognized by the Israeli rabbinate. It is worthwhile to note that the similarity in the answer distribution of the two age-groups shows that the intervening

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years of army service and maturation have no significant effect on their attitudes toward this issue. Yet, although there is low personal preference assigned to non-Orthodox marriages, a large proportion of the respondents (about half of each of the age groups) are in favor of non-Orthodox marriages, including single-sex unions.

In other words, they feel that each person has the right to live according to his or her beliefs.

2) Correlation with socio-demographic characteristics

a) Gaps between age groups: No gaps were found between the different age-groups.

b) Gender gaps:

No gender gaps were found.

c) Correlation with level of religiosity:

As expected, fewer secular Israelis personally preferred Orthodox marriages and a higher percentage of them preferred civil marriage. There were no significant differences between traditional, *haredi*, and religious Jews (regarding Orthodox vs. civil marriage). The lower the level of religiosity, the higher the percentage of supporters of the following types of marital unions: civil marriages, marriages by an unrecognized rabbi, and single-sex marriages.

d) Correlation with political identity

People who place themselves on the Left, personally prefer civil marriage over all the other kinds of unions. Also, as we move from Left to Right on the Left-Center-Right political spectrum, we witness an increase of those who personally prefer Orthodox marriages, and a decrease of those who prefer civil marriages. Similarly, as we move to the Right we witness a drop in supporters of marital unions that are not recognized today in Israel.

7. Attitudes toward Germany

Several statements or opinions about Germany were read to the respondents and they were asked, after each statement, if they believed it was correct or not. All the statements except for one referred to modern-day Germany.

"Germany today is one of the friendliest countries to Israel"; "The intensity of hatred of foreigners (xenophobia) in Germany is similar to the hatred that exists in every other country in the world"; Today's Germany is no different than Germany in the past, and a Nazi regime can rise again there"; "Today's Germany is among the world's civilized democracies like any other country in Western Europe such as England, France, Italy etc."; "The destruction of Jews in the Holocaust was, in effect, supported by most of the German nation and not only by the Nazi leadership."

Factor analysis demonstrates that the questions in this section are divided into the following two universe contents. The first factor is an appraisal of Germany today: friendliness to Israel; whether a Nazi regime could rise today; a civilized democracy like other countries in Western Europe. The second factor is xenophobia in general, and the support of most of the German nation of the annihilation of the Jewish people during the Holocaust period. The first factor is self-understood. It is intuitive that there would be a negative correlation between one's views of today's Germany as being democratic, civilized, and friendly to Israel - and whether a Nazi regime could rise again today. However, the second factor-analysis finding is surprising. According to this finding, the opinion regarding the possibility of a Nazi regime rising again is not connected to xenophobia and perceptions of the behavior of the German nation during the Holocaust. Even more surprising is that the same set of perceptions emerges separately in each of the age groups. A possible explanation for this is that despite the belief that the destruction of the Jews during the Holocaust was supported by most of the German nation, the respondents believe that this belongs to the past. They may feel that xenophobia in Germany today, as in other countries, is not connected to the Holocaust or to chances of the rise of another Nazi state today.

Assessment of Germany in the present

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Tables No. 20–21 exhibit the responses of the interviewees.

	Entire	sample	Jewisl	n sector	Arab	sector
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
	a. Germ	any today is one	e of the countrie	es friendliest to	Israel	
True	53	54	49	56	61	51
False	37	30	40	28	30	34
Don't know	10	16	11	16	9	15
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
b. Today'	s Germany is no	different than	Germany in the	past, and a Na	zi regime can r	ise again
True	33	25	35	24	30	25
False	61	64	61	64	52	61
Don't know	6	11	4	12	8	14
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
c. Germany to	day is one of the		l democracies l ngland, France,		ries in Western	Europe – for
True	64	60	65	62	59	54
False	23	20	22	19	28	25
Don't know	13	20	13	19	13	21
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table No. 20: Viewpoints of Germany of todayAccording to sector and age group

B. Jews: According to age group and level of religiosity

		Ages	: 15-18		Ages: 21-24				
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	
		a. Germany	v today is one	of the coun	tries friend	liest to Israe	1		
True	35	32	47	62	31	41	61	68	
False	44	53	46	29	41	37	29	20	
Don't know	21	15	7	9	28	22	10	12	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

b. Tod	lay's Germa	any is no dif	ferent than G	ermany in	the past, an	d a Nazi reg	ime can rise	again
True	68	51	34	21	49	38	22	12
False	19	44	63	75	31	51	71	80
Don't know	13	5	3	5	20	11	7	8
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
c. Germany	y today is o	ne of the wo	rld's civilized	democraci	es like other	countries i	n Western Eu	rope - for
			example Eng	gland, Fran	ce, Italy etc.			
True	52	62	61	73	38	54	60	76
False	28	26	27	15	28	26	21	10
Don't know	20	12	12	12	34	20	19	14
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

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Assessment of xenophobia in the present, and hatred of Jews in the past

Table No. 21: Perceptions of xenophobia in today's Germanyand involvement of the German nation in destructionof the Jewish nation during the Holocaust

A. According to sector and age group

	Entire	sample	Jewish	sector	Arab sector	
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
a. The intensity of h	atred of foreig			-	o the hatred th	at exists in
		every other co	ountry in the w	vorld		
True	47	46	49	50	42	35
False	40	32	38	28	45	42
Don't know	13	22	13	22	13	23
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
The destruction of Je	ws in the Holo	caust was, in e	ffect, supporte	ed by most of t	he German na	tion and not
		only by the	Nazi leadersh	ір		
True	62	62	70	70	44	35
False	30	25	25	22	42	36
Don't know	8	13	5	8	14	29
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

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		Age	s: 15-18		Ages: 21-24				
	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	
a. The	intensity o	f hatred of f	oreigners (xen	ophobia) in (Germany i	s similar to	the hatred that	t exists in	
			every oth	er country i	n the worl	d			
True	44	53	49	47	44	48	44	55	
False	35	32	39	42	25	30	34	27	
Don't know	21	15	12	11	31	22	22	18	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
The dest	ruction of	Jews in the	Holocaust was	, in effect, su	pported b	y most of th	e German nati	on and not	
			only by	y the Nazi le	adership				
True	77	73	73	66	77	78	67	66	
False	12	21	24	30	11	16	23	28	
Don't know	11	6	3	4	12	6	10	6	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

B. Jews: According to age group and level of religiosity

Summary

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1) Perceptions of Germany today tilt toward the positive

About half of the Jewish adolescents and a little more than half of the young adults feel that today's Germany is one of Israel's friendliest countries (a large minority of the adolescents and a small minority of the young adults don't expressly agree with this claim). Almost two-thirds of both age groups agree that Germany is one of the world's civilized democracies. Close to two-thirds of both age groups (61 and 64%, respectively) don't agree that a Nazi regime could rise again in today's Germany. On the other hand, only a bit less than 40% of both age groups, don't expressly state that such a regime **couldn't** arise. About a third of the adolescents and a quarter of the young adults agree explicitly that such a regime **could** arise in Germany; while 4% and 12% respectively could not state explicitly that such a thing **could not** happen. About half think that xenophobia in Germany today is no different than in other countries.

Data from the Arab sector are similar to the ones from the Jewish sector,

except that 61% of the Arab youths agree that Germany today is very friendly to Israel – higher than the corresponding rate among the Jewish youths.

But Germany of the past is another story indeed. The positive assessments of modern Germany do not erase or even dull the collective Jewish memories of Germany in the past. A significant majority of the Jewish respondents (70% of both age groups) think that the destruction of European Jewry in the Holocaust was supported by a majority of the German nation. However, they also feel that xenophobia in today's Germany is no greater than in other countries, and will not lead to the rise of a Nazi regime.

2) Correlation with socio-demographic characteristics

a) Gaps between national groups

No significant differences were found between Jews and Arabs regarding their outlook toward Germany today, with one exception: a higher percentage of Arab youths feel that Germany is a friend of Israel, relative to the corresponding Jewish group.

Regarding Germany's present hatred of foreigners (xenophobia) relative to other countries and to the past involvement of the German nation in the Holocaust, the following gaps were found between the two national groups: the proportion of Jews who feel that Germany's present hatred of foreigners is no different than other countries is higher than the corresponding proportion among the Arabs. However, a significantly higher proportion of Jews than Arabs think that most of the German nation took an active part in annihilation of the Jews during the Holocaust.

b) Age gaps:

Jewish sector: A higher proportion of adolescents than young adults have the following opinions: that Germany today is **not** friendly toward Israel; that a Nazi regime **could** rise even now; and that Germany exhibits **more** xenophobia than other countries.

Arab sector: There is a higher proportion of Arab than Jewish adolescents who feel that today's Germany is friendly to Israel.

c) Gender:

No gender gaps were found in either national group.

d) Level of religiosity (only Jews):

The higher the level of religiosity, the lower the proportion of those who view today's Germany as a civilized democracy and the higher the proportion of those who feel that a Nazi regime could rise today. A higher proportion of religious Jews (national-religious and haredim, in contrast to secular and traditional Jews) feel that most of the German nation was involved in the destruction of Jews during the Holocaust.

e) Correlation with political identity (only Jews):

As we move from Right to Left on the political spectrum, we find an increase in the proportion of respondents who feel that Germany is one of the friendlier countries to Israel, and who reject that claim that a Nazi regime could arise today in Germany. The transition from Right to Left also raises the proportion of those who agree that Germany today is among the world's civilized democracies. Respondents who identify themselves as Left or Center are more likely to reject the argument that the German nation supported the annihilation of the Jews, than respondents on the Right of the political spectrum.

8. Exposure to the mass media

Another domain that was examined in this survey and found by factor analysis **not** to be linked to any of the other topics above, is the domain of the media. As technological changes have widened the generation gap, we found the mass media to be relevant to our discussion. We found it important to examine the communication channels to which the youth are exposed, from what sources do they obtain their information about the world, and what influences them. The following media-related issues were raised in the survey:

- Exposure to the mass media
- Involvement in social and political activities via the internet

- Reading hard-copy books that are not textbooks
- Report on their friends' usage of the internet
- Level of trust in the internet

Frequency of exposure to the mass media

The questionnaire referred to each of the following forms of media: radio, television, internet, and the press (printed newspapers). The respondents were asked about their use of the media-forms listed above for consumption of news or current events-related information as well as information on other topics. Below are the questions:

"How frequently, if at all, do you: listen to news or current events on the radio/ watch the news or current events programs on television / read about the news or current events on the internet / read about the news or current events in the (printed) press."

"How frequently, if at all, do you use one of the following forms of media as a source of information on other topics (such as: culture, health issues, nutrition, environmental issues, etc.)."

The survey also probed the respondents about how much their *friends* used the internet. The questions in this category were: "From what you know, or according to your general impression, do youth who are your friends or acquaintances use the internet for social or political activity?" The youth who answered that at least some of their friends use the internet were then asked, "In your opinion, what is the main reason that young people turn to the internet for social or political activity?"

Factor analysis shows that the use of the media by the respondents themselves is divided into two groups or factors. The first factor is exposure to news and current events programs in each of the four media forms: television, printed press, internet and radio. The second factor is searching for information on other subjects using the same resources: television, internet, and the printed press (listening to the radio for non-news related information does not belong to this universe content). Results of the internal reliability (Cronbach) test show that one joint index may be used for these types of media exposure.

The second category we get from the factor analysis is: non-news related information from the radio. Finally, the friends' use of the internet for anything else but information (such as social networking sites) does not belong to either of these universe contents and, therefore, appears in a separate sub-chapter.

Tables No. 22-24 displays the responses of the interviewees.

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Exposure to news and current-event programs on television, the printed press, internet and radio

	Entire	sample	Jewish	sector	Arab sector		
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	
	Listeni	ing to news or	current events	on the radio			
Every day	23	36	23	36	25	34	
Several times a week	31	22	34	23	21	18	
Once a week	14	12	13	12	17	11	
More infrequently	30	28	29	27	34	33	
Did not answer	2	2	1	2	3	4	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
	Watching the	e news or curr	ent events pro	grams on telev	ision		
Every day	32	30	28	27	46	40	
Several times a week	31	26	34	26	23	25	
Once a week	14	11	15	11	13	10	
More infrequently	21	28	23	30	15	23	
Did not answer	2	5		6	3	2	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
	Reading	the news or c	urrent events	on the internet			
Every day	39	49	30	44	66	65	
Several times a week	21	18	22	19	17	13	
Once a week	12	7	15	8	6	6	
More infrequently	26	22	31	25	11	13	
Did not answer	2	4	2	4		3	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

Table No. 22: Exposure to news and current events on the mass mediaA. According to sector and age group

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	Entire sample		Jewish	sector	Arab sector				
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24			
	Reading th	ding the news or current events in the printed press							
Every day	18	29	19	31	15	22			
Several times a week	17	22	18	25	13	13			
Once a week	28	25	27	22	34	34			
More infrequently	34	21	36	20	33	26			
Did not answer	3	3		2	5	5			
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			

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B. Jews: According to age group and level of religiosity

		Ages	s: 15-18		Ages: 21-24				
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	
		Listening to	o news or cur	rent event	s on the 1	adio			
Every day	40	15	19	26	21	23	41	45	
Several times a week	21	38	33	35	20	29	20	23	
Once a week	2	17	17	11	11	21	12	10	
More infrequently	35	28	30	27	41	25	25	22	
Did not answer	2	2	1	1	7	2	2		
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
	Watc	hing the nev	vs or current	events pro	ograms of	n television			
Every day	7	20	32	30	8	15	36	36	
Several times a week	12	30	37	37	8	21	33	31	
Once a week	9	18	14	14	5	13	11	13	
More infrequently	60	29	16	19	50	48	19	18	
Did not answer	12	3	1		29	3	1	2	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
	I	Reading the	news or curre	ent events	on the in	ternet			
Every day	12	29	32	33	20	47	48	50	
Several times a week	9	23	21	24	17	23	19	18	

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	Ages: 15-18				Ages: 21-24				
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	
Once a week	7	16	16	15	7	6	7	9	
More infrequently	65	29	30	27	38	22	24	22	
Did not answer	7	3	1	1	18	2	2	1	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
	Rea	ading the ne	ws or current	events in	the print	ed press			
Every day	19	11	19	23	20	29	36	34	
Several times a week	23	19	19	17	22	24	26	24	
Once a week	35	33	25	23	29	26	21	18	
More infrequently	21	35	35	35	21	20	15	23	
Did not answer	2	2	2	2	8	1	2	1	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

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	Entire	sample	Jewish	sector	Arab sector		
	15-18	21-24	15-18	15-18	21-24	15-18	
		R	adio				
Every day	12	19	12	19	11	18	
Several times a week	15	18	14	18	17	18	
Once a week	14	13	11	12	22	15	
More infrequently	55	46	59	47	45	46	
Did not answer	4	4	4	4	5	3	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
		Tele	evision				
Every day	49	37	59	58	55	44	
Several times a week	21	19	19	15	22	20	
Once a week	10	11	6	8	8	15	
More infrequently	18	27	13	15	14	19	
Did not answer	2	6	3	4	1	2	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	

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	Entire	sample	Jewish	sector	Arab	sector
	15-18	21-24	15-18	15-18	21-24	15-18
		In	ternet			
Every day	61	61	58	59	70	68
Several times a week	16	14	17	16	13	10
Once a week	7	7	8	7	5	6
More infrequently	14	14	15	14	11	15
Did not answer	2	4	2	4	1	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		Print	ed Press			
Every day	15	23	16	25	10	18
Several times a week	18	20	21	24	12	10
Once a week	32	27	30	24	40	38
More infrequently	32	26	32	25	32	30
Did not answer	3	4	1	2	6	4
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

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B. Jews: According to age group and level of religiosity

		Ages	s: 15-18			Age	s: 21-24	
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular
			Rad	io				
Every day	16	13	13	11	16	19	21	21
Several times a week	14	17	9	17	13	22	15	18
Once a week	9	13	9	12	12	16	11	11
More infrequently	54	52	67	57	48	41	49	48
Did not answer	7	5	2	3	11	2	4	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
			Televi	sion				
Every day	7	29	56	56	5	24	51	44
Several times a week	2	28	19	20	6	12	21	25
Once a week	5	14	12	10	4	13	11	10

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		Ages	s: 15-18			Age	s: 21-24	
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular
More infrequently	70	27	12	13	54	47	15	19
Did not answer	16	2	1	1	31	4	2	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
			Inter	net				
Every day	14	46	67	65	24	63	63	68
Several times a week	7	27	13	18	13	19	15	17
Once a week	2	9	8	8	10	7	8	5
More infrequently	65	16	10	9	31	10	13	8
Did not answer	12	2	2		22	1	1	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
			Printed	Press				
Every day	14	9	16	20	17	18	31	27
Several times a week	26	17	20	22	23	23	29	21
Once a week	26	45	28	25	28	31	20	21
More infrequently	30	28	34	32	22	27	17	30
Did not answer	4	1	2	1	10	1	3	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

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Table No. 24: Reporting on friends' surfing of the internetA. According to sector and age group

8	Entire sample		Jewish	Jewish sector		sector			
	15-18	21-24	15-18	15-18	21-24	15-18			
a. Proportion of friends who surf the internet									
All or most of the youth I know	31	29	30	27	33	33			
About half	14	14	14	16	14	8			
A small proportion	36	32	38	32	31	32			
No one	17	20	16	19	21	23			
Don't know	2	5	2	6	1	4			
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			

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	Entire sample		Jewish	Jewish sector		sector
	15-18	21-24	15-18	15-18	21-24	15-18
l	b. Reasons f	or surfing t	he internet			
More efficient than other methods	35	38	36	42	32	26
More interesting, challenging and modern than other methods	29	24	29	20	30	38
Youth are interested in activity but are too lazy to do something "real"	10	15	12	16	8	12
This is the way we grew up	8	6	7	7	9	3
Other forms of activity are only available to people who are older or are in positions of power	8	9	9	11	6	5
Don't know	10	8	7	4	15	16
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

B. Jews: According to age group and level of religiosity

			s: 15-18		Ages: 21-24						
	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular			
	a. Proportion of friends who surf the internet										
All or most of the youths I know	21	28	33	30	14	24	31	31			
About half	9	18	16	12	10	27	13	14			
A small proportion	28	39	33	43	28	32	28	36			
No one	40	14	17	13	31	11	23	17			
Don't know	2	1	1	2	17	6	5	2			
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			
		b.	Reasons for s	urfing the	internet						
More efficient than other methods	16	41	32	39	30	38	43	46			
More interesting, challenging and modern than other methods	32	34	27	28	34	16	20	17			

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		Ages	s: 15-18		Ages: 21-24			
	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular
Youth are interested in activity but are too lazy to do something "real"	24	8	12	10	13	20	18	14
This is the way we grew up		3	11	7	8	8	7	5
Other forms of activity are only available to people who are older or are in positions of power		6	9	12	8	11	8	13
Didn't answer	28	8	9	4	7	7	4	5
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Internet use for social and political activism purposes,

and reading of (printed) fiction

The survey examined how the respondents themselves used the internet and e-mail for social and political activism purposes. A list of various activities was read to the respondents (these activities are listed in the appropriate table below) and then they were asked, "In the last two years, were you involved in these types of activities?" The question about books was, "When did you last read a fictional or non-fictional book for your own enjoyment?" Factor analysis showed that the reading of books for enjoyment (i.e. not connected to school-study requirements) belongs to the same universe content as using the internet for social and political purposes. Perhaps the reason may be that the same people who use the internet for social-activism purposes (and not only for enjoyment such as games or information) are the same people who tend to read books. Another possible explanation is that the responses to the above questions may be affected by social desirability (a form of bias in which the interviewee gives a socially acceptable answer even if it is not true for him or her), and this factor is shared by people who read books and use

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the internet for "serious" purposes. Since we don't know which explanation is valid, we have chosen to display both topics in the same sub-chapter.

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Tables No. 25-26 display the responses of the interviewees.

Table No. 25: Percentages of respondents involved in e-mailand other internet-based activities (in the two years preceding the survey) A. According to sector and age group

	Entire	Entire sample		sector	Arab sector	
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
Participation in online discussions on public agenda topics	20	21	20	21	22	20
Signing petitions (on the internet)	44	41	53	49	17	20
Organizing social and political events (via the internet)	20	19	20	17	23	26
Sending e-mails to government offices, Knesset members or social activist organizations	15	19	12	16	27	29

B. Jews: According to age group and level of religiosity

		Ages	: 15-18	Ages: 21-24				
	Haredi	Religious	Traditional	Secular	Ha-redi	Religious	Tradi- tional	Secular
Participation in online discussions on public agenda topics	5	23	22	19	8	28	20	24
Signing petitions (on the internet)	14	45	56	61	27	62	44	45
Organizing social and political events (via the internet)	7	18	21	21	5	22	18	20
Sending e-mails to government offices, Knesset members or social activist organizations	5	16	12	11	17	17	17	16

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	Entire sample		Jewish sector		Arab sector	
	15-18	21-24	15-18	15-18	21-24	15-18
	The last time	e I read a boo	k for pleasu	e was:		
During the previous week	36	41	37	46	32	29
Two or three weeks ago	12	8	10	8	17	9
A month ago	14	11	12	10	19	13
Two-three months ago	9	6	10	5	9	8
About half a year ago	7	7	8	8	5	6
Seven-twelve months ago	4	5	4	5	3	4
In the far-off past	18	21	19	18	13	30
Don't know or refuse to answer		1			2	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table No. 26: Frequency of reading books for pleasure A. According to sector and age group

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B. Jews: According to age group and level of religiosity

	Ages: 15-18				Ages: 21-24					
	Haredi	Religious	Traditio-nal	Secular	Haredi	Religious	Traditio-nal	Secular		
The last time I read a book for pleasure was:										
During the previous week	73	49	28	32	51	54	35	46		
Two or three weeks ago	5	7	12	10	8	12	7	7		
A month ago	9	13	10	14	13	9	9	9		
Two-three months ago	2	10	9	12	3	3	8	6		
About half a year ago	2	5	12	9	6	11	7	7		
Seven-twelve months ago	2	5	4	3	2	2	5	8		
In the far-off past	7	11	25	20	14	9	29	17		
Don't know or refuse to answer					3					
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		

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Level of trust in the media

In this section, the interviewees' overall level of trust in the media was probed with the question, "Do you usually trust the information transmitted by the media?" In addition, the respondents were asked about the source of information they considered to be the most reliable with the question, "Among the following information sources, which one do you trust more than the others regarding news and current events information?" (The information sources referred to in this question were: internet, radio and the printed press.) Table No. 27 displays the responses of the interviewees.

	Entire	sample	Jewish sector		Arab sector	
	15-18	21-24	15-18	15-18	21-24	15-18
	Overall leve	l of trust in	the media			
Trust all or most of the media	31	19	33	21	28	17
Trust some of the media resources, distrust others	53	47	53	48	51	46
No trust all or most of the media	16	33	14	31	21	36
The n	nedia form t	hat received	maximum t	rust		
Printed press	19	13	22	13	11	13
Television	44	33	45	30	38	41
Internet	22	21	18	19	33	28
Radio	10	11	10	12	10	9
All are equally trustworthy	3	13	3	15	4	5
None of them are trustworthy	2	9	2	11	3	4
Don't know					1	
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table No. 27: Level of trust in the media

A. According to sector and age group

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D. UC (1) (1)	Ages: 15-18				Ages: 21-24					
	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular	Haredi	Reli-gious	Traditional	Secular		
Overall level of trust in the media										
Trust all or most of the media	5	22	31	44	6	8	22	31		
Trust some of the media resources, distrust others	61	55	57	47	36	48	53	50		
No trust all or most of the media	30	23	12	9	57	42	24	19		
Didn't answer	4				1	2	1			
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		
		The med	lia form that I	received m	aximum	trust				
Printed press	35	17	18	25	17	9	7	16		
Television	12	32	54	50	5	16	48	37		
Internet	16	23	18	17	17	23	15	19		
Radio	23	17	6	7	19	11	12	9		
All are equally trustworthy	2	9	3		14	20	13	15		
None of them are trustworthy	12	2	1	1	28	21	5	4		
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		

B. Jews: According to age group and level of religiosity

Summary

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1) Exposure to the media

Israel's youth are interested in the news. In the Jewish sector, 51% of the adolescents and 55% of the young adults expose themselves to news and current events at least once a day (84% – adolescents and 86% – young adults catch up on current events at least a few times a week). Among Israeli Arabs, 81% of the adolescents expose themselves to news and current events every day; 95% do so at least once a week. The respective percentages among the young adults are 80% and 91%.

Below are the percentages of those exposed to the various forms of media. The numbers within the parenthesis refer to those who are exposed every day, while the non-bracketed numbers apply to the respondents who claim to seek out the news at least a few times a week.

Table No. 28 displays the responses of the interviewees.

	Jewish	sector	Arab	sector
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24
	a. Exposu	ire to news and curre	nt events	
Internet	(30) 52	(44) 63	(66) 83	(65) 78
Television	(28) 62	(27) 53 (46) 69		(40) 65
Radio	(23) 57	(23) 57 (36) 59 (2		(34) 52
Printed press	(19) 37	(31) 56	(15) 28	(22) 35
	b. Search fo	or information on oth	er subjects	
Internet	(58) 75	(59) 75	(70) 83	(68) 78
Television	(59) 78	(58) 73	(55) 77	(44) 64
Radio	(12) 26	(19) 37	(11) 28	(18) 36
Printed press	(16) 37	(25) 49	(10) 22	(18) 28

Table No. 28: Exposure to media forms

2) Internet activity for social networking objectives

The table below displays the percentages of youths who use the internet for various social networking purposes

	Jewish	sector	Arab sector		
	15-18	21-24	15-18	21-24	
Used the internet for more than one purpose	59	54	60	41	
Used the internet for one purpose	26	26	31	41	
Didn't use the internet for any purpose	15	20	9	18	

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3) Trust in the media

Although a large percentage of the respondents are exposed to the media, only a third of the Jewish adolescents and a little more than a quarter of the Arab adolescents say that they trust all or most of the media. The corresponding percentages among the young adults are approximately fifty percent for both sectors. Moreover, a little less than a third of the young adults in both sectors (a bit more for Arabs than Jews) say that they do not trust most or all of the media.

4) Correlation with socio-demographic characteristics

a) Gaps between national groups

No gaps were found between Jews and Arabs regarding the frequency of exposure to the media. The difference between the two groups is the type of media they use. Exposure to the internet and television is more prevalent among the Arabs than the Jews, while the Jews tend toward the radio and the press. No gaps were found between the two groups regarding use of the internet for social networking purposes, or the level of trust they have in the media.

b) Age

In the Jewish sector: The exposure to media index shows that the average exposure frequency of young adults is higher than that of the adolescents. On the other hand, the adolescents have a higher trust level in the media (as they have in government institutions) than do the young adults. No age gaps were found in the use of the internet for social networking purposes.

In the Arab sector: The level of trust of adolescents in the media was higher than that of the young adults.

c) Gender:

Female respondents were exposed to the media more than males, in both the Jewish as well as Arab spheres.

d) Level of religiosity (in the Jewish sector alone):

As the religiosity level rises, the frequency of exposure to the media and trust in the media both decline.

e) Correlation with political identity:

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As we move from Right to Left on the Right-Center-Left political spectrum, we find an increase in the frequency of exposure to the media. Social network activities on the internet are more prevalent among supporters of the Left than supporters of the Center and Right. |___

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Chapter 3

Political and Social Attitudes of Israeli Youth: Trends over Time

Prof. Eppie Ya'ar and Yasmin Alkalai

The Main Findings

The findings presented in this chapter are based on three surveys conducted in 1998, 2004 and 2010 on representative samples of Israeli youth in two age groups: 15–18 and 21–24. Some of the questionnaire items appeared in only the last two periods. The first part of the summary refers to the entire group of Jewish youth in Israel, while the second part presents the main findings according to the respondents' personal (demographic) characteristics: age, gender, family income, religiosity, and political identity. In addition, there is a summary with a comparison of the Jewish and Arab youth.

Jewish Youth: Entire Group

Optimism regarding the future: Throughout all three years in which the surveys were conducted, the levels of personal optimism were very high (an average of 90% of the youths were very optimistic or fairly optimistic). By contrast, the levels of optimism regarding the future of the State were much lower, at 58%. Optimism in relation to the likelihood of achieving one's aspirations in Israel reached 79%, or a bit less than the personal optimism percentage.

Trends over time: the optimism level fell in 2004 when compared to 1998, especially with regards to the future of the State, but then returned to its former level in 2010. This pattern of descent in 2004 and ascent in 2010, which recurs in a majority of issues, is evidently the result of the "intifada effect."

Perception of threat on personal and familial safety. This topic was

examined in two of the three years. In 2004, 44% of the Jewish youths felt insecure (lack of safety) while only a little less than a quarter (24%) felt this way in 2010.

Attitudes toward the Arab community in Israel, and the Arabs in general: In 2004, about half (51%) of the Jewish youths were in favor of revoking the right of Arab citizens to be elected to the Knesset; close to half (46%) were of the same opinion in 2010. In both years, about two-thirds of the youths believed that the Arabs still hadn't recognized the existence of the State of Israel and would destroy it if they could.

Attitudes toward peace: The percentage of youths supporting peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority was 60% in both years. This percentage is lower than the stance of the Israeli public as a whole. In terms of the importance of peace as a national goal it is still ranked among the top three goals, but has been losing ground in absolute percentages: from 28% in 1998 to 16% in 2004 and 18% in 2010.

Attitudes toward democracy: The status of democracy has weakened according to the four criteria tested below:

1. **Importance of democracy as a national goal** weakened over time: In 1998 it was ranked in second place when 26% chose it as the most important goal of the State. In 2004 it still received second place, but the percentage fell to 17.0%. Finally, in 2010 it declined to third place, with only 14.3%.

2. **Trust in the legal system** also declined over time. In 1998, 74% of the youths expressed 'full trust' or 'fair amount of trust.' In 2004 it declined to 65%, in 2010 - to 63.5%. This decline is also reflected in the ranking of the legal system. In 1998 it was ranked second, while in the other two later dates it dropped to third place.

3. Support for use of **violent and non-violent civil resistance** against the government by citizens who feel that governmental policy toward the peace process harms Israel's national interests. In 1998, the percentage of supporters of non-violent civil resistance was 20%; in 2004 it was 28% and in 2010 it had risen once more, this time to 31%. The percentages regarding violent civil resistance were: 9%, 24%, and 26%, respectively. In other words, more than a quarter of Jewish youth today (2010) justify the use of violent protest measures, while in 1998 only 9% justified the use of force.

4. Most Jewish youth prefer **strong leadership** over the rule of law. In 1998 the percentage was 60%, it rose to 69% in 2004 and then returned to its former 1998 level in 2010.

Trust in institutions: Out of the eight institutions included in the study, the IDF was the only one with a very high level of trust sustained over the years. It ranked first, with a distinct advantage over all the other institutions, and scored an average trust level of about 91.0%. Trust in the following two institutions that were ranked under the IDF – the legal system and the police force – dropped consistently over time. This trend was especially prominent with regards to the legal system: from 74% in 1998 to 65% in 2004 and 63.5% in 2010. The respective percentages of trust in the police were – 71%, 67.5% and 65%. However, it should be emphasized that throughout the entire survey period, these two institutions consistently occupied the second and third positions though they exchanged places.

Levels of trust in the remaining five institutions went through several changes during the time periods under discussion. The following institutions saw increases in levels of trust: the Histadrut (from 39% in 1998, to 58.5% in 2010), the rabbinate (from 48% to 60%), and the media (from 37% to 53%).

When summarizing the overall trust-levels of all three time periods, it seems that after a decline in 2004, the trust level recovered significantly in 2010 – even beyond the 1998 level.

Internal controversies: Throughout the relevant periods, most of the attention was focused on two controversies: associations between religious and secular and between Arabs and Jews – though these two changed places. In 1998, 44% of the respondents viewed the religious-secular schism as the most dangerous, in comparison to the 27% who were more concerned about the Arab-Jew schism. In 2004 and 2010, the Jewish-Arab schism received the highest 'danger' ratings of 46% and 42% respectively, while the religious-secular schism received 21% and 23%, respectively.

Throughout the entire period, the Right-Left schism ranked third with percentages of 16%, 17% and 19%, respectively. The remaining two schisms – relationships between Mizrahim (Sephardim) and Ashkenazim – and the gap between rich and poor, received only isolated percentage points with regards to the risks they pose to Israeli society.

Important goals of the State of Israel: Out of the following seven goals – high standard of living, economic equality, democracy, Jewish nature of the State, peace, political and social equality, and gender equality – there were three that were ranked at the top of the list throughout the periods, though they exchanged places within the top three. In 1998, peace (28%) took first place, democracy (26%) was a close second, and the Jewish nature of the State was ranked third (18%). But over time, greater importance was accorded to the Jewish identity of the State. It rose to first place on the scale with percentages of 26% in 2004 and 33% in 2010 while the popularity of the other two goals declined, as explained above. It is interesting that even the political and social equality goal, chosen as the most important goal by 11% of the respondents in 1998, lost ground in the following years to 9% and 4%, respectively. The rest of the goals only earned isolated percentage points.

Interest in the Holocaust: Personal interest in the Holocaust rose significantly and consistently over time. In 1998, 61% reported high or very high levels of interest in the subject; it rose to 69% in 2004, and in 2010 it reached 80%.

Attitudes toward Germany: A significant improvement in the image or profile of modern Germany took place between 1998 and 2010. Thus, agreement with the view that Germany today is one of the friendliest countries to Israel rose from 41.5% (1998) to 60% (2010); that Germany today is among the civilized countries of the world, from 61% to 76%; and that Germany's present hatred of foreigners (xenophobia) is no different than other countries, from 43% to 59.5%. In the same vein, fewer and fewer respondents felt that Germany today resembles Nazi Germany (from 43% to 32%). Nevertheless, the vast majority of respondents throughout the years believed that most of the German nation took an active part in annihilation of the Jews during the Holocaust, though the percentages declined a bit between 1998 and 2010 (from 78% to 75%).

Overall summary: With regards to Israeli society, the current trends among Jewish youth in Israel testify to the strengthening of Jewish ultra-nationalism in contrast to a significant weakening of the values of peace and democracy. These trends were congruent with the higher levels of suspicion and distrust toward the Arab-Israeli community and the entire Arab world.

Profiles of personal (socio-demographic) characteristics

Age: The young adults were a bit less optimistic than the adolescents, mainly in relation to the future of the State and their prospects for fulfilling their personal aspirations in Israel. Similarly, the young adults were more concerned about their personal and familial safety. The attitudes toward peace negotiations between 2004 and 2010 became more positive among the adolescents and more negative among the young adults. Even the concept of peace as a national goal received more support from the adolescents in 1998 and 2010. The level of trust in the legal system was higher among the adolescents throughout the entire time period, and the drop in trust over time was more moderate than within the young adult group.

Although the adolescents were a bit more likely than the young adults to prefer strong leaders (in all three years), they ascribed greater importance to democracy in 1998 and 2010. The levels of trust in all the government institutions were higher among the adolescents. In other words, they tended to be less distrustful of the institutional systems than the young adults.

Interest in the Holocaust grew over time in both groups to the same extent, but the adolescents exhibited more interest in all three surveys than did the young adults. This gap is probably explained by the increase in popularity of high-school sponsored trips to the concentration camps.

Attitudes toward Germany were, largely, more positive among the young adults. With regards to the rest of the topics – attitudes toward Arabs, approval of civil resistance methods, perception of internal controversies, and ranking of national goals – the gaps between the two age groups were largely small and inconsistent.

Gender: The female respondents tended to be less optimistic regarding the future of the State than the males, and more optimistic regarding fulfillment of their personal aspirations in Israel. The females were more fearful than the males about personal and familial safety, especially in 2004. Attitudes toward Arabs were more negative among the male respondents in 2004, but in 2010 the two groups evened out. Support for peace negotiations was higher among the female respondents and they also tended (more than the males) to view peace as the most important national goal. With regards to trust in government institutions, a significant difference was found only with

regards to the rabbinate, which received higher levels of trust by the female respondents. The females exhibited significantly more personal interest in the Holocaust than males, though the percentages went up in both genders over time. There were no significant gender-related gaps with regards to the rest of the issues: strong leadership, civil resistance, importance of democracy, trust in the legal system, perception of dangerous controversies, and ranking of Israel's most important goals.

Family income: Attitudes toward Arabs were more negative on the low end of the income scale as opposed to the high end. (The average income group did not exhibit a consistent pattern.) Similarly, the lowest support for the peace process also came from the low-income group, but the other two income groups did not display significant, consistent patterns. A similar pattern was exhibited regarding the importance of democracy and trust in the legal system. Regarding dangerous controversies, the high income groups exhibited similar patterns in 1998, but in 2004 and 2010 gaps arose regarding the Jewish-Arab conflict. In the lowest income group, the gap between the Jewish-Arab conflict and the other controversies was smaller than in the other two income groups.

Regarding Germany's modern image: In most of the years and most of the domains, Germany's image tended to be higher in the high- and middle-income groups over the low-income group. The one exception was the claim regarding the role of the German nation in the Holocaust: the highest percentage of agreement with this, was exhibited in the high-income group.

The rest of the survey topics: There were only marginal differences with regards to optimism and to perception of threat to personal and familial safety. Similar to the age and gender demographics, there was a majority in favor of strong leaders in all three income levels and throughout all three time-periods (without significant differences between percentages). There were also no significant gaps with regards to civil resistance. There were no gaps regarding trust in government institutions, except for the legal system and democracy. There were no gaps regarding the country's important goals or in interest in the Holocaust.

Religiosity: Optimism on the personal level was similar in all the religious

groupings. The *haredim* were significantly less optimistic than all the rest regarding the future of the State. Although their optimism percentages did increase consistently, they still remained lowest (out of all the groupings) in 2010. Those who defined themselves as religious were generally more optimistic regarding the future of the State; their optimism values rose consistently and were very high in 2010. Within the traditional and secular groups, optimism fell between 1998 and 2004, but returned to its previous level in 2010. Regarding fulfilling personal aspirations in the State of Israel: there were no prominent gaps in 1998, but in 2004 and 2010 the most optimistic of all were the *haredim*, followed by the religious, the traditional and the secular in this order. Worries about personal and familial safety in 2004 were more prevalent among the secular and traditional groups than among the religious and *haredi* groups, but in 2010 the gaps disappeared almost completely as the sense of threat decreased in all four groups.

Attitudes toward Arabs were significantly and consistently correlated with the level of religiosity: the higher the religiosity level, the more prevalent were the negative attitudes. Similarly, there is a strong inverse correlation between religiosity and support for the peace process and its importance as a national goal, where the major gaps were between *haredi*-religious, and traditional-secular. In 1998 and 2004 there were no significant differences in attitudes toward strong leadership, but in 2010 this changed and significant differences developed between the religious groups. The secular were on the bottom of the scale in support of strong leadership; the traditional and *haredim* were in the middle, and the religious at the head of the scale.

Haredi willingness to use violent civil resistance became stronger over time in relation to the other religious groups, especially in contrast to the secular group. The higher the level of religiosity, the lower the percentages for democracy especially in the *haredi* group.

The level of trust in the legal system over time was also found to be inversely correlated with religiosity level. The greatest, most significant gap was between the *haredim* and the rest of the groups (including the religious group); this is in contrast to the less significant gaps in the rest of the groups regarding trust in the legal system. The status of democracy declined in all

four groups, but throughout the entire time-period its importance remained inversely correlated with religiosity level. The IDF was ranked highest in trust by all the groups except for the *haredim*. The institution most trusted by the *haredim* was the rabbinate, and the IDF was ranked just behind it by a small margin.

In 1998 all four groups, but especially the *haredim*, viewed the religious-secular dispute to be the major controversy of Israeli society. Then the situation changed radically in 2004 and 2010, when the Jewish-Arab dispute was considered most critical. Nevertheless, the *haredi* group alone was still evenly split in 2010 between the importance of the two controversies.

Important goals of the State of Israel – significant differences were evident here especially between the *haredi-religious* and secular-traditional groups, where the first two groups viewed the Jewish state as the most important goal with a significant gap between them and the other two groups. The secular group viewed peace and democracy as the most important goals throughout the entire period of the survey. The traditional group ranked peace and democracy in first and second places in 1998, but afterwards these principles lost some of their status for the sake of the goal of a Jewish state.

In all the groups, the percentage of those interested in the Holocaust rose over the years but still remained low among the *haredim*. Attitudes toward modern Germany became more positive between 1998–2010 in all the groups but still remained more positive among the secular than the other groups, especially in comparison with the *haredim*.

Political identity: No conspicuous, consistent gaps were found between members of the Right, Center and Left groups regarding personal goals for the future. Yet the Left tends consistently toward lower optimism than the other two groups with regards to the future of the State, while the Right is more optimistic than the Left and Center regarding fulfilling personal aspirations in the State of Israel.

Attitudes toward Arabs were far more negative in the Right than in the Center and Left. Similarly, the Right exhibited far lower support for peace negotiations than the Center and Left in the first two time-periods; the gap widened even further in 2010. A similar pattern of gaps emerges regarding the importance of peace as a national goal. The trend toward supporting

strong leadership is a bit higher in the Right in comparison to the Center, and especially in comparison with the Left. The Right supports civil resistance more than the Center and Left, including violent resistance. Throughout the entire time period, the Left preferred democracy as a national goal significantly more than the Right, with the Center in the middle. Trust in the legal system was higher in the Left and Center than in the Right throughout the entire period. In the Left and Center, the legal system and police were ranked second and third places on the scale throughout the entire period, while the Right assigned less trust to these institutions (in 2004 and 2010) than to the rabbinate. By contrast, the rabbinate was ranked last by the Left. Trust in the media by the Right was consistently lower than in the Center and Left.

The Right assigned more importance to the Jewish-Arab conflict in comparison to the religious-secular dispute, while the Left and Center tended to be more balanced in the importance they attribute to the two disputes – especially in 2010. There was also disagreement regarding the importance of the Jewish character of the State. This was ranked among the goals of lesser importance in the Left while it was consistently of highest rank in the Right, with peace and democracy lagging far behind. The Center was similar to the Left.

Throughout most of the years, support of modern Germany as a friendly nation was highly ranked by the Left, and less on the Right while the Center remained in the middle. No prominent gaps were found between Left, Center and Right regarding personal safety and the Holocaust.

Overall view: The socio-demographic characteristics with the most impact were: level of religiosity and political identity, followed by age, income and gender. Religiosity, with its ethnocentric viewpoint and often ambivalent views of democracy and peace is (of course) more prevalent in the *haredi* and religious groups, least in the secular group. Religion is also more dominant in the Right than the Center or Left.

With regard to age, it appeared that the adolescent group tends to be more liberal and less estranged than the young adults. With regard to income level, members of the lower income group were more likely to maintain negative views of Arabs, peace and democracy than the other two income groups,

particularly the higher income group. There were few important gaps between males and females, except for women's greater support for peace and greater interest in the Holocaust.

Attitudes of Arab and Jewish youth

Arab youth were less optimistic than the Jews in all three domains, but especially with regards to assessment of their chances to fulfill their personal aspirations within the State of Israel. Arab youth were also less likely to perceive personal and familial threats to their personal safety, and they were also less likely than Jewish youth to feel that most of the Arabs would destroy Israel if they could. While the Arabs consistently supported peace negotiations more than the Jews throughout all three surveys, even their support declined in 2004 when compared to the other surveys.

While in 1998 the Arabs expressed support of strong leaders (evidently an expression of Arafat's status), this support declined gradually and, in 2004 and 2010, was lower than among the Jews. Support for both non-violent and violent civil resistance grew in both groups over the years, but was higher among the Arabs (except for support for violent protest in the 2004 survey). Regarding trust, the largest gap between the two groups relates to the IDF which, throughout the entire time period, was ranked at the top of the scale by the Jews, but one-before-the-last among the Arabs (before the political parties). By contrast, the two institutions most trusted by Arabs over the years were the legal system and the religious institutions. The third place is, surprisingly, held by the police.

The most important controversy according to Arab youth is the Jewish-Arab dispute; not only is this consistently ranked first place throughout the entire period, but all the other disputes were much lower (separated from the first by a very large gap). Among the Jews, the Jewish-Arab dispute 'competed' with the religious-secular dispute. The most highly ranked goal by Arab youth, in the highest ranking throughout the entire time period, is peace. Nevertheless, even peace lost importance among the Arabs by absolute percentages and in 2010 it 'shared' first place with the hope that Israel would be a nation of all its citizens. This latter aspiration was far less important in 1998 and 2004. Since peace also

lost some of its importance among the Jews, and was replaced by aspirations for Israel to be a Jewish state (in the 2010 survey), the result is that both groups adopted higher goals that contradict one another – a Jewish state versus a nation of all its citizens. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that both groups resemble one another in the importance they attribute to Israel as a democratic country – a value ranked by the Arabs in the second or third place, with similar percentages throughout the years.

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Arab interest in the Holocaust was very low and even decreased sharply between 1998 and 2004. This trend runs counter to Jewish youth, whose interest in the Holocaust was much greater even at the beginning. Arab youth were more likely than Jewish youth to think that Germany is one of Israel's friends. In the early years of the survey, the two groups held the similar view that Germany's hatred of foreigners is similar to that which exists in all other countries. But in 2010, the Jewish youth ranked Germany higher than did the Arab youth. No gaps were found between the two groups regarding the chances of Germany becoming a Nazi state. While Arab youth viewed Germany as a civilized country in the surveys of 1998 and 2004, in 2010 the tables were turned and Jewish youth were more positive about Germany than the Arabs. There is a significant difference between the two groups regarding the role of the German nation in the Holocaust: the Arab youth were much less likely to blame the German nation, than were the Jewish youth.

There were no significant gaps between the two groups regarding the importance of democracy as a national goal.

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Political and Social Attitudes of Jewish youth: Trends over Time

Background

The current chapter, like the entire book, is based on findings of three surveys carried out in March–April 1998, May 2004 and July 2010. The objective of the surveys was to examine the attitudes of Israeli youth on a gamut of political and social issues in two age groups: 15–18 and 21–24. Clearly, the dozen years that elapsed since the first survey witnessed dramatic political and security changes that altered Israel's external geo-political status in the regional and international sphere, as well as its internal political and socio-economic power structure. Since we assume that these developments influenced the attitudes of Israeli youth in the relevant fields, we feel it necessary to briefly review the changes.

The first survey was conducted in 1998, a relatively 'calm' year by Israeli standards. The Right-wing government of the time, headed by Binyamin Netanyahu, did not eagerly support the Oslo Agreement signed by the Rabin government in September 1993, but Netanyahu had committed himself to implementing the agreement before the elections of 1996. And in fact, Netanyahu's elected government signed the Hebron Agreement in which Israel committed itself to remove its IDF forces from the city of Hebron and its environs. Palestinian terror, which intensified significantly after the signing of the Oslo Agreement, did not cease during Netanyahu's government but decreased significantly in comparison to the earlier period (especially during 1994–1995). At the same time, the peace process continued with contacts and direct and indirect talks between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority, though no actual progress was achieved.

In the socio-economic sphere, the picture was mixed. The inflation rate at the time was quite high (8.6%), though no different than it had been in previous years. Slightly more positive tidings arrived in 1998 on the heels of an upward trend in the rate of economic growth, though unemployment rates also continued upward and reached 8.5% that year. Regarding economic inequality, according to the Gini Index no significant changes were recorded

in 1998 in comparison to earlier years and the Gini coefficient is listed as 0.35 (after transferring social welfare payments such as child benefits, income support, unemployment payments etc.) – a figure that testifies to significant income gaps.

In contrast to the relative calm of the time-period under discussion, it is difficult to describe the far more drastic changes and upheavals that shook the political-military and socio-economic status of Israel in the post-1998 years. In the elections of May 1999, the Right-wing government lost power and was replaced by a government headed by Ehud Barak, who created a Left-wing coalition government to advance the peace process that lagged behind in the Netanyahu period. These efforts reached their peak at the summit of Camp David in July 2000. As we know, however, the summit failed miserably with both sides accusing the other of responsibility for the fiasco. A short time afterward, at the end of September 2000, the second Palestinian intifada, also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada, broke out. This led to the collapse of the peace process and renewal of terrorist acts of unprecedented scope that claimed numerous victims among the civil Israeli population.¹ These developments led to radical changes in the attitudes of the Jewish community regarding everything related to the peace process with the Palestinians. These changes were translated into a significant strengthening of the Right and the Center at the expense of the Left.²

The change in the mood of the Jewish community was expressed in two election campaigns held in Israel after May 1999. In the personal elections for prime minister, held in February 2001 (in other words, about half a year after the eruption of the intifada), Ehud Barak (head of the Labor party) was defeated by Ariel Sharon (head of the Likud), who was known as a conspicuous opponent of the Oslo Agreements and a prominent representative of the uncompromising military approach toward foreign policy and security. Almost two years later, in January 2003, general elections were held in the Knesset. The result of these elections was the

According to official sources, during the first four years of the Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000–2003) 1,017 Israelis were killed, out of which about 70% were civilians (Ha'aretz, 28.9.2004).

On this topic see: Yuchtman-Ya'ar Ephraim and Hermann Tamar. "Divided yet United: Israeli-Jewish Attitudes toward the Oslo Process." The Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39, 5:597–613, 2002.

extension of the trend of the earlier election for prime minister: significant strengthening of the parties affiliated with the Right, especially the Likud, and significant weakening of the electoral power of the two leftist Zionist parties, Labor and Meretz. From then until today, all the Israeli governments have been essentially Right-wing governments. Beyond the intifada's effect on the power – play between the Right and the Left, it caused a significant erosion of the average Israeli's sense of personal safety and undermined the national morale, as evident in the ongoing surveys of the Peace Index.

This trend continued more intensely after the general elections of 2006, during which the Right-wing and Center parties won a sweeping majority under Ehud Olmert. These elections were held in the shadow of missile attacks on the settlements of the Gaza Envelope district, which had begun a short time after the one-sided evacuation of IDF forces and Jewish hitnachluyot (settlements) in the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2005. Moreover, a few months after establishment of the government, the Second Lebanon War broke out during which the civilian population was exposed to massive firing of missiles from Hezbollah in Lebanon, together with many casualties among IDF soldiers. The Cast Lead military campaign was held at the end of 2009-beginning of 2010. It is important to remember that about a year earlier (February 2009), general elections for the Knesset were held again that led to strengthening of the Right-wing and the establishment of the present government headed by Bibi Netanyahu. This government has adopted a more unyielding approach regarding foreign affairs and security than the previous government under Ehud Olmert.

Thus we can summarize that while the scope of terrorist attacks decreased significantly between 2004 and 2010, this time period was plagued by missile attacks and military campaigns in the North and the South. Hence military-security and political problems continued to engage most of the attention of government institutions and the wide public.

The depressed mood of the Israeli public at the onset of the twenty-first century was not only caused by the political-security situation. The significant worsening of the economic domain was a strong contributing factor on both the national as well as personal levels. This trend was expressed in most of the major economic indicators: economic growth, that

had reached its peak in 2000, was halted (during 2002–2003) and even began to drop in the first part of 2004. Although the inflation rates declined during this period, this was caused by the stagnation (or 'stagflation') of the Israel economy, reflected in the upward trend of unemployment rates (among other phenomenon). These indicators, which had been high even in preceding years, continued to increase more steeply and the unemployment rate reached a peak of 10.7% in 2003. At the same time, there was a significant increase in the dimensions of inequality and the circle of poverty widened.

There were some positive and some negative developments in the socio-economic realm between 2004 and 2010. On the positive side, Israeli economy growth had revived and coped with the world economic crisis of 2009 (which is still ongoing) with relative success in comparison to most of the countries in the world including many Western states. Nevertheless, the inequality trend has continued and even increased. The gap between rich and poor has reached unprecedented levels, pointing to Israel as being one of the most unequal countries in the Western world.

Chapter structure

This chapter is divided into two: Part A summarizes the major findings regarding Jewish youth and is divided into two sub-chapters. The first sub-chapter (1A) presents aggregate-based comparisons, and the second sub-chapter (2A) presents multivariate regression analyses, as detailed below. Part B of the chapter reports the findings regarding the entire group of Arab youth for each of the survey-years, while comparing these to the corresponding findings of the entire group of Jewish youth.

As mentioned above, all the comparisons cited in this sub-chapter (1A) below are only on the aggregate level without multivariate analyses.

Research Method

Thus, we have briefly described above the major socio-economic, military and security developments that took place in Israel between the years of the first survey in 1998 until the last (third) survey in 2010. Our critical question is: How have these sweeping events affected the attitudes of Israeli youth

regarding the major issues of the personal and national domain – as reflected in the data and analyses of the three surveys?

As will be explained below, the topics included in this study represent only a portion of the gamut of topics that were included in the three surveys. But before we describe the topics that appear in the study and present the analysis of relevant findings, we present three important methodological explanations below.

The survey

First of all: each survey is based on telephone interviews with respondents who represent the full range of Israeli youth in the relevant age groups in each of the three time periods. The report compares the findings of the three surveys while distinguishing between six group profiles rooted in the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents: nationality (Jews and Arabs), age (adolescents aged 15–16 and young adults aged 21–24); gender; level of religiosity (*haredim*, religious, traditional, secular), family income (low, middle, and high), and political identity (Right, Center, and Left). Regarding the comparison between three surveys held in three different years, it should be noted that some of the questions were posed only in 2004 and 2010. The findings that refer to the samples in their entirety, without differentiating between Jewish and Arab youth, appear in an appendix at the end of the report.

Second of all: The statistical analyses in this report, based on the group profiles, refer only to the Jewish youth. References to the Arab community were limited to comparisons with the Jewish community only on the aggregate level – in other words, between the representative samples of the two groups as a whole. Analyses of group profiles of Arab youth appear in a separate chapter (Chapter 5, "Social and Political Viewpoints and Attitudes of Arab-Palestinian Youth in Israel").

Third of all: The steering committee of the report had decided that each of the two surveys conducted in 2004 and 2010 would contain only about 40% of the questions that had been included in earlier versions of the survey. As a result, it was possible to compare only a small proportion of the questions that appeared in 1998 with those that appeared in surveys on the

following two dates. Since (for this reason) the comparisons between the first and second dates, as well as between the second and third dates were limited regarding the questions that could be included, it was decided to give preference to those items that appeared in all three surveys and the two surveys conducted in 2004 and 2010. Due to these constraints, we could compare only a small portion of the variety of topics included in the surveys.

The items of the questions included in the present report were divided into the ten subjects or topics below. Note that some are represented by two or more questions, some by a single question. They are:

- Optimism regarding the future this was represented by three questions: level of optimism regarding one's personal future; level of optimism regarding the future of the country; and level of optimism regarding one's chances of fulfilling personal aspirations in the country (Israel).
- 2. **Personal safety** to what extent the respondents feel that their personal safety (and that of their families) is threatened (one question).
- 3. Attitudes toward the Arab community two questions: for or against revoking the right of Arabs to be elected to the Knesset; for or against the statement that most of the Arabs do not recognize the existence of the State of Israel and would destroy it if they could.
- Attitudes toward peace two questions: for or against negotiating for peace between Israel and the Palestinian Authority; and ranking peace as Israel's most important goal, out of seven possible goals.
- 5. Status of the rule of law and democracy four questions: 1) for or against a government based on "strong rulers" instead of on laws; 2) attitudes regarding use of non-violent or violent civil resistance by civilians who feel that the government's decisions regarding peace, harm the national interests of Israel; 3) ranking of democracy as the most important goal of the State out of seven possible goals; 4) level of trust in the legal system.
- 6. Trust in government institutions eight questions in which each question examines the level of trust or distrust in the following institutions: the IDF, the police, the Knesset, the legal system, the political parties, the media, the Histadrut, and the rabbinate.

 Internal controversies - one question, in which the respondents were asked which controversy is the most dangerous to Israeli society, out of a list of five: relations between Mizrahim (Sephardim) and Ashkenazim, secular and religious, Right- and Left-wing, rich and poor, Jews and Arabs.

- 8. National goals one question, in which the respondents were asked to pick what they feel is the most important goal of the State of Israel out of the following seven possibilities: a state with a high standard of living; a state with more economic equality; a state that is a democracy; a Jewish state; a state that lives in peace with its neighbors; a state with full political and social rights for all its citizens; a state with full gender equality...
- 9. Level of personal interest in the Holocaust one question.
- 10. Attitudes and perceptions regarding Germany five questions that examine agreement or disagreement with the following opinions:
 1) Germany is among the countries that are friendly with Israel; 2) hatred of foreigners (xenophobia) in Germany is no worse than in other countries; 3) Germany today is no different than Germany of the past, and a Nazi regime could rise again today; 4) today's Germany is a civilized democracy just like the other countries in Western Europe such as England, France, Italy etc.; 5) The destruction of the Jews in the Holocaust was, in effect, supported by most of the German nation and not only by the Nazi leadership.

Methodology

Part 1-A is based on descriptive statistics that presents the findings on the aggregate level, while comparing groups and surveys from different years. The second part (1-B) presents the results of a series of multivariate regression analyses carried out on the surveys on three different dates. These analyses help us assess the power of the controlled effect on each of the socio-demographic characteristics (the independent variables, or IV) on the attitudes of the respondents (the dependent variables, or DV) while controlling for their mutual effects. Due to the large number of questions that examine the attitudes of the respondents (26 in total), we used factor analysis to reduce the number of dependent variables (factors) so that each factor represents attitudes that share a

joint universe content. Those attitudes that were assessed on the basis of only one question (for example, level of personal interest in the Holocaust), were left as is for regression analysis. In this way, the number of dependent variables (for regression analysis) was reduced from 26 to 10; 5 of them were factors representing two or more items and 5 were discrete items, as described below:

I – **Optimism regarding the future:** Factor including all three items on this subject: personal future, fulfilling personal aspirations within the country, and the future of the State of Israel.

II - **Perception of personal safety:** one item with a question about personal safety.

III – **Attitudes toward Arabs:** This factor represents two items: belief that most of the Arabs have not recognized the existence of the State of Israel; and prohibiting Arabs from being elected to the Knesset.

IV – **Attitudes toward peace:** Contains one item out of the two on this subject: attitudes regarding negotiations for a peace agreement. The second item (importance of peace) is included in factor VI.

V – Attitudes toward the rule of law and democracy: This factor includes 3 out of 4 items on the attitudes toward strong leadership and use of non-violent and violent civil resistance. The fourth item (democracy) is included in factor VI.

VI – **Trust in institutions:** Three factors represent 8 institutions (levels of trust in these institutions were checked). The first factor includes the three national institutions in charge of defense, security, and enforcement of the law: the IDF, the police force, and the legal system. The second factor includes the political and social institutions: the Knesset, the parties, the Histadrut, and the media. The third factor includes only one institution – the rabbinate.

VII – **Internal controversies:** Factor analysis could not be carried out here because the respondents were given a list of 5 different controversies and asked which of them was most dangerous to Israeli society. Instead, the best way to test the effect of each of the controversies on the DVs was via multinomial regression.

VIII – **Joint goals:** Since here, too, the respondent was given a list of 7 possible goals and asked to choose the most important of them all were included in one multinomial regression analysis in order to assess their effects.

IX – **Personal interest in the Holocaust:** One item: "Do you take a personal interest in the Holocaust?"

X – Attitudes and perceptions vis-á-vis Germany: Two factors represent the 5 items in the topic. The first factor includes the 3 items referring to: the level of xenophobia (hatred of foreigners) in Germany; the possibility of another Nazi regime arising: and the role of the German nation in destruction of the Jews in the Holocaust.

The second factor includes opinions of today's Germany as being a friend of Israel, and whether today's Germany is a civilized nation.

Part 2-A displays the results of the multivariate regression analyses, where the socio-demographic characteristics serve as independent variables and the questions representing the attitudes on the different topics are the dependent variables.

Findings

Part 1a: Attitudes of the Jewish youth on the aggregate level **A. Optimism regarding the future**


The entire sample: The respondents were asked to rank their level of optimism or

pessimism in relation to three domains: their personal futures, the future of the State of Israel, and their chances of fulfilling their personal aspirations within the State. The findings received for the Jewish youth point to two clear trends: first, at each of the different time periods, an average of 89.6% of the youths had high or relatively high levels of optimism regarding their personal futures. This was significantly higher than their optimism regarding the future of the State of Israel (58.2%), while the percentage of those who believed they could fulfill their aspirations in Israel was in the middle (79.3%).

Secondly, the level of personal optimism in 2004 (87.2%) declined a bit in comparison to 1998 (90.1%), but bounced back in 2010 to its previous level and even a bit higher (91.8%). This pattern of decreasing and increasing was also evident in two additional spheres. Thus, optimism percentages regarding the future of the State reached 59.4% in 1998; 53.2% in 2004; and 62.6% in 2010. Similarly, the percentages for fulfilling personal aspirations in the State were: 79.4%, 74.4% and 84.6%, respectively.

We can assume that the pattern above – uniform decline in optimism in 2004 in comparison to 1998, and recovery in 2010 – is at least partly correlated with the negative effects of the Second Intifada on the personal and national morale, as has been documented in the surveys of the Peace Index. As mentioned above, the intifada began at the end of 2000 and reached its height (in terms of terrorist attacks) in 2003.

1



Graph 1: Optimism regarding the future

Age: The adolescents (15–19) tended to be a bit less optimistic than the young adults (21–24) in all three domains and time periods, especially with regards to the future of the State and likelihood of fulfilling personal aspirations in its framework. In addition, this pattern – of decline in optimism between 1998 and 2004 and then increase in 2010 even above the initial 1998 level – reappeared in both age groups.

Gender: In general, it appeared that male and female respondents were very similar in their attitudes regarding their personal futures and likelihood of fulfilling personal aspirations in Israel. Thus, the general picture we receive of the Jewish sample (on this issue) is applicable to both genders. On

the other hand, with regards to the future of the State, the female respondents tended to be less optimistic than the males in all three years. The female optimism percentages were as follows: 57.2% in 1998; 48.9% in 2004; and 60.5% in 2010. The percentages among the male respondents were 62.3%, 58.0% and 65.1%, respectively; the average difference is about 6%. This is the only topic in which the pattern of answers is represented by a U-curve.

Family income: Although the effects of this variable on the three aspects of optimism were rather small, two trends did exist: First, the optimism level in the middle-income group tends to be a bit higher than the high- and low-income groups, especially with regards to optimism about the future of the state: 61.0% – middle income, in comparison with 54.9% on the low income level and 55.3% on the high income level.

Second, in all three groups, and pertaining to all three aspects, the familiar pattern appeared of a dip in optimism between 1998 and 2004 and recovery in 2010.

Religiosity: The optimism levels (for personal futures and aspirations) were quite similar in the four groups, including a minor decline in 2004 and recovery in 2010. By contrast, with regard to the future of the state, the optimism of the *haredi* and religious groups rose consistently while the pattern among the traditional and secular respondents was of decline in 2004 and increase in 2010. Nevertheless, since the 1998 optimism percentage among the *haredim* regarding the future of the State was significantly lower than the other three groups (38.2% of the *haredim* versus about 60% or more in the other groups), the *haredi* optimism level remained the lowest even in 2010, while the religious group had the highest percentages.

Regarding the chances for fulfilling personal aspirations in the State of Israel, only the *haredi* group exhibited a consistent upward trend in optimism levels: from 80.4% in 1998, to 83.8% in 2004, and 94.8% in 2010. By contrast, the familiar pattern appeared in the other three groups, especially among the religious: decline in 2004 followed by recovery in 2010. As a result of these changes, the most optimistic in this domain were the *haredim* (94.8%) and the religious (94.0%), while the percentages of the traditional and secular groups were only 81.0% and 79.9%, respectively.


Political identity: In each of the domains - personal future, future of the

state, and likelihood of fulfilling aspirations in Israel – the familiar pattern recurs of decline of optimism in 2004 followed by recovery in 2010 in each of the three groups defined by their political identity: Right, Center and Left. The only difference among them is the low optimism level of the Left-wing youth regarding the future of the state, with percentages of 51.0% in 1998, 44.5% in 2004, and 48.6% in 2010. The parallel percentages of the Right-wing youths were: 65.2%, 57.8% and 64.7%; and the Center: 63.7%, 57.1%, and 64.7%. It is evident that the last two groups overlap completely.

B. Perception of personal safety

1

The entire sample: There was a significant decrease in perception of threat to personal and familial safety among Jewish youth between 2004 – when 44.2% of the respondents reported feeling very high or fairly high levels of threat – and 2010, when the percentage fell to 24.0%. This trend is consistent with the fact that the intensity of the intifada weakened from 2005 and onward; toward the end of the decade, it disappeared.



Graph No. 2: Perception of personal safety

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Age: During both time periods, fears for personal safety in the young adult group were a bit higher than in the adolescent group. In 2004, 40.5% of the adolescents expressed their apprehensions about personal safety in contrast to 47.7% of the young adults. In 2010, the respective percentages were 21.9% compared to 26.8%. It is possible that the higher threat-perceptions among the young adults can be attributed to harsh experiences some underwent during their army service. For example, the Cast Lead campaign took place in the winter of 2009–2010, and some of the young adults may have served at that time in the reserves. In any event, the perception of threat declined significantly among both groups in 2010.

Gender: The findings show that the female respondents were more inclined to fear for their personal and familial safety, especially in 2004 when 52.8% of the females expressed these fears in contrast to 35.0% of the males. The gaps between the two groups narrowed considerably in 2010, when only 27.4% of the females were fearful compared to 20.0% of the males.

Family income: All three income groups reported very similar levels of threat to personal safety in 2004, and then all three reported similar rates of decline in 2010. This is especially true in the low- and middle-income levels in which the perception of danger decreased from 45% to 22%, while the analogous decrease in the high-income group was a bit more moderate: from 42.1% to 27.6%.

Religiosity: In 2004 the perception of danger was very high or fairly high among 33.9% of the *haredi* and 37.7% of the religious groups, while the corresponding percentages of danger among the traditional and secular groups were higher at 48.1% and 45.1%. These gaps may result from the calming effect of religious faith that, evidently, moderated the worry for personal and familial safety during the intifada. By contrast, the perception of safety rose in all the groups in 2010, after terrorist attacks diminished significantly. The perception of safety rose in all the groups to an (almost) equal level. Only about a quarter of the youths (in each of the religious groupings) reported very high or fairly high fears for personal safety in 2010.


Political identity: The frequency of threat perception on personal and familial safety was very similar in all three groups during the two time periods. The percentages varied from about 43% to 47.0% in 2004, and

declined to percentages that varied from 21% to 27% in 2010. In other words, threat perception decreased about 20%.

C. Attitudes and perceptions toward the Arab community

The entire sample: A little bit more than half of the Jewish youths (51%) were in favor of denying Arab citizens of Israel the right to be elected to the Knesset. Although this percentage declined a bit in 2010, a large minority (46%) still supported this position at that time and only a third opposed it. The remaining 20% were undecided. At the same time, about two-thirds (67%) of the Jewish youths in 2004 agreed with the opinion that "most of the Arabs have not recognized the existence of the State of Israel and would destroy it if they could" – a percentage that declined a little bit in 2010 (64%).

It seems that Jewish youth have transferred the hostility they have toward Arabs in general, to the Arab citizens of Israel in particular.





Age: A close look at the findings of this topic in both age groups shows that in 2004, the adolescents were more likely than the young adults to agree with the

opinion that Arab citizens of Israel should be denied the right to be elected to the Knesset, with percentages of 55.7% and 46.6%, respectively. In 2010 the percentage of adolescents who adopted this position, dropped by about 10% and approximated that of the young adults (between 46% and 47% in both groups). However, a different pattern emerges with regards to the claim that Arabs seek the destruction of Israel: while in 2004 the adolescents were a bit more likely to agree with this opinion, in 2010 the situation was reversed and the adolescents were less likely to agree than the young adults. The percentages were 59% (adolescents) and 69% (young adults). Perhaps the tougher positions of the young adults were the result of the Cast Lead military campaign, which took place at a time that some of the young adults still served in the army.

Gender: In 2004, the percentage of those who agreed with the opinion that Arab citizens of Israel should be denied the right to be elected to the Knesset was a bit higher among the male respondents (53.6%) than among the females (48.5%). However, in 2010 the two groups evened out with a slightly lower percentage of 46.4%. The other opinion – that most of the Arabs would destroy the State of Israel if they could – was more acceptable in 2004 to males than to females (70.9% versus 63.6%), but the differences between the two groups disappeared almost completely in 2010.

Family income: The findings show that attitudes toward Arabs were also affected by income levels. The low-income group is the only group whose attitudes regarding barring Arabs from being elected to the Knesset did not change over time. The percentages of low-income respondents in favor of revoking Knesset membership were: 55% in 2004 and 54.08% in 2010. By contrast, the percentage of the middle-income group in favor of revoking Knesset membership *fell* from 56.4% in 2004 to 38.7% in 2010. And the percentage of the high-income group in favor of revoking Knesset membership *rose* from 41.5% to 46.8%.

A similar pattern of answers emerges with regards to agreement with the opinion that most of the Arabs would destroy the State of Israel if they could. The percentages of low-income respondents in favor of this opinion were virtually equal in both surveys: 67.6% (2004) and 68.7% (2010). By contrast, the percentage of middle-income respondents in favor of this opinion *fell* from 68.8% in 2004 to 61.% in 2010. Only the percentage of the high-income

group in favor of this opinion rose a little (as in the previous question) from 63.8% (2004) to 65.4% (2010).

Religiosity: Attitudes toward the Arabs were significantly and consistently affected by level of religiosity: the higher the religiosity level, the more frequently were negative attitudes expressed in relation to the two questions under discussion here. Thus, in 2004, support for revoking Arab Knesset membership was adopted by 42.5% of the secular, 58.3% of the traditional, 63.8% of the religious and 70.5% of the *haredi* groups. This hierarchy reappeared but with even wider gaps in 2010, especially between the secular group (whose percentage dropped to 31.0%) and the *haredi* group (whose percentage rose to 74.3%), forming a gap of 43% separating the two groups!

A similar trend emerges with regard to the second question. In 2004, the belief that most of the Arabs would destroy the State of Israel if they could was supported by 84.3% of the *haredim*, 75.4% of the religious, 73.8% of the traditional and 59.5% of the secular. This ranking was repeated in 2010 and, as in the previous question, the differences between the groups increased over time especially between *haredim* (85.0%) and secular respondents (51.5%). Predictably, the attitudes of the religious group (77.5%) were closer to those of the *haredim* while the traditional respondents (60.3%) were more similar to the secular ones.


Political identity: Predictably, the effect of political identity on attitudes toward Israeli Arabs and Arabs in general was very powerful and consistent over time. The main differences were between Right-wing and Center-Left affiliated youth. Thus, 64.3% of the Right-wingers supported revoking Arab Knesset membership in 2004, while the corresponding percentages of the Center and Left were 25.7% and 30.6%, respectively. While the stances of the Right-wingers were a bit more moderate in 2010 with a lower support percentage of 59.3%, the gap in contrast to the Center (18.9%) did not shrink significantly and, in contrast to the Left (12.8%) even grew.

A similar pattern, with even more prominent gaps, emerges in relation to the opinion that most of the Arabs would destroy the State of Israel if they could. The percentage of support of this opinion in the Right-wing group was high in 2004 – 72.7% – and became even higher in 2010, 78.0%. By contrast, the percentages of

the two other groups in favor of this statement (which was much lower even in 2004), declined in 2010 both in the Center (from 52.3% in 2004 to 44.4% in 2010) and especially in the Left-wing camp (46.5% in 2004 to 23.8% in 2010).

D. Attitudes toward peace

Entire sample: The percentage of supporters of peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority was 60% in survey time-periods, 2004 and 2010. Although this is a clear majority, it should be noted that it is lower than the percentages of support for renewing negotiations with the Palestinian Authority within the larger Jewish community in Israel, as indicated by the Peace Index. In addition: Regarding the proportion of Jewish youth who viewed peace as the most important goal of the State (in comparison to the other six possible national goals), 28.4% chose peace in 1998 and peace was first place. However, the percentage dropped to 15.9% in 2004 and peace dropped to third place on the list. In 2010, peace was chosen by 18.2% as the most important goal and rose to number two on the scale, but still lagged significantly behind the importance attributed to it in 1998.



Graph No. 4: Attitudes toward peace

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Age: A comparison between the adolescent and young adult groupings reveals a reverse pattern over time: support for negotiations with the Palestinians among the adolescents increased to a certain extent over time (from 58.0% in 2004 to 63.3% in 2010), while the corresponding percentages in the young adult group dropped from 62% to 55.2%. This decrease in support within the older group, may also be attributed to army experience. A similar trend is revealed regarding the importance attributed to peace as a national goal, by the two age groups. True, the percentages dropped in both groups over time: in 1998, 29.9% of the young adults and 27.0% of the adolescents ranked peace as most important, while the percentages dropped in 2004 to 16.8% and 15.0%, respectively. However, while the position of peace in the adolescent group partially recovered and rose to 20.4% in 2010, it did not change in the older group and even slightly declined as it was chosen as the highest goal by 15.9% of the young adults.

Gender: Support for peace negotiations with the Palestinians was, in effect, identical in the two gender groups in both time periods. However, there is a small but consistent difference between them in that female respondents tended a bit more than the males to view peace as the most important goal, with average percentages of 22.1% (females) to 19.1% (males).

Family income: There were significant differences between the three income groups regarding support for peace negotiations with the Palestinians. The lowest level of support is found in the low income group, with similar percentages in 2004 (46.6%) and 48.0% (2010). In the other income groups, there were differences between the two time periods. In the middle-income group, the support percentage rose from 58.4% in 2004 to 64.6% in 2010, while in the high-income group support declined in the same time period from 73.2% to 59.7%.

A similar picture emerges between the income groups with reference to the status of peace as the most important goal throughout the time periods involved. In 1998, peace rose to first or second place in all three groups, with similar percentages that ranged between 25% and 27%. But in 2004, the importance of peace declined in all three groups with percentages of: 10.9%

in the lower income, 15.7% in the middle income, and 20.0% in the higher income groups. But while the importance of peace recovered somewhat in 2010 in the low and middle-income groups with percentages of 17.0% (low) and 19.7% (middle), the downtrend continued in the high-income group with 18.5% in 2010. In other words, in 2010 the peace-concept was weakened in the high-income group in comparison to 1998, both with regards to support for peace negotiations as well as to the importance of peace as a national goal.

Religiosity: As we can assume, and as consistent with earlier findings, a strong inverse correlation exists between level of religiosity and level of support for the peace process, in both time periods. Moreover, the gap between *haredi*-religious on one side and traditional-secular on the other, continued to grow. Among the last two groups, the percentages of support for the peace process in 2010 (60.3% – traditional group, and 77.2% – secular group) were higher than in 2004 (53.1% and 72.6%, respectively).

However, the corresponding percentages of support were 33.6% among the *haredim* and 30.6% in the religious group. The picture we get from the religious profile regarding peace as a national goal is not uniform. With regard to secular and traditional respondents, (peace) had higher support in all three time periods, higher than among the religious and *haredim*. While peace dropped in importance in 2004 (in both groups), it partially regained importance in 2010 in the secular group but not in the traditional group – in fact, it dropped in importance somewhat. The following percentages illuminate the standings of the two groups on peace over all three years (1998, 2004, 2010): secular – 32.0%, 18.1% and 25.4%; traditional – 29.9%, 18.6%, and 15.2%.

In the religious group, less importance was attributed to peace from the beginning (11.4% in 2004) and remained on the same level in later years (8.7% - 2004 and 9.6% - 2010).

The percentage of *haredim* who viewed peace as most important in 1998 (16.3%) was a bit higher than the corresponding percentage in the religious group. But the percentage in the *haredi* group dropped precipitously in 2004 to 1.7%, then recovered in 2010 at 11.7%.

Political identity: The differences between Right, Center and Left

regarding support for peace negotiations were very large in 2004, as the following percentages demonstrate: Right – 47.3% in contrast to 77.5% of the Center and 80.4% of the Left. The differences even widened a bit in 2010 as the Right's percentage remained static (47.0%), while the Center rose to 80.7% and the Left, to 92.0%.

When we examine the percentages of those who chose peace as the most important goal of the State, the picture becomes more complex. In 1998 the Right and Center held almost identical attitudes, with percentages of 24.6% (Right) and 26.4% (Center). By contrast, 33.1% of the Left viewed peace as the highest goal. In 2004, the status of peace dropped in all three groups, with the following percentages: Right – 13.4%; Center – 20.2%; and Left – also about 20.2%. In 2010, the importance of peace in the Right hardly changed (14.2%) though it bounced back to its former level in the Center (25.4%), and partly bounced back in the Left (26.4%).

In summary: the gap remains between the Right-wing group and the other two groups with regards to the importance of peace as a national goal.

E. The status of the rule of law and democracy


1. Attitudes toward strong leaders:

Entire sample: Most of the Jewish youth were in favor of strong leadership as an alternative to the rule of law in each of the three survey years. Support for strong leadership was 60.1% in 1998, rose to 68.8% in 2004 and returned to its former level of 60.5% in 2010. The jump in support for strong leadership in 2004 is consistent with the "intifada effect" explained above. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that even in the non-intifada surveys, only a minority of 40% of the youths did not agree that strong leadership is preferable to the rule of law.

Age: The findings show that the same pattern exists in both age groups, though the adolescents have slightly higher preferences for strong leadership over the young adults in each of the years. The percentages for strong leadership were as follows: Adolescents – 62.2% in 1998, 70.8% in 2004, and 61.4% in 2010. Young adults: 59.0%, 66.7%, and 58.6%, respectively. As we see, support for strong leadership was especially high in 2004 in both age groups.

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Gender: This variable had very little effect on the choice between strong leadership and the rule of law. The female and male respondents exhibited the same percentages of support for strong leadership throughout all three years of the survey, except for miniscule differences. Thus, the percentages of female and male respondents for strong leadership were as follows: 1998 – 59.4% (females) and 60.0% (males), 2004 – 68.1% and 69.4%, respectively; 2010 – 62.8% and 57.9%, respectively.



Graph No. 5: Level of objection to strong leadership as a substitute for the rule of law

Family income: A majority of the respondents on all income levels also support strong leadership over the rule of law in all three time periods, with no pronounced or consistent differences in the size of the majority. A slight exception: during the last two survey time periods, support of strong leadership was a bit higher in the middle income group (70.8% – 2004, and 62.7% – 2010) and higher income group (68.1% and 60.7%, respectively), in contrast to 61.1% and 56.6% in the lower income group. Thus the pattern of more support for strong leadership in 2004, is repeated on all income levels.

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Religiosity: In 1998 and 2004 there were no significant or consistent differences between the religious groups; there was a clear majority in all of them for strong leadership, in similar percentages. On the other hand, significant differences emerged in 2010: the secular group exhibited a support percentage of 54.9%, the religious – 73.3%; and the *haredim* and traditional groups were in the middle with percentages of 60.0% and 60.5%, respectively. The religious group is unusual in that it is the only group out of the four whose support for strong leadership consistently gathered strength over the years (58.0% in 1998, 68.2% in 2004, and 73.3% in 2010). By contrast, the other groups exhibited the intifada effect with higher percentages in favor of strong leadership in 2004.


Political identity: It seems that the popularity of strong leadership crosses political lines as well and garnered majority support in the Right, Center and Left alike. The differences between them were relatively small, with a trend toward greater support in the Right in contrast to the Center and the Left. The greatest gap in this respect was in 2010, when the support for strong leadership over the rule of law was highest in the Right (64.3%) over the Left (50.4%), with the Center just slightly below the Right (60.7%). It should be noted that the inverse U curve occurs here as well, since the level of support for strong leadership was higher in 2004 than in the two other dates (one before and one after 2004) in all three groups.

2. Forms of protest (civil resistance):

Entire sample: Another expression of the low status of democracy and rule of law among Israeli youth is found in their attitudes toward use of civil resistance against the government by people who think that its policies regarding the peace process cause harm to Israel's national interests. Civil resistance includes both violent and non-violent resistance. The findings show that in every survey-year there was a clear majority against both types of protests, especially violent civil resistance, whether from the Right (example: to forcefully resist evacuation of settlements), or the Left (example: to forcefully oppose the construction of a separation fence). Yet the percentages of those who support both types of resistance grew significantly in 2004, especially the violent forms. The percentages of those who support

non-violent civil resistance (such as demonstrating without a license, refusal to pay taxes or serve in the army) were as follows: 19.9% in 1998; 27.9% in 2004; and 31.3% in 2010. The corresponding percentages regarding support for violent civil resistance, which were predictably lower, were as follows: 8.7%, 23.7%, and 25.8%, respectively.

In other words, more than a quarter of Jewish youths today (2010) justify the use of violent civil resistance by civilians who feel that the government's peace policy harms the country's national interests, while in 1998 (about two years before the outbreak of the Second Palestinian intifada), the percentage of support for these kinds of protests was only 9%.



Graph No. 6: Attitudes toward forms of protest

Note, however, that the choice of the two types of civil resistance was not mutually exclusive; for example, someone who supports violent civil resistance may also support non-violent civil resistance. Therefore we tested this item by splitting it into the following four theoretical possibilities: Opposition to both types of civil resistance; in favor of only non-violent civil resistance; in favor of only violent civil resistance; and in favor of both types

of civil resistance. The results obtained for each of these "civil resistance types" over three years, were displayed in Table No. 1 below.

Table No. 1: Attitudes toward types of civil resistance												
Independent Variables	1998				2004				2010			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Gender:												
Male	75.6	14.9	5.2	4.3	56.1	19.6	13.4	0.9	55.6	17.3	14.6	12.6
Female	75.4	16.5	4.2	3.9	60.0	16.7	14.3	8.6	53.8	21.5	13.6	11.1
Age:												
Young adults	75.1	15.6	4.9	4.3	53.5	18.7	17.6	10.1	58.5	14.7	17.8	9.0
Adolescents	76.2	15.7	4.1	3.8	62.8	17.5	10.3	9.4	50.8	24.3	10.4	14.5
Religiosity:												
Haredim	66.0	13.6	7.8	12.6	58.4	10.6	20.4	10.6	41.7	23.6	14.6	20.1
Religious	68.6	17.1	9.5	4.8	54.1	15.6	25.0	7.4	50.9	20.2	16.5	12.4
Traditional	77.9	14.4	3.4	4.3	52.8	22.2	13.6	11.4	51.1	17.6	20.1	11.2
Secular	77.8	16.1	3.9	2.2	61.5	17.6	11.6	9.2	68.1	13.8	2.7	9.3
Income level:												
Low income	75.3	11.1	6.8	6.8	59.3	22.4	12.2	6.1	50.6	24.7	13.1	11.6
Middle income	75.2	16.8	4.0	4.0	55.2	16.5	16.3	12.0	56.8	19.1	13.9	10.1
High income	76.7	15.9	4.3	3.1	61.0	18.5	9.6	10.9	54.6	16.9	15.2	13.2
Political Identity:												
Right	74.7	15.0	6.4	3.8	56.4	16.2	16.6	10.7	52.4	17.3	17.3	13.0
Center	75.6	16.0	3.4	5.0	68.8	9.2	10.1	11.9	61.0	22.0	11.3	5.6
Left	77.6	17.2	2.3	2.9	61.1	23.4	9.0	6.6	56.4	27.1	6.4	10.0

Table No. 1: Attitudes toward types of civil resistance

Legend:

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1. Oppose both types of civil resistance

2. In favor of only non-violent civil resistance

3. In favor of only violent civil resistance

4. In favor of both types of civil resistance

|__

As we can see from Table No. 1 above, the incidence of opposition to both types of civil resistance has been on a gradual downtrend (i.e., an increase in support for both types of resistance) - this has already been mentioned above. Of the four types of attitudes recorded in this table, the most interesting and surprising is #3, those supporting only violent protest, with the exclusion of non-violent protest. Our common sense would say that anyone siding with violent civil resistance would also side with non-violent civil resistance, while the reverse does not hold true: someone siding with non-violent civil resistance may not always support violent civil resistance as well. The considerable percentage of Jewish youths who identify themselves with this third typology, shows that there is a non-negligible minority of youths who think that non-violent civil resistance methods were too "soft," and that the only way to influence political decisions about peace is to adopt violent tactics. Also on their side were those who belong to the fourth category: those who feel that in order to maximize chances for success, one must employ both types of civil resistance. In any case, the next question is: How were the supporters of various types of civil resistance affected by socio-demographic characteristics? The findings below were displayed for each socio-demographic characteristic according to the following order:

Age: While the differences between the young adults and adolescents were marginal 1998, they grew in the two subsequent time periods. In 2004 the percentage of opposition to all kinds of civil resistance declined more among the young adults (from 75.1% to 53.5%) than among the adolescents (from 76.2% to 62.8%). At the same time, the rate of support for violent civil resistance among the young adults rose threefold or more and reached 17.6%, while the increase among adolescents in support of violent civil resistance (in comparison to 1998) was more moderate and reached 10.3%. A somewhat different pattern emerged in 2010. True, the young adults still supported violent civil resistance more than the adolescents, with a gap identical to the one in 2004, but the adolescents were more inclined than the young adults to support both non-violent civil resistance (24.3% versus 14.7%), as well as use of both kinds of civil resistance (14.5% versus 9.0%). We think that even in this case, the greater tendency of the young adults to support civil resistance stems from the influence of army service in general, specifically the Cast Lead campaign.

Gender: Simply put, gender had no effect on attitudes in the civil resistance issue.

In both gender groups, throughout the years, there was a decrease in the percentages of those who opposed civil resistance while support for the three types of civil resistance rose in similar percentages, without noticeable differences between them.

Family income: Support for civil resistance gained ground in all three income groups. However, in contrast to the similarities among the groups in 1998, gaps emerged among the income groups in later years regarding the extent of support for the three types of civil resistance. The lower-income group supported, more than the other two groups, the use of non-violent civil resistance over the other types of civil resistance. This was true in 2004 (22.4% of the lower income group versus 16.5% of the middle income group and 18.5% of the high income group), as well as in 2010 (24.7% versus 19.1% and 16.9%, respectively). At the same time, there was more support for use of the two types of civil resistance in 2004 in the middle- and high-income groups with support percentages of 12.0% and 10.9%, while the corresponding percentage in the low-income group reached only 6.1%.

Religiosity: The picture that emerges from the religiosity profile is that there was an increase in support for all the various types of civil resistance in all four religious groups – even though there were significant differences between *haredi*-religious and traditional-secular groups from the beginning. Sometimes the *haredi* group is treated separately from the religious group too.

In greater detail: In 1998, opposition to the use of any kind of civil resistance was greater among the traditional and secular groups (77.9% and 77.8%, respectively), in comparison to the *haredi and religious groups*, with corresponding percentages of 66.0% and 68.6%. The two latter groups were similar to one another in their greater support for violent civil resistance (7.8% and 9.5%) in comparison with the traditional group (3.4%) and secular group (3.9%). But the *haredim* also differed from the religious group: the *haredi* percentage in support of the two forms of civil resistance was 12.6% in comparison to 4.8% – religious group, 4.3% – traditional group, and 2.2% – secular group.

In 2004 there was a decline in the incidence of opposition to the use of civil resistance (that is, an *increase* in *support* of civil resistance) in all the groups, though it was more moderate in the secular group. Regarding the three forms of civil resistance: the most salient finding is the trend of *haredi* and religious groups to support violent civil resistance (20.4% and 23.0%, respectively) in comparison to the traditional group (13.6%) and secular group (11.6%).

Interesting gaps emerged between the groups in 2010. The decline in opposition to (or increase in support of) the use of civil resistance continued among the *haredim*, and to a significantly lesser extent among the religious and traditional groups. Meanwhile, the opposition to civil resistance within the secular group recovered, though it did not return to the former 1998 level. The percentage of decline in opposition to civil resistance in the *haredi* grouping was especially large – from 58.4% to 41.7% (2010). In other words, a clear majority emerged in the *haredi* group in support of all types of civil resistance in 2010. In addition, the percentage of *haredi* support for the use of non-violent and violent civil resistance together (20.1%) was higher than in the rest of the groups (12.4% in the religious group, 11.2% in the traditional, and 9.3% in the secular).

In general, we can summarize by saying that the willingness of the *haredim* to use civil resistance techniques, including militant measures, has become more prominent than in the rest of the groups, especially in contrast to the secular group.

Political identity: The willingness to use civil resistance has risen over time in all three groups, but differences have developed among them regarding preferred types of resistance – in comparison to the relative similarities among the groups in 1998. In 2004 the Right expressed equal measures of support for violent and non-violent civil resistance (about 16.5% for each), while there was far greater support in the Left for non-violent civil resistance alone. Violent civil resistance was supported by only 9.0% in the secular group, similar to the percentage of support in the Center (10.1%), which also expressed lower levels of support for non-violent civil resistance (9.2%).

The picture changed only a little in 2010. The Left stood out in its high

percentages of support for non-violent civil resistance (27.1%) in comparison to the Center (22.0%) and the Right (17.3%). It also stood out in its low support for violent civil resistance (6.4%), in comparison to the Center (11.3%) and especially the Right, of which 17.3% supported violent civil resistance. Regarding those who supported both kinds of civil resistance, the Right emerged again at the top of the list (13.0%), and the Center at the bottom of the list (5.6%). In this case the Left emerged in the middle, but closer to the Right, with a support percentage of 10.0%.

In general, it appeared that the Right tends to support civil resistance, including violent civil resistance, more than the Center or the Left.

3. Democracy as a national goal:

Entire sample: One way to assess the importance of democracy to youth is to see how they rank it on a scale of the most important goals of the State of Israel (a detailed discussion on this topic appears further on). The findings show that in all three survey years, democracy appeared among the first three values heading the list of eight items. Yet over time, democracy's importance waned, both in absolute numbers as well as in its rank on the scale. In 1998 it was ranked in second place, when 26.1% of Jewish youth chose it as the most important goal of the State. In 2004 it was still ranked in second place but was only chosen by 17.0% of the youths, and in 2010 it fell to third place, and only 14.3% of the youths had chosen it as the most important national goal.

Age: Findings analysis in accordance with the age groups show that in 1998, peace and democracy were the most important goals for both age groups with only small differences between them (peace – 27.0% among the adolescents and 29.9% among the young adults; democracy – 28.5% and 23.2%, respectively). Third place was occupied by the importance of Israel as a Jewish state (18.1% – adolescents and 18.2% – young adults).

On the other hand, the Jewish-state goal rose to first place in the rating scale in the last two time periods. The percentages in the adolescent group for the Jewish state were 29.1% (2004) and 29.3% (2010), and among the young adults – 23.5% (2004) and 36.9% (2010). At the same time, the importance of peace and democracy declined in 2004, in both age groups. Among the

adolescents, 15% voted for peace while 16.8% of the young adults voted for peace. The corresponding percentages vis-á-vis democracy were 15.9% (adolescents) and 18.0% (young adults).

In 2010 there was a partial comeback among the adolescents regarding peace (20%) and democracy (17.4%). On the other hand, the erosion of the importance of peace and especially of democracy continued among the young adults, with corresponding percentages of 15.9% (peace) and 11.3% (democracy).

Gender: No significant differences were found between male and female respondents in the importance they attributed to democracy, and the status of democracy declined in both groups over time. The percentages of those who voted for democracy as the most important goal were as follows: among the males – 23.7% in 1998; 16.7% in 2004; and 14.6% in 2010. The corresponding percentages among the females were: 28.0%, 17.2%, and 14.2%, respectively.

Family income: Over time all three income groups underwent the identical trend of decline in the status of democracy as the most important goal. However, there is a positive correlation between income level and the importance attributed to democracy, as reflected in the following average percentages (of all three surveys): high-income group – 22.5%; middle-income group – 19.9%; and low-income group, 14.4%.

Religiosity: The effect of religiosity on the status of democracy in Israeli society is clear and consistent. Democracy was ranked as first or second by the secular group as the most important goal of the state, while among *haredim* it received only a few percentage points. The traditional group ranked democracy in second or third place. Among the religious, it was ranked in second place in 1998 and 2004, and fourth place in 2010, but a large gap separates it from the importance attributed to preserving the Jewish nature of the state. In 2010, only 6.0% of the religious group viewed democracy as the most important goal of the state, in contrast to 63.3% who viewed the Jewish nature of the State as of primary importance.

Yet, despite the differences between them, it is important to emphasize that all four groups were partner to the erosion in the importance attributed to democracy between 1998 and 2010. In the secular group, 32.7% viewed it as

the most important goal in 1998, while in 2010 it dropped to 21.2%. The corresponding findings in the traditional group were 22.1% and 15.5%; in the religious group – 21.9% and 6.0%; and in the *haredi* group – 3.85 and 1.4%.

Political identity: In each year, the percentages in favor of democracy as the most important national goal were higher in the Left than the Right, while the Center (as expected) was sandwiched in between. Thus in 1998, democracy received about 35.2% of the Left votes, 26.4% of the Center and 20.6% of the Right. The corresponding percentages in 2004 and 2010 were as follows: 21.3% and 25.0% of the Left, 19.3% and 19.2% of the Center,14.3% and 11.7% of the Right. It is evident that democracy lost some of its status in 2004 in all three groups, but while it recovered slightly in the Left in 2010, and remained stable in the Center, its importance in the Right continued to decline.

4. Trust in the legal system:

Entire sample: The last criterion with which we can examine the status of democracy among the Jewish youth is their level of trust in the legal system, which is one of the pillars of any democratic regime. The findings show that in all three time periods, the legal system was ranked in one of the top three places out of eight institutions on the list. But it turns out that the level of trust ascribed to the legal system by Jewish youth was eroded during the years, both in absolute as well as relative terms. In 1998, 73.8% expressed full trust or sufficient trust in the legal system; in 2004 the percentage went down to 65.1%, and in 2010 - 63.5%. This decline is also reflected in the ranking of the legal system. In 1998 it was ranked in second place, while in later time periods it fell to third place.

Age: The findings show that the major erosion of the legal system took place in the young adult age group with the following trust-percentages: 71.6% in 1998, 64.3% in 2004, and 52.8% in 2010. The analogous trend in the adolescent group was not consistent, with corresponding percentages of 75.7%, 66.0% and 74.4%. However, every year the trust-level of the adolescents in the legal system was higher than that of the young adults. In addition, in contrast to the ongoing erosion that took place among the young adults, the trust-level in the adolescent group recovered in 2010 after the decline between 1998 and 2004.

Gender: No significant differences were found between male and female respondents in any of the survey years. The level of trust in the legal system declined over time in both of the groups, from 74.9% (1998) to 64.2% (2004) and 63.5% (2010) among the female respondents and from 72.4% to 66.0% and 63.4% among the males.

We can summarize by saying that no major differences were found between the genders throughout the years, regarding any of the four criteria used to test attitudes to democracy: support of strong leadership, attitude toward two types of civil resistance, importance of democracy as a national objective, and level of trust in the legal system.

Family income: The level of trust in the legal system declined over time in all three income groups. However, higher levels of trust tended to be expressed in higher income groups. The percentage levels (of trust in the legal system) were as follows, in order of years: low-income group – 66.3% (1998), 56.4% (2004), and 53.6% (2010); middle-income group – 66.2%, 66.9%, 66.3%, respectively; and high-income group – 77.9%, 68.7%, and 65.7%, respectively.

Religiosity: A clear, consistent pattern emerges regarding the correlation of religiosity with level of trust in the legal system. In all three time periods, the trust-level of the *haredi* group was significantly lower than the other two groups and declined over the years from 33.4% in 1998 to 30.9% in 2004 and 25.7% in 2010. There was also an erosion of trust-levels in the religious group as well, though the gap between the two groups remained rather large. The trust-percentages in the religious group were as follows: 76.9% in 1998, 58.8% in 2004, and 55.2% in 2010. The trust-percentages in the traditional and secular groups were identical (about 78% in 1998). While the percentages in both groups fell in 2004 and rose again in 2010, the trust-levels of the secular group (70.9% in 2004 and 74.1% in 2010) remained higher than those of the traditional group (66.0% and 69.1%, respectively). In summary, the level of trust in the legal system was found to be in inverse proportion to level of religiosity.


Political identity: In every survey year, the levels of trust in the legal system were highest in the Left and lowest in the Right. Moreover, while trust-levels in the Right progressively declined over the years – from 70.4% in 1998, to 60.5%

in 2004 and 57.9% in 2010 – the trust-slevels remained firm in the Left, even regaining strength to a small extent: 78.7% in 1998, 78.2% in 2004, and 84.2% in 2010. In the Center there was a decline in trust-levels from 77.3% in 1998 to 71.5% in 2004, but with a partial comeback in 2010 with 75.3%.

F. Trust in government institutions

Entire sample: Over the years, many changes took place in the level of trust of Jewish youth in central institutions of Israeli society. In effect, of the eight institutions included in the study, only the IDF was accorded high levels of trust over the years; it occupied the number-one ranking and enjoyed a significant advantage over the other options, with an average trust level of about 91.0%. By contrast, two institutions that were ranked in 1998 in the second and third places – the legal system and police – suffered from a consistent decline in trust-levels in the two subsequent time periods; this trend was especially salient with regards to the legal system. As we have seen above, the trust-levels in the legal system over time were as follows: 73.8% in 1998, a decline to 65.1% in 2004, and 63.5% in 2010. Similarly, the corresponding data regarding the police were: 70.6%, 67.5% and 64.9%. Yet it is important to emphasize that these two institutions remained in the second or third positions throughout the entire time period, while switching positions between them.

Levels of trust in the remaining five institutions went through some changes during the time period, but all dropped in 2004 and rebounded in 2010 (with the exception of the media). This pattern is the U-curve. The most impressive rebound was made by the Histadrut; trust percentages rose from 39.0% in 1998 and 32.6% in 2004, to 58.5% in 2010. While the level of trust in the rabbinate (60.4%) was higher in 2010 than of the Histadrut, the rabbinate garnered relatively high levels of trust in the two previous time periods as well: 47.1% in 1998 and 46.1% in 2004. Thus the rabbinate was fourth place on the scale after the IDF, the police and legal system. The media, with identical trust-levels in the first two time periods (37%–36.6%), improved its status significantly in 2010 when 52.7% of the respondents chose 'trust' or 'complete trust.' Even then, however, the media only climbed to the sixth place on the scale, just above the Knesset and the parties – the two institutions that consistently remained in the seventh and eighth places, respectively.




Graph No. 7: Trust in national institutions

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Graph No. 8: Trust in political and social institutions






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In summary of the overall levels of trust in each of the three time periods, in all of the institutions as a whole: after a certain decline in trust percentages – from 52.8% in 1998 to 48.2% in 2004 – the levels of trust rebounded significantly in 2010 to 58.7%. In other words, the youths' trust in these institutions rose in 2010 to levels that were even higher than they had been in 1998.



Graph No. 9: Trust in the rabbinate

Age: A comparison of levels of trust in the institutions among the two age groups shows that both age groups ranked the same four institutions in the top four spots throughout the entire time period. These institutions are: the IDF, the police, the legal system and the rabbinate. Meanwhile the only institutions that garnered consistently low trust-percentages throughout the time period – were the political parties. The other three institutions were ranked in the fifth and seventh places, without uniform order. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the levels of trust in all of the eight institutions were significantly higher among the adolescents (56.5%) in contrast to the young adult group (45.2%). In other words, the more adult members of the

youth tended to be more skeptical vis-á-vis the Israeli institutional system.

Gender: Regarding the eight institutions listed in the trust question, there were significant gender gaps with regards to only one institution: the rabbinate, which garnered higher trust percentages among the female respondents in 2004 (51.3%) and 2010 (65.7%) than the males (40.5% and 54.1%, respectively). Thus the gender-gap in relation to the rabbinate in the last two time periods, was about 10%.

In addition (as we see from most of the results above), the trust-levels in both gender groups regarding most of the institutions (except for the media and the rabbinate), were lower in 2004 (48.4%) than the corresponding 1998 levels (54.3%). In 2010 the trust-levels rebounded even above the 1998 levels, with an average percentage level of 60.2%.

Family income: The IDF garnered much higher levels of trust in all three income levels and in all three time periods (as can be predicted from similar findings in the other socio-economic groupings above). The police force and legal system were generally ranked in the second or third places, the only exception being the drop in the legal system's rank in the low income group in 2010 (fifth place). Yet it is important to note that in contrast to the relative stability in trust-levels accorded over the years to the police, the trust-levels in the legal system were on a downtrend in the high income group (from 77.9% in 1998 to 68.7% in 2004 and 65.7% in 2010) and low income group (from 66.3% in 1998 to 56.4% in 2004 and 53.6% in 2010). By contrast, the levels of trust in the middle-income group fell from 72.3% in 1998 to 66.2% in 2004, then remained on the same level in 2010.

Thus it is clear that almost all the institutions suffered from a reduction in their status in 2004. If we ignore this intifada year and limit ourselves to a comparison between 1998 and 2010, we find that in the low-income group, only the police and legal system suffered from a loss in trust. The other six institutions witnessed higher levels of trust in 2010, especially the Histadrut (an increase from 42.1% to 55.8%) and the rabbinate (from 55.8% to 67.0%). In the middle-income group, the police and legal system also suffered from a loss in trust levels (between 1998 and 2010) while the other institutions received higher levels of trust, especially the media (from 36.3% in 1998 to 55.4% in 2010) and the Histadrut (from 36.7% to 61.1%, respectively). The

high-income group expressed a waning of trust in the legal system, in contrast to a significant increase in trust in the media (from 38.0% in 1998 to 56.8% in 2010), in the Histadrut (from 39.5% to 56.3%), and the rabbinate (from 37.0% to 54.1%).

Religiosity: A comparison of levels of trust in government institutions according to religious profiles show that with the exception of the *haredim*, the other three groups express the highest level of trust in the IDF in all three time periods, without significant gaps among them. The institution to receive the highest level of trust in the *haredi* group is the rabbinate, while the IDF is ranked just underneath with a small gap. In the religious group, by contrast, the rabbinate is ranked second place after the IDF in all the survey time periods, with a significant difference of 10% or more. In most of the groups the police is ranked in third place, while the religious group places it in fourth place – evidently because of the role of the police in evacuating Jewish settlements from the Gaza Strip (in the Disengagement of 2005).

Significant differences between the four groups emerged with regard to trust in the legal system. In the secular group the legal system was ranked second place in all the time periods; in the traditional group it was ranked second place in 1998 and third place in the other two time periods. In the religious group it was ranked third place in 1998; fourth place in 2004; and fifth place in 2010. In the *haredi* group, on the other hand, it was ranked fourth place in the first two time periods and seventh place in the last survey.

Inter-group gaps also exist with regard to trust in the media. In the secular group, the media was ranked in fourth place; in the traditional group, its ranking ranged from seventh place in 1998 to fifth place in 2010, while the media was usually ranked last in the religious and *haredi* groups.

Inter-group differences also exist regarding trust in the media. In the secular group, the media is ranked fourth place; in the traditional group, it ranges from seventh place in 1998 to fifth place in 2010. Meanwhile, it is generally ranked last by the religious and *haredim*. The Knesset and parties were also given low rankings, while the Histadrut was ranked in the fifth place on average over the years.

Political identity: The IDF enjoyed high levels of trust in the Left, Center and Right in all three time periods. While its trust-level was eroded a little in

2004 in the Left group (from 90.9% in 1998 to 82.2% in 2004), the trust-level bounced back in 2010 and rose to 92.9%.

The effect of political identity on trust in the other institutions is expressed in two ways. One, it is expressed in the level of trust ascribed to the institutions at the different points in time; two, it is expressed in the differences in trust-levels, sometimes significant, over the years. For example: In the Left and Center, the legal system and police were ranked in the second and third places on the trust-scale at each point in time. Yet only the Left expressed a clear and consistent preference for the legal system over the police, with the following percentages: Legal system: 78.7% (1998), 78.2% (2004), and 84.2% (2010); police: 71.9%, 67.9% and 75.7%, respectively. In the Center group, the gaps between the two institutions were small, and the institutions often exchanged places on the scale.

A slightly different picture emerged in the Right. In 1998 the police and legal system ran neck-to-neck with almost identical levels of trust (69.3% and 70.4%), but a gap emerged in 2004 with a clear advantage to the police (69.5% in comparison to 60.5%). The second place was filled in 2010 by the rabbinate with a trust percentage of 70.1%, while the police went down to third place (63.4%) and the legal system to fifth place, with a trust percentage of 57.9%.

In contrast to the rabbinate's second-place ranking by the Right in 2010, it was ranked last by the Left group that year, as had been the case in 1998; in 2004 it emerged in sixth place. Throughout the years, the rabbinate had an average trust-level of 25.3% in the Left, while in the Right it received 63.1%; in other words, a gap of 36%. Predictably, the trust of the Center in the rabbinate was somewhere in the middle but closer to the Right with an average percentage of 44.3%.

The Histadrut occupied fifth place in most of the years; however, its level of trust in absolute terms rose impressively in 2010 in all three groups, with averages that ranged from about 58% to 65%. This was in comparison to percentages of 35% to 44% in 1998, and 29% to 34% in 2004.

The media also greatly improved its standing throughout the years in all the groups, but it consistently received low trust levels by the Right – much lower than in the Center and Left-with the following average percentages: 37.1%, 50.8%, and 48.5%.


The parties generally occupied the eighth, last place in all the groups, except for two occasions in which they were ranked seventh place with average trust percentage of: 25.1% in the Left; 28.0% in the Center; and 28.7% in the Right. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the level of trust attributed to the parties by the three groups in 2010, was higher than what they had received in the previous two survey time-periods.

The Knesset was ranked alternately in the fifth and seventh places. Then in 2010 it improved its standing in the Right, Center and Left – similar to the Histadrut – with trust percentages of 42.7%, 48.9%, and 45.3%, respectively.

G. Internal controversies

Entire sample: Various studies have shown that Israeli society was plagued by numerous schisms from its very inception, including in the pre-state period. One of the questions raised in this context is; which of the schisms is most dangerous for the integration of Israeli society according to the Israeli public? Our data show that while attitudes toward this subject have changed over the years, most of the attention of Jewish youth in our surveys focused on two schisms: relations between religious and secular and between Arabs and Jews, though the priority among the two changed over the years. The most prominent change took place between 1998 - when the dominant discourse was the internal Jewish rift between religious and secular - and 2004 and 2010, when most of the attention turned to the Jew-Arab rift. In numbers: in 1998, 44.1% viewed the religious-secular rift to be most critical, in contrast to 26.5% who viewed the Jew-Arab rift to be most important. In that year, the Right-Left rift earned third place on the scale by 15.7% of the respondents. Meanwhile, the remaining two controversies on the list received only isolated percentages. (These were: contacts between Mizrahim (Sephardim) and Ashkenazim and gaps between poor and rich). By contrast, in 2004 and 2010 the Jew-Arab rift was ranked at the top of the list by 45.9% (2004) and 41.9% (2010) of the youths, while the religious-secular rift received 21.1% and 23.3%, respectively.

In the last two surveys (2004 and 2010), the Right-Left controversy was ranked in the third place (as it was in the first survey in 1998), with the following percentages: 16.8% in 2004 and 19.1% in 2010. These percentages were only slightly lower than the percentages for the religious-secular rift.



Graph No. 10: The most important schisms in Israeli society

Age: It seems that the patterns that emerged above from the comparisons of the two age groups, apply here as well – that adolescents generally express higher trust-levels than young adults. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the adolescent group displayed a stronger inclination than the young adult group to view the Jew-Arab schism as the most dangerous controversy of all. The relevant percentages were: adolescents – 30.3%, 42.2% and 46.9%; in contrast to the young adults – 22.3%, 42.8% and 36.9%.

Gender: Throughout most of the years, the two genders tended to "vote" similarly on the most critical internal controversies – both with regards to placement on the scale as well as in percentages (regarding the most important controversies). Thus, for example, in 1998 both groups (males and females) ranked the religious-secular schism in first place, with selection percentages of 42.9% among the females and 46.3% among the males. In the two subsequent time periods, this schism was ranked in second place, with the following percentages: females – 22.0% (2004) and 23.4% (2010); males – 20.2% (2004) and 23.1% (2010). Similarly,

the Jew-Arab schism that was ranked in 1998 by both males and females in second place captured first place in both gender groups in 2004 and 2010.

Family income: The findings point to great similarities among the income groups regarding the ranking of the important controversies as well as the selection percentages. In 1998, the following controversies were ranked first, second and third places, respectively: schisms between religious and secular; Jews and Arabs; Right- and Left-wing groups. The 1998 percentages of all three income groups ranged from: 43% to 47% (religious-secular), 23% to 27% (Jews-Arabs); and 13% to 17% (Right-wing, Left-wing).

In 2004 and 2010, the Jew-Arab schism rose to first place while the religious-secular schism dropped to second place and the Right and Left schism remained in third place. The rest of the controversies received only isolated percentages.

Religiosity: The findings show that in 1998 all four religious groups considered the religious-secular schism to be the most critical of all in Israeli society. The most prominent in this respect was the *haredi* group, with 63.1%. The percentages of votes for the religious-secular divide in 1998 were as follows: religious – 42.9%; secular – 48.1%. In the traditional group there was a close tie between the religious-secular schism (34.7%) and the Jew-Arab schism (35.5%).

Changes from 2004 to 2010: In the *haredi* and religious groups there was a consistent drop in the importance attributed to the religious-secular divide in this time period. Instead, the Jew-Arab divide assumed greater importance. This trend also took place among the secular and traditional groups (i.e. preference for Jew-Arab split over religious-secular split as most important); however, the absolute percentages for the religious-secular divide in this group, rose from 19.1% in 2004 to 27.0% in 2010. It is clearly evident that even after the increase in 2010, the percentages were still significantly lower (for the religious-secular divide) than had been the case in 1998 – even among the secular group.

In 2004 and 2010, the *haredi* group exhibited a more balanced division of votes between the religious-secular and Jew-Arab splits than did the other groups.

Political identity: The findings point to great similarity among the Right, Center and Left groups regarding the ranking of the three most important controversies in Israeli society. In 1998, the following three schisms were ranked at the top of the scale for all three groups: the religious-secular schism (number one), the Jew-Arab schism (number two), and the Right-Left schism (number three). In 2004 and 2010, the top two switched positions so that the Jew-Arab schism rose to the top of the list and the religious-secular schism remained in the number-two place on the scale. The Right-Left schism remained in the number-three spot of the scale in all three time periods, while the other two schisms – Mizrahi-Ashkenazi and rich-poor – were ranked in the bottom two spots, with only isolated percentages each.

Nevertheless, this deceptive picture of group uniformity in the ranking of the three important controversies does not stand up when we examine the **absolute** percentages per controversy. In 1998, the gaps between the schisms that were ranked in first place (religious-secular schism) and second place (Jew-Arab schism) were as follows: 25.5% in the Left, 24.8% in the Center, and only 14.7% in the Right. In 2004, the gaps between the schisms that that were ranked in the first place (Jew-Arab schism) and the second place (religious-secular schism) were as follows: 19.2% in the Left, 25.7% in the Center, and approximately the same percentage in the Right. In 2010, the analogous gaps were: 4.3% in the Left, 14.1% in the Center, and 23.2% in the Right.

In other words: the Jew-Arab schism received greater importance in the Right when compared to the religious-secular schism, while the Left tended to be more balanced in the perception of the importance of the two controversies, especially in 2010. The Center group, as expected, is located in the middle of the two other groups.

H. The important goals of the State

Entire sample: In light of the controversies discussed above it is interesting to see if there is any agreement among Jewish youth regarding the important goals of the State of Israel. The findings show that out of a list of seven possible goals, three stood out as preferred choices

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
throughout the time period though they did exchange places within the top three spots. In 1998 the following three goals were ranked at the top of the list (the top three places): achieving peace (28.4%), safeguarding democracy (26.1%) and Jewish-ness of the State (18.1%). However, in the last two time periods, the importance accorded to the Jewish identity of the State strengthened and that goal rose to the first place on the scale, with 26.3% in 2004 and 33.2% in 2010. Meanwhile, the popularity of the other two goals weakened; democracy was selected in those years as the most important goal by 17.0% (2004) and 14.3% (2010), and peace – by 15.9% and 18.2%, respectively. It is important to note that the goal of social-political equality, which was chosen as most important goal by 11.2% of the respondents in 1998, was also eroded in subsequent years and received selection percentages of only 8.7% (2004) and 4.4% (2010).

Age: The findings show that in 1998, peace and democracy were the most important goals for both age groups with only small differences between the two groups: peace – 27.0% among the adolescents and 29.9% among the young adults; democracy – 28.5% and 23.2%, respectively. At that time, the importance of Israel as a Jewish state ranked third on the scale (18.1% – adolescents and 18.2% – young adults). However, in the last two time periods this goal rose to first place in the importance-scale. The percentages in the adolescent group were 29.1% (in 2004) and 29.3% (2010); in the young adult group they were 23.5% and 36.9%, respectively. Simultaneously, the importance attributed to peace and democracy dropped in both groups but especially in the young adult group. The percentage of young adult respondents who chose democracy as the most important goal in 2010 (11.3%) was almost identical to the percentage that chose a high standard of living as their most important goal (11.7%).

Gender: As we have already seen in most of the gender-related findings presented above, it is not surprising that here, too, male and female respondents agreed on most issues, with a few negligible differences. Thus, for example, the goal of peace that was ranked in 1998 as the most important goal by both males and females, with selection percentages of

29.6% among the women and 26.5% among the men, declined in importance over time. The percentage of those who voted for peace dropped in 2004 to 17.2% among the females and 14.5% among the males, while the corresponding percentages in 2010 were 19.6% and 16.4%. At the same time, the importance of a Jewish state rose consistently in both groups.

No gender difference emerged even with regards to the goal of male-female equality, and this goal captured the last place on the scale in all three time periods for both males and females. There was only one exception: among males, gender equality shared the last place with political equality during one time period.



Graph No. 11: The most important goals for the State of Israel

Family income: The findings show that the goals of peace, democracy and Jewish nature of the State appear in the top three places on the scale, but the goals switch places over time within the top three. In the high-income group, democracy was ranked first place in 1998 with a percentage of 30.8% but in 2004 and 2010 it dropped to third place with percentages of

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18.0% and 17.2%, respectively. The percentages for peace also declined over the years, from 27.2% in 1998 to 20.0% (2004) and 18.5% (2010). By contrast, the importance of Israel as a Jewish state rose consistently with corresponding percentages of 12.8% (1998), 19.5% (2004), and 31.5% (2010).

Similar trends of decline in importance of peace and democracy, in contrast to strengthening of Jewishness of the state, were found in the middle- and low-income groups.

Religiosity: The findings point to significant gaps both in ranking results and in absolute percentage points, mainly in the *haredi*-religious and secular-traditional breakdowns. In all three survey time periods, the *haredi*-religious groups ranked the goal of a Jewish state in first place, with a large gap between that goal and all the other goals. The percentages in the *haredi* group were: 66.3% in 1998, 80.9% in 2004, and 70.3% in 2010. The corresponding percentages in the religious group were: 49.5%, 44.9% and 63.3%. Second place in the *haredi* group in 1998 and 2010 was the goal of peace, though it received only isolated percentage points in 2004, together with all the remaining goals. In the religious group, the second-place spot in 1998 and 2004 was filled by democracy with 21.9% and 13.0%, respectively; however, democracy declined to fourth place in 2010 with only 6.0%; instead, peace assumed second place that year with 9.6%.

The most important goals in 1998 in the secular group were peace (32.0%) and democracy (32.7%). These goals retained their places in the scale in 2004 and 2010, but with lower selection-percentages: democracy – 21.5% (2004) and 21.2% (2010), and peace – 18.1% and 25.4%, respectively.

These two goals (peace and democracy) also captured first and second places in 1998 in the traditional group, but in 2004 and 2010 they lost some of their status to the Jewish-state goal.

Political identity: Peace and democracy were chosen among the top three ranking goals in all three groups and in all three survey time-periods. By contrast, there is lack of agreement regarding the ranking of the importance of a Jewish state among the three groups.

In the Left group, the Jewish state was ranked in the fifth or sixth place

throughout the years, while the following goals occupied the top two positions in the scale: democracy, accorded first place by 27.2% (average of all three years); peace in second place (23.2%). Third place was occupied by political equality (12.5%), with a significant gap between the top two goals and the third.

In the Right group, the Jewishness of the State was consistently ranked in first place (35.5%). This goal was followed by a considerable gap by: peace (17.4%) and democracy (15.5%). In the Center group there was greater competition for the top spot, with democracy in first place with an average selection percentage of 21.6%; peace in second place (17.4%) and Jewishness in third (16.8%).

It is important to note that in absolute terms over time, democracy lost considerable ground as the most important national goal even in the Left group. The percentages of those who selected democracy as most important, declined from 35.2% in 1998 to 21.3% in 2004 and 25.0% in 2010. A similar trend is found in the Center with corresponding percentages of 26.4%, 19.3%, and 19.2%; and in the Right, with percentages of 20.6%, 14.3%, and 11.7%. Similar changes also took places in the importance attributed to peace, though the Center group was the only one in which the peace-goal bounced back in 2010 (after the decline in 2004), to the same popularity level it had in 1998.

I. Interest in the Holocaust


Entire sample: Jewish youth have become increasingly and consistently interested in the Holocaust over the years. In the 1998 survey, 60.9% of the Jewish youths reported that they take a 'very great interest' or 'great interest' in the subject; in 2004 the interest level rose to 69.4%, and in 2010 it reached 80.3%.

Age: The findings clearly show that personal interest in the Holocaust grew over time in both age groups to the same degree, though in each of the three survey years the adolescents' level of interest superseded that of the young adults. In 2010, for example, 85.2% of the adolescents reported 'very great interest' or 'great interest' in the Holocaust, while the corresponding rate in the young adult group was 75.7%. The gaps between the two age groups

were almost certainly due to the yearly trips of high school student groups in Israel to the death camps in Europe, particularly Auschwitz, at the initiative of the Education Ministry. These trips have become more popular and frequent in recent years.

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Gender: Personal interest in the Holocaust was higher among female respondents than males in each time period. In 1998, interest-percentages were: 68.7% (females), 53.6% (males), and in 2004 the corresponding percentages were 75.2% and 63.1%. In 2010 the percentages rose even higher, to 81.6% and 78.8%. As is evident from these figures, the gaps between the two age groups shrunk from year to year.



Graph No. 12: Level of personal interest in the Holocaust

Family income: The findings demonstrate (again) great overlap between the three income groups in all three of the time periods. Thus, personal interest in the Holocaust increased consistently in all three income groups.

Religiosity: The findings demonstrate that personal interest in the Holocaust increased consistently and significantly in all four religious groups. In the secular group, the interest-percentages rose from 61.1% in

1998 to 68.4% in 2004 and 81.3% in 2010. The corresponding percentages in the traditional group were 60.2%, 67.4% and 81.7%; in the religious group – 68.5%, 76.8%, and 83.4%.


The level of interest in the Holocaust in the *haredi* group was lower, in general, than the other groups, and the changes over time were inconsistent: 59.0% (in 1998), 72.2% (in 2004), and 68.6% (in 2010).

Political identity: Consistent with the trend exhibited in the other groups, personal interest in the Holocaust increased consistently in all three political groups without significant gaps among them. The percentages over time were as follows; Right – 59.3% (1998), 68.1% (2004), 74.8% (2010); Center – 58.7%, 78.0%, and 80.8%, respectively; Left – 56.2%, 70.4%, and 83.3%, respectively.

Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that personal interest in the Holocaust was lower in the Right-wing group in 2010 than the other two groups.

J. Attitudes and perceptions regarding Germany

Entire sample: An interesting and counter-intuitive finding is that the increasing interest in the Holocaust by Jewish youth, was accompanied by a significant upturn in the youths' attitudes toward modern Germany, as is evident in the answers to a series of questions on this issue. Thus, between 1998 and 2004, the agreement-rate rose regarding the claim that today's Germany is among those countries friendly to Israel (from 41.5% to 60.3%), that Germany is one of the civilized nations like other Western European nations (from 61.4% to 75.9%), 2nd that the level of xenophobia in Germany is similar to that of other countries (from 43.3% to 59.5%). In the same vein, fewer youths today believe that modern Germany resembles Nazi Germany (from 43.3% to 31.7%). There was only one question to which there was no change in the attitude of the respondents over time: whether the German nation took an active part in the destruction of the Jews during the Holocaust. An overwhelming majority believed this statement to be true, with corresponding percentages of: 77.7% in 1998, 73.2% in 2004, and 75.1% in 2010.





Graph No. 13: Attitudes and perceptions regarding Germany as a civilized nation that is friendly to Israel

Age: The differences between the adolescents and young adults were generally small, though a noticeable trend is evident: the young adults tended to view Germany in a more positive light than the adolescents, especially in the first two survey time-periods. Thus, for example, the percentages of adolescents who viewed Germany as friendly to Israel were as follows: 38.2% in 1998, 34.2% in 2004, and 55.3% in 2010; while the corresponding percentages of the young adults were 45.4%, 41.8%, and 57.5%. In general, the gaps between the two groups decreased significantly in 2010, when the positive viewpoint of Germany increased. The only statement that received equal levels of support among the two groups over all three years was the belief that most of the German nation supported the destruction of the Jews in the Holocaust.

Gender: The findings show that in three of the five questions about attitudes toward Germany, the positive opinions tended to be consistently more prevalent among the male respondents. In the male group, the level of agreement with the opinion that Germany is friendly to Israel was: 46.2% in

1998, 43.3% in 2004, and 67.7% in 2010. The corresponding percentages in the female group were 37.5%, 32.9% and 53.6%. A similar pattern emerged with regards to the questions about whether today's Germany is a civilized nation, and whether it resembles Nazi Germany. However, no significant differences among the two groups emerged regarding the other two questions.





Family income: A positive correlation was revealed between income level and an upbeat view of Germany throughout most of the survey time periods and with regards to most of the questions. In other words, the higher income-level group tended to view Germany in a more positive light than did the lower-income group. The middle income group was in the middle of the two groups, but closer to the higher income-level group. For example, the agreement-level in the high-income group regarding the opinion that today's Germany is one of the civilized democracieswas: 63.4% (1998), 67.7% (2004) and 80.2% (2010). The corresponding percentages in the low-income group were: 57.0%, 54.1% and 71.2%; and in the middle-income group:

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61.5%, 58.1%, and 78.8%. However, income level had no consistent effect over time with regards to the belief that most of the German nation supported the destruction of the Jews in the Holocaust.

Religiosity: Results will only be presented on this question for data received in 1998 and 2010, because in most cases there was a significant decline in the percentages obtained on this topic in 2004 (the U-curve). Thus we will omit the 2004 'intifada' values from this discussion, due to the magnitude of findings to be covered.

There was a significant increase in the percentages of those who believed that Germany is among the countries that are friendly with Israel throughout all the religious groups. In the secular group, the percentage went up from 48.3% in 1998 to 72.5% in 2010; in the traditional group, from 33.5% to 57.5%; religious group, 41.5% to 44.0%; and in the *haredi* group, from 26.6% to 44.0%. As we see, the tendency to view today's Germany as friendly to Israel was stronger in the secular group than in the other groups in both time periods. This trend existed with regard to most of the opinions regarding Germany, with a few exceptions that are detailed below.

The following percentages of the various groups agreed with the opinion that today's Germany is one of the civilized democracies of the world: secular group – 66.3% (1998) and 85.5% (2010); traditional group – 50.5% and 71.1%, respectively; religious group – 69.3% and 69.0%, respectively; and the *haredi* group – 55.9% and 59.8%, respectively. It is interesting to note that here too, fewer members of the *haredi* group tended to view today's Germany as civilized.

The following percentages of the various groups agreed with the opinion that hatred of foreigners (xenophobia) in Germany is no worse than in other countries: secular group -43.1% (1998) and 59.8% (2010); traditional group -42.2% and 56.2%, respectively; religious group -44.9% and 62.1%, respectively; and the *haredi* group -48.7% and 61.6%, respectively.

The findings show that in most of the groups, there was less of a tendency to believe that a Nazi regime could rise again in today's Germany. The percentages were as follows: secular group – declined from 34.5% (1998) to 17.3% (2010); traditional group – declined from 48.8% to 30.6%, respectively; religious group – 52.0% to 48.2%, respectively; and the *haredi*

group – 70.6% to 66.6%, respectively. The decline in this belief was less significant in both the religious and *haredi* groups; in the *haredi* group, in fact, about two-thirds still believe (2010) that a Nazi regime could rise again in today's Germany.

Regarding the belief that most of the German nation supported the destruction of the Jews in the Holocaust, the changes over time were not consistent in the *haredi*, religious, and traditional groups. By contrast, there was a consistent decline in the secular group with the following percentages of agreement: 74.7% in 1998, 70.3% in 2004 and 69.6% in 2010.

Political identity: The image of Germany in all the aspects that were examined, became progressively more positive throughout the years in all three political categories. (One exception was 2004 in which there were isolated instances of slightly less positive answers than the other two time periods.) However, in most of the time periods the most favorable perceptions of Germany emerged from the Left group, while the least favorable emerged from the Right and the Center generally remained in the middle. Thus, for example, the following percentages of the Left group agreed with the opinion that Germany is among the countries that are friendly with Israel: 50.8% (1998), 55.1% (2004) and 75.8% (2010). The corresponding percentages in the Center group were: 48.1%, 40.4% and 69.0%; in the Right – 34.9%, 31.0%, and 56.9%. Thus it is evident that the main increases in all three groups took place between 2004 and 2010.

However, the agreement-level with the claim that most of the German nation supported the destruction of the Jews in the Holocaust steadily declined over the years in the Left (75.6%, 67.8% and 64.1%) and the Center (72.9%, 70.2% and 68.5%). By contrast, the corresponding percentages in the Right dropped from 80.6% in 1998 to 76.6% in 2004, but returned almost to their former level in 2010 (79.4%).

An overall view: Germany's image in the eyes of Jewish youth became much more positive during the years that elapsed from the first survey conducted in 1998, but especially subsequent to 2004.

Part 2A: Multivariate Analyses Methodology

This section describes the results obtained from a series of regression analyses. Some were regular linear regression tests while others were multinomial regression tests (such as patterns of civil resistance, controversies and goals). Multinomial regression is necessary when the independent variable is nominal – that is, a set of categories that cannot be ordered in any meaningful way such as the effect of socio-demographic variables (gender, political affiliation etc.) on the respondents' answers to the survey questions. The dependent variables were the answers to the questions, which were categorical; for example, selection-percentages of the most important goals. The list of independent variables is identical to the list of topics above, which were based on the results of factor analysis.

Regression analyses, in relation to each of the topics, are presented separately for each of the three years in order to enable us to examine the consistency of the effect of the independent variables. These variables ('descriptive variables') include the five socio-economic demographic variables (or personal characteristics): age, gender, income level, religiosity and political identity. Since all these variables are nominal ('dummy variables'), regression analysis requires that one of the categories in each of them will serve as an intercept (constant). For 'age,' the category serving as the basis of comparison is the adolescent age group; thus in the regression analysis, the coefficient of the young adult group will appear (and not the younger adolescent group). This coefficient shows whether age has a significant effect on the independent variable, in accordance with the differences in the scores that were obtained in the two groups; and if so, what is the direction and the strength of the effect. These terms are explained below:

Significance of the effect (or significance level) – It is accepted that the minimum significance level is 0.05 or **less**. Thus, a coefficient of. 07 would not be considered significant.

Direction of the effect – may be positive or negative. Positive coefficients (above zero) of the Left toward Arabs means that their attitudes tended to be more *positive* to Arabs *in comparison to* the base-group, i.e. the group missing from the table (i.e. *haredim*). Negative coefficients (below zero) of

the high-income group regarding the perception of threat to their personal safety, means that they tended to feel *less* threatened *in comparison to* the base-group (i.e. the low income group).

Similarly, females serve as the basis of comparison in relation to gender. Corresponding examples of other variables that serve as bases of comparison are: the low-income group, the secular group and the Right-wing group.

		1998			2004		2010			
Independent Variables	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar -dized coeffi- cient	Significan ce level	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar -dized coeffi- cient	Significan ce level	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar -dized coeffi- cient	Signifi-cance level	
Constant	.028	-	.693	.042	-	.523	084	-	.184	
Males	.002	.002	.954	.042	.032	.311	.028	.024	.485	
Young adults	.008	.006	.854	113	086	.006	032	027	.436	
Haredi	.005	.002	.951	.195	.079	.017	.218	.114	.002	
Religious	.122	.057	.112	.118	.054	.100	.268	.176	.000	
Traditional	.078	.057	.123	.030	.020	.551	.109	.080	.035	
Middle income	.057	.045	.344	.108	.081	.050	.059	.047	.226	
High income	.076	.058	.230	.066	.048	.257	.002	.001	.976	
Center	083	041	.232	010	005	.888	018	011	.747	
Left	144	109	.004	089	061	.071	015	008	.819	

Table No. 2: Regression results No. 1 - Optimism regarding the future

In general, we see that the effects of personal (demographic) characteristics on the optimism levels were few and weak throughout the survey years. This finding should not surprise us because the differences between the categories of each one of them, were rather small even on the aggregate level. In any case the only variable that had several significant effects (at least in some of the years) is the level of religiosity. Thus, the regression coefficients show that in comparison with the secular group, the *haredi* group was more optimistic in 2004 and 2010 because their metric coefficients were higher than for the other groups. The religious and traditional groups were also more

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optimistic but only in 2010. Gender did not have significant effect in any of the years; in other words, the level of optimism of female and male respondents was similar throughout the entire period. Only isolated, non-consistent effects were found for the other variables.

Note that the paragraph below refers to Table 3 below, not Table 2 above.

The regression analyses show that only gender and religiosity have significant, consistent effects on the perception of threat to personal and familial safety. The threat-perception among males was lower than among females (in 2004 and 2010), with coefficients of 0.366 in 2004 and 0.244 in 2010. (Remember that the females do not appear on the table because they were the basis of comparison.) The *haredim* were less worried than the other three groups, with respective coefficients of 0.338 and 0.298. The religious felt less threatened in 2004, but in 2010 they were no different than the traditional and secular groups. (True, the traditional group has a coefficient of -.067, but since the significance level is low we ignore the coefficient.)

 Table No. 3: Regression results No. 2 - Threats to personal

 and familial safety

			anu	Tamm	al safet	y			
		1998			2004			2010	
Independent Variables	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Signifi- cance level
Constant	-	-	-	2.453		.000	2.914		.000
Males	-	-	-	.366	.190	.000	.244	.144	.000
Young adults	-	-	-	147	076	.013	076	045	.190
Haredi	-	-	-	.338	.094	.004	.298	.110	.003
Religious	-	-	-	.237	.074	.021	.050	.023	.555
Traditional	-	-	-	.025	.012	.726	067	035	.358
Middle income	-	-	-	.078	.040	.322	.020	.011	.771
High income	-	-	-	.124	.061	.138	059	032	.414
Center	-	-	-	.068	.020	.519	.098	.043	.226
Left	-	-	-	085	040	.230	.083	0.33	.363

With regard to age, it was found that the young adults were slightly less inclined to worry than the adolescents. However, despite the identical direction of the coefficients, the difference between the two groups was only significant in 2004, with a coefficient of (-0.147).

The income and political-identity variables had no significant effect on threat-perception in any of the years. In other words, the perception of threat was similar among rich and poor and throughout the entire political spectrum.

	1998		0	2004			2010		
Independen t Variables	Metri c coeffi- cient	Standar - dized coeffi- cient	Significanc e level	Metri c coeffi- cient	Standar - dized coeffi- cient	Significanc e level	Metri c coeffi- cient	Standar - dized coeffi- cient	Signifi - cance level
Constant	-	-	-	112	-	.120	128	-	.083
Males	-	-	-	159	098	.001	.003	.002	.947
Young adults	-	-	-	.024	.015	.594	.009	.006	.844
Haredi	-	-	-	425	145	.000	516	195	.000
Religious	-	-	-	307	141	.000	382	183	.000
Traditional	-	-	-	208	116	.000	112	060	.062
Middle income	-	-	-	051	031	.401	.036	.021	.535
High income	-	-	-	.050	.029	.438	090	050	.134
Center	-	-	-	.509	.180	.000	.611	.273	.000
Left	-	-	-	.610	.337	.000	.933	.381	.000

Table No. 4: Regression No. 3 - Attitudes toward Arabs

The two variables which had significant effects in the two relevant years (in the Table), were religiosity and political identity. Regarding religiosity the findings show that attitudes toward Arabs become more negative as the religiosity level increased, as we see from the metric regression coefficients in 2004 and 2010: *haredi* group – (-0.425, 2004) and (-0.516, 2010); religious group – (-0.307) and (-0.382), and in the traditional group – (-0.208) and (-0.112), respectively. It is interesting to note that the negative

effects in the first two groups, **increased** between the two years while it **weakened** in the traditional group (in the same time period). The significance level became borderline in 2010; 062 is considered borderline because. 05 is accepted as the minimum significance level.

The coefficients of political identity show that the attitudes of the Left and Center toward Arabs, were more positive than among the Right. The coefficients are: Center – 0.509 and 0.611 and Left – 0.610 and 0.933. These effects were stronger in 2010, and as in the previous case of religiosity, the effect of the more extreme group on the political identity scale (the Left) is stronger than the effect of the Center.

Regarding the rest of the independent variables, the age and income variables had no significant effects. However, males held more negative attitudes toward Arabs than women did, but only in 2004.

		1998			2004			2010	
Independent Variables	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Signifi- cance level
Constant	-	-	-	2.613	-	.000	2.690	-	.000
Males	-	-	-	254	118	.000	128	061	.043
Young adults	-	-	-	.048	.002	.430	097	046	.129
Haredi	-	-	-	911	227	.000	761	222	.000
Religious	-	-	-	736	209	.000	879	328	.000
Traditional	-	-	-	322	134	.000	116	049	.145
Middle income	-	-	-	0.92	.042	.258	.183	.083	.017
High income	-	-	-	.303	.134	.000	.036	.016	.652
Center	-	-	-	.428	.112	.000	.370	.129	.000
Left	-	-	-	.581	.243	.000	.712	.228	.000

Table No. 5: Regression No. 4 - Attitudes toward peace

This regression analysis shows that all of the personal characteristics (except age) had significant effects on the attitudes toward peace. However, the effects that were consistent over **both** years were those of religiosity and

political identity. Again, the effects were negative in both religious groupings; the regression coefficients were: *haredi* – (-0.911) and (-0.761); religious – (-0.736) and (-0.879). The effect in the traditional group was only significant in 2004, and even then it was much weaker with a coefficient of (-0.322).

Regarding political identity, the effects of Center and Left were positive in both years, where the coefficients of the Left (0.581 and 0.712) were higher than those of the Center (0.428 and 0.370).

Gender also had significant effects in both years, when the attitudes of the males toward peace were less positive than the attitudes of the females; the male coefficients were (-0.254) and (-0.128).

The age and income variables had no significant effects on this topic.

		1998	0. Regies		2004	0		2010	
Independent Variables	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Signifi- cance level
Constant	2.170	-	.000	2.137	-	.000	2.485	-	.000
Males	038	020	.565	035	018	.583	.117	.066	.055
Young adults	014	007	.830	.039	.019	.545	.000	.000	1.000
Haredi	008	003	.947	048	013	.710	271	095	.012
Religious	.089	.027	.465	.008	.002	.944	396	175	.000
Traditional	057	027	.482	.049	.022	.525	199	099	.010
Middle income	.084	.043	.381	092	046	.280	139	074	.060
High income	.133	.067	.181	060	028	.508	101	052	.192
Center	.114	.037	.301	.114	.032	.321	001	.000	.993
Left	.087	.043	.272	.057	.025	.461	.039	.015	.684

Table No. 6: Regression No. 5 - Strong leadership

The findings for this topic in the first section had shown that the differences in level of support or opposition to strong leaders among the group profiles, were relatively small. Thus here, too, in regression analysis we find that the effects were not particularly strong. Only religiosity

shows significant effects, and only in 2010; in the two previous years, the categories that belong to this variable do not differ from one another.

With regards to the negative coefficients (in 2010) of the *haredi* (-0.271), religious (-0.396) and traditional groups (-0.199), this means that these groups preferred a regime headed by strong leaders over a government based on the rule of law to a greater extent than the secular group. If preferences in this question give any kind of indication of the attitude toward democracy, we can then say that the status of democracy in all the non-secular groups was much weaker than in the secular group.

Regarding Table No. 7 below: this table displays a large amount of data. In order to help the reader follow these results, we will first focus on each of the different types of civil resistance across the different years. Only afterwards we will relate to the entire picture.

First, two preliminary comments:

One: The group that opposes both forms of civil resistance serves as the constant (basis for comparison) for each of the regression coefficients on the table, together with the three types of civil resistance in each of the years. As we saw in the discussion of aggregate findings, this group (i.e. those opposed to any form of civil resistance) was the largest in scope throughout the years though its proportion shrank from 75.7% in 1998, to 58.2% in 2004, and 53.9% in 2010.

Two: Next to each of the categories (of personal characteristics) appears a regression coefficient under which appears the exponential B statistical value (or odds ratio). Thus, in Table 7 below, the regression coefficient for Males is (-.171), and the exponential B statistical value or odds ratio is 843.. This exponential B statistic expresses how large or small are the odds that the entire category (for example, males) will support a specific type of civil resistance (for example, non-violent civil resistance) in comparison with the relevant category of the same characteristic (in this case, females), when the basis for joint comparison of both categories are, as aforesaid, the group that does not support either type of civil resistance. It is important to remember to refer to the exponential B value **only** if the regression coefficient has an asterisk, which means that is statistically significant.

			01 0		2010				
Independent		1998			2004			2010	
Variables	Non- violent	Violent	Both	Non- violent	Violent	Both	Non- violent	Violent	Both
Constant	*-1.997	*-1.997	*-3.335	*-1.124	-1.124	*-2.510	*-1.423	*-1.504	*-2.288
(opposes all forms of civil resistance)	_	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Males	171	.241	.165	.315	.144	*.420	181	035	.163
Males	.843	1.273	1.179	1.370	1.155	1.521	.834	.966	1.177
V	023	216	272	298	*712	-3.18	*.698	305	*.567
Young adults	.977	.805	.762	.743	.491	.728	2.011	.737	1.763
YY 1'	.173	.288	*1.420	295	.277	.344	*.719	*.785	*1.309
Haredi	1.188	1.334	4.136	.745	1.319	1.411	2.053	2.193	3.709
D II I	.532	.743	*1.200	.304	*.691	.178	.395	.572	.363
Religious	1.702	2.101	3.321	1.355	1.995	1.195	1.484	1.771	1.438
T 11.1	.021	518	*.924	*.423	.045	.262	.115	*.815	.387
Traditional	1.021	.596	2.519	1.526	1.046	1.300	1.122	2.259	1.472
Middle	.489	633	583	329	.262	*.941	371	049	004
income	1.631	.531	.559	.720	1.300	2.564	.690	.952	.996
YY: 1 .	.460	450	211	319	150	*.830	511	.128	.293
High income	1.584	.638	.810	.727	.861	2.294	*.600	1.137	1.340
Conton	.003	541	.528	735	694	.037	511	307	*857
Center	1.003	.582	1.696	.479	.500	1.038	1.561	.736	.425
Left	.004	*-1.127	.081	.339	*520	*568	*.843	.773	241
Lett	1.004	.324	1.084	1.404	.594	.567	2.323	.463	.786

 Table No. 7: Regression No. 6 (multinomial) – Attitudes toward types of civil resistance^{*}

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* The coefficients marked with a star in this table (and subsequent multinomial regression tables) are significant to the level of: p<.05

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On the background of these comments, we first discuss the findings related to non-violent civil resistance. Support of this phenomenon rose over the years very moderately, from about 16% in 1998, to 18% in 2004, and 20% in 2010.

We see in the second column in Table No. 7 (under 1998) that none of the independent variables had a significant effect on this type of civil resistance because no asterisks appear next to the regression coefficient. In other words, the percentage of support for this type of civil resistance (as aforesaid, 16%) more or less reflected the scope of support given it that year by all the categories of personal characteristics.

The corresponding findings that were obtained for 2004 (column 4) present a picture similar to the one obtained for 1998, except for the isolated effect of the religiosity variable. Note that under column 4 (next to the Traditional group), we see a regression coefficient of *.423. Thus, according to these findings, the odds that the traditional group would support non-violent civil resistance was higher by a factor of 1.52 (the exponential B value); that is, they were 1.52 chances more likely to use non-violent civil resistance than the secular group.

Column 7, which displays the findings for 2010, points to several significant effects scattered among the four independent variables; the only one without any effect is gender. Thus, the regression coefficients show that the odds of the young adult group to support non-violent civil resistance were higher in that year by a factor of 2.01 over the younger group (remember: in comparison with the group that does not support any type of civil resistance). The odds of the *haredi* group were 2.05 higher than the secular group. By contrast, the high-income variable has a negative coefficient; the odds of the low-income group. Regarding the effect of political identity, the odds of the Left supporting this type of civil resistance was higher by 2.32 than the corresponding odds in the Right.

The findings that refer to use of violent civil resistance alone show that support for this kind of protest also rose over the years, and the major jump took place between 1998 (support of 4.8%) and 2004, when support reached 13.5% – almost 3 times as much as the earlier period. In 2010 the upward

trend continued, though it only rose to 14.2% that year. The data for 1998 show that only political identity had a significant effect; the odds of the Left for supporting violent civil resistance were significantly lower (by a factor of 0.324) than those of the Right.

The extent of significant effects on support of violent civil resistance grew slightly in 2004. As we see in column 5, the young adults (2004) tended to support this type of civil resistance by a factor of almost half of the adolescents, with an odds ratio of 0.491. By contrast, the odds of the religious group for supporting this type of civil resistance were higher by almost a factor of two than of the secular group, with a coefficient of 2.00. The odds of a similar support by the Left were lower by almost half than the corresponding odds of the Right, with a coefficient of 0.594.

In 2010, the *haredi* and religious groups together supported the use of **only** violent civil resistance to a greater extent than the secular group, with odds ratios of 2.05 and 1.48, respectively. In 2010 (as in 2004), the young adults supported violent civil resistance less than the adolescents by an odds ratio of 0.74. Thus, age-group and political identity had significant effects on this type of civil resistance.

Support of **combined use of both types of civil resistance** rose over the years; like the increase in violent civil resistance alone, the increase in combined forms of civil resistance took place mainly between 1998 (when the support for this was only 3.8%) and 2004, when the support reached 10.5%. There was an additional, minimal increase in 2010 to 11.2%.

The findings for 1998 show that only religiosity had a significant effect on the trend to combine both forms of civil resistance, when all the non-secular groups sided with this type of civil resistance more than the secular group. In the *haredi group* this trend was higher by a factor of more than 4; the religious group – by a factor of 3.2; and the traditional group, by a factor of 2.52.

A different picture emerges in 2004. Religiosity, was been the only variable with an effect on this variable in 1998, had no significant effect in 2004; its place was taken by the income and political identity variables. Specifically: the middle- and high-income groups supported the combination of both types of civil resistance more than the low-income group, with odds

ratios of 2.56 and 2.29, respectively. Regarding political identity, the Left tended toward this type of civil resistance much less than the Right (in 2004), with an odds ratio of 0.57.

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In 2010 the findings change, though only partially. In that year, the young adults sided with the use of a combination of violent and non-violent civil resistance more than the adolescents by an odds ratio of 1.76. The religiosity variable returned to the picture, with the *haredi* group supporting this form of civil resistance by a factor of 3.70 more than the secular group. Within the political identity category, only Center had a significant effect but their support of combined violent and non-violent civil resistance was less than the Right by a factor of 0.43.

Table No. 8: Regression No. 7 – Trust in government institutions in charge of security and law enforcement: the IDF, the police and the legal system.

		1998			2004		2010			
Independent Variables	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level	
Constant	.088	-	.249	.205	-	.001	.247	-	.000	
Males	047	034	.294	.004	.003	.921	055	043	.182	
Young adults	096	069	.031	228	177	.000	282	221	.000	
Haredi	631	261	.000	280	117	.000	406	198	.000	
Religious	012	005	.888	.069	.032	.317	070	043	.241	
Traditional	.046	.030	.397	.063	.044	.182	018	013	.724	
Middle income	.127	.091	.048	.105	.081	.046	.135	.101	.006	
High income	.072	.050	.281	.040	.030	.469	.018	.013	.733	
Center	.103	.046	.166	.001	.000	.989	.092	.053	.111	
Left	.001	.001	.986	.008	.005	.873	.198	.104	.003	

The findings show that three variables – religiosity, income and age – had significant, consistent effects throughout the years on the level of trust in the group of government institutions including the IDF, the police and the legal

system, as follows:

The trust-level of the *haredi* group was significantly lower than that of the secular, with regression coefficients of (-0.631) in 1998, (-0.280) in 2004, and (-0.406) in 2010. Since the coefficients of the religious and the traditional were not significant, we can infer that their trust-level was similar to that of the secular group.

Regarding the age groups: the trust-level of the young adults was lower than that of the adolescents and the gap between the two groups even widened over the years, as we learn from the following coefficients: (-0.096) in 1998, (-0.228) in 2004, and (-0.282) in 2010.

Regarding family income groups: the trust-level of the middle-income group was higher than that of the two other income groups in a moderate but consistent pattern, as we see from the following coefficients: 0.127, 0.105, and 0.135. Assuming that family income can serve as an indicator for socio-economic status, we can say that the trust-level of the middle class or middle socioeconomic status (SES) tended to be higher (to some extent) than the low and high SES – at least regarding the three institutions we examined.

Another variable that had a significant effect on the level of trust in the government institutions but only in 2010, was political identity. In that year, the trust-level of the Left – that had not differed from the Right and the Center in the two previous time periods – was moderately but consistently higher with a coefficient of 0.198.

		1998			2004		2010			
Independent Variables	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level	
Constant	090	-	.219	.066	-	.344	.286	-	.000	
Males	015	012	.724	016	011	.723	046	034	.291	
Young adults	111	084	.010	125	088	.005	332	245	.000	
Haredi	331	145	.000	401	152	.000	411	189	.000	

 Table No. 9: Regression No. 8 - Trust in political and social institutions:

 the Knesset, the parties, the Histadrut and the media

		1998			2004		2010			
Independent Variables	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level	
Religious	021	010	.787	032	014	.673	136	079	.036	
Traditional	.024	.017	.651	.005	.003	.930	128	084	.023	
Middle income	049	037	.434	.028	.020	.632	.044	.031	.405	
High income	.000	.000	.997	032	021	.608	054	037	.329	
Center	.163	.078	.023	013	005	.864	.048	.026	.445	
Left	.092	.067	.073	.089	.056	.092	.021	.011	.761	

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The two most important variables with regard to trust in political and social institutions were religiosity and age (similar to previous findings). Gender and income had no significant effects, and political identity had an effect only once and to a marginal degree.

Regarding religiosity: again, the *haredi* group played a central role among the categories of this variable, with regression coefficients of (0.331) in 1998, (-0.401) in 2004, and (-0.411) in 2010. In other words, the level of trust of the *haredim* in these institutions was significantly lower than that of the secular group. In 2010, the trust-level of the religious and traditional were also significantly negative, but to a much more moderate extent when compared to the *haredim*; the religious and traditional coefficients were (-0.136) and (-0.128), respectively. In other words, the gap between the trust-level of the secular and the other three groups grew in 2010 in comparison to earlier years, especially with regards to the *haredi* group.

The effects of age here were similar to the effects of age on trust in the other government institutions. Here, the trust of the young adults in political and social institutions was consistently lower than that of the adolescents, with coefficients of (-0.111), (-0. 125) and (-0.332). It should be noted that the gaps in the trust of the females in both groups grew over the years, similar to the trend that characterized the gaps between secular and *haredim*.

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Regarding the rest of the personal characteristics: only one significant effect was found of political identity in which the Center exhibited a bit more trust than the Right in 1998. This is evidently a random finding.

		1998			2004		2010			
Independent Variables	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level	
Constant	285	-	.003	.008	-	.306	126	-	.158	
Males	019	010	.731	092	047	.092	192	098	.001	
Young adults	144	076	.010	336	170	.000	310	158	.000	
Haredi	.935	.290	.000	1.075	.293	.000	.984	.314	.000	
Religious	.786	.249	.000	.770	.237	.000	.875	.351	.000	
Traditional	.538	.262	.000	.480	.218	.000	.572	.260	.000	
Middle income	005	002	.955	081	041	.266	062	032	.335	
High income	078	040	.352	165	080	.033	067	013	.712	
Center	051	017	.582	215	063	.027	323	121	.000	
Left	393	199	.000	386	174	.000	424	146	.000	

Table No. 10: Regression No. 9 - Trust in the rabbinate

Obvious, predictable differences existed throughout the years in the level of trust attributed to the rabbinate institution. Here, too, the religiosity variable – especially the *haredi* group – was key player in all the time periods. The regression coefficients of the *haredim* were: 0.935 (1998), 1.075 (2004), and 0.984 (2010). The corresponding coefficients of the religious were: 0.786, 0.770, and 0.875; of traditional group – 0.538, 0.480, and 0.572. It is evident that the level of trust in the rabbinate was in direct proportion to the level of religiosity.

Two additional variables with significant effects over time were age and political identity. Regarding age we find that once again, the young adults tended to consistently place less trust in institutions than the adolescent group, with coefficients here of: (-0.144), (-0.336), and (-0.310).

A similar picture emerges regarding political identity. The trust-levels of

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the Center, and mainly the Left, were significantly lower than that of the Right. The coefficients obtained for the Center were only significant in 2004 and 2010, and reached (-0.215) and (-0.323), while the effects of the Left were significant throughout the years with coefficients of (-0.393), (-0.386), and (-0.424). Gender and income-groups yielded relatively isolated and marginal effects.

Most important controversies											
Independent	19	98	20	04	201	0					
Variables	Religious and Secular	Right and Left	Religious and Secular	Right and Left	Religious and Secular	Right and Left					
Constant	.272	*-1.107	*-1.289	-1.059	*-1.093	*-1.032					
Jews and Arabs	-	-	-	-	-	-					
Mala	*.425	*.562	038	140	.168	.064					
Males	1.530	1.755	.962	.869	1.183	1.066					
Y 11	*.394	*.505	*.417	.064	*.779	.043					
Young adults	1.484	1.656	1.518	1.066	2.180	1.044					
	*1.093	*.954	*.950	*.725	*.628	.557					
Haredi	2.982	2.597	2.585	2.064	1.874	1.745					
D 11 1	.447	*.923	*.957	*.951	.245	*.827					
Religious	1.563	2.517	2.605	2.589	1.277	2.286					
	*716	*519	.101	.232	*544	.421					
Traditional	.489	.595	1.106	1.261	.580	1.524					
Middle	027	.256	110	301	320	202					
income	.974	1.291	.896	.740	.726	.817					
· · ·	085	.070	.165	169	224	*476					
High income	.918	1.072	1.179	.844	.799	.621					
G	.405	.233	.173	004	*.601	.141					
Center	1.499	1.263	1.189	.996	1.823	1.151					
T C	.311	.215	.340	.191	*.723	*.660					
Left	1.365	1.239	1.404	1.210	2.060	1.930					

Table No. 11: Regression No. 10 (multinomial) – Most important controversies

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The discussion below on the findings of Table No. 11 will focus on the effects of independent variables on the priority scale of the three issues that were selected as the most important controversies throughout the survey time periods: Jew-Arab schism, religious-secular schism, and Right-Left schism. The Jew-Arab schism served as the basis for comparison, so that the coefficients expressing the effects of the independent variables were relative to this schism.

In general, religiosity emerges among the five independent variables as the one with the strongest and most frequent effects. In 1998, the odds of the *haredim* choosing the religious-secular schism as the most important controversy of all was greater by a factor of three (odds ratio of 2.98) than the odds that they would choose the Jew-Arab schism, in comparison to the odds of the secular group.

A similar pattern of effects also existed in 2004. Simultaneously, the Right-Left schism occupied an important place in the *haredi* group, more than the Jew-Arab schism, with odds ratios of 2.60 in 1998, and 2.06 in 2004. In other words: in those years, the Right-Left schism was perceived by the *haredim* as being more important than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with odds ratios of 2.60 in 1998, and 2.06 in 2004. In other words, in those years the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was pushed aside by the *haredim* to last of the three most important controversies. This trend continued in 2010, but the schism between Right and Left was not significant that year.

The overall picture we receive of the religious group is that they considered the religious-secular schism to be more important than the Jew-Arab schism only in 2004 (in contradistinction to the *haredi* group), with an odds ratio of 2.605. Yet the religious group viewed the Right-Left schism as more important than the Jew-Arab schism (like the *haredi* group and unlike the secular group). Moreover, in contradistinction to the *haredim*, the religious maintained this viewpoint throughout all three years with an odds ratio of 2.52 in 1998, 2.59 in 2004 and 2.29 in 2010.

The findings regarding the traditional group point to a different pattern of effect. As opposed to the *haredi* and religious groups, the traditional group attributed less importance to the religious-secular schism than to the

Jew-Arab schism. In addition, the negative regression coefficients of the traditional group – (-0.716) in 1998 and (-0.544) in 2010 – show that they attribute even less importance to the religious-secular schism than did the secular group.

A similar finding was reported in the traditional group regarding the Right-Left schism, though the coefficient was only significant in 1998. In both 2004 and 2010, the coefficients of the traditional group were similar to the secular and different than the *haredi* and religious groups.

Age was another variable that had great effect on attitudes in this subject. In 1998 the young adults attributed more importance to the secular-religious schism (than to the Jew-Arab schism) with an odds ratio of 1.48; and to the Right-Left schism (than to the Jew-Arab schism) with an odds ratio of 1.66; in comparison to the adolescent age group. These gaps continued to exist in 2004 and 2010, though they were only significant in reference to the religious-secular schism.

Gender also had effects on this subject but they were significant only in 1998, when the males ascribed more importance than the females to the religious-secular schism and the Right-Left schism, in contrast to the Jew-Arab schism, with odds ratios of 1.53 and 1.76, respectively.

Regarding political identity: the findings show that in 1998 and 2004, this variable did not have significant effect. However, in 2010 it was found that the Center and Left both viewed the religious-secular schism as the most critical controversy, in contrast to the Right. The odds ratio that it would be preferred over the Jew-Arab schism was 1.82 in the Center and 2.06 in the Left. Moreover, the same pattern of effect appeared in the Left in the same year with regards to the Right-Left schism, with an odds ratio of 1.93.

Thus, the findings that appear in Table No. 12 point to many effects, some of which were very strong, in selecting the most important goal from peace, democracy and Jewishness. The main variable (from this aspect) was the religious factor, especially with regards to the choice between democracy and Jewishness.

Findings regarding the importance of democracy as opposed to peace: the only gap in this issue was between the *haredim* and the rest of the groups.

Thus, the *haredim* greatly belittled the importance of democracy in 1998 with an odds ratio of 0.134 (in other words, less important by a factor of almost 10) and in 2010 with an odds ratio of 0.215. No significant effects were found in the religious and traditional groups; therefore, except for the *haredim*, the other groups did not prefer democracy less or more than peace, similar to the secular group.

Moreover (with only one exception) none of the other independent variables had significant effects on choosing between democracy and peace throughout the years. The one exception concerns the middle- and high-income groups that chose democracy over peace in 2010, more than the low-income group. The odds ratios were 1.84 (middle) and 1.93 (high), in other words – almost twice as much.

Table 100. 12. Regression 100. 11 (Inutifionital)											
Independent	1998	3	2004	ļ	2010)					
Variables	Democracy	Jewish state	Democracy	Jewish state	Democracy	Jewish state					
Constant	.191	*938	.404	.486	*723	*-1.064					
Peace	-	-	-	-	-	-					
Males	216	*.704	.143	*.467	.044	.430					
	.806	2.022	1.154	1.595	1.045	1.538					
Varia a la lu	288	063	.028	*566	.014	*.643					
Young adults	.750	.939	1.028	.568	1.014	1.903					
Henry I.	*-2.008	*2.579	309	*3.609	*-1.535	*2.315					
Haredi	.134	13.91	.734	36.925	.215	10.127					
Dullistere	.387	*2.419	121	*1.658	595	*2.619					
Religious	1.472	11.237	.886	5.250	.551	13.272					
The little and	298	*.880	*625	*.792	.491	*1.441					
Traditional	.742	2.410	.535	2.208	1.633	4.223					
Middle	.134	480	121	348	*.607	087					
income	1.144	.619	.886	.706	1.836	.917					
High income	.284	283	430	740	*.656	*.697					

Table No. 12: Regression No. 11 (multinomial)

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Independent	1998	}	2004	ļ	2010		
Variables	Democracy	Jewish state	Democracy	Jewish state	Democracy	Jewish state	
	1.328	.753	.651	.477	1.927	2.008	
Center	005	462	260	*756	075	*-1.201	
	.995	.630	.771	.469	.928	.301	
Left	051	*-2.054	055	*875	.130	*-1.833	
	.950	.128	.947	.417	1.139	.160	

We receive a more diverse picture when the choice is between peace and Jewishness. Predictably, the *haredim* assign a much greater importance to Jewishness throughout all the years, in comparison to the secular group: by a factor of 14 in 1998, a factor of 37 in 2004, and a factor of 10 in 2010. In the religious group the odds for preferring Jewishness over peace were higher by a factor of 11 in 1998, a factor of 5 in 2004, and a factor of almost 14 in 2010. The traditional group also preferred Jewishness over peace, though more moderately: by a factor of 2.4 in 1998, 2.2 in 2004, and 4.2 in 2010.

Another variable with significant, consistent effect in this issue was political identity in which the priority-list of the Center and Left clearly tilted toward peace, when compared to the religious group. The Center group's odds ratios of Jewishness were: 0.630 in 1998, 0.469 in 2004, and 0.301 in 2010 (in 1998 the effect was not significant). On the other hand, the Left achieved odds ratios of 0.128 in 1998, 0.417 in 2004, and 0.160 in 2010. In other words: the odds that the Left group would choose the Jewish nature of the State as the most important goal, were smaller by a factor of almost 8 than the odds that it would choose peace in 1998, and by a factor of 6 in 2010.

Among the effects of the other independent variables that were smaller and weaker, we note that males preferred Jewishness over peace more than females in 1998 (factor of 2) and 2004 (factor of 1.6). The same trend appeared in 2010, but was not significant. Regarding age: in 2004, the young adults preferred peace over Jewishness by a factor of 0.176 more than the adolescents.

On the other hand, in 2010 the young adults preferred Jewishness over peace with an odds ratio of 1.9, in other words – the preference pattern was

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reversed. Finally, the findings regarding the effects of income level also show this reverse trend among the high-income group. In 2004 the high-income group preferred peace over Jewishness by a 2.1 odds ratio, while in 2010 the same group preferred Jewishness by a factor of 2.

	1998				2004		2010		
Independent Variables	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level
Constant	2.749	-	.000	2.929	-	.000	3.308	-	.000
Males	203	119	.000	168	102	.001	185	116	.001
Young adults	171	100	.002	074	045	.148	180	113	.001
Haredi	.200	.067	.064	.050	.017	.619	260	102	.006
Religious	.195	.068	.058	.043	.016	.626	.111	.055	.161
Traditional	.080	.043	.238	057	031	.356	.074	.041	.281
Middle income	.046	.027	.566	.085	.052	.212	.027	.016	.678
High income	.116	.066	.167	.157	.091	.031	.036	.021	.594
Center	.055	.020	.554	.168	.059	.067	.047	.022	.537
Left	.143	.081	.033	.012	.007	.839	.034	.014	.694

Table No. 13: Regression No. 12 - Personal interest in the Holocaust

The two variables that had consistent effects on the level of interest in the Holocaust, were gender and age.

As evident from the negative regression coefficients of gender in the table above, males exhibited less interest in the Holocaust than women, with the following regression coefficients: (-0.203) in 1998; (-0.168) in 2004; and (-0.185) in 2010. The results received for the effect of age show that the young adults tended to have more interest in the Holocaust than did the adolescents, with the following regression coefficients: (-0.171) in 1998; (-0.74) in 2004; and (-0.180) in 2010. Although the coefficient in 2004 was not significant, the direction of its effect was negative as were the coefficients of the other years. The rest of the characteristics had significant

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effects in only one year.

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	1998			2004			2010		
Independent Variables	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level
Constant	.008	-	.913	.208	-	.001	.026	-	.686
Males	072	055	.094	073	055	.076	089	073	.025
Young adults	003	002	.953	033	025	.421	.013	.010	.753
Haredi	.440	.191	.000	.360	.145	.000	.478	.241	.000
Religious	.289	.131	.000	.072	.033	.309	.219	.140	.000
Traditional	.114	.080	.029	.013	.009	.787	.052	.037	.309
Middle income	040	031	.519	107	080	.050	.026	.020	.586
High income	028	021	.663	108	078	.063	.113	.085	.026
Center	017	008	.818	172	075	.019	141	085	.012
Left	017	012	.740	135	092	.006	230	126	.000

 Table No. 14: Regression number 13 - Xenophobia, Chances for the rise of a

 Nazi regime, and Involvement of the German nation in the Holocaust

Religiosity is the variable with the strongest and most consistent effect on attitudes toward Germany in this sphere. The *haredi* and religious groups exhibited negative effects throughout the years, with corresponding coefficients of: *haredim* – 0.440, 0.360, and 0.478; religious – 0.289, 0.72, and 0.219 (though the coefficient of the religious group was not significant in 2004).

In the traditional group, a significant negative effect was obtained only in 2004. In other words, the secular group tended to view today's Germany in a more positive light than did the non-secular groups.

The next variable in the order of effects is that of political identity. Consistent, positive effects were obtained for the Center and the Left in 2004 and 2010 (the effects in 1998 were not significant). The corresponding coefficients were: Center – (-0.172) and (-0.141), and Left: (-0.135) and (-0.230). In other words, the Right was more likely (in 2004 and 2010) to

view Germany in a more positive light than were the Left and the Center.

Gender also had an effect, as males tended to view Germany in a more positive light than women did though the significance of most of the coefficients were borderline. The rest of the characteristics yielded only isolated and marginal effects.

	1998			2004			2010		
Independent Variables	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level	Metric coeffi- cient	Standar- dized coeffi- cient	Significance level
Constant	280	-	.002	396	-	.000	131	-	.110
Males	.206	.130	.000	.229	.143	.000	.314	.196	.000
Young adults	.076	.048	.150	.118	.074	.016	.204	.127	.000
Haredi	220	079	.032	147	048	.135	401	152	.000
Religious	.060	.022	.538	088	033	.302	376	182	.000
Traditional	260	150	.000	097	054	.100	192	107	.004
Middle income	.079	.050	.301	.089	.056	.169	.010	.006	.879
High income	.119	.073	.130	.217	.129	.002	022	013	.735
Center	.015	.006	.868	.166	.060	.058	.145	.067	.050
Left	.169	.103	.007	.329	.183	.000	.339	.141	.000

Table No. 15: Regression number 14 – Germany as a civilized nation, friendly to Israel

The three variables with the most prominent effects on this Germany-related issue, were: gender, religiosity and political identity.

The effects of gender, which were significant and consistent throughout the three years, show that males had more positive images of Germany than females did. The male coefficients were: 0.206 in 1998, 0.229 in 2004, and 0.314 in 2010. As is evident from the magnitude of the coefficients, the gender gap grew over time.

The effects of religiosity were generally significant and negative. In the *haredi group* they were significant in all three years, with the following

coefficients: (-0.220) in 1998; (-0.147) in 2004; and (-0.401) in 2010. In other words, the gap between the *haredi* and secular groups became even larger in 2010. In the remaining two groups – the religious and traditional – the effects were significant and negative in two out of three years. In other words: all the groups that were not secular tended to have more negative attitudes toward Germany than the secular group did, on this issue.

Regarding political identity: The findings show that the Center and especially the Left held more positive attitudes in this sphere than the Right did. Significant effects were obtained in the Center only in 2004 and 2010, with coefficients of 0.166 and 0.145, respectively. In the Left group, all the effects were significant in all three years with coefficients of 0.169 in 1998, 0.329 in 2004, and 0.339 in 2010.

The direction of the age-related effects show that young adults viewed Germany in a more positive light than did the adolescents, though the effects were significant only in 2004 (0.118) and 2010 (0.204).

None of the income-level groups had real effects on this issue.

In general, it is important to note that the image of Germany in the religious and *haredi* groups, as in the Right group, tended to be relatively more negative regarding the Germany-related issues that appear in Tables 14 and 15.

Attitudes of the Arab youth

A. Perspectives toward the future

The Arab citizens of Israel are an ethnic, national, religious and cultural minority given to discrimination in many domains of society and state in contrast to the Jewish majority. Thus it is not surprising to discover that Arab youth tended to be less optimistic than their Jewish counterparts regarding their chances of fulfilling their personal aspirations within the State of Israel. This trend appeared repeatedly throughout the years of the survey. Optimism percentages were as follows: Arabs – 60.3% in 1998, 50.0% in 2004, and 66.6% in 2010; while the corresponding percentages among the Jews were: 79.4%, 74.3%, and 84.6%. In other words, there was an average gap of 20% between the two groups. It should be noted that the pattern of decline in optimism in 2004 and recovery in 2010 appeared in both groups. However, the differences between the groups in their levels of optimism regarding one's

future in general without reference to place (i.e. Israel) were much smaller; on average, only about 5%. General optimism levels among Arab youth were: 81.7% (1998), 83.8% (2004), and 88.8% (2010); among Israeli youth, 90.1%, 87.7%, and 91%, respectively.

The two groups are similar to one another in that both Arabs and Jews are less optimistic about the future of the State in comparison to their personal futures, though even here the young Arabs tended to be less optimistic than the Jews. It is interesting that the gap between the two groups was even greater in 2004, when the optimism rate was 36.5% among Arab youth and 53.2% among Jewish youth. The corresponding percentages were: 52.3% (Arabs) and 59.4% (Jews) in 1998, and 52.2% and 63.1% respectively in 2010. One of the possible explanations for the larger gap in 2004 is that the young Arabs thought that the intifada would have a greater negative impact on the national robustness and resilience of the Jewish population, while the Jews proved to be stronger and more resilient.

B. Perception of personal and familial safety

Even though the Arab youth tended to be less optimistic than the Jewish youth with regards to their personal futures and their chances to fulfill their personal aspirations within Israel, it seems that in the most important existential sphere – feeling of threat on one's personal and familial safety – the Arabs enjoyed a significant advantage throughout the entire survey period. In 2004, 63.8% of the Arabs did not perceive a threat to their welfare (or only a small threat) and in 2010, 88.8% felt this way while the percentages of the Jews who felt threatened, were much higher: only 44.2% (2004) and 24.0% (2010) felt relatively safe. We assume that the gaps stem from the fact that terrorism during the Second Intifada was directed mainly at the Jewish population, and the vast majority of terror victims were Jews. On the other hand, a significant minority of Arab youth also felt threatened, perhaps because some Arabs were also hurt in the intifada, together with Jews.

C. Attitudes toward the Arab community

For obvious reasons, members of the Arab sample were not asked about the rights of Israeli Arabs to be elected to the Knesset. Regarding the opinion that

most Arabs would like to destroy Israel, the percentage of agreement among Arab youth was, not surprisingly, lower than among Jewish youth though there were many who agreed with the opinion or were undecided. In 2004, the answer distribution was divided fairly evenly between those who agreed with the opinion (34.1%), those who disagreed (35.1%), and those who were undecided (30.8%). In 2010, the answers became more clear-cut in both directions: 45.3% agreed, 42.0% disagreed, and only 12.8% remained undecided. These findings may demonstrate that the fears of Jewish youth regarding the intentions of the Arab world toward Israel, are not necessarily expressions of paranoia.

D. Attitudes regarding peace

While most of the Jewish youth in the survey were steadfast in their support of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, the attitudes of the Arab youth underwent a significant change over the years. In 2004, about 74.5% of the Arabs supported negotiations, which was about 15% higher than among the Jewish youths. However, in 2010 the support among the Arabs fell significantly to 52.7% – a smaller percentage than among the Jews. While this seems to be very surprising, the findings of the Peace Index show that a section of the Arab community does not support negotiations with the Palestinian Authority unless Hamas is involved in the process. In other words, the decline in support of negotiations with the Palestinian Authority does not necessarily mean a decline in support for achieving a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.

This theory receives support from the fact that Arab youth classify the goal of peace between Israel and its neighbors as the highest goal on the scale throughout all the survey years. By contrast, this goal was chosen by Jewish youth for first place only in 2004; in subsequent years, it fell to second-place in importance. Nevertheless, an examination of absolute percentages shows that the importance of peace among young Arabs fell from 38.3% in 1998 to 24.1% in 2004 and 22.7% in 2010. In other words, the goal of peace lost some of its importance among both Arab and Jewish youth between 1998 and 2004. While it recovered somewhat in the Jewish group in 2010, it continued its downward descent among the Arab group.

E. Status of the rule of law, and democracy

While the scope of support of Arab youth for strong leaders is clearly on a downward trend, it is still rather high with percentages of 69.3% in 1998, 62.3% in 2004, and 52.8% in 2010. As mentioned above, the support among Jewish youth for strong leadership rose from 54.5% in 1998 to 68.8% in 2004, and then declined in 2010 to 60.5%. It is likely that the high support of Arab youth for this kind of leadership in 1998 stemmed from their hopes to advance the peace process via strong leaders on both sides – Arafat on the Palestinian side, and Netanyahu on the Israeli side.

The level of support among Arab youth for non-violent civil resistance rose considerably from 28.5% in 1998 to 46.4% in 2004. It then remained on almost the same level (42.3%) in 2010. A slightly different pattern emerged regarding support for violent forms of civil resistance. While support remained at 15.4% in the first two time periods, it soared to 34.4% in 2010. True, the trend in favor of violent civil resistance also rose among Jewish youth over time, but the percentages among the Arab youth were much higher than among Jews, especially regarding non-violent civil resistance. The support percentages were as follows: Arabs – 39.1% (non-violent resistance) and 21.7% (violent resistance) and Jews – 26.4% and 19.4%, respectively.

Democracy received a very respectable place in the Arab youths' ranking of the important goals of the State. However, it did decline in importance between 1998 and 2004 and then remained on approximately the same level in 2010, in two aspects: its ranking on the goal-scale, and the absolute percentages it received. In the first survey year (1998) democracy merited second place on the scale with a 'vote' of 26.0%; in the two subsequent years it fell to third place, with percentages of 19.9% (2004) and 18.5% (2010). A comparison with Jewish youth points to a similar trend over time in both groups, with regards to ranking on the scale as well as actual percentage points as the most important goal.

Finally, the trust-level of Arab youth in the legal system was higher than in other institutions throughout all three time periods. This was despite the decline in its status between 1998 and 2004, with trust-percentages of 82.1% (1998), 71.1% (2004), and 71.9% (2010), respectively. Only in 2010 did the legal system share its first-place status with religious institutions. These findings demonstrate that Arab youth appreciate the legal system more than Jewish youth, who also demonstrate less trust in democracy (than the Arabs) throughout all the surveys. This finding, like the data regarding Arab youth support of forms of non-violent civil resistance, is typical of minority groups living in a democratic regime in which they suffer discrimination from the State and society.

F. Trust in state institutions

The two institutions that received the highest levels of trust (on average) among the Arab youth were the legal system and religious institutions. Third place was, surprisingly, filled by the police force. Slightly underneath the police were the Histadrut and the media in the fourth and fifth places (with small increments between them). The Knesset and the IDF were low on the list, sixth and seventh, and the lowest place (eighth) were the political parties.

An examination of the trends over the years as expressed in absolute percentages, shows us that trust in all the institutions (without exception) declined in 2004 in comparison to 1998. In many cases, the drop was steep. Although most of the institutions (except for the police) were partially rehabilitated in 2010, they did not succeed in returning to their former trust-levels of 1998 as can be seen from the following average percentages of all the institutions: 69.0% in 1998, 43.9% in 2004, and 56.7% in 2010. A similar pattern was found among the Jewish youth (as aforesaid) with average trust-levels of 52.8%, 48.2% and 58.7%, respectively. The difference between the two groups is that the Jewish youth bounced back in 2010 to even higher levels of trust than in 1998, while the Arab youth only partially recovered their trust; their 2010 trust levels remained lower than in 1998.

In greater detail: the legal system and religious institutions, like most of the institutions, lost some of the trust in 2004 in comparison to 1998 (legal system: from 82.1% - 1998 to 71.1% - 2004; religious institutions: from 80.6% to 63.1%, respectively). In 2010, the status of the legal system remained on the same level as in 2004, while the religious institutions were partly rehabilitated and increased to a trust level of 72.0%.

The high ranking of the (average) trust-level in the police is affected by the high level it received in 1998 – 72.1%, and also by the improvement in its status in 2010 (60.9%), after the steep drop of 2004 (50.1%). On the other hand, the political parties consistently remain on the bottom of the list with an average trust-level of 37.0%. A little bit higher is the IDF with an average of 41.8%. It is interesting to note that the IDF (together with the police) registered the steepest declines in trust between 1998 and 2004 – from 58.0% to 25.2%. However, the IDF (like the police) restored its status to a certain extent in 2010, with a trust percentage of 42.6%. Trust in the Histadrut and the media recovered impressively between 1998 and 2010, after the decline in 2004. The trust-level in the Histadrut rose from 39.0% (1998) to 58.5% (2010); in the media – from 36.6% to 58.9%, respectively.

The largest difference of all between the Arab and Jewish youth is expressed (not surprisingly) by their level of trust in the IDF, which occupied first place throughout the years in the ranking of the Jewish youth, and next-to-last place in the ranking of the Arab youth. On the other hand, both groups are united by their lack of trust in the political parties.

G. Internal controversies

The most important controversy in Israeli society in the eyes of Arab youth is, unsurprisingly, the troubled relations between Jews and Israeli Arabs (Arab citizens of Israel). Not only is this ranked in first place throughout the survey years, but all the other controversies lag behind by many points. As aforementioned, Israeli youth also viewed the Jew-Arab schism as high on the scale of important issues: first place in 1998 and second place in the other two time periods. However, it should be mentioned that the percentages for the Jew-Arab schism dropped significantly among the Arab youth in 2010. Only 44.7% rated it first place in the scale of importance in 2010, in contrast to the corresponding percentages of 62.9% (in 1998) and 67.6% (in 2004). This finding is very puzzling and should probably be examined to understand what it means. In any case, the main conclusion arising from the data is that Arab and Jewish youth agreed that the Jew-Arab schism is of critical importance to Israeli society.

H. The important goals of the State

Throughout all three years, Arab youth assign the highest rank to the goal of a peaceful Israel – that is, an Israel living in peace with its neighbors. The selection percentages were: 38.3% in 1998, 24.1% in 2004, and 22.7% in 2010. As we see, though peace maintained first place as an important goal, it lost a considerable proportion of the popularity it enjoyed more than a decade ago. One sign of the waning is the fact that the goal of peace in 2010 shared its first-place status (22.5%) with the aspirations for Israel to be a nation of all its citizens – a goal whose relative importance was much lower in 1998 and 2004 when it was ranked in fifth place. Only 4.8% (1998) and 6.9% (2004) selected it as the most important goal in those earlier surveys.

As mentioned above, the goal of peace also lost much of its importance among Jewish youth and was replaced by the aspirations for Israel to be a Jewish state. Thus we have reached a situation in 2010 where two groups adopt supreme goals that stand in stark contradiction to one another: a Jewish state on one side, and a state for all its citizens on the other. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that the two groups are similar in the importance they attribute to Israel as a democratic state. This was ranked by the youth in second or third place with similar selection-percentages in each of the three years as the most important goal of Israel (on average, 19.1% of the Jewish youth and 21.1% of Arab youth).

Regarding all the other goals, which generally received only isolated percentages, it is hard to ignore the fact that both groups ascribe minor importance to gender equality. This goal was ranked either last place or the one before last throughout all the years of the survey.

I. Interest in the Holocaust

There are at least two possible reasons to hypothesize that Arab youth would be far less interested in the Holocaust than Jewish youth. First of all, the Holocaust happened to another nation – the Jewish, not the Arab nation. Just as we would not necessarily expect a non-Jewish nation to take an interest in the Holocaust, so we would not expect the same of the Arabs. Second of all, the Arab narrative in general, and the Palestinian narrative in particular,

connects the Holocaust to the establishment of the State of Israel on one side, and the suffering caused to the Palestinian nation on the other. In other words, the Arabs claim that the Palestinian nation was forced to pay the price that the Jewish nation paid for the Holocaust, even though the Palestinians had nothing to do with the Holocaust. It goes without saying that elements of the Arab and Muslim world (Iran, for example) even deny that the Holocaust even took place in Europe and claim that the Jews "invented" it to receive the support of the international community in its establishment of the Jewish state on Palestinian territory. And in fact, the findings of 1998 and 2004 show that the interest level of Arab youth in the Holocaust is very low, but also that the levels declined sharply from 31.1% in 1998 to 7.2% in 2004. This is, of course, the opposite trend of Jewish youth whose interest in the Holocaust was initially higher in 1998 (60.9%) and then increased significantly afterwards (to 69.0% in 2004 and 89.3% in 2010). In recent years, the Israeli educational system tried to bring the Holocaust subject closer to the Arab community and especially Arab youth, including organizing trips of Arab students to concentration camps in Europe. Perhaps it is due to these efforts that the interest level of Arab youth in the Holocaust today is higher than it was in the past.

J. Attitudes and perceptions toward Germany

The Arab nation in general, and Palestinians in particular, did not have a long historical connection with Germany as did the Jews, and of course no connection in the context of the Holocaust. However, we might have expected that the attitudes of the Arabs toward today's Germany would be affected by Germany's position as one of the important nations in the world and in Europe. Thus it is interesting to reveal that the attitudes of Arab youth vis-á-vis Germany were not drastically different than the attitudes of Jewish youth, though there were a few significant differences we will discuss below.

Regarding the question, "Is today's Germany among the countries friendly to Israel?" – the Arab youth were more likely to answer in the positive than Israeli youth in the early survey years: 58.7% (Arabs) versus 41.5% (Jews) in 1998, and 56.7% versus 38.0% in 2004. However, the situation equalized in

2010 with agreement-percentages of 64.0% (Arabs) and 60.3% (Jews). We see that the positions equalized mainly due to the increase in the Jews' positive perceptions of Germany in 2010.

A slightly different pattern emerged regarding the question, "Is today's Germany considered one of the civilized nations in the world?" In the first two surveys, and especially in 2004, the positive view-point was more accepted among the Arab youth: 64.0% (Arabs) versus 61.4% (Jews) in 1998 and 71.8% versus 60.6% in 2004. But in 2010 the positive opinion became more prevalent among the Jewish youths (75.9%) than among their Arab contemporaries (67.8%).

Regarding level of agreement with the statement that "Hatred of foreigners (xenophobia) in Germany is no worse than in other countries," the two groups held similar opinions in the two earlier surveys of 1998 and 2004. However, as in the earlier question, Germany's image became a bit more positive among the Jewish youth in 2010 with an agreement-percentage of 59.5%, as opposed to the corresponding Arab percentage of 47.0%.

Regarding whether Germany today is different than Nazi Germany, no significant differences were received from the two groups. By contrast, there was a significant and consistent difference between the two groups regarding whether they believed that most of the German nation assisted in the destruction of the Jews in the Holocaust. While a large majority of the Jewish youth believed this to be true (average of 75.3%), a much lower percentage of Arab youth agreed (average of 57.0%).

General Summary: Lessons to be learned regarding Jewish youth

When we try to understand the trends that emerged from the main findings of the three surveys and the lessons (or morals) that we take into account when formulating policy, it is important to emphasize two main points:

First of all, any attempt to draw practical policy conclusions on the basis of findings related to attitudes, perceptions, and values, will necessarily express the world views of the persons doing this because there are no objective criteria for judgment in these spheres. As a result, even the

assessment of trends that characterize Israeli adolescents and young adults in the last decade is ultimately the result of the use of subjective criteria. In other words, when researchers go beyond description and analysis of findings to address the significance of the findings and to determine policies, they are required to operate according to the "full disclosure" principle so that the reader will know what criteria were used by the researchers in their evaluations. In this spirit, the conclusions and lessons presented below express the belief that Israel should and can be a Jewish state based on the principles of liberal democracy, a state that aspires to live peacefully with its neighbors. Second, when discussing how to implement the conclusions stemming from the findings in order to create policy, we must distinguish between the two age groups that were surveyed in the three surveys: 15- to 18-year-olds (the adolescents), and 21- to 24-year-olds (the young adults). Most of the members of the younger group (the adolescent group) still attend schools under the government educational system. Thus, if the educational system would be willing to cooperate, it could use various methods to carry out the conclusions of this study. Youth movements could also be helpful in this goal, as many members of the adolescent group are involved in youth movements. Moreover, adolescents are still in a formative period of their lives in terms of molding their personalities and world view, thus it is easier to influence them than young adults. Finally, the young adults are no longer affiliated with government institutions such as the educational system, thus we are extremely limited in reaching them with any kind of formal intervention program. In other words, the main thrust of implementing the conclusions should be directed at the adolescent group.

With an overall view of the twelve-year survey-findings related to Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, we see that the prevailing trends among Jewish youth are strengthening of Jewish ultra-nationalism accompanied by a significant weakening of the importance attributed to Israel's democratic-liberal basis. These trends go hand in hand with a significant erosion of the statuses of law and government institutions, such as the legal system and the Knesset (legislature). This was expressed by a significant decrease in trust in the legal system and increasing trend of favoring

non-violent and violent civil resistance against government decisions they don't agree with. Similarly, most of the youth tended to be in favor of revoking basic political rights such as the rights of the Arab citizens of Israel to be elected to the Knesset. It is clear that this basic right, together with the commitment to the democratic character of Israel – alongside its 'Jewishness' – is an inseparable part of the Proclamation of Independence, the founding document of the State of Israel. In addition, a significant minority of the youth feel uncertain regarding the very existence of the State of Israel in the future.

A close look at the attitudes according to the age of the respondents shows that the status of democracy is more weakened in the older group than in the younger one regarding most of the criteria listed above, though the process is evident in the younger group as well. Moreover, a prominent difference between the two groups exists with regards to the topic of peace; its importance as a national goal is more positive in the younger group and negative in the older one. During the discussion of the findings, we raised the theory that the reason for differences between the two age groups is the influence of army service that many of the young adults have already experienced. Unfortunately, the statistical instruments at our disposal did not allow us to test this hypothesis for methodological reasons. In any case, the weakening of the values of democracy and peace in both groups means that once we agree that these goals are important, we must create an applied program via the educational system or some other framework. The goal of this intervention is to strengthen the ideals of democracy and peace in our adolescents so that these values become internalized and resistant to erosion and attrition, whether due to the effects of army service or other reasons. As a springboard for developing a policy in this direction we must take into consideration the growing importance attributed by Jewish youth to the existence of Israel as a Jewish state. The significance of this trend from an educational point of view is that we must inculcate the belief that there no contradiction between Israel as a Jewish state and Israel as a democracy - a democracy that extends its "hand to all neighboring states and their peoples in an offer of peace and good neighborliness," as cited in the Proclamation of Independence. In addition, we must also explain how a democratic Israeli state that lives in peace with its neighbors will secure Israel's existence as a Jewish state.

One of the major difficulties involved in implementing an educational policy in this spirit is that the findings show that the values of democracy and peace were not held in high esteem, to put it mildly, among religious youth in general, and haredi youth in particular. These youth tended to reveal lack of trust in the institutions that are entrusted with maintaining democratic principles (such as the legal system), to side with methods such as civil resistance (including violent civil resistance), to prefer strong leadership above the rule of law, to support the denial of basic political rights of the Arab citizens of Israel, and underrate the importance of democracy and peace as national goals. At the same time, those same youth, especially haredi youth, viewed the Jewish ness of Israel as the supreme goal that overshadows all other national goals, including peace and democracy. In this context, it must be remembered that all the haredi youth, and segments of the religious and traditional youth as well, attend the independent education system of the haredi movement. Thus the chances that the independent education system would agree to integrate lessons about liberal democracy in their curriculum are very low. We have seen how all the governments have failed to require that the independent education system include 'core courses' that do not each Torah studies.

Moreover, as the findings show us, the negative trends that characterize religious and *haredi* youth regarding the importance of peace and democracy, also appear to a great extent among Right-wing, secular, and traditional youth. Most of these youth attend schools affiliated with the state educational system, whose curriculum is subject to the Ministry of Education. But the coalition-composition of the present government tilts clearly to the Right and depends on the support of the *haredi* and religious parties to ensure its existence. Thus it is hard to be optimistic regarding the chances that the Education Ministry would be willing to implement an intervention program to strengthen the values of democracy and peace in the state high schools in the country. From the point of view of the writers of this present report, this is of course a disappointing conclusion though an unsurprising one. But without detracting from the severity of the trends we have revealed above, it is also important to emphasize the importance of the wider political context,

especially the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as a major factor behind the growth of these trends. Without getting into the question "Who is to blame?" there is no doubt that the long conflict, without any satisfactory conclusion in sight, has left a deep mark on the consciousness of Jewish-Israeli youth, just as it has affected the entire adult Jewish community in Israel. On the conscious level this reality is expressed in apprehension about the future of the State of Israel – worries that feed on the prevalent belief that "the Arabs have never recognized the existence of the State of Israel and would destroy it if they could." Parenthetically, this belief is held by the larger Jewish-Israeli community. Moreover, according to the surveys of the Peace Index, most of the public does not believe that a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians would bring an end to the historic conflict between Israel and the Arab world.

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As we learn from sociological-historical studies, perceptions of existential threats serve as fertile ground for the growth of ultra-nationalism and the creation of a political climate that encourages isolation, or *self-encapsulation mentality*. In the Israeli context, these perceptions are especially strong because the perceived threat is not imaginary at all. In fact, there are multiple threats that emerge from many different directions at the same time: from Arab states as well as non-Arab states such as Iran. Thus, against this background, it is hard to believe that educational – informative activity among the youth will succeed in fighting these trends, even if such intervention is backed by the Ministry of Education or other parties. In other words, in order for Israeli youth to raise the importance of democracy to the same level as to the Jewishness of the state, they must first be convinced that Israel does not face existential danger.

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Chapter 4

Israeli Youth – Where Are They Headed? Analysis of Political Trends Based on a Quantitative Research Study

Dahlia Scheindlin

General

The research results tell two stories simultaneously. The first is about internal Jewish social gaps in Israeli society based on opposing world-views of the religious vis-á-vis secular communities. This was, and remains, the schism that forms the basis for the deepest disagreements in Israeli society and the most significant political controversies in Israeli life: the democratic nature of the state, relationships with the Arabs in general, and developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in specific. The different world-views of the religious and secular (an exact description appears later below) characterize the political orientations of the adolescents, as well as the young adults.

The second story is interesting from a different angle. While the religious-secular divide is well documented throughout Israeli history, a new trend has appeared that is not at all obvious. We have uncovered changes that occur in the attitudes of our youth during the adolescent teen-age years. The survey findings have uncovered significant, unequivocal differences between the adolescent and young adult (older) respondents, after the age of army service. These changes mainly pertain to their political stands and issues directly connected to formation of these stands. In general, these attitudes tended toward the hawkish and ultra-nationalistic, including: less trust in reconciliation and coexistence, less trust in the State and its institutions – with the one exception of the defense institution. Nevertheless, there are signs of more pragmatic approaches among the young adults.

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Adolescents who turn into young adult civilians become significantly more pessimistic. Their trust in governmental institutions is undermined; they are less disposed to support democratic principles; they are less open to Arabs and less inclined to anticipate or hope for peace. Simultaneously, the young adult respondents become more ultra-nationalistic and inflexible regarding the character of the State from a nationalistic viewpoint. They adhere more strongly to central values such as safeguarding the country's security and defense.

Throughout the political analysis we will point out these trends and offer possible hypotheses to explain the changes.

Overall political trends

In order to understand the political trends, it is important to first understand the Israeli experience from the point of view of the respondents. Despite all the schisms and opinions, controversies and opposing world-views, shared values still unite large sectors of society. Some of them also have political ramifications.

The domains that unite the young Jewish community in Israel

Despite the differences between the various population groups (religious groups, genders etc.) there are certain values and characteristics that are shared by a very large proportion of the survey respondents. Since these values and attitudes are held by a large majority of the respondents, they serve as shared world-view of Israeli society. Each one has direct or indirect ramifications on political trends in Israel today.


Family: When asked to select the most important goal out of a prepared list that was read to them, most (about two-thirds) of the Jewish respondents chose "creating a family." This was selected over other alternatives such as "economic success" (number two on the scale, with 10%); "acquiring a higher education" and "contributing to the State" – both received 8% each. The lowest on the list was "to have good friends." Thus we see that personal values (creating a family and achieving a high standard of living) were more important to the respondents than public values (contributing to the State and society). Higher education was only ranked third place.


Safety/Fear: We see from the survey that everything connected to the issue of safety and security earned widespread agreement among the Jewish respondents. More than 60% of the youths perceived a great existential threat (44%) or very great threat (18%) looming over the country. This perception only pertains to the status of the nation – as only a small proportion felt personally threatened (barely a quarter of the Jews and only 10% of the Arab respondents). In the comparison between the importance of security and the importance of democracy in Israel, the answer is clear: Three-quarters of the Jewish respondents say that in the event of a clash between the two requirements, security needs take precedence. Out of them, a little more than half say that security is more important in all cases.

Racism/ fear of the 'other': It would have been preferable if we did not have to address this sensitive issue, but it is impossible to ignore the many data that point to negative attitudes between Jew and Arab youth. When the Jews were asked what feelings arise when they think about Arabs, most gave the neutral answer (54% chose "neither positive nor negative,") but the second-most frequent answer after that (25%) was "hatred." The third most prevalent answer was "fear" at 12%. The two positive alternatives (closeness and sympathy) earned only 2.5% each. A similar proportion of the Arabs chose the neutral answer (57%), but the positive feelings received more percentages than the negative ones in this group: 16% chose "closeness," 13% chose "sympathy" and 13% chose "hatred." Barely 2% of the Arab respondents chose "fear."

In addition to the question about feelings, the respondents were asked about behaviors toward the 'other.' The questions in this sphere were connected to Arab-Israeli coexistence: willingness to live in the same neighborhoods, to have Arab/Jewish friends, to invite the other to your house, or accept invitations to their houses. Between 37% and 50% of the Jewish respondents were willing to do some of the things on the list. It should be noted that FSU-origin youth expressed openness to associations with Arabs at much higher percentages than veteran Israelis; this is in contrast to common misconceptions. Similarly, about 52% of the FSU youth said that Arab-Israeli coexistence is possible, while only 48% of the Jewish respondents felt the same way. Meanwhile, in contrast to the Jews, the Arabs were more willing

for social interchanges at higher percentages: between 58% to 81% were willing to implement various expressions of coexistence. Part of the Arabs' relatively high level of willingness for coexistence may be attributed to the 'social desirability' factor: a desire on the part of the Arab respondents to answer in a politically correct fashion and not admit to being prejudiced against Jews. On the other hand, youth are generally less sensitive to what others think of them, thus are more inclined to give true answers. But even if they did try to appear more open-minded than they really are, the answers still point to the different perceptions of values that are accepted in the two communities.





("Are you willing to do the following?")

* Each sector was asked about the other sector (percentage of those who answered "Yes" or "I think so").

The difficulty on the part of the Jews in accepting coexistence probably stems from lack of trust or worry of being physically harmed by the Arabs. When asked if they agree with the sentence, "Most of the Arabs

have not recognized the existence of the State of Israel and would destroy it if they had the chance," almost two-thirds (64%) answered in the affirmative. It should be noted that about 40% of the Arabs (44% of Arab adolescents and 37% of Arab young adults) also agreed with this statement. **Despite all, optimism triumphs.** All the respondents, Jews and Arabs alike, classified themselves as more optimistic than pessimistic, a finding that endorses the research of many other studies, Israeli as well as comparative international indexes.³ Let us view this optimism against the background of the respondents' answers to the question regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. When asked what scenario should be preferred regarding resolving the conflict, the large majority of the Jewish youths chose an extension of the existing situation (status quo) over all the other possibilities on the negotiating table. The answers show that Israeli youth, even if they are cognizant of the problematics of the present situation, think that the status quo is reasonable and can be continued without many changes. There is no evidence of the restlessness, the revolutionary trends or rebelliousness that characterized youth in many historical periods of the past. In short, the results show that there is no vanguard group of youth in Israel.

Ideological/political trends

In accordance with the feelings of fear and recoil at the idea of living with Arabs, most Jewish youth place themselves on the Right side of the political map. This trend has been increasing since the first survey in 1998. In that first survey, conducted 12 years ago, 48% of the respondents defined themselves as Right-wing. Six years ago (in 2004) this proportion went up to 56%, and in the present survey (of 2010) it reached 62%. An even more significant change took place in the declining levels of respondents who viewed

(http://www.forbes.com/2010/07/14/world-happiest-countries-lifestyle-realestate-gallup-table.html)

See, for example, *Peace and War Index* (April 2009), the study that serves as the basis for other studies regarding satisfaction and includes 47 countries, 2007 (Pew Global Attitudes Project data archive) (http://pewglobal.org/category/data-sets) and *Gallop's Comparative Survey* involving 155 countries, between 2005–2009.

themselves as Left-wing: from 32% in 1998 to a quarter (25%) in 2004, and then half as much (12%) in 2010. Another prominent finding is the variation in magnitude between Right and Left in the present survey: while the Left is divided into Left and moderate Left almost equally (6.5% moderate Left and 5% Left), the Right is divided differently: twice as many viewed themselves as Right (41%) in relation to those who viewed themselves as moderate Right (20.5%).

It is important to remember that these data refer to the Jewish population only; the trends among the Arab youth are, of course, different. While some half of the Arab youth defined themselves as Left-wing in the surveys of 1998 and 2004, this was followed by a precipitous decline afterwards and in 2010 only 25% chose this description. This decline was not accompanied by an increase in the Right, which garnered between 15% and 18% in all three surveys; instead, there was a sharp increase in the number of Arabs who did not choose any category at all: from a 27% abstention rate in 1998 to 40% in 2010.

In order to understand the roots of the attitudes among the Jews, we must examine those positions, which reflect the greatest gaps. Thus, for example, the Right attributes much greater importance to security than the Left. Also, the Right-wing respondents tended to place a greater emphasis on such values as creating a family and less on social activism. For example, almost three-quarters of the young adult respondents who define themselves as Right-wing, place the family goal as their highest priority. Only 46% of the Left, on the other hand, chose this as their highest goal.⁴ It seems that the Right focuses more on their private lives and is less interested in societal change. The data show that this is true for change within Israel, as well as regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But what is the actual meanings of the terms Right, Center, and Left?

In the State of Israel the Right-Left scale refers mainly to positions regarding the Arabs and the conflict,⁵ including: aspirations for achieving

^{4.} Although the figures are slightly different within the adolescent group, the trends are very similar.

Peres Yochanan, Yuchtman-Yaar Ephraim, Between Consent and Dissent: Democracy and Peace in the Israeli Mind, Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 1998. p. 95, 118–199 [Hebrew].

peace and readiness for concessions to that end; willingness to recognize the Palestinian nation and a Palestinian state; the desire to achieve peace instead of conquering more territory. Indeed, after almost half a decade of Left-wing leadership (1992–1996) the first survey in 1998 asked the youth to select the one most important item out of a list of characteristics of the State of Israel. Below are several findings that express the Right-wing trend, in contrast to previous years; the respective trends will be explained later on:

- In 1998, the description "that the State should live peacefully with its neighbors" was first on the scale: about a quarter of the Jewish respondents chose it (28%). (The Arab group also ranked peace as number one, except with a larger percentage of 38%.) The second-place answer was "that it should be a democracy," with percentages very close to the first. The "Jewish state" option was chosen by 18% as being most important; this earned second place. In the later two surveys, this trend changed. The decline in the preference for peace was probably due to the outbreak of the Second Intifada and its continuation, and the lack of any vista for achieving a political solution for the conflict.
- In 2004, the value of democracy in the eyes of the youth dropped sharply, reaching only fourth place with 9%. A fourth of the respondents placed peace aspirations in first place, but now the Jewish state-value reached second place with 17%.
- In 2010 the value of the Jewish state moved from second to first place in the priority scale of the Jewish youth, and by a higher proportion than peace: a third of the respondents chose the Jewish state. Peace still remained in second place (with 18%), but democracy lagged behind with 14%, a higher percentage than 2004.

The trend is clear: While the importance of a Jewish state increased consistently from 1998, democracy lost much of its potency among the youth. Despite a certain recovery in 2004, democracy did not rebound to its 1998 value in 2010. These findings are very significant for understanding the sources of political trends. In general, political

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positions in the Israeli society are correlated with religiosity levels. The survey results show that the more the Jewish-state value increases, the higher is the willingness to place this value above other ideals and to join political parties that promise to promote Judaism at the expense of other objectives.

The Jewish nature of the State is the foundation or source of Right-wing positions. Other positions (below) express the definitions or denotations of the Right, Center and Left sectors.

Grasping the security value: Jewish youth have great trust in the army, much more than in any other institution. This finding reflects the adult population's perceptions too, but at a more extreme level. In the present survey, 89% of the youths expressed trust in the army, compared to 79% of the adult population according to the Democracy Index of the Israel Democracy Institute in 2009. In the sampling of the adolescents (15- to 18-year-olds), this extensive trust encompasses the sample almost completely: 95% have trust in the army while 66% have complete trust; 82% of the youths (15-24) intend to serve in the army.

Regarding trust in other institutions (police, legal system, Knesset and parties), the young adults generally have lower levels of trust than the adolescents by significant percentages of about 20 points for almost each institution on the list. Only the army retains most of its high trust level among the young adults, with a decline of only six points.

- Other values: As expressed above, the Right in Israel (by self-definition) focuses on personal aspirations such as creating a family.
 Other significant differences between Right, Center, and Left:
- The desire to contribute to the State. Only 5% of the young adult Right-wingers said that contributing to the State was highest on their priority list, and this percentage increases as the ideological trend shifts leftward. In the Center, 9% viewed contributing to the State as their highest objective, while 16% of the Left agreed.⁶ This finding is

^{6.} Again, we see a very similar trend among the adolescents.

supported by the answers to the question of participation in societal activities: Over 50% of the young adult Leftist respondents answered that they were involved in social activism organizations (now or in the past), as opposed to 36% of the Right-wingers and Center supporters (in both age groups).

- The desire to acquire a higher education: 6% of the Right-wingers selected this, in contrast to 10% of the Left (and 11% of the Center).
- The desire to have good friends: 5% of the Right, 13% of the Center and 14% of the Left. This finding is logical if we view the desire to have good friends as a substitute for the desire to create a family, regarding some of the respondents – especially in the younger ages, when adolescents are not really focused on creating a family.
- The importance of democracy varies among the various ideological streams. In the Left, 90% of the younger (adolescent) respondents viewed it as an important value while only 74% of the adolescent Right-wingers agreed. The adolescent members of the Center are in the middle again with a vote of 84% for democracy being an important value.
- Peace is much more important to members of the Left than of the Right. Sixty percent of the Right-wingers say that it is 'very important' compared to 82% of the Left and 76% of the Center. Of the FSU respondents, only 56% feel that peace is very important to the State – even lower than the Right-wing vote.

Regarding the importance of a Jewish state: 74% of the Right views this as an important goal, in contrast to only 46% of the Left (and the Center). The FSU respondents answered the 'Jewishness' question like the Left did: only 51% felt that the Jewish State is a very important value.

These are the trends that most clearly delineate the gaps between the various political stands in Israel. We will elaborate on the subject of peace and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a separate section below.

Different experiences

More than 60% of the Center and Left respondents say that they served in the army (both with a similar percentage of 66%). By contrast, only 41% of the Right-wing young adult respondents served in the army. Fifteen percent of them were exempt for religious reasons and more than a quarter (27%) served in the *Sherut Leumi* (National Service) (a little bit more than the Left, with 21%). It is very likely that a formative experience such as army service has a significant effect on youth, and variances in participation in such an important experience is probably a source for variations in attitudes.

- Similarly, members of different religious levels display different patterns of army service, some of which run contrary to prevalent conceptions in the public. Among the young adults, most of whom who have already finished their army service, more than 60% of the secular say they have served in the army. Among the *haredim*, it is not surprising that only 6% say they have served as most have received an exemption for religious reasons (60%). But the findings show that as the religiosity level increases, the level of army service declined. In other words, not only do the *haredim* not serve, but starting from the traditional group the percentage of army service declines consistently. *Sherut Leumi* generally substitutes for standard army service. Thus the data contradicts the prevalent perception that high percentages of religious youth serve in the army. Another prevalent perception is that higher percentages of the religious serve in combat units, but that was not checked in the survey.
- The members of the Left consume news on current events at a higher rate than the Right from radio, television, and internet. While about half of the young adults in the Right-wing camp said that they consumed news every day or a few times a week, 70% of the Left did so. The Center group was sandwiched between the two: between 60–78% consumed news updates once a day or several times a week.
- Active political expression: Testimony to Right-wing tendencies among the youth is also expressed by the types of actions or activities that each group is willing to perform.


Justification for refusing to carry out orders in the army (military dissension): Almost a third said that it is forbidden under all circumstances to refuse to carry out orders. Three percent only justify dissension "of the Left" – that is, refusal to serve in the territories. By contrast, 20% justify dissension "of the Right" – refusal to evacuate (*hitnachluyot*) settlements.

As above discussed, the Left feels more involved in public issues. In addition, the Left-wing respondents testify to higher levels of political-social activities on the internet than did the Right, sometimes almost twice as much, in a series of questions on the subject (signing petitions, sending letters to public figures, organizing political events, and consuming information on public topics of interest). Here it is important to note that this trend is most evident among the young adults; these gaps are almost nonexistent among the adolescent respondents.

In summary, the differences between Right, Left and Center are based on values that are beyond political stances toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. One of the conspicuous findings is that members of the Right ascribe less importance to democracy as a value. We will discuss this more deeply later on.

Variations between the age groups


All of the trends that emerged from the data show variations between the two age groups that were polled in the study. There are consistent trends in the variations between the adolescents (aged 15–18) and the young adults (aged 21–24). The adolescent group (15–18) had more trust in government institutions, believed more in peace, was more open to the other, and was less ultra-nationalistic. The young adult respondents were more Right-wing, more ultra-nationalistic – in other words, they focused more on the Jewish identity of the State and believed a lot less in the government institutions. They were significantly less open to Arabs in general, and to the peace process in specific. Nevertheless, isolated findings testify to a certain pragmatism regarding the need for a political process and reaching some kind of agreement with the Palestinians.




Graph No. 2: Trust in government institutions

-| (Trust + Complete trust, only Jews, in percentages)

Graph No. 3: Ideology according to age (Only Jews, in percentages)



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Graph No. 4: The most important characteristic of Israel is that it should be... (Only Jews, in percentages)

It should be noted that this pattern of differences between the age groups, reflecting cynicism and negative attitudes toward the state, did not appear among the Arab respondents. But among the Jews, the trend repeated itself throughout the survey and was noted in various contexts below. In addition, the differences that were significant in the 2010 survey were not as significantly apparent in surveys conducted in the past. In the Right and Left indexes, there was a trend in this direction. Here, too, the level of trust in the army declined among the young adult respondents, mainly with regards to the answer of "**complete** trust." But in previous years, the decline had not been as sweeping with regard to other institutions. For example:

Regarding the legal system: In 2004, the trust-level in the legal system among the adolescents was 66%, compared to 64% among the young adults (this is within the standard deviation) and the level of complete trust was almost identical between the two groups. In 1998, the gap was 4% (adolescents - 74% and young adults - 70%); that is: almost no change in the level of complete trust.

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Knesset: The levels of trust in the Knesset was very inconsistent. In 2004 the level was similar in both age groups: 29% - adolescents, 25% - young adults. But in 1998 there was a tremendous gap: from 63% to 36%, respectively.

- In 2004, the percentage of those who voted that the State should live in peace with its neighbors as the most important goal was only lower among the young adults by 3%, a non-significant gap. In 1998, the percentages were higher in the 21-to-24 group (again, by 3%).
- There were no differences at all between the percentages of both age groups that selected "a Jewish state" in the two earlier surveys (ranging from 16%-18% in both groups, in both surveys).

Democracy

Israeli democracy was examined from several aspects: as a concept, as a method of government, and through questions examining democratic principles such as equality and situations when democratic principles conflict with security needs. As a result of the political trends, the Jews expressed mixed, inconsistent attitudes regarding the Israeli democracy. On the one hand, democracy is clearly important to the respondents. On the other hand, the youth have other values which they believe are more important than democracy, as we have seen in the questions cited above.

The value of democracy - an intrinsic value

- In addition to the question asking the respondents which value was most important to them out of a list that included democracy, the respondents were also asked to relate to democracy in a separate question and rank its importance. A very high percentage answered that democracy was important: an average of 89%. However, here we clearly discern the difference between the young adult and adolescent respondents: 80% of the young adults thought that democracy was important versus 97% of the adolescents.
- This finding is rather consistent with earlier years: in 2004, 87% of the respondents felt that democracy was important. At that time, however, there were no observable gaps between the two age groups. In 1998 the

support-percentages were even higher, about 92%, and then, too, there were no gaps between the adolescents and young adults. Similarly, there were almost no gaps between the age groups in 1998 and 2004 regarding those who felt that democracy was "very" important (77% – adolescents, 78% – young adults in 1998, 66% and 67% respectively in 2004). However, in 2010 there was a significant difference between the two age groups: 77% of the adolescents and only 63% of the young adults – a significant drop.

- Russian-speaking olim and youth born in Israel to Russian-speaking families viewed democracy with skepticism. True, 80% did view it as an important value, similar to the overall percentage of the adolescent respondents. But in complete contradistinction to all the age groups, and even the Right-wing respondents, only 13% viewed democracy as a very important value; 66% viewed it as simply "important."
- Equal political rights for all population sectors is important to the respondents (76%) but a little bit less important than democracy (89%). The 76% score for equal political rights represents a decline of about 6% from previous years. Among the adolescents 73% believe it is *very* important, in contrast to 68% among the young adults. Here, the respondents of FSU origin again differ from their veteran Israeli contemporaries. Only 36% viewed political equality of rights to be a very important value (80% total, including important and very important). This leads to the question: Is it that they don't think it is an important value, or that they don't believe it is possible?
- On this subject, there are significant gaps between the religious groups and ideological streams. The percentages of those who feel that equality between population groups is important, declined as religiosity rises: from 82% among the secular, to 78% among the traditional, to 66% among the religious and 65% among the *haredim*. Gaps between the adolescent and young adult groups are noticeable in all the political/religious sectors. (For example: 90% of the secular adolescents feel that equality is an important value, versus 73% of the secular young adults.) Among the Left, 58% agreed that equality is important in contrast to only 34% among the Right and 49% among the Center.

With regards to the characteristic that is considered the most important on the list, political and social equal rights are at the bottom of the list, second

before last (gender equality). In other words, although all the respondents pay lip-service to democracy as a supreme value, when the actual **significance** of democracy is examined, then support is less pronounced. Here, too, we see significant gaps between adolescents and young adults. While 85% of the adolescents claim that 'equal rights for all' is important or very important, only 67% of the young adults agreed.

The Arab youth support democratic values in Israel more clearly. This is not surprising, given the need of the Arabs as a national minority to promote their equal status.

Trust in institutions and values

Democracy is measured by the trust of a country's citizens in their institutions. This testifies to authority carried by government institutions in the eyes of the society, involvement in these institutions, and stability of the civil society.⁷ Thus, we generally assume that a person who distrusts government institutions will accord less authority to democracy. Earlier, we noted that trust in the state's institutions declined significantly among the young respondents. We can add that the *nature* of the institutions that receive high trust-levels also testifies to the strength of democracy. Thus, for example, we see that the army generally receives high levels of trust in Israeli society; this fact supports the finding that security beats democracy hands down (i.e., very significantly).

But an examination of the various population groups reveals a deeper understanding. In Israeli society, social cohesion is rare and many talk about internal splits. Against this background, we ask; what really unites the nation and endows it with a feeling of Israeli-ness? According to analysis of the data, the uniting factor is the military and security. When we observe the groups that are most dissimilar – that is, the various religious and political groups, as well as age groups – the one thing they all agree on, almost indisputably, is trust in the army.

Even among the young adults who register lower levels of trust in government institutions – secular, traditional and religious young adults – all say they have trust (or complete trust) in the IDF at

For an overview of the subject, see: William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post Communist Societies" *Journal of Politics* 59 (2) 1997, pp. 418 451.

percentages of 90% or more. Even three-quarters of the *haredim* (a large, strong majority) say they trust the army.


- Among sectors that differ greatly with regards to political issues (Left, Right and Center), the army is still an almost absolute unifying factor. Even after the decline of the post-army young adults, trust-levels still remain in the area of 90%: 87% - Left, 94% - Center, and 91% -Right, respectively.
- It should be noted that the trust-level in the army is even higher among the younger respondents (15 to 18, before army service) in all the sectors (religious, political, etc.), in almost equal percentages: 60% or more cite "complete trust." (The corresponding percentage of young adults in all the sub-sectors who have "complete trust" is around 43%.)

High trust in the army institution is in contrast to low trust-levels in the institutions connected to democratic values. For example, as we have seen above – barely a quarter of the youths trust the parties, and only a third trust the Knesset. Nevertheless, attitude segmentation according to religious and ideological sectors shows that the institutions representing democratic values simply reflect the deep divisions in the world-views of the people. A clear example of this are the attitudes toward the legal system, an institution that is controversial in the adult Israeli society as well.⁸

While 81% of secular adolescents (15–18) have trust in the Israeli legal system, only slightly more than a third (35%) of adolescent *haredim* express the same level of trust. Among the young adults (whose trust-level is less than the adolescents): the percentage of young adult secular youth who trust the legal system, declined from 81% to 65% (a difference of over 15%). Among the young adult *haredim* the trust-level also declined by 15%, to only 20% who have trust in the Israeli legal system.


As aforesaid, similar trends are reflected in the various political sectors: while 78% of the Left-wing young adults expressed trust in the legal system, only 45% of the Right-wing young adults did.

^{8.} See the decline of trust in the courts over the last decade in the Israeli Peace Index. In addition, there has been a series of appeals on the authority of the Supreme Court, including lack of implementation of verdicts, and personal attacks on judges in recent years.



Graph No. 5: Trust in the legal system according to religiosity level ("Trust" + "Complete trust," young adult Jews aged 21–24, in percentages)

Graph No. 6: Trust in the legal system according to political affiliation





We can understand the great attraction of youth to security-related values in contrast to government institutions. For young people who yearn to establish an identity and to identify with their country, the security-defense card unites society more than any other institution or value. Moreover, it seems that the respondents know that this is the conventional wisdom. In other words, the young adults probably believe in the value of defense themselves and are also aware that most of society feels the same way, and that identification with the defense establishment unites the Israeli identity. This explains the glorification of the defense establishment even when it clashes with democratic values. This trend has been growing, when compared to earlier years. Since the conclusion is that defense takes precedence over democratic values, we now understand the finding that the workings of democracy are less important to the youth than one strong leader. It seems that the image of an aggressive leader who can rule with a strong hand appeared (to the youth) to be more appropriate for safeguarding security and defense. It seems that laws and discussions, the basis of the democratic process, are viewed as a form of luxury.

- About 58% of the youths, almost without distinction between age groups, agreed with the following statement, "'A few strong leaders could fix the situation in the country better than all the laws and talks." Despite the prevalent impression that olim from the FSU would tend to support a strong leader more than veteran Israelis (since they demonstrate less support for democratic values), the data show that only 56% of the FSU olim agreed with the 'strong leader' statement above.
- More than half of the secular respondents agreed with the strong-leader statement (52%), and the percentages increase together with the religiosity-level. Thus, almost three-quarters of the religious youths agreed with it. However, the *haredim* in this instance only agreed at a level similar to that of the secular youth.
- The group with the lowest agreement-percentage is the young adults of the Left group; only 44% of them agreed with the strong-leaders statement, compared to 59% of the Center and 61% of the Right-wing groups.

The trends show that while the democracy value is important in and of itself, its roots are not deep. It is clear that true understanding and support for the value-components of democracy are lacking, in light of the superiority of defense needs.

Democracy versus security

When there is a conflict between democracy and security, the answer is unequivocal; security needs take precedence in the Israeli consciousness. We witnessed this change, one of the greatest changes of all, which took place between 2004 and 2010. Six years ago, respondents were asked if they agreed with the following question, "Even the slightest threat to the security/defense of the State justifies serious limits on democracy" – and only a third agreed. In the current survey, the question was worded a bit differently: "Sometimes democratic principles clash with the security needs of the State, or democratic values?" Three-quarters of the respondents voted for the security needs, with almost no difference between adolescents and young adults. Among the FSU respondents, 80% chose security-related considerations.

It seems that according to Israeli youth, democracy is expendable.

In summary - trends among adolescents regarding democracy

- Although democracy seems to be considered an important value, it doesn't compete with the value of security among most of the youth. This, evidently, is connected to the fact that the security issue unites the society and is the backbone of Israeli identity in the eyes of the youth.
- As a result, trust in public institutions responsible for security is much greater than in institutions connected directly to democratic values, such as the legislative authority (Knesset) and the judiciary (legal system). Similarly, most prefer that power be centralized in a strong leader, than rely on the laws and discussions that characterize democracy.
- Social schisms between religious and secular and between Right and Left

 overlapping groups show that the significance of these groups does
 not only relate to certain policies, and not only to the Jewish nature of the


State or interactions with Arabs. The gaps between religious and secular in Israel today, and between Right and Left, are much deeper: there is no agreement regarding the foundations of democracy on which society rests, the foundations for discussion on core issues. The trends are quite clear: the more that the youth are religious or Right-wing, the less they champion and support democratic values.

Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Similar to the picture above with regards to democracy, youth supported the peace process. However here, too, support declines as they get older; after army service, only 52% supported this process compared to 62% of the adolescents. It is interesting that a reverse trend emerges regarding the Arab youth – less than half (48%) supported the process at the adolescent ages, while the young adults supported it by a majority of 54%. Thus, in principle, Jewish youth felt that it is very important that Israel be a country that lives peacefully with its neighbors: 93% of the adolescents agreed that this characteristic (peace with neighbors) is important or very important. And again, a smaller percentage – 75% – of the young adults agreed.

But the support focuses on the "process" – it is harder for the youth to believe in peace itself. Almost seven out of ten adolescents before army age did not believe that the process would bring peace – and an absolute majority (80%) of young adults agreed. Here, too, there is a reverse trend among the Arabs who are more optimistic in general, at least on the declarative level: 55% of Arab adolescents don't think the process will succeed, and this proportion declines a bit to 50% of the young adults. Clearly, these trends reflect the attitudes of the adult population in Israel, and these feelings have prevailed ever since suspension of the political process of Camp David in 2001.⁹

This trend is explained in detail in: Shamir, Jacob and Shikaki, Khalil: Palestinian and Israeli Public Opinion, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2010 pp. 77–78.




Graph No. 7: Attitudes regarding the peace process (only Jews, in percentages)

When asked, "Are you for or against a peace agreement based on the principle of 'two states for two nations,' even if that requires significant concessions on the part of Israel?" – the overwhelming majority of the Jews opposed this, about 70% of both age groups (77% among FSU youths). This finding is understandable because the formulation of the question only cited concessions on the Israeli side and did not mention concessions on the Palestinian side. As expected, most of the Arabs, about three-quarters, agreed.

There are also pragmatic attitudes. A little more than half of the adolescents think that in order to reach an agreement, a 'two states for two nations' solution must be implemented. It is surprising that more of the young adults also think the same way: 60%. It seems that the young adult respondents accept this reality, despite their objections to concessions in general. Other findings corroborate this theory: when the respondents heard the list of several possibilities for continuation of the peace process, more than half of the adolescents chose the option of continuation of the

current situation (status quo). This rate fell to 40% among the young adults, who support the two-state solution by 27% versus 22% of the adolescents.



Graph No. 8: What is preferable? (Only Jews, in percentages)

In contrast to the uniform opinions on the subjects of security or defense, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict exposed the deepest schisms in Israeli society. Similar to the earlier survey years, the biggest disagreements between the population groups was found in the attitudes toward the conflict and not in internal economic and social issues. The meanings of Right, Center, and Left, as well as the political gaps between other segmented groups (such as religion), have become defined on the axis of the conflict.

Three-quarters of the secularists supported negotiations with the Palestinians, in contrast to 59% of the traditionalists. That was followed by a large gap, with only 30% of the religious and *haredim* in favor of negotiations.

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Among the secularists, a relative majority of 36% chose the 'two states for two nations' policy while 33% preferred a continuation of the status quo. Regarding the traditional, religious and *haredi groups* - more than half, about 55%, preferred the status quo and only a small minority (22%, 12%, and 11%, respectively) preferred the 'two states' solution.

- For comparison purposes, almost no differences were revealed among the religious groupings regarding economic approaches. When the youth were asked, "Do you feel that the privatization process is being carried out to the appropriate degree, too much or too little?" – almost half of the youths answered that privatization was carried out appropriately or too little – with gaps of only isolated percentage points (47% to 50% among secular, traditional, religious and *haredim*). Between 17%-33% (starting from the secularists downward) think that the State privatizes too much, and the percentage of those who don't know was high in all the groups, but increased with the religiosity level.
- Confirmation of the hypothesis that there was not much variance between the population groups regarding economic/social issues was evident in the political sectors among the youth. No gaps were found between the Right and Center at all regarding the privatization process (and no gaps between the two age groups that would testify to a specific pattern). The distribution of answers (too little, too much, or privatization at the appropriate level) were similar between the Right and Center groups, with between 21% and 30% for each answer. Only the Left answered in accordance with their world-view: 47%, a clear relative majority, thinks that there was too much privatization.
- The answers to the question, "Do you think that the free market should operate with minimal government intervention?" shows a mild, gradual difference between Right and Left; 40% of the Left agrees, 48% of the Center and 53% of the Right. Here, too, the differences are not great. Again, there were no gaps between the adolescents and young adults that show any kind of pattern or trend by age.

When asked whether the State does enough to help the weaker elements of the population, even the slight gaps disappear and there are no differences between Right and Left, religious and secular. About 80% and more of (almost) all the groups feel that the government does not do enough to help the underprivileged. We can conclude from this that the ideological axis of Right and Left in Israel, even among the youth, was based mainly on national issues and attitudes toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – and attitudes regarding democratic values – and less on social-economic worldviews.

Summary

The insights gleaned from the surveys demonstrate one well-know trend: the deep chasms between religious groups in the Jewish society in Israel. In many places, the denotations of Right and Left overlap the religiosity gaps between respondents.

In light of the long-range history of the schisms between secular and religious Israelis with regards to political stances, there is no reason to think that the situation is likely to change in the near future. In other words, as the percentages of religious and *haredi* Jews in Israeli society continue to grow, we foresee a corresponding increase in so-called Right-wing views; in other words, less support for democratic values and the peace process. However, not all the Right-wing trends among the youth can be attributed to an increase in the number of religious Jews.

Implications of the Right-wing viewpoint include more hawkish attitudes and ultra-nationalism regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the lack of economic-social significance. In addition to these, another import of the "Right-wing" approach as we see from the results of the surveys, means: less support for democracy and its basis values.

In order to halt the erosion of democracy-based values, we must first understand the source of the trend. There are two possibilities: one, that the essence of a religious lifestyle or the world-view of the Jewish religion contradicts democracy. In other words, the fact that a person is a believer or observant Jew causes him (or her) to be less democratic. A second possibility is that a decline in favor of democracy results from other attitudes connected to religion, but not necessarily that religion itself disqualifies democracy. For example, perhaps religious world-views are significantly correlated with ultra-nationalistic positions. The more that democracy is perceived as allowing entry to forces that weaken the Jewish national identity of the State, it is considered a threat.

According to the second approach, the problem is not that Judaism disqualifies democracy but that the classic Zionistic formulation – "A Jewish and democratic State" – simply does not work in practice. Instead of creating a winning combination that involves only monitoring of Jewishness-democracy balance, the two concepts are evidently viewed as mutually exclusive. Thus the State's citizens feel that they are forced to choose between them. For the religious sector, Judaism is supreme – this is also true for some secularists who embrace the national identity. Or perhaps some non-religious but nationalistic Jews exchange security for religion. In any case, one or the other (Judaism or security) subjugates the values of democracy and peace.

The second, new and interesting trend revealed in the survey is the gap between the younger respondents (15- to 18-year-olds) whom we call the adolescents, and the older respondents (21- to 24-year-olds), whom we call the young adults. The young adults were found to be more ultra-nationalistic, less democratic, and more hawkish, but also pragmatic in certain issues such as the need to achieve the two-states solution. All this points to a new trend, a finding which raises many questions regarding the source of the change:

- Is there a possibility that the adolescents will follow in the footsteps of the young adults and also become more Right-wing in the future?
- If yes, what experiences cause this change in attitude? Some possibilities are: army service, accumulated knowledge, greater exposure to current events or, in general, rubbing their shoulders with adult life as responsible citizens who vote in elections, pay their taxes, and have personal contact with government authorities and institutions.

Or perhaps we are viewing a unique phenomenon, particular to the present generation of youth who reached adulthood at the height of the Second Intifada and the relentless terrorist attacks accompanying that period. Perhaps these experiences were what increased the youths' cynicism regarding chances for peace, and their anger at all threats to the State and its identity.

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Chapter 5

Social and Political Viewpoints and Attitudes of Arab-Palestinian¹⁰ Youth in Israel

Dr. Taghreed Yahia-Younis

Introduction

This article is based on a survey of youth in Israel that was carried out in the summer of 2010. It was the last of a series of three surveys, the first of which was conducted in 1998 and the second in 2004. All three surveys focus on the political and social viewpoints and positions of Israeli youth, Jews and Arabs, from two age groups: adolescents ranging from 15 to 18 years old and young adults from 20 to 24 years old. This was a representative sample¹¹ of 1,613 participants in each survey, of which 407 were Arab youth. The survey examined a gamut of wide-ranging topics, such as: what characteristics of Israeli society are important to the youth, what goals do they feel should be important to the State, what level of trust do they have in governmental institutions, to what extent do they feel they 'belong,' and what positions do they take regarding the possibility of coexistence and social proximity between Jews and Arabs.

^{10.} It is reasonable to assume that the descriptive label of "young Arab-Palestinians" that I used in the title will differ from other designations used by my colleagues in this book and in general; the most common appellation in the Israeli establishment is "Israeli Arabs." Moreover, in various sections of the article I will refer to the same category under discussion by different names such as "the Arabs in Israel," "Arabs/ Palestinians who are Israeli citizens," in accordance with specific contexts. For more information about the politics of names, see Rabinowitz, 1993.

^{11.} For more information about the entire sample, sampling method and other methodological questions see Chapter 3, "Results of Survey of Positions Regarding the Social-Political Identities of Israeli Youth" in this book.

This article focuses on the viewpoints and positions of the Arab-Palestinian youth. It deals with the positions of the Arab youth regarding Israeli society and the Arab world, their inclinations for social proximity with the Jewish citizens of Israel and their assessments of the chances for peaceful coexistence. Two issues in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that were examined in this survey were: the youths' stances vis-á-vis negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and their favored solutions to the conflict. In addition to the collective-political aspects of the Arab youth regarding personal issues, mainly: the goals they aspire to, their view of their chances for fulfilling their goals in the State of Israel, their level of optimism regarding their personal future, and their perception of the threats that endanger their personal safety.

This article also tracks the **changes** in the viewpoints of the youth over time, as the three series of surveys extended over a period of twelve years.¹²

The two questions that are central to this article are: What are the viewpoints and positions of Arab youth vis-á-vis the State of Israel, Israeli society and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? In light of these viewpoints and positions, how do they perceive their future and their personal safety in the State of Israel?

It is reasonable to assume that the viewpoints and positions of Arab youth regarding the State of Israel and the general Israeli society will be affected by their status as members of the indigenous Palestinian-Arab minority. An extension of that hypothesis is that these viewpoints and positions will affect the way they view their personal futures and prospects in the State of Israel.


Perceptions and attitudes toward the State and society


Desired characteristics and goals of the State

A very large majority (90.3%) of the Arab youth attribute importance to the democratic nature of the State. In fact, 76.7% even say that it is 'very important'; this is the highest percentage earned by any one characteristic in this category, relative to the other characteristics. A large majority also voted for the following additional characteristics from the list of important attributes of the State: full

^{12.} I would like to take this opportunity to offer my thanks to Yasmin Alkalai for her statistical processing of the data of the study on which this article is based.

political equality between the various sectors (90.6%), equality between women and men (92.8%), high standard of living (87.2%), economic equality among the citizens (87.4%), that the State should live peacefully with its neighbors (86.4%), and that it should be a country for all its citizens¹³ (86.4%).





Comparison between the two nationality groups: Although a large majority of the Jewish youth also attributed importance to the above-mentioned characteristics, there is a significant difference in the low importance they attributed to full equality in political and social rights among the various groups. First, a larger majority of Arabs than Jews felt that full political equality is important (90.6% – Arabs, 81.6% – Jews); secondly, about three-quarters of the Arabs selected 'very important,' in contrast to only 42% of the Jews.

When the democratic principle clashes with security needs or is measured

^{13.} Note that the Jews were asked a different question: they were asked about the desirability of a "Jewish state," not "country for all its citizens." This will be discussed later on.

against the efficacy of strong leaders, it loses some of its support though continues to represent an important value to the Arab youth. Out of the large majority of those who chose the democracy goal, about two-thirds of the Arabs felt that democracy should prevail in a conflict with security; only about a quarter of the Jews agreed. Only about half of the Arab youth, in contrast to 60.5% of their Jewish contemporaries, agreed that "strong leaders could fix the state of the country better than laws and discussions." Thus it seems that the Arab youth consistently attribute great importance to democracy. A trend is evident over the axis of time for a steady increase in preference for democratic apparatuses over strong leaders. This is expressed in a decline in percentage points for those who feel that strong leaders are more effective than the democratic process (69.3%, 63.3% and 52.9%, in chronological order of the surveys). Simultaneously, there is a steep, steady increase in the rate of those who totally oppose this opinion (9.3%, 21.7% and 33.8%, in chronological order).

An interesting and significant finding is that a very high percentage of the youth (92.8%) voted for the importance of equality between men and women; this is the highest percentage for any one characteristic, after democracy. This fact is worthy of attention especially because Arab society is perceived as patriarchal, conservative, and traditional. Ironically, it is likely that this background of inequality may be the very reason that the youth aspire for something they may not have. However, though they make a statement on a theoretical level, they may not necessarily be committed to gender equality in practice; research has shown that often there are gaps between lip-service proclamations and actual behavior under different circumstances. This, of course, is beyond the purview of this survey.¹⁴


Another finding in this context is the non-political nature of the gender-equality goal. The youth may perceive this as something separate and distinct from the State, at least directly – in contrast to equal political rights for all sectors, and economic equality for all citizens. Therefore, we hypothesize that the issue of gender equality was perhaps perceived as a 'safer,' less emotionally charged issue to the Arab respondents, one in which they could safely demand equality.

For information about the gap between theory and reality, see the study initiated by the NGO "Women Against Violence" (Ganem, 2005).

When the survey respondents were asked to indicate the most important goal they feel the State should aspire to, the goals that were chosen by the young Arabs for the top three places appear in the following order of frequency: peace with neighboring countries (22.7%), that Israel should be a country for all its citizens (22.5%), and that it should be democratic (18.5%). True, there was a drop over the years in frequency of selecting peace with neighboring countries (38.3%, 24.1% and 22.7%, in chronological order). Nevertheless this goal remained in first place, consistently over time, for understandable reasons regarding the Arab citizens of Israel.

The "country for all its citizens" goal rose to second place in 2010, right on the heels of the first goal (peace) (22.5% – citizens, 22.7% – peace). Thus it seems that by 2010, the "country for all its citizens" discourse had filtered down to the entire young Arab community. The political equal-rights goal, which had captured third place in 1998, advanced on the goal-scale to second place in 2004 but did not make it to the top three goals in the 2010 survey (18.8%, 23.1% and 6.2% in chronological order).

Graph No. 2: The three most important goals that the State should fulfill, according to national group



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By contrast, the Jewish youth rated the following three goals in the top three spots according to the following frequency: a Jewish state (33.2%), peace between Israel and its neighbors (18.2%), and a democratic state (14.3%). It is important to note not only the differences among the youth in both nationalities, and not only the order, but also the differences in selection-percentages of the goals. Thus we discern a trend: democracy declined in importance among the Jewish youth, both in terms of selection-percentages (26.1%, 17.0% and 14.3%, in chronological order) and in terms of its placement or ranking among the most important goals. Democracy dropped from first place on the scale in 1998 to second place in 2004 and third place in 2010; this was accompanied by a corresponding trend of increasing importance of the Jewish-state goal, which garnered the following percentage-selections: 2004 (26.3%) and 2010 (33.2%).

Democracy and the various forms of equality in the State are extremely important attributes to the Arab citizens of Israel because they are a national minority in an ethnocratic state (Yiftachel, 1999) and, at best, in an ethnic democracy (Samooha, 1990). Democracy and equal rights enable them to struggle for their political and civil rights against the dominant majority group and the State.

The age groups also display significant differences regarding the desired characteristics and goals of the State. Democracy, high standard of living, and economic equality are more important to the young adults than to the adolescents. But when the adolescents had to choose between democracy and security in the event of a clash, they preferred democracy. Similarly, they also were less inclined to agree that strong leaders are more effective than the democratic process.

The discourse about the nature of the State and its character is the basis for ultra-nationalistic trends and radicalization of the Jewish sector. This, in turn, has implications for the status of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel. These findings testify to the effects of the discourse on the nature of the State on the present survey. The Arab minority also takes an active part in this discourse, for example in the Vision documents.¹⁵

^{15.} For information about the Vision documents created under the Metzilah Center by the National Committee of Heads of Local Arab authorities in Israel, see: http://www.metzilah.org.il/webfiles/fck/FutureVision.pd

Additional indicators of the importance of democracy to Arab youth are their levels of trust in the various state institutions.


Trust in government institutions

The survey examined the trust accorded by the respondents to eight governmental institutions. The overall picture we receive is often dialectic and complex. Some of the institutions are connected directly to the democratic regime, first and foremost the parties and the Knesset, thus they are additional parameters for examining the perception of democracy in the country. The young Arabs have little trust in the parties (40%) and the Knesset (49%); in fact, the parties are ranked lowest, thus reflecting a crack in their trust of the country's democracy. On the other hand, the legal system received high trust percentages (71.9%), almost as high as the trust in the religious institutions (72%). It should be noted that the religious institutions received the highest levels of trust, even in the category of 'complete trust' a third. This is probably because the religious institutions were granted autonomy by the Israeli state, thus after 1948 they came to symbolize continuity with the past and the Arabs continued to identify with them. The legal system received high trust-levels of Arab youth (15 to 24 years) over time: 82.1%, 71.1% and 71.9%, in chronological order. We see that it lost only a small proportion of trust in the problematic period between 1998 and 2004 and received high percentages of 'complete trust' ratings over the years, just behind the religious institutions (36.5%, 25.9% and 27%, in chronological order).

Out of all the government institutions, the army received the lowest trust-level of the Arab youth; 39.5% of them expressed 'no trust' at all, the highest percentage-level of distrust among all the institutions. Meanwhile, trust-percentages in the police and the media were 60.9% and 58.9%, respectively.

The nationality groups expressed significant differences in their trust-levels toward the government institutions in the country. The most prominent gap is regarding the army, which attained the trust of almost all the Jewish youth (92.1%), and 'complete trust' of 57.9%. Meanwhile, the Arab respondents expressed more trust than the Jews in the legal system, the religious

institutions, the media, the Knesset and the parties; but the reverse is true regarding the army, the police and the Histadrut. Nevertheless, the Arabs voted more frequently for "complete trust" in all the institutions – with the exception of the army, of course.



Graph No. 3: Trust level of young Arabs in the government institutions, according to the various institutions.

We clearly discern significant changes over time regarding the trust-levels of the young Arabs in the government institutions. We detect a significant drop in trust between the first two time periods – that is, in the shadow of the October 2000 events. Then there is a partial rebound with an increase in trust, but not at the same initial level (of the first point of comparison) as 1998. Thus the trust in the police dropped from 72.1% in 1998 to 50.1% in 2004, and rebounded to 60.9% in 2010.

We can understand these findings, at least partially, as evidence of a widespread behavior pattern of a discriminated minority in a country whose two important components of self-definition are mutually exclusive: "Jewish" and "democratic." Under the best of circumstances,


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this incompatibility breeds tension. Thus, a discriminated-against minority in a State that claims to be democratic pins their hopes on the law authorities and, at the end of the day, on the legal system. This system serves the Arab-Palestinian minority as a mechanism to protect their rights and achieve other objectives. This is despite the fact that the Knesset and the government find ways (especially lately) to circumvent the High Court of Justice; one example is the famous verdict of the Court regarding the petitions in the names of Arab citizens (for example, the Kadan verdict, regarding the right of an Arab to buy land and live in the Katzir Jewish community settlement). The legal system provides the forum for legal battles for civil rights, the path that citizens are expected to take in trying to achieve their aims.

The media is perceived to be, and is supposed to be, professional and objective, thus the majority express faith in it. In a contradictory yet complementary manner, perhaps the situation in this context reflects the ability of the hegemonic dominant group to cause some of its subordinates (i.e. the Arabs) to develop trust in it.

Lack of faith in the army is the mirror picture of the situation among the young Jewish community; in general, the army is the focus of the consensus in Jewish society. It should be kept in mind that the Youth Survey of 2010 was conducted about a year after the end of the Cast Lead campaign in Gaza. The Arab youth saw the harsh pictures of death and destruction of their fellow Arabs in Gaza (as did the broad public in Israel and throughout the world). On a daily basis, they witness the commonplace practices of the occupation: barriers and barricades, closures and more, and the suffering that these practices have caused their fellow Arabs. Moreover, the space of three years that elapsed from the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006 was not enough to forget the experiences of that war, especially of those in the North, who were abandoned on the home front without shelters and other protection-measures that were vital under the circumstances – as opposed to the well-equipped neighboring settlements of their Jewish counterparts.

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Graph No. 4: Development over time of trust in select government institutions, according to survey year

Significant differences exist between age groups regarding attitudes toward government institutions. The young adults have less trust than the adolescents in: religious institutions (64% and 76%, respectively); the police (55% and 74%, respectively), the parties (40% and 49%, respectively) and the Histadrut (37% and 43%, respectively). Almost half of the young adults have no trust at all in the parties in contrast to a quarter of the adolescents, and no trust in religious institutions as follows: young adults – 19.7% and adolescents – 9.5%. Even the intensity of their trust in these institutions is low; for example, only 29% of the young adults profess 'complete trust' in the religious institutions, compared to 37.3% of the adolescents.

These differences are the product of age and experience. We can assume that many of the young adults already had opportunities to rub elbows with these institutions and experiences that caused them to lose trust. While this is true for religious institutions and the media, it is even more pertinent to their troubled relationship with the police. It must be remembered that a decade earlier in October 2000, the young adults of today (ages 21–24)

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witnessed the killing of thirteen of their contemporaries by police forces, ostensibly. The inquiry files that were opened against the police suspects were closed at the recommendation of the state attorney and indictments were never filed. Since then, twice as many young Arab citizens of the State were killed by the police and other members of the armed forces under various circumstances.

Regarding the Knesset, the source of distrust is rooted in the fact that the Arab minority in Israel views the Knesset as responsible for discriminatory and even racist laws against them. A series of such laws, some of which were legislated and some of which are in various stages of readings, are the handiwork of the Knesset in recent years. Some of these laws are especially relevant to Arab youth such as the citizenship law that infringes on their basic right to select a Palestinian spouse from over the Green Line; the loyalty law in lieu of citizenship is mainly aimed at these potential spouses. Moreover, it is likely that merely observing discussions in the Knesset plenum, especially those connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and other topics connected to its Arab minority, also contributed to lowering the Arabs' trust in the Knesset.

I would like to say a few words about the attitudes of the Arab youth towards the parties, since political parties are important institutions in a democratic regime. Among all the institutions mentioned above, the lowest trust-levels were accorded to the parties - similar to the low Jewish percentages. It should be noted that the survey did not specifically define which parties to evaluate: Zionistic, Arab, or joint non-Zionistic (Hadash). Therefore we assume that the question refers to the perception of all the above parties. A consistent lack of trust in the parties has been evident over time, with a decline in 2004 then recovery in 2010 (48.5%, 23.1% and 40%, in chronological order). Possible explanations for Arab distrust of the political parties are as follows: the weakened status of political parties in the Arab sector since the establishment of the State; the ultra-nationalism and radicalization of old and new Right-wing parties; the decline in status of the Zionist-Left Meretz party among the Arab population and the public's repugnance for the corruption connected to the parties. Finally, the Arab parties (and the way they were generally run)

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were never really accepted and established in the general Arab public.

In the following section, I will focus on attitudes and perceptions of the youth regarding issues connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict

As an opening remark for this section, I will note the following: The perceptions and attitudes of young Arab-Palestinians in the State of Israel are formed on the background of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – just like the attitudes of the Jews. But for the Arab-Palestinian citizens, the conflict represents the most important, essential focus of their perceptions and attitudes.

The survey examined the attitudes of youth toward several issues connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Recognition or non-recognition of the existence of the State of Israel

When the youth were asked to express their stand on the statement, "Most of the Arabs have not recognized the existence of the State of Israel and would destroy it if they could," less than half of the young Arabs (45.3%) agreed with this point of view as opposed to two-thirds of the Jewish youth. Out of the Arabs who agreed, only 16.1% "definitely agree" and a similar percentage "definitely oppose" the statement, in contrast to 40.9% and 60.8% of the Jews, respectively.

The differences between the two nationality groups on this issue are significant. However, no significant differences were found regarding age group and gender. In comparison to 2004 (the question did not appear in the survey of 1998), there was an increase in the percentages of those who agreed with the viewpoint (from 34.1% - 2004 to 45.3% - 2010), in contrast to a small decrease in the percentages of those who 'definitely agree' (16.7% to 16.1%, respectively).

Negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority

About half (52.7%) of the young Arabs are in favor of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, in contrast to 59.2% of the Jews. Significant changes have taken place on this issue over time. The percentage of those who believe in negotiations increased in contrast to 2004 (25.6%), as well as intensity of belief or faith ("complete faith," 12.8% and 29.4%, in chronological order.) By contrast, there were no changes among the Jews over time on this issue.

Preferred solution

While a majority of 54.6% of the young Arabs prefers the two-state solution, a majority of 52.9% of their Jewish counterparts favor the status quo. The second-ranking solution of the Arabs is a bi-national state with a frequency of 29.8%; this solution was chosen by 19.0% of the Jewish youth. The second-place solution of the Jews is the two-state solution, favored by 28.1%.

Civil resistance

Most of the Arab respondents oppose civil resistance, violent or non-violent (66.8% and 58%, respectively), as a response to a government peace policy that they feel harms the interests of the Arab minority. There were significant differences between the Arab and Jewish youth on this issue. The percentages of Jews who oppose violent or non-violent civil resistance (refusal to evacuate settlements, refusal to serve in the occupied territories, etc.) in the context of peace are higher (74.2% and 66.7%, respectively).

No gender or age-related differences were found regarding attitudes toward civil resistance.

Significant changes took place over the survey's time frame. The percentage of those who opposed non-violent civil resistance dropped between 1998 and 2004 (71.5% and 53.6%, respectively) and then increased a bit in 2010 (57.7%). Furthermore, there was a significant drop in the rate of those who opposed violent civil resistance between 2004 and 2010 (84.7% and 65.6%, in chronological order).

Political identity


The percentage of Arab youth who did not identify with any political group was very high (40.4%) in contrast to about a tenth of the Jewish sector in the corresponding category. This is one of the most striking

finding regarding Arab youth. A quarter of the Arab youth identified themselves as Left, as opposed to about a tenth of the Jews. Most of the Jewish youth (61.4%) identified with the Right, in contrast to 18.5% of the Arabs.

The differences between the political identities of the nationality groups are significant, but age group and gender have no significant effects. The twelve-year perspective of the survey demonstrates that significant changes took place in the political trends of the Israeli youth. In addition, we observe a trend of decline in the percentages of those who identify with the Left in both nationality groups. From about half of Arab youth who identified with the Left in 1998, the rate declined to about a quarter in 2010 (51.9%, 49.6% and 24.4%, in chronological order). Among their Jewish counterparts, the percentage of Left-identifiers declined from a third to around a tenth (32%, 25.1% and 11.6%, in chronological order). The differences between the percentages above were, of course, divided among the rest of the political options equally, so that the only thing that changed in the voting distribution was that the Right's share was bigger.

Identification with the Right: The Arabs demonstrated an initial decrease in identification with the Right, then an increase (15%, 10.5% and 18.5%, in chronological order). By contrast, there was a continuous increase over time in support for the Right among the Jewish youth (47.8%, 56% and 61.4%, in chronological order).

Percentage of the unaffiliated: There was a stable, gradual increase in the unaffiliated rate among the Arabs (26.9%, 35.3% and 40.4%, in chronological order). This trend within the Jewish group was much more moderate and remained hovering around ten percent (10.2%, 10.9% 12.3%, in chronological order). Identification with the Center: Arab youth – 6.2%, 4.5% and 16.7%, in chronological order; in contrast to Jewish youth – 10%, 8.1%, 14.7%, respectively.



Graph No. 5: Political identification (Right, Center, Left, and Unaffiliated), according to national group and year

1

A logical reason for the high unaffiliated rate among the Arab youth may be due to fear of identifying themselves politically, especially in an interview (even a phone survey). The Arab minority group has been subject to mechanisms of monitoring and control ever since the establishment of the State of Israel, especially with regards to political activity and party identification (see Lustick, 1985), and even more so in recent years. As a result, many swathes of the Arab minority sector shy from political socialization in its institutionalized and structured format as well as organized political and party activities. In most societies, the two institutions of family and educational system fulfill important roles as agents of political socialization, but in the Arab minority, they do not fulfill this role appropriately. They do not expose youth in their formative years to the relevant content and broad variety of views that lead to political identification.

Identification with the Left is another pattern that characterizes minorities because Left-wing groups aspire to change the socio-political status quo and

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better their lives. Thus, the second-largest percentage (about a quarter) of the Arab youth identify with the Left, though at a lower rate than one would expect; this is due to the explanations above. The Arab parties were also somewhat more active in the last decade, especially in the target youth population (though the rate remained low).

Regarding Arab support of Zionist parties, especially Right-wing ones: this phenomenon may not be based on ideological-conceptual identification but narrow sectarian interests which do not merit legitimization as part of a principles-based discussion on the reciprocal relationship between the Arab citizens and the parties.

In summary, the issue of political identification of Arab Israeli citizens (youth) requires a more methodical and thorough research study.

Despite the importance attributed by Arab youth to democracy in the survey, they also report a low level of belonging to (or affinity with) Israeli society. I explain this in the section below.

Involvement in Israeli society

Feeling of belonging

Arab youth express low levels of belonging to, or "feeling part of," the Israeli society or the Arab nation: only about a half feels any kind of affinity to Israeli society in contrast to the overwhelming majority of the Jews (87.2%). In addition, only 18.6% of the Arabs feel the connection strongly ("to a great extent") in contrast to about half of the Jews (51.9%). Similarly, only about a half of the Arab youth feels part of the Arab nation, while a third of those feel this way to a great extent.

We can better understand the perceptions above if we take into account the historical context of the formation of the Arab-Palestinian minority in Israel and its problematic status within the State. The Arabs were transformed from a majority to minority on the territory of the State of Israel in a drastic and tragic manner from their perspective: overnight transformation, expulsion, being chased away, becoming refugees, destruction of villages and emptying of cities, disintegration of the social structure, collapse of the economic infrastructure, severance of cultural and political traditions, and long-term disconnection from the Arab nation in general. They found themselves

viewed as foreigners in a country where the authorities consistently treat them with suspicion and prejudice, and where they are cut off from the Arab nation in general. All these factors continue to cast their shadows over Arab perceptions of belonging or feeling part of Israel society.

On the one hand, the Arabs have become citizens of a country that is waging a bloody and ongoing battle against the Arab nation to which they belong. On the other hand, the same country employs an institutional policy of exclusion and defamiliarization mechanisms (Yahia-Younis, 2006). In the last decade the government even adopted a policy of de-legitimization and removed the Arabs from the boundaries of the Israeli collective by defining these boundaries as overlapping the Jewish majority (Kimmerling, 2004; Kemp, 1999). All these cause the low feelings of belonging as reported above. This situation is described in the professional literature as a "double process of marginalization" (Al-Haj, 1993).

Gender-related gaps appear in this issue, as more males feel connected to Israeli society than females (23.3% and 14.0%, respectively). This is probably because men and boys are more integrated in Israeli society due to needs of employment, running errands, recreational activities, etc. More Arab men than women look for work on the Israeli labor market; this is true with regards to Arabs who have a higher education as well as those who are members of the unskilled workforce (Lewin-Epstein & Semyonov, 1994; Khattab, 2003). In addition, women are perceived as bearers of the identity and culture and as its gatekeepers of their group (Yuval-Davis, 1998).

Lack of belonging-perceptions to Israeli society is mainly expressed in two additional parameters examined in the survey: army service and activity in volunteer organizations.

Army service

A tiny minority of about ten percent of Arab youth in Israel have served, serve now or intend to serve in the army or *Sherut Leumi* (National Service), in contrast to about two-thirds (65.1%) of the Jewish youth. A negligible percentage (0.7%) of the Arabs has served or serves in *Sherut Leumi*: (1.4%) of the females, as opposed to 14.1% of Jewish youth.

In 2007, the Israel establishment attempted to impose a form of national

(or civil) service on Arab-Palestinian youth in Israel.¹⁶ This aroused intense debate in the Arab sector, a debate that is linked to the general discourse on civil obligations/rights in Israel. The Israeli establishment portrays the national/civil service as "volunteerism," but it would be equivalent to the obligatory army service in that it would be a pre-condition for receiving state benefits and entitlements. The dominant opinion in the Arab population, especially the leadership, does not accept the connection made between civil service and equal obligations/rights; this is because the experiences of Druze and Bedouins who served in the Israeli army prove otherwise (Kanaaneh, 2005). Moreover, powerful criticism is levelled against entrusting the service to a government body, and to the "real" intentions regarding its operation and the way it will be conducted. According to the main argument in the critique, the establishment ignores the scathing questions of identity in the context of imposing any service that is parallel to army service on the Arabs-Palestinians. In fact, this kind of service is a tool for distorting the identity of the youth, a new apparatus for an old project: Israelization, the formation of the Israeli-Arab (for more details see Rabinowitz, 1993; Cohen, 2006). Government authorities do this in order to exploit the economic distress of the Arabs, who make up the lion's share of representation under the poverty line. The negligible percentage of those who served in the army or Sherut Leumi (according to the present survey) seems to contradict the findings of other surveys on the subject, such as that of Smooha (2008), conducted in the fall of 2007, according to which, a large majority of 65.0%-78.2% of the Arab citizens were in favor of national service.

The disparity in the findings can be attributed to several supplementary reasons that I will raise here. First of all, the sampling in Smooha's survey (Ibid) represents the entire Arab sector, including of course the older age groups. In addition, his survey was biased in the emphasis it placed on the volunteering aspects of the service; volunteer service is perceived as a supreme value in general, and in the Arab society in particular. Other biases

^{16.} Though "national service" and "civil service" appear to be the same thing, the Arabs do not think that the two terms are synonymous on the symbolic, ideological level. Thus, the fact that "civil" (or civilian) was used is evidence to an attempt to camouflage (or whitewash) the nationalism debate and facilitate the government's attempt to market the idea.

include: the emphasis placed on the benefits to the 'volunteer,' concealing the true nature of the national service as an apparatus of Israelization (Ibid). The tiny percentage of Arabs in the present survey (who served in the army or national service) does not match the tendentious assessments and reports designed to market the national service concept among the Arabs.

Since it is a fact that the army is an institution that engenders a major, inherent portion of the perceptions of being part of Israeli society (Lustick, 1985; Horwitz and Lisak, 1990), not only during army service but beyond, it is clear that the Arab citizens do not share this feeling. The findings in the previous section show this.

Volunteer activity in civilian organizations

About a quarter (22.7%) of Arab youth are presently active in a volunteer organization in contrast to about a quarter (21.2%) of the Jewish youth; a tenth (10.8%) were active in the past in contrast to (17.5%) of the Jewish population. However, we must take into account other accepted forms of volunteering in the family-communal Arab sectors that are not necessarily defined as such. In addition, despite the growth of the civil society (such as the NGO non-profit organizations) since the 1990s, most of these organizations are not accessible in every Arab village or settlement. This explains the fact that the young adults are more active than their adolescent counterparts (36% and 30%, respectively) because when young adults move to the city (primarily as students in educational institutions), they are exposed to more volunteer organizations that were not accessible to them in their former rural residences. These geographical limitations also probably explain the gap in volunteerism between the two national sectors in favor of the Jews (30% - Arabs, 38% - Jews). Previous studies, in Israel and throughout the world, show that youth demonstrate higher levels of social and political involvement than any other segment of the population especially during their stint as university or college students (Al-Haj, 1996).

However, a large gap remains between the willingness to volunteering to civil organizations within their own societies, and national/civil service portrayed by the establishment as volunteerism. The gap can be partly explained by the counter-arguments (to national/civil service) that I brought above. We can conclude that the willingness of young Arab-Palestinian citizens to contribute to society and volunteer on its behalf, is higher under circumstances and modes that

do not exacerbate the clash between their national and civilian identities.

In the following section I will present the major findings regarding their perceptions and attitudes regarding Israeli-Arab coexistence.

Israeli-Arab coexistence

Coexistence of Arabs and Jews in Israel was examined in the survey via the following three aspects: theoretical belief in coexistence; feelings of the interviewees toward the other nationality; and willingness for social proximity, using a number of indicators. The results show that most of the Arabs believe in coexistence and are ready for social proximity to the other national group. Their belief is stronger and they score higher on all indicators of willingness than their Jewish counterparts. From all the possibilities listed, the young Arabs are most willing to have a Jewish friend who is a citizen of Israel; they are least willing to accept a Jewish family living in their neighborhood. In addition, the Arabs reported more positive feelings than the Jews, who indicated more negative feelings towards the Arab citizens of Israel.

I will elaborate on these subjects in the following sections.

Belief in coexistence

Three-quarters (75%) of the young Arabs believe in coexistence between Arabs and Jews in Israel, compared to about half (48.6%) of their Jewish counterparts. Moreover, there is a significant difference between the national groups in the intensity of their belief in coexistence. While the Arabs are divided almost evenly between the answer-categories of "believe" and "definitely believe" (37.1% and 37.9%, respectively), only 13.4% of the Jews believe strongly in coexistence. An additional, significant difference between the two national groups relates to the attitudes of the age groups. In the Jewish population, about half (53%) of the adolescents and 42% of the young adults believe in coexistence, while there were no parallel differences befween the Arab age groups.

Feelings toward the other nationality

The youth were asked about their feelings toward the members of the other nationality. The possible answers offered for this question were: fear, hatred, sympathy, closeness, and no emotions. Most of the Arab youth (58%) said

they had neither positive nor negative feelings toward the Jews; second in frequency were positive feelings of sympathy and closeness, reported by about a quarter of them; a bit more than a tenth (12.8%) expressed hatred. A somewhat smaller majority (51%) of Jewish youth also did not harbor feelings toward the members of the other nationality, but more than a quarter of the Jews (27.9%) reported hatred.

In the Arab group, significant gaps regarding emotions are linked to gender; more females reported lack of emotion toward the Jews (62.7% – females and 51.3% – males). The most intense feeling expressed by both genders was closeness (15.7% – females, 13.2% – males), but hatred appeared more frequently and with greater intensity among the females (15.2%) than the males (10.8%). An explanation appears later below in the chapter.

Willingness for social proximity with the Jews

The Arab youth revealed high willingness for social proximity with their Jewish counterparts in Israel. Topping the indicator scale for proximity was willingness for friendship, and the bottom of the scale was willingness for a Jewish family to live in the neighborhood. A large majority of 80.6% were willing to have a Jewish friend of the same age, out of which half were sure of it; 72.7% were willing to invite the friend to their house; 67.5% would be willing to accept an invitation to be hosted at the home of a Jew. A majority, though a smaller one of 57.3%, was ready to have a Jewish family living in their neighborhood. Regarding the Jewish-residence issue, the answer with the highest frequency (32.2%) out of all four possibilities is 'Definitely not ready.' However, in all the other indicators for social proximity, the highest frequency was recorded in the 'Completely ready' category.

By contrast, the Jewish youth were much less ready for social proximity with members of the other nationality, and especially with regards to visiting a friend (38.1%) and having an Arab live in the neighborhood (43.9%). The highest readiness on their part was for friendship (52.7%) and inviting the friend to their home (50.2%) – even here, only half of the Jews were ready. Moreover, the most frequent answer-category chosen was 'Definitely not ready,' as opposed to the Arabs who scored highest in the 'Completely ready' category (except for the neighborhood-issue as explained above).

There is a **gender gap** in only one indicator, which is the readiness to visit the home of a Jewish friend. Females expressed significantly less readiness to visit the home of a Jewish friend. In addition, only a third of the females answered "Completely ready' (to visit), while half of the males chose the same answer.

More significant differences are evident regarding **age groups**. Regarding willingness to share one's neighborhood: Arab group – 54% of the adolescents and 61% of the young adults are willing for a Jewish family to join the neighborhood, while the highest percentages were recorded for willingness to have a Jewish friend their age (80% – adolescents, 81% – young adults). Three-quarters of the Arabs were willing to invite a Jew to their homes, in comparison to half of the Jews; there were no differences between the two age groups in the two national groups. A majority of 64% of the Arab adolescents and 71% of the Arab young adults were ready to accept an invitation to visit a Jewish friend at home. In this parameter, the readiness-percentage declined among the Jews in both age groups to the lowest percentages of all the parameters: 35% – adolescents, 29% – young adults.




Chart No. 6: Readiness for social proximity with the other national group, according to parameters and national group

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These findings closely follow the pattern of similar studies conducted in Israel and throughout the world of majority and minority groups (Mustafa and Arar, 2009). It was found that members of minority groups are generally more willing to accept the majority group than the reverse.

These differences – regarding willingness for social proximity – can be expressions of superiority of the majority group vis-á-vis the minority group, or fears due to prejudice and stereotypical opinions. In the present study, the findings can be explained in light of the segregation of the two populations in their communities, their residences, the educational systems and more. The few and limited opportunities for mingling may exist in branches of work and institutes for higher learning during the student period. Moreover, Israeli culture and society maintain very negative images of Arabs, including Arab citizens of Israel, who are demonized in their eyes. Thus, Israeli Jews are afraid of approaching Arab areas: certain neighborhoods, towns, villages, and certainly private homes. This phenomenon is better understood in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the opinions, attitudes and perceptions of both Arab and Jewish citizens are formed against the background of the conflict.

This specific case (willingness for social proximity) has implications for other attitudes, both of the minority and majority groups. In the next section, I relate to the subject of controversies that threaten Israeli society.

Controversies that threaten Israeli society

One of the characteristics of Israeli society, which is frequently and regularly discussed in the professional literature, is the fact that it is divisive and full of schisms.¹⁷ Five major societal schisms are presented to the survey participants, who are then asked to rank them according to the level of danger they present to Israeli society.

The young adults in both national groups selected the controversy between Jewish and Arab Israeli citizens as the most dangerous rift of all: Arabs – 44.7%; and Jews – 41.9%. Second place in the Arab group was the controversy between Arab citizens regarding integration in Israel, pro or con – but with a much lower percentage of 16.2%. Close behind, with a small difference

^{17.} For extensive reading about schisms in Israeli society, see: Yaar, 2003; Horwitz and Lisak, 1990.

(14.7%), was the Right-Left dispute; then the rich-poor divide (11.8%), and last of all – the secular-religious split, with only 0.5%. By contrast, the secular-religious split in the Jewish sector was ranked second with 23.3%.

Thus, the age groups in both national groups agree on the most dangerous national dispute: the Jew-Arab rift. This was the vote of half of the adolescents of both groups (Arabs – 48%, Jews – 47%), and of the young adults (Arabs – 44%, Jews – 37%). The Arab adolescents ranked Israeli integration as the second-most important schism (17%); this schism was ranked third place in the young adult group with 15%, and second-place was the Right-Left divide with 16% – negligible difference between second and third place among the adolescents. The Right-Left divide received 14% among the adolescents, and was ranked third.

The nationalist controversy between Jewish and Arab citizens continued to assume first place among the young adult Arabs throughout all three survey time periods, with high though fluctuating percentages: 62.9% (1998), 67.6% (2004), and 44.7% (2010). Among the young adult Jews, the religious-secular divide, assumed first place in 1998 with 44.2%, replacing the Jew-Arab divide which fell to second place that year. The religious-secular divide also replaced the Jew-Arab divide (among the young adults) in the following two time periods: 2004 – 45.9%; and 2010 – 41.9%.

These findings correspond with the changes that have been taking place in the Israeli society for the last decade. The trends include increased ultra-nationalism in the political system and the Jewish public, which is why the Jew-Arab schism rose to the top of the list as most dangerous to Israel. Two additional rifts – ideological/political (Left-Right) and secular-religious – continue, over time, to appear among the top three on the ranking of the most dangerous Israeli controversies.

Perceptions regarding personal issues

Against the background of the opinions of young Arabs regarding the Israeli State and society and their place in it, it is interesting to become acquainted with their perceptions of personal issues. What are their important goals in life? And what are their chances (in their opinion) to fulfill their aspirations in Israel? How optimistic/pessimistic are they regarding their personal futures? Do they feel that their personal safety is threatened?

Personal goals


The young Arabs ranked the creation of a happy family as first place in importance on their personal 'goals' list; 40.6% of them chose this option. Higher education was ranked second with 34.7%. Third place, lagging significantly behind second place with only 12.3%, was economic success. Having good friends was the fourth goal, with a selection-percentage of 9.1%, while the desire to contribute to country or society remained last (fifth place) with only 3.2%.

The survey results show that the following personal characteristics cause significant differences in respondents' aspirations: national groups, age groups, and genders.

There are significant differences between Jews and Arabs in the order of importance of the goals in general, and in the percentage-selections of each one of them, in particular. About two-thirds (65.9%) of the Jews indicated that the most important goal is to create a happy family; this is a large concentration in one category. The answers of the rest of the respondents are divided among the other goals. (For more details, see Chapter 3,"Political and Social Attitudes of Israeli Youth: Trends over Time," and Chapter 4: "Israeli Youth – Where are they Headed? Analysis of Political Trends Based on a Quantitative Research Study.")

The age groups also differ significantly in the goals they aspire to attain. About half (48%) of adolescent Arabs ranked the acquisition of a higher education as their most important goal, while second-place was the creation of a happy family, selected by 28%. The young adults also chose these two goals, but in inverse order: a little bit more than half (54%) felt that a happy family is most important (first place), while 21% chose higher education (second place). An explanation for this is provided below.

The findings also demonstrate significant differences regarding aspirations among the Arabs based on gender. Significantly higher percentages of females than males chose higher education as the first-order goal in their lives (41.6% and 27.3%, respectively). The second concentration of females was in the happy family goal, with 38.8% compared to 43.3% of the males. While both genders ranked the rest of the goals in a similar fashion, it should be noted that almost twice as many males (15.5%) as females (8.6%) voted for economic success as the third goal.



Graph No. 7: Personal aspirations of youth, according to national group

The great importance attributed to higher education by the young Arabs can be explained as a typical pattern of minority groups. The professional literature describes the trend among minority members according to which the acquisition of a higher education is viewed as a mechanism of coping with their place in a discriminatory society (Al-Haj, 1996; Mustafa, 2006; Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, 1994). According to this pattern, higher education is a critical resource for penetrating the labor market, for advancing financial status (income), and for acquiring social prestige. For minority-group members, higher education is an important route to social mobility. This pattern is even more critical for Arabs in the State of Israel, given the reality of far-reaching changes in their economic patterns and their transformation from an agrarian to proletarian society on the Israeli labor market. The proletarianization process was the result of the expropriation of private lands that had been, in the past, sources of employment and income as well as social prestige for the land-owners. Other causes of proletarianization were the collapse of traditional Arab agriculture with lack of modern agriculture development in its stead, and lack of industrialization of the Arab settlements. In addition, over the last two decades the local workforce was

replaced by foreign workers. All these developments have not left alternative sources of work, income, and social prestige within the grasp of the Arab citizen. Moreover, the preference of Arab candidates for institutions of higher learning, universities, as well as private colleges for studying the liberal professions (medicine, law, accounting, and engineering) is mainly an attempt to ensure employment and economic autonomy in relation to State institutions (Al-Haj, 1996).

As we see above, about half of the adolescents, and a fifth of the young adults, place higher education as first on their goal list. Thus we cannot avoid the obvious question: Why is there such a large gap between the proclaimed goals of the youth, and the de-facto low percentages of Arabs studying in Israel's universities? Take, for example, a report of the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) regarding the 2007-2008 academic year: in that year, 11.8% of the Arabs were accepted to undergraduate programs and started to study; they represented 9.8% of all the academic degrees. Studies have pointed to the barriers Arab candidates face in universities. The major obstacle is the psychometric exam due to its cultural bias. Since the Arab educational system and the corresponding Hebrew system frequently employ, different pedagogical methods, the Jewish student finds the psychometric exam and higher studies as natural extensions of his/her past education, while the Arab counterpart finds them unfamiliar. Moreover, the average low financial status of Arab families does not allow the youth equal access to the 'industry' of psychometric preparatory courses.

Another obstacle is the personal interview that is required for acceptance to prestigious faculties and high-demand departments and study tracks; this critical procedure does not improve the chances of Arab candidates. This is usually the first encounter of Arab candidates with a representative of the academic institution and these candidates are generally unfamiliar with the interview-language in which the meeting is conducted, the skills involved in self-presentation, and lack preliminary socialization for the profession they have chosen.

In recent years, acceptance to high-demand study-programs in universities has been limited to youth aged 20–21 or older; this has roused great criticism among the Arab minority, who view this as an additional discriminatory

impediment. As a result of all these factors, young Arabs in search of higher education have turned to institutions abroad for many years, mainly to countries of the FSU (and have done so since the 1950s). Today, they continue to apply to these countries while also turning to Germany, Italy, and Jordan (Abu-Esbah, 2007; Yahia-Younis, 2002; Arar and Haj-Yehia, 2009). Others simply abandon their hopes for an education two or three years after graduating high school.

The differences between age groups regarding Arab youth' most important goals, stem mainly from their respective stages in life. The agreed-upon order of life-goals in general, and in the Arab society in specific, follows the stages in life: acquiring an education, forming a family, achieving economic success. Thus it is only natural that adolescents think about their next life-stage which is post-high school, while the young adults aged 21–25 think about their next objective – creating a family. It should be remembered that since Arab youth are legally exempt from army service, those who continue on for higher studies do so at a younger age than their Jewish counterparts.¹⁸

Gender gaps regarding hopes for higher education: a higher education is perceived as almost the only legitimate means for young Arab women to achieve spatial and residential mobility outside of parental homes. This is especially true when the geographical distance from academic institutions requires this, as most of the institutions are far from Arab residential areas except for teachers' seminars. Education improves the chances of Arab girls to join the labor market and raises their earning potential, for two reasons: due to their number of years of study, and due to the potential ranking of their future profession. All these yield social dividends as well. Even when the work-related goals are not achieved due to high unemployment rates, which affect academic Arab women as well, then a higher education – up to the

^{18.} Some of the Israeli universities impose a minimum age thresholds for acceptance to departments of certain subjects, especially those fields perceived as being more prestigious, such as medicine; and/or those with high demand, such as social work and nursing. This has aroused criticism on the part of the Arab society in Israel, both in the past and in the present. This policy is perceived as stemming from the deliberate placing of additional obstacles in front of Arab candidates to the universities, with attendant implications of exclusion and even discrimination (Mustafa, 2006).

bachelor's degree threshold – improves the chances of the young woman in the "marriage market."

Gender-related gaps have been recorded to the benefit of Arab women in Israel in academic studies and in receiving a bachelor's degree, starting from the 1990s (Al-Haj, 1996). In 2007–2008 the percentage of Arab women receiving a bachelor's degree in the universities was 63.3%, and a master's degree – 49.9%. The gender gap turned against them in acquiring doctoral degrees, where Arab women represented only 07.7% of the total (CBS, 2008).

In an attempt to understand the perceptions of young Arabs regarding their chances for fulfilling their goals in Israel, I will address their optimism-levels and their answers to the relevant questions on this subject.

Optimism regarding personal future

The large majority of young Arabs (88.8%) were optimistic regarding their personal futures, though this was lower than the corresponding rate of optimistic Jewish youth (91.8%). Yet the rate of Arabs who reported 'very optimistic' (56%) was higher than the corresponding rate of Jews (43%) in this category. On the other hand, two-thirds (66.6%) thought that they have high chances for fulfilling their important aspirations in Israel, in contrast to a larger majority (84.6%) of their Jewish counterparts. Only a quarter of the Arabs (24.9%) assessed their chances as 'very high,' a little less than their Jewish counterparts (26.4%). The differences between the two national groups regarding chances for actualizing important aspirations are statistically significant.

No significant differences were found between age groups or genders.

The yearning for a good life and belief in one's individual capability to achieve this despite all obstacles characterizes the younger age groups. This can be a partial explanation for the high optimism among the respective adolescents. Yet the abovementioned significant differences between the two national groups supports the hypothesis regarding the perceptions of Arab youth as having relatively fewer windows of opportunity open to them, as members of a discriminated minority group in the State.

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Threat to personal safety

Only about a tenth of young Arabs perceived a threat to their own personal safety or that of their family members, in contrast to about a quarter of the Jews in the relevant category; this is a significant difference. Arab females felt threatened significantly more than males (15.1% to 7.2%, respectively). There was a significant drop in personal threat-perception between 2004 and 2010 (36.2% and 11.1%, respectively), as well as a drop in the percentage of those who felt 'strongly threatened' (from 18.2% to 4.2%).

Two complementary explanations can be offered for this significant difference. One is cultural in nature: it is less accepted in the Arab culture to talk about feelings of weakness or inadequacy, including feeling of being personally threatened, even though security apparatuses of the State such as the police and military tend to me more hostile and less protective of Arab citizens.

In addition, with regards to cultural gendering in the gamut of human cultures, it is more accepted for women to express their emotions and perceptions than men, especially regarding those of safety. Moreover, women may feel less safe than men because they are exposed to various forms of gender-related threats including violence against women in the family. But the cultural aspect is only part of the gender gap. Social structural factors should also be emphasized, and the top of the list is the fact that Arab women are members of a minority group. Due to the interrelationship of the structural and cultural factors, female Arabs are more likely to be exposed to various forms of violence, including murder. In this context, research points to the role of the State and its authorities in causing replication of the phenomenon of murdering women on the background of "family honor" (see Hasan, 1999).

Summary

In general, the survey results exhibit patterns that are characteristic of minority groups. Yet we can also point to specific patterns that express the contextual uniqueness – both historical as well as contemporary – of the Arab-Palestinian minority in Israel. The problematics of this unique minority

stem from its position as a minority in the State, in the Palestinian nation, and in the Arab nation in general. One of the prominent characteristics exhibited by minorities is the importance they attribute to democracy and the associated, desired characteristics of the nature and tone of the State and society. Thus, a significant and sizeable majority of Arab youth attribute great importance to the democratic nature of the State, to full equality of political rights among the various groups in the country, to economic and social equality of its citizens and to gender equality. The majority (65.7%) also feel that democracy should prevail even when there is a conflict between democratic principles and security needs.

Another cluster of patterns relates to the attitudes of young Israeli Arabs toward government institutions. Again, their perceptions and attitudes express, on the one hand, a pattern shared by all minority groups, and on the other hand, a pattern that is unique to their specific instance. Therefore, their trust-level in government institutions is dualistic and sometimes complex. On the one hand, the legal system receives their high levels of trust. On the other hand, despite the high importance they accord to democracy, they place the Knesset and parties (the two leading democratic institutions in the State), near the bottom of the trust-scale (the army ranks on the very bottom).

As opposed to their strong identification with democratic principles, many of the Arab youth in Israel express low levels of belonging to or affinity with to the State. However, they also feel the same way vis-á-vis the Arab nation. Only a relatively small percentage feels that they belong to one entity or the other. This pattern expresses the anomaly of their existence: their position vis-á-vis the two sides, the isolation and severance imposed on them in the past and present from the overwhelming majority of the Arab and Moslem nation, and the repercussions of all these elements. The importance accorded by the young Arabs to peace between Israel and its neighbors (in the various survey time periods) is an expression of their hopes that peace will lead to an improvement in their own status. Their assumption is that their unique problems will be addressed in the peace solution, and not remain external to it.

The Arab youth' social perceptions and attitudes toward the Jewish majority is another example of a typical minority-group pattern. Their willingness for social proximity with the Jewish majority, according to all the indicators tested by the survey, was higher than the corresponding willingness of the majority group. While most of the Arab respondents reported emotional indifference (57.3%), the ones who do have emotions express positive feelings of closeness and sympathy (27.2%) to the Jews, in contrast to the hatred (27.9%) expressed by the young Jews. However, the Arabs are **least** willing to have a Jewish family live in their neighborhood (or village or town). In my opinion this may be an expression of internalization of segregation, but mainly demonstrates their compensatory need to retain their private space, the only immediate space that remains, that is not under the control of the majority.

In light of the picture above, the typical minority-group pattern repeats with regard to personal questions. Young Arabs are less optimistic regarding their personal futures than members of the dominant majority group. Their ranking of higher education in a high place on their goals-scale, with second-highest percentages, is another expression of the trend of minorities to use education to leverage their chances in a discriminatory reality. They hope that higher education will galvanize their social mobility and give them potentially greater concrete and symbolic benefits, while overlooking their limitations in converting the resources that are at their disposal. Moreover, the liberal academic professions facilitate a certain amount of autonomy from the government authorities. Finally, the young Arabs' assessments of their chances for fulfilling their goals are lower than that of the young Jews.

The variables that are presented and explicated are: significant differences between the national groups, the age groups, and the two genders. A not-surprising but important comment is that more significant differences were found between the national groups than between age or gender groups. In fact, the lack of significant gender or age-related differences across both national groups, is in itself a finding. This shows us that in most of the topics that were examined, the perceptions and attitudes of individuals in the State of Israel, men and women like, are formed according to their nationality: whether Arab or Jew.

It is important to note that gender gaps do exist in some, but not all, of the issues examined by the survey. Gender gaps exist in: personal goals, threats

to personal safety, feelings of belonging to Israeli society, army service, readiness to visit a Jewish friend in the friend's home – as detailed in the relevant sections of the article. But gender-related differences do not exist in major topics connected to the nature of the State and its desired characteristics and to the importance of democratic values and trust in State institutions. The existence of gender gaps in certain fields and the fact that they do not exist in other fields are important findings, in and of themselves, rooted in the paradoxical experience of being a member of the Arab-Palestinian minority group in Israel.

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Chapter 6

Face to Face: Interviews with Adolescents and Young Adults in Israel

Dr. Mina Tzemach

This chapter presents an analysis of in-depth interviews conducted face-to-face with members of the various population groups and then transcribed. The first two sections of the chapter focus on the results among the Jewish population, and the other two sections deal with the Arab population.

Interviews of the Jewish national group were conducted among two age groups: adolescents aged 15–18, and young adults aged 21–25. Thus the first sections dealing with the Jewish population are divided according to the two age groups, the first presenting findings for the adolescents and the second for the young adults.

Interviews of the Arab national group were conducted according to gender. The third part of the chapter presents the findings for the Arab adolescents and young adults, and the fourth section presents the findings of interviews with female Arab adolescents and young adults.

The chapter presents an integrative analysis of all sub-groups in each age group and gender group. The analysis was made according to topics. Obviously some topics were raised with all the groups while others were not. Furthermore it should be pointed out that, due to the open nature of the in-depth interviews, the grouping of interviewees' responses sometimes appears artificial, and some statements belong in more than one category.

Jewish Adolescents: Summary of Interviews with 15–18 Age Group

Characteristics of the Interviewees

Several groups were interviewed:

1) Secular veteran Israelis (veteran Israelis are also called 'Sabras,' meaning they were born in Israel).

Fourteen adolescents were interviewed, 8 boys and 6 girls.

Army: From the discussions it appears that all the adolescents with whom we spoke intend to serve in the army. Two of them, American citizens, even obtained Israeli citizenship in order to be able to do so. At present, all the adolescents in their crowd plan to enlist. Anyone who does not intend to serve in the army is embarrassed by his decision. A large segment of those interviewed are aware that in recent years there has been a change in attitude toward army service.

Work: Some of the interviewees who have finished school are working at odd jobs.

2) Olim (immigrants) from the FSU (Former Soviet Union).

Seven adolescents were interviewed, 4 boys and 3 girls.

Aliya (immigration to Israel): Apart from one girl, all those with whom we spoke made aliya in the 2000s. The girl made aliya in the mid-1990s.

Army: All those interviewed, both boys and girls, intend to serve in the army.

3) National religious

Eight adolescents were interviewed, 4 boys (one living in a settlement and three living in the city), and 4 girls (one living in a settlement, one living in a moshav, and two living in the city).

Army: All the boys intend to serve in the army. Two of the girls have not yet decided whether to serve in the army or do their *Sherut Leumi* (National Service) instead, because "you can help more people if you do *Sherut Leumi* than if you enlist in the army." 4) Adolescents in the periphery

Three interviewees, two of them Ethiopian. Army: All those interviewed intend to serve in the army.

Responses of Jewish Adolescents to Topics relating to State and Society

The chapter is in two parts: the first part relates to the interviewees' perceptions of and attitudes toward the State of Israel. The second part of the chapter relates to the interviewees themselves: their aspirations, how they spend their time, and so on.

Perceptions regarding the State

1. The political-security sphere

Among the national religious interviewees, the girls refrained from offering an assessment of this subject. Only the boys responded, all of them expressing negative assessments: "a State in crisis," "the situation is bad, a building freeze has been imposed in the territories." One criticism was directed at the leadership's weakness in the face of external pressure: "we're chickens; we don't stand up for our principles. If we want to go to war and the United States doesn't agree, we cave in."

The olim (immigrants) focused mainly on the security situation: one interviewee, who lives in Ashkelon, referred to the fear of dying from rocket fire. Some of them remembered the fear of terrorist incidents during the period when bombs were exploding on buses. Some of those interviewed expressed their hope for peace, although they did not believe it was possible.

2. Attitudes towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

and belief in the chances for peace

Nearly all the interviewees in every group expressed a lack of faith in the possibility of peace. The prevailing belief is that Israel must take a firm stand vis-á-vis the Palestinians, with no concessions or compromises. Some interviewees feel that at present Israel is making most of the concessions.

The perception that colors the attitudes of most secular Sabras is that the

Arabs want to destroy the Jews. They express distrust of Palestinians, maintaining that as regards peace it is up to the Palestinians to take the first step in order to prove they are serious, and that they (the Palestinians) are willing to pay a price for peace and ensure Israel's security. As previously stated, they have the sense that today Israel is courting the Palestinians, and they think the situation should be reversed. ("We're stronger, they have more problems, and there's no reason why we should be courting them"). As they see it, the State of Israel can continue to survive without peace.

The interviewees in the periphery took a similar approach. ("We must take a firm stand vis-á-vis the Palestinians, not grant any concessions whatsoever – not with Gilad Shalit and not with territory – and fight instead."). On the periphery, too, one of the interviewees said it is possible to continue living without peace.

The religious interviewees addressed the possibility of withdrawing from the territories. They alluded to the terrible mistake of the disengagement from Gush Katif, and gave it as the reason why it is forbidden to withdraw. It was clear from their words, however, that this is not the only reason why they oppose withdrawal. It appears that in any event they are opposed to withdrawal. None of the interviewees was willing to give back territory in exchange for peace. "Everybody wants peace, why must we give back territory?" One interviewee even said "I'm willing to give everything for peace, except for a piece of land!" The following explanations were given by the religious group for their unwillingness to give back territory:

- There's no chance of peace. If an agreement is reached, it won't hold. "No chance, both sides are at fault, so if a referendum is held I'll vote against it, because it won't hold." Another interviewee expressed it more sharply, "Their nationalism demands a holy war against us, and that's more powerful than anything else with them."
- The Arabs have many regions, so it is justifiable to annex the settlements without territorial exchange. "People who live in the cities don't notice how much space the Arabs have."
- "Peace must be in the interests of both parties, not just one side that is expected to pay for it. You don't give up something for peace; peace is something that is made mutually."

In order to attain peace, the religious interviewees suggested working together with the other side. "Peace is made together," or "I'm prepared to work with them for peace." One interviewee said "the way to do it is to encourage the Israeli Arabs."

The most blatant statement came from the immigrant interviewees, who said the conflict cannot be solved by democratic means.

3. Attitudes toward Arab citizens of Israel

In the main, attitudes toward Arab citizens of Israel range from mildly negative to extremely negative, whether from a sense of hostility on the part of the Arabs, a lack of familiarity, or ideological reasons. We will present these attitudes, beginning with the mildest negative attitude.

Secular Israeli-born interviewees believe that Israel, as a law abiding state, must grant full equal rights to Arab citizens of Israel.

For the olim, the concept of "Arab citizens of Israel" is more abstract. Only a few of the boys are acquainted with some, if any, Arabs. Regarding those Arabs whom they know personally, they say they are "okay," even though they feel threatened by most Arabs, either because they are Jewish or because of their Russian origins. Some of them recall that "during Operation Cast Lead Israeli Arabs called for death to the Jews."

Nevertheless, one of the immigrant girls referred to the economic plight of the Arabs, assuming that it was a reason for their resentment towards the State.

Interviewees in the periphery (two out of three) say the Arabs living in Israel should be banished. One of them said "there is no such thing as Israeli Arabs; it's either Arabs or Jews. They shouldn't be here."

The third interviewee said "they are to be pitied," and "she doesn't care if they stay in the country, but they should not be granted equality, they should not be related to. They should not be granted equal rights because they don't give us equal rights."

Among the religious¹⁹ as well, the opinions expressed were extremely negative, even including expressions such as "backstabbers," and "they must

^{19.} The question about attitudes toward Arabs in Israel was only posed to Jerusalem interviewees.

be got rid of." It would seem that friction with the Arabs and their conspicuousness during the interview (the voice of the muezzin could be heard) is a factor in this antagonism. As expected, the involvement of Arab citizens of Israel in terrorist acts fosters a negative attitude. One interviewee, who was in a bus that was attacked by an Arab-Israeli terrorist, described the repercussions of the incident as follows: "Once I regarded them in a positive light, and when I heard negative things I refuted them, but today I do not see them in a positive light and I try to see if there is a change for the better." The only non-negative opinion was patronizing, "if we unite with those (Arabs) who don't hate us, it will be good... The Arabs are aware that we are the source of their livelihood."

4. The social situation

Most of those interviewed addressed societal gaps and schisms. At the same time it would seem that some of the groups focused mainly on what is relevant to them.

On the other hand, interviewees in the periphery focused mainly on the gaps between olim (immigrants) and the veteran Israeli Sabras around them. Female interviewees said racism is evinced toward olim "but not much." Nevertheless, two of them said that, in addition to long-standing friends, they also have friends from Russia. In a similar vein, the olim spoke about the gaps between groups of various origins – Russian olim and Ethiopian olim – and differing social strata and economic status. Reference was also made to the distinction between Jewish and non-Jewish olim from the FSU, and the belief that non-Jewish olim from the FSU express anti-Semitic sentiments: they call the Jewish olim "zhid."

The religious interviewees focused primarily on the gaps between religious and secular and between Jews and Arabs: "Anything that can be split, splinters... everything sucks... everyone's to blame, including the leadership and ourselves"; "We have to unite"; "First we need peace within the Jewish people... then we can establish a better state."

The olim were not unanimous regarding how to deal with the economic gaps that were mentioned. One interviewee said that not enough is being done to narrow class disparities. In contrast, other interviewees referred to the subsidy the State provides for various services and National Insurance (Bituach Leumi) benefits. There were even those who claimed that some citizens exploit the State through their National Insurance benefits, and that state assistance lowers the motivation to work.

This subject was indirectly referred to by the secular Israeli Sabras when they expressed the hope that the status gap would diminish and the economy would improve.

5. Violence

In three of the four groups interviewed (olim, religious, and youth on the periphery), the subject of violence came up in connection with a discussion on the social situation in Israel:

The adolescent olim spoke of violence in school, although the girls stressed that they were more concerned about violence connected with social activities. They referred to rowdiness in class and the teachers' difficulty controlling the students: "In most classes 5% sit and listen while the others yell and do whatever they want, and disturb those who want to listen."

From this it appears that some of the violence stems from people's perceptions that "I'm entitled." In such cases, when the "entitled ones" don't get what they want, they resort to violence.

In response to the question on who is responsible for the violence, the adolescents in the periphery were in disagreement: one said that the youth are responsible, another claimed that the adults are responsible, while the third maintained that those who sell alcohol to young children (under the age of 12) are responsible.

The olim maintained that education plays an important part in preventing violence, but judging by results, the social system has failed. The olim feel that parents are equally responsible, "parents don't set boundaries; there is no respect."

The claims in the periphery are similar: all those interviewed agreed that young people do not respect their elders in general and their teachers in particular. One interviewee attributes it to the fact that education is too 'soft': "If I don't want to be expelled from school. I won't be insolent, but if I know that my place is secure, I'll be disrespectful." This argument was also raised

by the national-religious group, albeit less frequently. Most of them maintained that "we respect our teachers." The term "we" is used to distinguish them from secular adolescents, although one female interviewee said that disrespect for teachers is also a problem among the religious. Another interviewee also referred to the problem of alcohol consumption.

6. Education

Interviewees related to education on two levels: promoting values and the level of teaching.

As regards promoting values, the olim feel that school places great emphasis on achievements and less on values and broadening horizons. One interviewee said "the maps they show in class only show Israel and its neighbors."

As we saw above, all the groups complained about violence in schools. In the periphery, for example, they said, "not enough is invested in education," or "the educational system does not teach enough. Today information is available on the internet, the teacher must be an educator." Furthermore, in the periphery they blamed the media.

Regarding the level of teaching, the olim maintain that it is lower than in Russia. They were of the opinion that there are many ignoramuses in Israel. In Russia, Jewish families expect their children to be highly educated. They could not understand "how a child could be uneducated."

A considerable number of the religious interviewees, both boys and girls, spoke of the high demands of religious education, which resulted in drop-outs and the inability to pass matriculation examinations.

The secular interviewees also related to the quality of teaching, particularly with regard to the high threshold requirements for higher education: most of them are apprehensive about the psychometric exam and the level of grades needed for their studies. They hope to be accepted for advanced studies in Israel.

7. The economic situation

Among the religious group, there was great variance between positive assessments of Israel's economic situation and the sense that the situation is terrible. Those who said Israel's economic situation is bad offered several reasons: According to one, there is too much unemployment. Another interviewee said, "bureaucracy impedes activity and development." Nevertheless, another interviewee said, "I don't understand the economy but I know there will always be needy people. This is not right, but it is the way of the world."

The opposite view was put forward by one of the religious interviewees who said that "for a state that only came into being sixty years ago, we are an amazing country."

All those interviewed in the periphery maintained that the economic situation is bad, and there is a great deal of poverty and unemployment.

As previously mentioned, some of the olim felt that the State does not do enough to narrow the social gaps. On the other hand there was a perception that some citizens exploit state assistance in the form of money and National Insurance.

The secular interviewees only touched on the subject indirectly, mainly in that they felt that career-wise, young people can be more successful overseas than in Israel.

8. Culture

This topic was only raised with the olim.

The interviewees made a distinction between cultural consumption and cultural behavior. Regarding cultural behavior, there was severe criticism. As regards cultural consumption, one interviewee commended the fact that fringe-culture has its place in Israel, "even those who are not mainstream have their fringe culture. This is an advanced culture."

9. The media

This topic was only raised with religious interviewees and those in the periphery. The attitude of the religious group was clearly more negative than that of the adolescents in the periphery. The religious interviewees made various allegations against the media: incidental blame is directed against the media for the faulty education of the youth. Furthermore, when we discussed democracy with them, the interviewees said democracy "is destroying the State" and voiced complaints against the media and the Left regarding freedom of expression.

The interviewees also fear that the media contributes to the negative image of the national-religious community: "It bothers me that the media does not portray us well," or "the media depicts the national camp as fanatics." In contrast, although the attitude of interviewees in the periphery towards the media is realistic – one said that sometimes the media changes how things are presented in order "to capture the viewer's interest" – it appears that in general they have no complaints against the media.

10. Attitude to the IDF (Israel Defense Forces)

Overall, all the groups demonstrated a positive attitude toward the army. Most of them said they intend to enlist. Among the secular interviewees, two of them, American citizens, even obtained Israeli citizenship in order to serve in the army.

The religious interviewees glorify the IDF: "One of the strongest armies in the world!" But others do not like the fact that the IDF is subordinate to politicians. "It's a shame they must obey the leaders." A somewhat similar argument was put forward in the periphery. One interviewee said the soldiers are okay, but she pointed an accusing finger at commanders in the senior echelons.

One interviewee in the religious group said that "the IDF is doing holy work." The IDF generates a sense of security. Some referred to those who shirk their army service. "I'm sorry there are shirkers and that they try to influence others. Luckily there are people who are crazy about the army."

11. Attitude toward the State of Israel

Most of those interviewed are proud to live in Israel and love the country.

All the religious interviewees want to continue to live in Israel in the future, "I'm very proud of Israel. Little things like hikes in the Negev, even in the desert in the heat. I love seeing the country. I have great pride in Israel. We started from people who came out of hell and it's unbelievable what they have done here in sixty years."

Along with their pride in the State of Israel, the religious group is critical of the way the country is run. This is expressed in the specific topics described above, as well as in general remarks such as "I like living in Israel

but I don't like the way the country is run," or "I would like to see decent people heading the country."

All the Israeli-born interviewees have a strong Israeli identity and express a sense of pride in being Israelis, although those who served in the IDF mentioned that during stays abroad they felt they couldn't take pride in being Israeli. Their reasons were connected both with the negative image of Israelis because of how Israeli tourists conduct themselves overseas, and because of world censure of Israel due to the Israel-Palestine conflict and its repercussions.

In the periphery two of those interviewed – of Ethiopian origin – profess to be proud of Israel and happy their families made aliya. The third says "on the whole it's not bad."

Among the olim there are differences between boys and girls: all the boys said they are proud to be Israelis and that there is a Jewish state. One interviewee expressed his pride at Israel's contribution in world crises such as the recent crisis in Haiti. The girls, on the other hand, did not express any particular pride in being Israelis, "I'm not ashamed but there's nothing to be proud of." Overall, the responses on this topic make it clear that Israel's power of attraction increases when it is compared to other places.

12. The image of the State of Israel

The attitude towards the image of the State was on two levels: the image of Israel and the image of Israelis.

Regarding the image of Israel, most interviewees say that Israel has a negative image but they believe it is not justified. They had various reasons for this.

For example, Israel's negative image in the world ("they've turned us into Nazis and the Arabs into saints") was explained by one interviewee in the periphery as jealousy of the Jews.

The religious interviewees explain Israel's negative image regarding their conduct toward the Palestinians as anti-Semitism: "Everything they say about the Goldstone Report is only anti-Semitism, all the 'bleeding-heart' countries do the same but they only harp on us." At the same time, some members of the religious group said that Israel is perceived as a democratic country.

Among the olim group, and only among them, the argument was raised that Israel's negative image is partly justified. "It's true that we're not always okay," but the sanctions imposed on Israel are unjustified, "what's the connection between an educational evening with politics and boycotting [Israeli] academia?" On the other hand, the negative image of Israelis (on trips overseas) is regarded as justified: as previously mentioned, this topic was raised by secular Sabra interviewees who feel ashamed by it, and by female olim who believe this image is justified: Israelis "don't behave nicely."

13. The country's vision - Israel's values

Veteran Sabras:

Most of those interviewed positioned "democracy" in last place, and "Jewish majority" in first place.

Olim:

The girls were unanimous: "peace" was the most important value. The value rated second in importance was "democracy." The interviewees are aware of the importance of democracy and in this respect they compare Israel to its neighbors, particularly the Palestinian Authority, where there is no freedom of speech and "a distorted picture" is portrayed. The third value was "Greater Israel," and the fourth was "Jewish majority."

Periphery:

For all the interviewees the two most important values, in order, were "Greater Israel," and "Jewish majority." For two interviewees, "peace" was of least importance.

Religious:

All the girls and one boy ranked "Jewish majority" in first place. The others placed it second. As regards "democracy," 3 girls and 2 boys ranked it in third place, 2 boys ranked it in fourth place and one girl ranked it second, while murmuring, "with a Jewish majority, democracy is possible."

The two topics that came up in particular among the religious and olim

groups were religion and spirituality, and the attitude towards the sector to which these groups belong.

14. Religion and spirituality

The religious group expressed the belief that secular life is lacking in spirituality, "there is not enough spirituality in Israel!" They reject the secular quest for spirituality. They made remarks like, "All the spiritual issues of secular people are bullshit." "Only our spirituality is interesting, we have what we believe in and we don't need to search for anything else. Our truth sustains us and we don't need to look for substitutes."

In this context it should be mentioned that one of the secular interviewees said he attends Torah classes with his father.

The olim related to religion in the context of their identity. Two of the boys described themselves as Jews, but do not believe in religion. One interviewee was a Reform Jew.

None of the female olim evinced a connection to Judaism. Some of them expressed the opinion that religions fulfill mankind's psychological needs or economic interests, "they invented God." Only one of the olim interviewees said she believes in God. Another said she "believes in some kind of power," but she doesn't believe in God. She believes in reincarnation. The third girl believes in mysticism: astrology, numerology, and so on.

15. Attitude toward religious people

Nearly all the religious interviewees expressed their belief that criticism of the religious sector is unwarranted and they are being maligned, "they're always coming down on us." As previously mentioned, the interviewees attribute the creation/perpetuation of this stereotype to the media. "There is a sense that they make generalizations about the *haredim* (ultra-Orthodox) and apply them to religious people or right-wing fanatics, or else they label the entire national-religious sector as *mitnachlim* (settlers). There are also religious people in Jerusalem and in the north and south of the country. '*Mitnachel*' has become a derogatory nickname that is applied to us all. As a settler it hurts me that one sector is singled out like that. This is a community that cares about the country, and it's terrible that they are being singled out."

It is also clear from these remarks that they object to the unfavorable stereotype of the settlers.

However, all those who alluded to this also said they are handling it successfully. "I know who and what I am, and I don't fit their definitions." One interviewer also said that in her opinion the discrimination abated after Operation Cast Lead.

The issue of a group-stereotype was also raised among the olim.

16. Attitude towards the stereotype of olim

All the olim mentioned that olim are stereotyped as alcoholics. Although they do not deny that most olim [from the FSU] drink, they do not relate to them as alcoholics. "The culture of drinking goes back three hundred years. They say a Russian knows how much he can drink and doesn't get drunk, Israelis get drunk quickly." On the other hand, one interviewee pointed out that, "Russian olim raised the standard of employment and improved Israel's educational and academic standing."

Responses of Jewish Adolescent Interviewees on Personal Issues **1. Where they see themselves in the future**

In general it appears that most of the Jewish interviewees see their future in Israel, despite the fact that several of them assume that living overseas is better or easier. This gives rise to the feeling that some interviewees are conflicted between their sense of belonging to the country and their personal aspirations.

All the secular Sabra interviewees said they see their future in Israel. They hope to be accepted to institutes of higher learning in Israel, although they feel threatened by the psychometric exam and the criteria for acceptance to classes that are in demand. Nevertheless, two secular interviewees said they believe they would be more successful abroad. Their reasons were different: one said that in Israel everyone is successful so there is more competition. The other one said that "in places like the United States everything is large, so you can succeed on a larger scale. In Israel everything is small, including success."

A similar sentiment was expressed by the olim. Although some of them see their future in Israel, others said they see their future overseas, because there are more opportunities for advancement, even though they pointed out that things are good in Israel. For example, one interviewee thinks all Jews should live in Israel, but his dream is to be a wrestler in the United States or Canada. Another interviewee in the olim group said she has difficulty relating to Eastern culture and prefers the European culture. All the interviewees in the periphery want to live in Israel, but one said she wants to get to know other countries.

The religious interviewees were the only ones who expressed love for Israel and a boundless desire to live there in the future. For some interviewees the desire to live in Israel goes along with a wish to contribute to the country. "I want to live in Israel, a place where I'm needed."

2. Aspirations

The two main aspirations of the interviewees are to have a successful career (from the point of view of money and social status) and to have their own family. For some groups, being socially established appears to come before creating a family. The secular interviewees alluded to this, but it was the female olim who stated it explicitly: they want to study and become financially established before creating a family. One of them said that it is nevertheless important for her to be a young mother, say at the age of 27. When asked whether 27 was young to become a mother, she replied in the affirmative.

All those interviewed in the periphery want to create a family. One pointed out that she doesn't want a family too soon. Only one said she doesn't know whether she wants to learn a profession. Another wants to be a psychologist. The third wants to study and travel.

As regards the present, the secular interviewees discussed their wish to be involved in a relationship. The boys said that while they are in high school they don't want a serious relationship, but once they are in the army they want a steady girlfriend who will be there when they come home on leave.

3. Types of recreational activities

While adolescents in all sectors appear to engage in similar social activities – such as hanging out with friends, going to cafés and restaurants, and surfing Facebook – the groups differ from one another in the time spent in each activity, and also, it would seem, in the content of their get-togethers.

Getting together with friends:

The secular interviewees meet their friends in cafés and restaurants, and parties in nightclubs or homes. The conversation is usually about the opposite sex.

The olim also meet with friends on the weekend either at home or outside of the home. Sometimes they go to pubs and nightclubs. Two of the interviewees belong to a youth movement or belonged to a youth movement in the past.

Among the religious group, most of the interviewees meet their friends in the youth movement that all but two attend. Those who do not belong to a youth movement spend their time in various group activities. Going out with family members and friends (to restaurants and cafés) is a popular pastime. When they meet at home, they usually listen to music, play musical instruments, and so on.

Those interviewed in the periphery also belong to youth movements (2 out of 3). They usually meet their friends in cafés or in the park.

Mass media:

All the secular interviewees spend considerable time on internet social networks, particularly Facebook. They watch hardly any television.

The olim also spend a large portion of their time on the internet, at least during the week. They play games and contact their friends on Facebook. Some said they surf less than one hour each day, but others said they are "addicted" and even surf during classes at school, using their mobile phones. Only one said he spends a great deal of time watching television.

In connection with mass media even the religious interviewees said that the internet has taken the place of television. There are differences of opinion regarding social networks and Facebook in particular: some think it is "nonsense" and in the best of cases it is "a waste of time," while others like to use it to find out "what's happening," but even they don't spend much time surfing the site. Most of them are of the opinion that face-to-face encounters are far preferable to superficial contact through Facebook. One interviewee in the periphery spends 3 hours on Facebook every day, yet she also watches television.

Books:

The secular interviewees say they don't read books. A few members of the religious group read books.

Sport:

The secular, religious, and olim groups all work out in gyms or engage in other sports activity.

4. Political and societal involvement

Political involvement and / or interest in politics:

All of those interviewed claimed to be uninvolved in politics. The secular adolescents said that they do not discuss politics when they meet socially. Nevertheless, several interviewees mentioned that when they were overseas with friends they talked a great deal about politics and society. When asked "why particularly when you were overseas?" they had no reply ("that's just how it was"). Perhaps the encounter with a different culture emphasized the unique characteristics of Israeli society. It is also possible that the way Israel and Israelis are perceived overseas (as referred to in the above interviews) raised the need to discuss these issues. Or perhaps they were homesick.

A recurring theme in most of the groups is their negative attitude to politicians: the religious group spoke of them scathingly, making remarks such as: "the leaders care about themselves rather than caring for the needy"; "the Knesset is like a kindergarten, with bribery and so on. You never know what they're going to discover about each Knesset member and prime minister, you can't believe any Knesset members"; "it's disgusting to see how the ministers and the prime minister fight among themselves." Two interviewees in the periphery expressed an extremely negative attitude to

politicians, "they're all shit!"; "they deal in money, bribery, instead of what's needed. Instead of investing in the country they invest in cars."

Among the olim, one interviewee said: "All those in the Knesset – their time is up. They don't know how to run the country." In this group there are differences between boys and girls. The boys take an interest in what is happening in the country, but the girls, except for one, do not show any interest in politics. Quite the reverse, their refusal to be involved in politics is deliberate. Perhaps the negative image of politicians has had an effect on their political involvement.

Some of the members of the religious group, both boys and girls, said they take an interest in the news.

In the periphery, the attitude to politics was ambivalent. Two interviewees say they watch the news, but one of them said she is actually not interested in politics. The third said that politics does not interest her, but maybe in the future she will decide to enter politics.

Volunteer work:

The only interviewees who volunteer are the national-religious group and those in the periphery.

All the religious interviewees engage in volunteer activities through their school (the school urges them to engage in individual volunteer activities) or through the youth movement (collecting donations for the needy, volunteer activities with autistic children and adults, working in homes for the aged, helping children from abroad prepare for the Bible Contest, and more). Among the group in the periphery, too, at least one volunteers through her school.

By contrast, the secular and immigrant interviewees say they have no time for volunteer activities. One immigrant interviewee was even opposed in principle to volunteering, saying she prefers to work and earn money. Secular interviewees who were in youth movements regarded their movement activities as volunteerism. However they all expressed their willingness to engage in volunteer activities in the future.

Some of the olim say they might be prepared to volunteer now, but they don't initiate it. They need someone to approach them and get them going.

Environmental protection:

Most of those interviewed were aware of environmental protection but apart from the religious interviewees, most of them are not involved in public activities except on a personal level in their immediate environment.

One of the immigrant interviewees referred to the public service broadcasts aimed at raising awareness of the issue, but he maintained that they are only temporarily effective and other, more effective steps must be taken.

Among the religious group, two boys and three girls are also engaged in public service activities (clearing the Lifta area in Jerusalem, removing garbage around the Kinneret, planting on Tu B'Shvat, rounding up and taking care of pets without owners, and more). The settler interviewee also said that a system of watering the garden with waste water has been installed in her home.

Interviewees in the periphery are apparently unaware of environmental issues. One of them says her mother saves grocery bags, but she herself is not involved in environmental protection activities.

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Young Jewish Adults: Summary of Interviews with the 21–24 Age Group

Characteristics of the Interviewees

Interviews were conducted among several groups:

1) Secular Israeli-born Sabras:

- Ten men and six women aged between 21 and 24 were interviewed. All of them live in the center of the country.
- Army: All the interviewees have completed full army service.

Work: All the interviewees are working, most of them at odd jobs or in junior positions.

Political leanings: 10 right-wing, 6 center.

2) Olim from the FSU (Former Soviet Union):

Six young adults were interviewed, 3 men and 3 women.

Aliya: Three of those interviewed made aliya between 1990 and 1995, two of them made aliya between 1995 and 1999; and 1 made aliya in 2006.

Army: All those interviewed have served in the army apart from 1 who made aliya at a more advanced age.

None of the men served in combat units. One interviewee was an Atuda'i (student whose military service has been deferred and approved by the army because he is studying a needed profession) and now works in the regular army. One served with the Intelligence Corps.

Political Leanings: The interviewees' positions range from the center to extreme right-wing.

3) National religious:

Four men and 4 women were interviewed.

Army: Of the women, two did their *Sherut Leumi*, one of them spending part of the time in Montreal. The other two served in the army, one in the national police force and later in the military defender's office.

All the men served in the army. One is an officer in a Nahal brigade (Bnei Akiva group), another has served three full years as a combat soldier, and the other two served in the regular army, one as a combat soldier and the other in the military defender's office.

4) Young adults in the periphery:

Three women and one man were interviewed.

Army: Two of the women did *Sherut Leumi*, the third served in the army. The man did not want to serve in the army.

Responses of Young Jewish Adults to Topics relating to State and Society

Perceptions regarding the State

1) The political-security sphere

Interviewees in two sectors considered the security issue to be a grave, central problem: the national religious group and the olim.

The religious group addressed not only the direct effects of the security situation but also how it indirectly affects most aspects of life in Israel. They claim that the security situation has an adverse affect on morale, inflicts stress on the population, and affects their interpersonal behavior (it also affects drivers on the roads). One interviewee said that investing most of the government budget on security means that other problems are prolonged: "[if less of the budget was invested in security it would be easier to] solve problems of education, infrastructure, sport... narrowing gaps."

The interviewees do not believe there will be any change from the security point of view. They feel that for every problem solved, others will come in its place: "The situation remains the same. It just moves from north to south or from the south to the north"; "there will be other, more serious, problems." One interviewee expressed the opinion that those who lead the country are not planning enough for the future in all spheres, but are working "to put out fires". In fact there is an overall lack of faith in today's leaders: "the same people will remain, they just switch parties"; "the leadership is trying to appease the United States and is less concerned with the country's interests."

The olim addressed the disturbing influence of the security situation on their lives ("this is not the quietest country, it will never be quiet. That bothers me a lot"). They criticize the political and information echelons, but express great faith in the IDF. Furthermore, as detailed below, the olim also refer to the indirect effect of the security situation on the societal situation,

referring to the tension between different sectors of society as the result of the "struggle for survival".

2) Attitudes toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and belief in the chances for peace

Like the adolescents, this group does not have much faith in the chances for peace. Most of those interviewed blame the other side for their low expectations that the conflict will be resolved (the Palestinians or Arab states that "don't want them").

According to the religious group, as formerly mentioned, "ten years from now, the newspaper headlines will still be the same..." Interviewees in the periphery compare peace to a fantasy or the Messiah – a nice but unattainable idea. They say that they and the Israeli public are disillusioned. One interviewee in the religious-national camp said that although he believes that the Palestinians too want to lead normal lives, the situation has deteriorated to the point of no return.

Among the olim, one interviewee said the conflict is thousands of years old and he doesn't see any solution, "so long as the State of Israel is here, surrounded by Arab countries – there will always be a problem." Even the peace with Egypt is founded on economic interests, so it is impossible to fully rely on it.

In the secular group, even those who define themselves as "politically in the Center" do not believe in the chances for peace, both because there is no partner for peace and because it is difficult for Israel to depend on a peace treaty that entails relinquishing territory.

At the same time, most interviewees in the various groups do not support making concessions in the peace process, although different groups had different reasons: lack of trust in the other side, experience of the past (the Disengagement) and ideological reasons (Greater Israel).

A large segment of the secular interviewees said that withdrawal from Judea and Samaria, even under the aegis of a peace treaty, is liable to jeopardize the security of the State of Israel. Therefore, they believe, any peace agreement must include guarantees of the country's safety, although they could not give details about these kinds of guarantees.

Those in the periphery are opposed to relinquishing territory because this method has not proved itself, as can be seen by the outcome of the Disengagement.

The religious interviewees believe that rather than make territorial concessions in the framework of a peace treaty, a firm stand should be taken; apart from their distrust of the Palestinians, "we gave them a thousand and one opportunities and each time they were the ones who messed up!" There is a sense that more is demanded of Israel and less from the Palestinians. One religious interviewee said she is in favor of two states for two nations, but she does not believe the Palestinians will honor the peace treaty. Paradoxically, she is opposed to demilitarizing the Palestinian state "so we can fight them properly." The religious interviewees are essentially unwilling to make territorial concessions. One of them said, "I believe we can attain true peace even if we don't give back territories. They can live among us, in Jerusalem, in the Jordan valley, in the territories and so on." They are also strongly opposed to dividing Jerusalem.

It would seem that there are also differences of opinion between interviewees in the various groups regarding the solution to the conflict and the ultimate purpose of discussions with the Palestinians. One religious interviewee said, "peace is a situation of quiet, when we're not fighting," and added that the prevailing situation with Syria is one of peace, "that's enough for me." Some interviewees in the periphery espouse the principle of "separation of military forces" and believe this situation can continue for many years.

One religious interviewee, believes a Palestinian state already exists, "they have representation, there is an army – Fatah – and they have a government and ministers. They aren't running it. It's a disgrace. Should it be given the seal of approval? That won't change anything." A particularly extreme position was taken by another religious interviewee who said, "The question arises from the assumption that we want to live with the Palestinians. No. We want them to live in their own countries, and we will live here!" This interviewee said he might agree to a peace treaty, but only post factum, in order to prevent war and save lives, but it (a temporary agreement) is not ideal.

None of the FSU olim agree with the proposed peace treaty,²⁰ and in their opinion the Palestinians will not agree to it either. One interviewee said the Palestinians will not accept the peace treaty because, "if the borders are closed they will have no livelihood."

The interviewees' main objection concerned the division of Jerusalem. "Why must it be divided? Who has the right to divide Jerusalem if it's historically ours?" Some of them also objected to giving back territory and diminishing Greater Israel, "if we cut back there will be nothing left." Reading between the lines it seems this is the first time their parents feel they are proprietors or landlords of the Jewish State, and they have passed on this worldview to their children. If you are a landlord, you do not relinquish ownership. Even if they live elsewhere, in Canada or a European country, they will have a sense of ownership regarding the State of Israel.

The interviewee who said that peace is the most important value, says he is only referring to "true peace."

3) Attitudes toward Arab citizens of Israel

Attitudes toward Arab citizens of Israel range mainly from total distrust to "respect him but suspect him."

Like those in the younger group, secular interviewees explicitly believe that Israel, as a law abiding state, must grant full equal rights to Arabs in Israel. It should be mentioned that the secular group feels that the attitude of Israeli Arabs toward the State of Israel has improved (Arabs express less animosity and hostility toward Israel). At the same time, there is a latent

^{20.} Interviewees could choose their position regarding a virtual peace treaty based on the following principles: Alternative #1: Israel is the state of the Jewish people and Palestine is the state of the Palestinian people. Palestinian refugees have the right to return to the Palestinian state. The Palestinian state will be demilitarized, with no army. The borders will be based on the 1967 lines, including equal exchange of territories, while taking into account Israel's security needs and preserving large settlement blocs under Israeli sovereignty. Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem will remain under Israeli sovereignty while Arab neighborhoods will be under Palestinian sovereignty. The Old City within the walls will be without sovereignty and will be administered jointly by the United States, Israel, and the Palestinians. The holy sites will remain under the same religious jurisdiction that exists today (for example: Israel will supervise and be responsible for the Western Wall). Alternative #2: A binational state extending from the Jordan River to the sea where Palestinian refugees have the right of return.

sense that they are suspicious of Arabs, and one interviewee expressed the fear that the Arabs in the Galilee region will demand national rights and seek autonomy.

In some cases, it was clear that there is a connection between familiarity with Arabs and attitudes toward Arabs. For example, the olim interviewees tend to think that "our" Arabs, meaning Arabs they are acquainted with, are nice, but "all the Arabs" are much less so. "The Arab girls I worked with are sweet... [other] Arabs pretend, they smile but they hate us." In certain cases, however, it seemed that even personal acquaintance with Arabs does not make much difference. A religious interviewee said she works closely with Arabs and doesn't trust them. As far as she is concerned there is no difference between Arabs in Israel and Palestinian Arabs. In fact, it appears that she still thinks most Arabs are terrorists and murderers and they should not be granted equal rights with Jews. The statements can be interpreted to mean that even when the attitude toward Arabs undergoes a change upon closer acquaintance with them, it only changes toward those Arabs with whom interviewees are in direct contact and does not apply to the sector as a whole. For example, one interviewee in the periphery said there is a lack of justice regarding Arabs, "if an Arab comes here maybe nothing will happen to him, but then again someone may jump on him suddenly," and that the Arabs he knows are helpful and giving even though he is a Jew. At the same time, he does not believe the conflict between the two peoples will ever be resolved.

Most of the interviewees blame the Arabs for the conflict between Arab citizens of Israel and Jewish Israelis.

Most of those interviewed in the periphery express distrust of the Arabs in Israel, although "there are extremists on both sides." They feel that the Arab population is taught to hate Jews. Among the religious group as well, one interviewee said he "doesn't trust them at all. I keep my distance in case there is the slightest chance of getting a knife in my back... I would move them out of Israel." He went on to say: "Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me!"

Some of the religious interviewees spoke of practical terms. They want to maintain the status quo, "the situation they are in right now is okay"; "as long

as they don't make trouble, if they are loyal to the State, there is no problem." Again, unexpressed distrust can be sensed in the last remark. The corollary to this, that they are not all loyal to the state, is expressed in the sentence, "the problem is that there are those in the Knesset who speak out against the state." In this context, some interviewees make a distinction between the general Arab public and the Druze, saying, "I don't have any problem with the Druze."

Some of the religious interviewees distinguish between rationality and emotion when relating to Arabs. Intellectually they realize that Arabs can be trusted, but at the same time on the emotional level they find it hard to trust them completely. One interviewee said, "I don't like them... I don't mind if they're here [in Israel], but not close to me." She also had difficulty with Arab culture, "modern Arabs – I accept them. But it's unpleasant to see clans (extended family groups) in hospitals... most of them are primitive." Religious interviewees say they feel the Arabs should contribute to the State, though not by enlisting in the army.

One of the religious interviewees said that at the yeshiva where he studied there were many Arab workers who were very loyal to the yeshiva and "loved us." He did not believe that every Arab wants to kill him. His point of view was markedly different from that of the other religious interviewees and more closely approximated that of the Sabra secular interviewees who felt that the Arabs should be fully integrated, both socially and with regards to employment, because after all they were here when the Jews arrived in the land. He said, "I don't accept them post factum but to begin with." He thinks Arab nationalism emerged because Israeli society was not wise enough to assimilate them, "we made a historic mistake and now there is Arab ultra-nationalism." The interviewee drew an interesting parallel between Arabs in Israel and the religious sector: he does not agree that whatever an Arab does should be attributed to his temperament or his religion, "it's like when I do something, they say 'it's because he's religious'. I don't like it."

4) The social situation

All the interviewees addressed the social-societal situation in Israel. They all referred to the alienation between various sectors in society, and some also related to socio-economic gaps.

The olim painted a picture of a violent, divided society and unwarranted hatred. Some of them attributed it to the security situation: "when a society is living in a war it is not united. The more you fight for your existence the more violent you become." At the same time it appears that among some of those interviewed, the relationship between olim and Sabras is considered to be good, "I have no problem relating to people who aren't Russian. The Sabras are also willing to associate with us."

Regarding the estrangement between olim and Sabras, the secular interviewees spoke mainly about Ethiopian olim and not about FSU olim (perhaps because there are greater inter-cultural differences between Sabras and Ethiopians than there are between Sabras and FSU olim). It should be mentioned that few of them had been friends with FSU olim, and none of them had been friends with Ethiopian olim before they enlisted in the IDF, but friendships were forged in the army both with FSU olim and olim from Ethiopia.

With regards to the integration of olim into society, it appears that on the one hand, the Sabra interviewees blame the olim for the alienation between Sabras and olim, pointing to the isolationism of FSU and Ethiopian olim. As regards those of Ethiopian origin, on the other hand, when asked how they feel about integrating olim equally in education and the labor market, it emerged that they believe it is too early to integrate them because they are at a far lower level and liable to hold back the Sabras – even though they say that ideally it would be preferable to integrate them.

Most of the religious interviewees also referred to the polarization and the tensions between Sephardim and Ashkenazim, religious and secular, olim and Sabras, "they all hate each other," "there are too many factions, [and] too many parties, each one thinks he is right." One religious interviewee thinks the gaps are caused mainly by the media. Apparently, despite the desire to resolve differences and the attempts at reconciliation, there is still not enough familiarity and understanding. On the other hand, one interviewee pointed out that the country is "warm" and provides a sense of "togetherness," saying that religious people are not discriminated against in Israel.

Support for this position came from the secular interviewees, who expressed a positive attitude towards the national-religious sector. Secular

interviewees feel that religious youth are the salt of the earth (presumably they encountered them and forged ties with them in the army). At the same time, they are greatly disturbed by the tension between the *haredim* and the secular, and by attempts of the *haredim* to dictate their way of life.

As regards the gaps between social classes, some religious interviewees said the State does not invest enough in reducing the disparities, "some private bodies try, but the State should help more." One interviewee mentioned the imbalance that existed in the past between different social classes: the various waves of immigration, particularly from Middle Eastern countries, "they stuck them in *ma'abarot* (transit camps) and then in development towns, with no concern for their integration into society." In her opinion, this trend still continues today, although she feels there has been some improvement. The exception was one religious interviewee who stated explicitly that she believes that equal opportunity exists: "Each and every person can succeed and advance in whatever he or she wants."

In the periphery, too, the prevailing opinion is that the State does not invest enough in reducing the gaps, particularly in the periphery. Interviewees mentioned the assistance provided by the societal organizations, saying "the weaker [underprivileged] people are losing faith in the government, they believe in helping one another." Three interviewees in the periphery hinted at corruption in the government and also stated plainly that "the financial and governmental oligarchies watch each others' backs," and the government causes the "rich to get richer and the poor to get poorer," or "doesn't encourage small businesses." Nevertheless, one interviewee said "people should be encouraged to go out to work, rather than [signing on for] unemployment."

In general terms (capitalism – socialism) – 11 of the secular interviewees defined their world view as capitalistic, while 5 said they tend towards socialism. When asked to describe their world view in operational terms, however, it transpired that they all range between capitalism and socialism. All the interviewees feel the State should provide basic services such as minimal food to all its citizens, and also be responsible for health care and education. Some of them even expected higher education to be significantly subsidized. Most of them feel that strikes should be allowed. On the other

hand, the majority are in favor of privatization, although it should be selective and not all-inclusive.

Among the religious group, two of them uphold a socialist world view. One says everyone must make an effort to support themselves, but the State should take care of those who have difficulties. She would like the entire country to operate like a kibbutz, "the work ethic has disappeared. Everyone in the country wants to make money. In the kibbutz they educate toward work, not easy money." Another wants to see complete equality in Israel. Other religious interviewees spoke of equal opportunities but are not in favor of a welfare state, "in the long run anyone who works hard and earns money should enjoy his earnings. This doesn't mean they should pay a lot of income tax," or: "why should I care if the rich have more, it need not be at someone else's expense." There is a sense that anyone who earns less works less and doesn't work as hard. One interviewee gave the example of a friend's father who does not go out to work because he receives more money from the National Insurance.

The religious interviewees also related to the future of the country from the societal aspects, but their perceptions were mixed. Some of them were optimistic, saying that the situation of Israeli society has improved. One of them made a favorable comparison between the attitude toward olim today and the attitude toward her grandparents (of Mizrahi origin) when they made aliya, while another spoke of the unity of the people, and of social welfare organizations that make up for shortcomings of the leadership. Only one of the religious interviewees expressed a contradictory opinion: she thinks many people have left the country, and "the society will deteriorate. The reason is that those who lead the country don't know how to manage it."

5) Violence

All those interviewed in the periphery said the problem of violence is growing in severity, either because young people are bored and indifferent, or because of the indifference of the authorities and the police. One interviewee described two occasions when she appealed to the police but did not receive an appropriate response. Another interviewee says the authorities do not invest enough in the youth, instead they divert resources to projects aimed at

improving the appearance of the city. All those interviewed in the periphery agree that the youth have a drinking problem that leads them to violence.

6) Education and culture

Like those in the adolescent group, the young adults approach the topic of education from two angles: cultural values and schooling.

The olim focus on the low level of education. The interviewees claimed that "in the republic we came from, education is on a far higher level than in Israel." However, when discussing higher education, they said the requirements of the higher education system are too stringent, "wherever you want to study, a high psychometric examination result is required!" With regard to values, the olim compare Israeli culture to Russian culture, where they are taught "not to talk back to adults." One interviewee said, "there's no need to hit [the students], but one must educate somehow."

Ironically, some of those in the other groups regard the FSU olim as having no educational values. One interviewee in the periphery claimed that the composition of the population, specifically the increase in olim, is holding back the development of the country. An interviewee in the national-religious sector said that education is not at its best, "the generation that has grown up is not sufficiently well-bred. It has been taught to care only about itself." Another interviewee in the religious sector says the decline in the attitude toward authority figures like teachers can be attributed to Russian culture.

Apparently this interviewee's claim encompasses all groups that are not affiliated with his. He maintained that the deterioration in values began because of the "less cultured" Middle Eastern culture. Specifically, the source of every serious problem can be traced to the fact that originally there was only a homogenous group of Europeans in the country. In the wake of the waves of aliya that brought people from "uncultured" cultures, values deteriorated and corruption "permeated every level." According to this interviewee, Ashkenazi society has not learned to assimilate other cultures.

It can be seen from the words of the religious interviewees that they mainly link education to social gaps, but they disagree on the question of cause and effect: some regard educational problems as the result of social gaps, while others see them as the cause.

All those interviewed in the periphery agree that the problem "begins at home": there are no values, the parents do not support the educational system. However, the interviewees disagree on the value of the educational system: two of those interviewed say the schools are good (according to one, this is particularly due to investment in the periphery) and "whoever wants to study will succeed," but the children are not motivated to study. Another interviewee says she attended a private school "because of the upbringing and educational level there."

An interviewee in the religious sector referred to the low budgetary allocation for education, saying that were if so many resources were not invested in security, education in Israel would be better.

7) Consumer culture

The olim maintain that Israelis do not read or enjoy classical music, instead they absorb most of their culture from television ("before 'Born to Dance' there was no awareness of dance"). It comes from their parents. Television controls culture to a great extent, people absorb culture and knowledge mainly from television (they are so hooked on the media that they don't notice how the media influences them). However it does not appear to bother them. As regards culture, the olim feel they are in a cultural ghetto.

8) The economic situation

Among the olim, it should be pointed out that most of the girls did not know or were not prepared to evaluate the economic situation. Even when they gave an assessment, it was only in general terms, such as: "I don't see any problems"; "it's not critical, there's something to aim for." The boys' evaluation was fairly positive. The perception is that Israeli companies are strong and contribute to the strength of the country. Our problem is that the (small) size obscures the quality. The olim express the feeling that the country is successful and therefore Israeli companies are strong, "there are wonderful things in the Israeli health system that America doesn't have. We're better than anyone else in agriculture and electronics."

The secular interviewees emphasized that the country is weak in the low-tech sphere, and they expect that in another few years it will also weaken in the sphere of hi-tech, not because Israel's performance and success have deteriorated, but because Israel is losing its qualitative edge. In other words, productivity (of East Asian countries such as China and India) will surpass quality. While it is true that Israel has a higher proportion of professionals and experts than other countries, in their opinion, the other countries will ultimately be more successful. Nevertheless, the secular interviewees do not feel that the economic threat poses an existential threat to the country. However, in the economic sphere as well, the secular interviewees level criticism at the leadership. They feel that the leadership depends too heavily on resourcefulness and skills, and does not plan ahead but improvises, "they're living in a mess, there is no orderliness, they develop technologies but there is no order."

One of the religious interviewees referred to the consumer culture, saying that many people are influenced by Western consumer culture, "many have the American dream, to aspire to as much as possible." However, "there are people who are satisfied with less."

9) The media

Most of those interviewed regarded the media as a destructive force, but the reasons for the negative attitude to the media are different for each group. As far as the olim are concerned, for example, the great drawback of the media (television) is its unshakeable control over Israel's consumer culture.

The main complaint among interviewees in the periphery and among the religious interviewees is that the media suffers from lack of objectivity and present distorted data. According to the religious group, the media highlight some incidents and downplay others, depending on the viewpoint of media personalities and consideration for the ratings. For instance, one religious interviewee mentioned how 'quick' the media are to slander people, and gave as an example incidents where those suspected of committing a crime are dealt with as if they were already convicted. In the event that they are acquitted, "they mention it in small print on the back page." According to one of the religious interviewees, the media are even responsible for the large

gaps in society. This opinion was supported by another interviewee in the religious sector, who said with regard to the issue of military dissension, "if a religious soldier refuses to follow orders the media jump on it, but they don't mention it with secular soldiers!" One religious interviewee maintained that in this regard "Israel Today" is an exception newspaper, because even though it is "Bibi's" paper, it attempts to present a variety of opinions.

Interviewees in the periphery also claimed that the media are biased. One interviewee in particular severely attacked the media, calling them Left-wing, anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist.

Another issue that was raised in connection with the media was the conflict between freedom of speech and the welfare of the State. The religious group felt there was "no need to tell" when dealing with subjects that are classified from the security aspect. One interviewee said that sometimes freedom of expression in the media comes at the expense of "political moves," meaning the good of the country.

Only one of the religious interviewees thinks the media enjoy a suitable degree of freedom of expression, although he prefers not to be connected to radio, television, or internet.

10) Attitude to the IDF

The olim have great faith in the IDF. When asked about their experiences while in the military, some felt it was positive, but one interviewee said the army is hard and unrewarding work. He wanted to serve in a combat unit but he is an only son, and since his parents only signed a release form after he had already been in the army, for a few months he instead served as a graphic artist in military headquarters. He regrets spending the time when he could have been studying, "they were three wasted years."

Among the religious group, everyone was very pleased to serve. Military service adds something to a person, it consolidates his point of view, and it raises many questions about himself and the conduct of the State.

Furthermore, the religious group discussed the topic of military dissension at great length: most of those interviewed feel there is no room for refusing orders in the army. On the other hand, the interviewees lay the blame for dissension on the army system, both as regards the issuance of orders and

how dissension is handled and punished. One interviewee said the army should exercise discretion regarding the orders; are they legitimate orders and are they giving the orders to the right soldiers? For example, "they shouldn't tell a group of yeshiva students to evacuate [settlements]. They should circumvent the problem." Additionally, one interviewee (who claims that there is no room for dissension in the system) said he refused three times to follow orders, and the army "swept it under the rug." In other words, although everyone must follow the dictates of his conscience, the army, as a system, cannot accept this. Another interviewee said "it is legitimate to refuse orders when the order is not legitimate." Regarding the issue of refusing to evacuate settlements vis-á-vis refusal to serve in the territories, some interviewees said there is no difference between *halacha* (Jewish religious law) and conscience, "if religious people have the right to dissent, so can secular people." Only one interviewee said he does not regard halachik prohibitions as equivalent to conscience.

11) Attitude toward the State of Israel

Apart from the olim, most interviewees see their future in Israel. All the secular interviewees want to travel abroad (to have fun, work for a short time, or study), but eventually they all want to return to Israel. Their reasons were: Hebrew language, friends, and Israeli culture. Israel is regarded as a warm, friendly country. According to one secular interviewee, "this is home. It's nice to travel but we'll feel like outsiders anywhere else." The interviewees feel that Israel is where they can fulfill their professional and personal aspirations.

Interestingly, there is an inverse relationship between quality of life in Israel and the desire to live in Israel regarding the olim and religious interviewees: in other words, all the religious interviewees see themselves living in Israel even though they all said it is hard to live here. A completely opposite picture emerges from the olim: even though they all say it is good to live in Israel (remarks such as "I feel at home here" were frequent), most of them do not see their future in Israel. Canada is the most popular alternative.

FSU olim offer several reasons for leaving Israel: some are reasons of expediency, "salaries are low"; "there are work opportunities in Canada, it's

also easier to buy a house, here it's almost impossible... if they'd give me better conditions of course I'd stay in Israel." Other reasons are education and culture: level of education, low culture, and the fear that their children will be harmed by violence. There is a sense that the difficult absorption experiences, particularly the way the newcomers are harassed by the Sabras in school, continues to haunt the interviewees who say "I can't forget it and I'll always be afraid my children will also suffer from it, even though the situation has changed." Another factor, of course, is the security situation.

It is also clear that most of the olim interviewees have no basic connection to Israel and they believe that everyone (including Jews) should live wherever is best for them. Moreover, despite the difficult absorption experiences, they saw that it was possible to acclimate relatively quickly, so they are not worried about further moves.

12) Pride in the State of Israel

Three of the four interviewees in the periphery said they are very proud of the country. The fourth said he is proud of the land, the territory, but not of the State: "I like the people, but not the government."

Only some of the religious interviewees expressed wholehearted pride in the State of Israel and said they are also **not** ashamed. They do not express unmitigated pride. Even the interviewee who said, "we are very proud to have a country," added that "it's not at its best right now, but it's on its way." One interviewee said he is "not as proud to be Israeli as he is happy to be Israeli." All the interviewees see their future in Israel, and one religious interviewee even said, "I don't even see myself travelling abroad." Another religious interviewee summed up by saying, "if we weren't Jewish, and if it was not important for us as Jews to have a country, I don't think I would want to live in Israel... I think that's what keeps most of the Jews in Israel... it's hard for me to understand someone who doesn't relate to that."

Similar sentiments were expressed by the olim. One interviewee said he is not particularly proud but neither is he ashamed to be Israeli. Another interviewee said he "believes in the State of Israel more than in the Land of Israel." In other words, while a Jewish state is important to him, the holy places in Israel are less so. The third interviewee takes great pride in being an Israeli.

However, most of the olim are very concerned about the State in general and political issues in particular. Two olim said they were disappointed with other countries. One said he had lived in the United States for a few years and felt alien, he did not care for the American culture. Another remarked that he visited Moscow recently and was very disappointed by the people, saying they are vulgar. All the secular interviewees have a strong Israeli identity and a sense of pride in being Israeli. At the same time, some of them expressed concern that not all of their age group or those of different ages in Israel feel the same way. This is attributed to the rifts in Israeli society and disagreement on important subjects (such as the price they are willing to pay for peace, questions relating to state and religion, and other topics). There is a fear that because of these schisms it is difficult to define the Israeli identity.

13) The image of the State of Israel

This topic was mainly addressed by the interviewees in the periphery. Notwithstanding their pride in the country, they believe that Israel has a negative image, but they think this negative image is the result of poor *hasbara* (advocacy and information) or a shortage of "goodwill ambassadors" or, as one interviewee put it, "there is a certain unfavorable image and it doesn't matter what we do."

14) Attitude toward Diaspora Jewry

The religious interviewees were ambivalent in their attitude toward Jews in the Diaspora: on the one hand, some of them understand how difficult it is to make aliya, especially from an economic point of view, "there is a fear that people will make aliya but they won't have work," but also from other aspects. On the other hand, however, some of them feel there is some degree of hypocrisy in their conduct, "you educate your child to a certain understanding that you personally do not fulfill," and they express their sense that Jews overseas "lack something," in other words, it is hard for them to understand how one can feel Jewish without living in Israel. One mentioned the danger of assimilation, "I'm not sure they can remain Jews for very long." Only one religious interviewee was unforgiving toward Diaspora

Jews. Both he and some of the other interviewees expressed their sense that the Jews only move to Israel when things are bad for them overseas (although some of them do not blame them for doing so).

When asked whether Diaspora Jews should make aliya, all the religious interviewees say they would like to see them here, but there is a sense that they understand their situation. One interviewee said that Diaspora Jews feel secure because the State of Israel exists. "Everyone should do what's right for him"; "it's obvious to me that they should live here, but after I saw how they live, I was more understanding."

Furthermore, in the opinion of one religious interviewee and some of the secular interviewees, the role of Jews in the Diaspora is to protect the interests of the State of Israel and promote the image of Jews in the world. According to the religious interviewee, "the fact that they live there helps us." The secular interviewees expressed the fear that were it not for the Jews in the Diaspora, Jews would be perceived as Shylocks. Some interviewees thought the role of the Jewish people is to serve as "a light unto the nations" and disseminate knowledge in the world.

Nevertheless, some of the secular interviewees thought there might be another Holocaust, not necessarily in Germany, "Israel is the only safe place for Jews, if you can call this safety."

The interviewees in the periphery were also ambivalent about Diaspora Jews: two of them said they are concerned about the assimilation of Diaspora Jewry: one of them is being sent abroad by the Jewish Agency while another participated in an overseas mission. One interviewee compared the nation to a garden that has not been planted in its natural place – "we'll wither if we don't live in Israel." Another interviewee in the periphery said it does not trouble her that Diaspora Jews do not live in Israel; she believes everyone should live wherever is good for them. Another interviewee in the periphery did not address the question directly but said he would like to live overseas, but cannot because he is Jewish.

In connection with Diaspora Jews the interviewees were also asked whether they are in favor of giving Israelis living abroad the right to vote. All of them were opposed.

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15) Attitude toward Germany

Although it appears that most of those interviewed support ties with Germany, the past has been neither forgotten nor forgiven. Among the secular interviewees, many agree, or think that Germany is a friend of Israel: "they do a lot for Israel." Among the religious group too, most interviewees believe we should maintain ties with Germany and apparently they have no problem visiting there, although most of them relate pragmatically to the friendship and assistance that Germany extends to Israel, even if they are not sure what lies behind it. Some interviewees referred to ties with Germany in the same way they relate to ties with any other country.

On the other hand, one religious interviewee said he does not feel that Germany has made reparations to Israel. He is not referring to monetary compensation but to gestures such as spearheading a worldwide campaign against racism. Other religious interviewees mentioned neo-Nazism in Germany, but the majority believe that the Germans have changed. Only one religious interviewee revealed an extremely negative attitude toward Germany, "I don't forgive and I don't forget. I don't care if it goes on for another ten generations. They have German blood." She does not understand how Jews can go to Germany to work.

The secular group's attitude toward Germany is one of "respect but suspect." They do not denigrate Germany but are in no hurry to go there, "there's nothing there for us." Apart from that, it appears that secular young adults harbor an incorrect image of contemporary German culture. They have not visited Germany, they are unfamiliar with German culture, and they draw conclusions based on the Germans they have encountered in Israel, or, according to some of them, "Germany is already half Turkish"; "Germans are boring..."

Some of those interviewed in the periphery were influenced by the question of whether their own families had suffered in the Holocaust, not by the impact of the Holocaust on the Jewish people as a whole. One interviewee said in the same breath, "I would be prepared to go to Germany, I would be willing to live there, my family was not affected by the Holocaust, I've been to Yad Vashem many times, I know a lot about the Holocaust." They are helped in this perception by the fact that Germans are trying to

atone for the iniquity they committed against the Jews. On the other hand, some interviewees would not be willing to live in Germany, like the interviewee who, while not seeing her future in Israel, said she would not want to live in Germany because of the Holocaust, but added, "even though my family wasn't harmed." One interviewee said, "I don't have anything against them now. Today they're not the problem" (the German problem is dwarfed by the Palestinian problem).

The most negative attitude toward Germany was expressed by interviewees in the periphery: apart from one who said that the post-Holocaust generation of Germans is not guilty, the responses of the other interviewees ranged from "we won't forgive or forget," through accusations that the Germans are not doing enough against Holocaust deniers, and the opinion that future generations will forgive, but not now, and we must make sure they don't deny it or forget. The last interviewee compared the issue of Germany to "talking to someone whose sister has just been raped."

16) The country's vision – Israel's values

Secular:

When asked to rank the following four values: democracy, peace, Jewish majority, and Greater Israel, only a few rated democracy first. The most prevalent response was Jewish majority, followed by Greater Israel. The interviewees saw no contradiction between a Jewish majority and Greater Israel, because they were not prepared to grant equal rights to the Palestinian residents of the territories in the event that the territories are annexed by the State of Israel.

Religious:

Four interviewees responded to this question. Only one said that democracy was the most important value, followed (in descending order) by peace, Greater Israel, and a Jewish majority. With respect to a Jewish majority he said he does not regard this as a value but rather as a "practical means."

Two interviewees felt the most important values (in descending order) are:

Greater Israel, a Jewish majority, democracy, peace. The other interviewee ranked the values as follows: a Jewish majority, democracy, peace, and Greater Israel. In connection with democracy the interviewee said she sometimes feels that when the law is not enforced as it should be, democracy turns into anarchy.

Periphery:

For three out of the four interviewees, democracy came in fourth. The other interviewee ranked democracy third. Two of the interviewees felt the most important value is a Jewish majority, while the other two ranked peace in first place. For one of these two, a Jewish majority is the second most important value.

17) Stereotypes of olim and attitude toward olim

The olim alluded to the negative stereotype of Russians as drunkards. Although it was clear they dissociated themselves from this label, they did not do so wholeheartedly. They said that while drinking is part of the Russian culture, they do not drink except on special occasions, "the fact is we drink a normal amount at family celebrations. It's our culture."

Interestingly, when the Israeli-born interviewees were asked about their attitude toward olim, they focused mainly on Ethiopian olim and not on those from the FSU (perhaps because greater cultural differences exist between Sabras and Ethiopians than between Sabras and olim from the FSU). As has already been mentioned, it was in the army that Sabras struck up friendships with olim from the FSU as well as those from Ethiopia.

Nevertheless, as mentioned above, most of those interviewed were critical of the isolationism of both the FSU olim and those from Ethiopia. When the interviewer asked the interviewees for their theories regarding the origins of this isolationism, the youths attributed the FSU isolationism to arrogance, and the Ethiopian version to their need to protect one another.

The interviewer attempted to posit other explanations for the FSU olim, suggesting, for example, that a cultural ghetto may pave the way for better absorption, but the interviewees did not accept it.

Regarding integration with olim from Ethiopia, the secular interviewees made a distinction between what would be desirable in a perfect world and what can be done in light of the actual situation. What is needed is educational equality, integration, serving in high-level positions, and so on. However, they believe it is too soon to provide Ethiopian olim with full equality in different occupations, because of their current "level". Moreover, in the educational sphere the interviewees would not want their younger siblings to attend classes together with Ethiopian olim, for the sole reason that it may hinder their pace of learning, according to them, and not for reasons of skin color or financial or cultural level.

One secular interviewee said the State is duty-bound to invest a great deal in educating children of Ethiopian origin, to hasten the process of closing gaps and furthering their studies so they can be integrated into mixed classes.

Responses of Young Jewish Adult Interviewees on Personal Issues 1. Personal identity

Olim – the male and female interviewees view their personal identities differently: the males tend to view themselves as "human beings" or "Israelis." As one male interviewee said, since Israeli and Jewish is the same, he is Jewish-Israeli. Among the females, identity ranges from national identity (Jewish) to sectarian identity (immigrant from Russia who loves Israel) to professional identity (ballerina or dance teacher).

It should be pointed out, however, that when the interviewees talk about their sector, they call themselves 'Russians' (not 'olim from Russia' or the republic from which they made aliya) and they call the other Jews 'Israelis'.

When asked why they do this, some attempted to explain by saying that by 'Russians' they mean Russian-language speakers. Nevertheless it was obvious, from other things they said, that they made a clear distinction between the sectors.

One interviewee from the periphery described herself as a Jew, and another called herself a Zionist.

Two youths used idioms to describe themselves: one said he "loves justice and pursues peace", and another said she advocates "loving your neighbor like yourself". Both quoted from the Bible.

Two of the religious interviewees called themselves Israelis. One referred to himself as a human being. Another interviewee said he viewed himself as being more Jewish than Israeli, but added "I live them both," and "I am also a student looking to get ahead in life." Two female interviewees said they mainly view themselves as Jewish, one called herself Jewish-religious. Another female interviewee called herself national-religious, with the emphasis on national. Only one religious interviewee did not know how to define himself. All the secular interviewees appeared to have strong Israeli identities, though they pointed out that it is difficult to define Israeli identity because of the many factions in Israeli society.

2. Aspirations

This issue was directly addressed by the secular Israeli-born interviewees and the religious interviewees, and it is interesting to compare the responses of these two sectors.

The aspirations of the secular interviewees were individualistic in nature: they want to succeed in their careers, both materially and in terms of status and prestige, and they want love and a warm family. At the same time, they speak of postponing marriage. None of them is considering marriage at this stage or in the near future. Some also mentioned the need for a spiritual place in their lives.

During their army service the secular men felt the need for a steady girlfriend who would wait for them at home. The girlfriend should be appealing but "not too much": pretty, but "not too much," intelligent, but "not too much."

In contrast to the aspirations of the secular group, the aspirations of the religious group go hand-in-hand with their desire to contribute to the country and the nation: one interviewee says she wants to be involved in the media. Another wants to work in a profession that contributes to others, like her mother. She does not want to live in a closed religious settlement but in an open city, "I want to be involved, to be part of the State." Another interviewee said she is studying to be a teacher of history, particularly Jewish history, since "children today don't have the most elementary idea about

Zionism." She feels that this way she can contribute to the country. Yet another interviewee want to hold public office and contribute in the spheres of both society and Torah.

Another interviewee who recently returned from a stint as a Jewish Agency emissary abroad said that since his return he has experienced a letdown, "you're nobody. You feel wasted." He spoke of the desire, on the one hand, to be happy with what he has, to find work and get married, but on the other hand "to feel convinced of what I'm doing and also convinced of the State. To feel that I'm not only contributing to myself but to society as well." After completing his studies, another interviewee wants to train as an ambassador, to travel to Europe / America and help Israelis and Jews, "but the date of my return to Israel will be carved in stone. I'll definitely return to Israel!"

3. Patterns of recreation

All the secular interviewees spend considerable time on social networks on the internet, particularly on Facebook. They regard it as "getting intimate the shortest possible way."

They meet at the homes of friends. Their meetings are set up through Facebook. They also hang out in bars.

The interviewees feel that the physical fitness of their age group has deteriorated, attributing it to a lack of physical activity as the result of staying home and spending time on the internet. It should be pointed out in this context that the adolescent group reported that they engage in physical activity as part of their daily routine. It is possible that after their army service, which entails physical activity and mental pressure, the letup of pressure leads to less strenuous physical activity.

A few of them devote time to spiritual pursuits: meeting with rabbis, kabala courses, the Book of Knowledge (cosmic knowledge apparently transmitted by a medium known as Mevlana). It should be mentioned that all those who met with rabbis emphasized that "the rabbi doesn't try to influence me or make me become religious. He just teaches and it does me good."

It can be understood from the words of the secular interviewees that they have been overtaken by the pursuit of materialism, "we are a generation that

is swiftly drawn to materialism: technology, new products, income"; "the environment [today] is too materialistic." This creates an emotional void, which distresses them. By turning to spirituality they may be attempting to redress this deficiency. One interviewee said she and those around her take a great interest in spiritual matters, she wants to master the information and sees it as her duty to pass it on. "Whoever does not pass on information is like an ass holding a book" (this interviewee spoke a great deal about the Book of Knowledge). The rest of those interviewed obtain their information from the internet, especially Wikipedia. Some said that through Wikipedia they have enriched their knowledge in spheres in which they had no particular interest to start with ("every day I do a cursory scan of Wikipedia sections, looking for something to hold my interest. While doing so, I become interested in many subjects"). It is notable that the interviewees are aware that Wikipedia information is not necessarily reliable or detailed, but they begin with the assumption that it is sufficient for their needs.

Among the religious group it appears that surfing social networks is far less prevalent. During the week, the interviewees generally spend time with friends, sit in cafés, go to the beach, or go on night hikes. When not meeting with friends they surf the internet, but only two said they surf Facebook, mainly to obtain information about people and less to keep in touch with friends. One interviewee said she prefers to maintain face to face contact.

Those interviewed 'zap' the internet to pass the time, watch film clips on YouTube, or follow regular series. They hardly ever watch television. They regard television as a waste of time, the internet less so, both because they can access more focused content and because there are (almost) no commercials.

One interviewee, who was married when he embarked on his studies, spends most of his free time with his wife. They go to plays or watch movies at home, and they go for walks. Some of those interviewed enjoy hiking when they have the time.

None of the religious interviewees hang out in pubs, "people are very surprised and look at us as if we're aliens when we get to the army and say we've never been in a pub..."

For the olim, too, the internet plays a different role that it does for the secular group. Some of those interviewed use the internet (Facebook, Classmates) for specific, practical tasks, not for recreation (arranging meetings, finding work, locating people), and they do not surf sites frequently. They realize that in this respect they differ from the Sabra group and they even adopt a critical tone with regard to the Sabras ("Sabras think about how to waste the evening. I don't go into Facebook, it's just a waste of time"). Another interviewee surfs the Russian parallel site to Facebook (called Classmates). He keeps abreast of the news through the internet rather than television. The olim do not watch television, due to lack of time and interest. One interviewee even mentioned that people in Israel are almost entirely influenced by television, particularly because they do not cross-check information with other sources such as books.

On the other hand, they (the olim) frequently meet with their friends, at home or in restaurants. Most of the interviewees said they very much enjoy hiking in the country. Among the women, there is a marked trend to go hiking with their families. Other recreational activities included reading books, attending plays, and sports. All the olim, with the exception of one, had more Russian than Israeli friends. Before entering the army they had hardly any Israeli-born friends. In the army, they got to know and become friends with Sabras, but on the whole these friendships were limited to their army service. One interviewee says the culture of recreation is hardest to bridge. Another thinks that as they grow older, these differences become less significant.

Two interviewees from the periphery do a great deal of challenging sports and hike a lot. Three of those interviewed said they like going out with friends. One said she spends more time watching television than surfing the internet, but two said they prefer surfing the internet to watching television. One interviewee mentioned that she enjoys spending time with her family.

4. Post-army travel and independence

This subject revealed the most marked differences between the various groups. While most of the secular Sabras went backpacking after their army service, none of the olim or the religious group did so. For the secular group, backpacking after the army fulfills two functions:

"Clearing the head": army service is stressful, there is a lot of pressure, the hierarchical army system requires unquestioning obedience to orders even when they seem to be unjustified, and of course the dangers to which they are exposed in the army make it necessary for the young adults to "clear their head." "In South America or India you can relax. In Israel I can't relax." Postponing decisions about the future: "I didn't want to begin the first day of the rest of my life..." said one interviewee.

As aforesaid, none of the olim set out on the 'big' post-army trip. One interviewee travelled with friends to Europe for two weeks. In his opinion a two month trip to Thailand, though it is cheap, is unnecessary. He claims he would not know what to do. Another interviewee says, "unlike most Israelis, I didn't go overseas after the army. I didn't feel independent enough to fly without my parents."

From their remarks it can be assumed that the difference between Sabras and olim stems from several reasons: first of all, there is the difference in their financial situation. Secondly, there is the cultural difference which prevents olim from traveling in the Far East or South America. And thirdly, there is the interviewees' sense of independence, which has been mentioned in various contexts.

With regard to the sense of independence, there is a clear distinction between those interviewed, and among the olim interviewees as well. For example, in contrast to the interviewee who said she did not feel independent enough to travel without her parents, another interviewee who made aliya at the age of 21 said, "it's only now, in Israel, that I can do what I want. In Russia I learned what my parents wanted and not what I want." Meanwhile, one interviewee established his own business immediately after the army. Yet, he and his girlfriend of five years are still living in their parents' home ("it's hard for us to make a living").

Among the religious group as well, as stated, none of those interviewed had made the "big" trip overseas (apart from traveling to Canada as a Jewish Agency emissary). Their reasons are similar to those given by the olim: it doesn't attract them, some of them think it's a waste of money, "it's crazy to

spend five thousand shekels on a trip!" However, one interviewee said that since yeshiva he feels so connected to Israel that it's hard for him to even consider traveling overseas. Moreover, female interviewees who have not traveled said they are afraid to travel overseas, "people go to India and forget where they came from."

5. Political and social involvement

Political involvement and/or interest in politics:

None of those interviewed in any group are politically active. Some of them, such as the secular interviewees and those in the periphery, are disinterested or politically uninformed. Those in the periphery even say they do not listen to the news, or try not to listen.

Others, like the olim, are too busy with the "struggle for existence": although most of those interviewed care about Israel, work and study take up most of their time and they take no interest in these matters, "politics doesn't bother me and I take no interest. I'm not publicly involved, I don't have the time to take any interest in anything – work and study, study and work."

Among the religious group, one interviewee said he used to organize demonstrations, but now less so, "both because I haven't found a party or a leader worth following, and because I'm going through a period of inner clarification." Another interviewee, perhaps the only one who is still active, says there is a movement of young people in his town dedicated to bringing about change, and he writes in local papers but under an assumed name (because his father works for the city and he doesn't want his father to be linked to his son's political opinions).

Volunteer work:

The group with the most social involvement is the national-religious sector. Many of those interviewed are or were socially active, and some of them hope to hold public office in the future, or something similar that will enable them to contribute to the community, either from the public aspect or from the point of view of education. One interviewee spoke of her mother, a lawyer who also helps people beyond the scope of her work, saying she wants to be like her.

Two of those interviewed were emissaries to Canada last year (one of them as part of her *Sherut Leumi*).

Three interviewees are doing volunteer work at present, one in the educational framework of Perach (a university tutoring project), and another one with the Pa'amonim organization that advises families on how to financially manage their households (the third interviewee did not go into details). The interviewees from the periphery had either volunteered in the past or are doing so at present.

None of the secular interviewees attributed importance to volunteering, and none of them are engaged in volunteer work at present, although they mentioned that they also plan to be involved in volunteer activities in the future. At the moment they feel they have no time available for it, that they must devote their time now to building their future. They also mentioned that they recently devoted several years of their lives to the nation and the State during their army service, thus they defer any volunteer activities they expect to be involved in to a later date, "when my head is clearer I'll be happy to do volunteer work... at our age we're too busy to spare the time." With regard to the future, most of them talked of doing volunteer work. One interviewee said, "if I have the money I'm prepared to contribute money, but not my time."

Similar attitudes emerged among the olim, who don't engage in volunteer work either. Apparently, as with their lack of political involvement, they are concerned with personal advancement at present and do not feel they have any time to devote to volunteer work. Like the secular interviewees, some of the male olim referred to their army service as volunteer work.

6. Environmental protection

The interviewees are aware of environmental protection, but in this age group as well, it would seem that most of them are involved in environmental protection activities on a personal level: recycling bags and bottles, and refraining from littering. Another interviewee from the religious sector said, "I take shorter showers."

One interviewee in the periphery is a member of the Greenpeace organization and takes part in their activities. A religious interviewee said

she has recently begun to take an interest in the subject of environmental protection, "in our house we never use disposable paper goods. We collect compost. I signed a petition." Two religious interviewees said they are not active at the moment, but hope to be active in the future within the structure of their work. One of them said the subject interests him, he believes environmental protection contributes to the economy, but right now he has no time to deal with it and he only practices it on the personal level.

7. Role models

All the religious interviewees cited people in their immediate environment as their role models. Three of them cited their parents as role models. One said that he turns to his mother, because she has had to contend with many things so she understands what he is facing (in his army service, for example). Another mentioned her father, because he guides her but "mainly he enables you to think for yourself." This interviewee said she is greatly influenced by the world view of Rabbi Kook, "love of Israel, the old and new settlements, Yishuv, secular people, and so on."

In addition, interviewees turn to their close friends when they are in doubt. One interviewee mentioned an older, blind friend who, due to his blindness "sees everything from a different point of view." Furthermore, talking to him provides him with a perspective of what it is like to be blind from birth, leading a full life, and married with three children.

One interviewee said he doesn't turn to any particular person but to the Torah when he needs direction.

Most of the interviewees from the periphery also cited people in their immediate environment as role models (parents, an uncle, or a youth movement counselor).

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Arab Adolescents and Young Adults

Characteristics of the Interviewees

The report is based on interviews with 7 Arab boys: a Druze from the Carmel region, a Bedouin from the north, an urban Christian, a rural Christian, an urban Muslim, and a rural Muslim.

Responses of Arab Interviewees on Various Topics

Sense of Discrimination

Most of those interviewed feel there is discrimination in Israel. Two interviewees said they do not feel any discrimination, one said "there has already been an Arab minister, there are hospital directors, university lecturers, Arab football players, and an Arab beauty queen, so it is evident that Arabs can reach every sphere in Israel."

Most of those who felt there is discrimination referred to discrimination against Arabs particularly as regards employment and land expropriation. Some refer to the humiliation they endure as the result of security precautions, and view security issues as the source of discrimination against Arabs. In the words of one interviewee, "the police take care to humiliate the Arab population and make their lives difficult. They treat Arab citizens as undesirables because of security concerns." Others speak of a negative attitude towards minorities in general, "the minorities are discriminated against, particularly the Arabs, but not only they. This is a racist country that discriminates against the underprivileged and the weak."

Most of those interviewed feel that this discriminatory attitude does not affect them – remarks such as: "an overall feeling of discrimination in the equilibrium of rights versus obligations"; "even though I have a high rank in the IDF, I was an ordinary security guard (and not the supervisor). I had the training but they didn't accept me, and they brought in a Jew whose rank was lower than mine, which caused me to leave the army." Another interviewee referred to Arab riots, "all the problems that occurred with the Arabs were because the police and the State did not let them demonstrate like they allow the Jews."

Assessment of the situation in the country

1. Education

In the opinion of the Arab interviewees, the main problem in Israel is education; however, they only addressed the issue of teaching moral values. According to the interviewees, there is too little emphasis on values and too much estrangement from tradition, "the young generation doesn't respect their elders any more, [they don't respect] the law or Druze distinctions and culture." From the words of some of those interviewed it appears that the problem is partially due to the fact that adolescents are exposed to other cultures, either in their leisure time or through mobile phones and the internet: "The blame lies with the internet and mobile phones, which the parents have no control over."

2. Society

Violence:

As the result of the problems in education there are problems of violence, both at school and at social events. The children drink and smoke (and also do drugs). The interviewees apparently link the source of the negative phenomena to other cultures to which Arab youth are exposed more than in the past, "the young people are exposed to crime and a violent way of life, smoking and alcohol." Another interviewee said adolescents drink despite religious strictures against it.

It is apparently expected that authority figures such as parents and teachers will control the adolescents, but they are incapable of doing so. Moreover, there were some hints that parents even serve as a negative example, "the adolescents copy the adults." Another interviewee said, with regards to violence in the country, that the punishments meted out are too mild to be effective.

Interviewees feel threatened by the violence, one said that he fears for his personal safety.

Social gaps:

The interviewees mainly addressed the issue of discrimination between Arabs and Jews. One significant reference was made to discrimination from

the economic aspect. They feel that Jews have more opportunities to be hired for work and advance than Arabs. Another advantage Jews have over most Arabs is when it comes to those who have completed their army service, "those who serve in the army are in a good situation, as one who did not serve in the army I have difficulty finding work."

One interviewee referred to the tension between Arabs and Jews, and spoke of the polarization between the groups. From his words, he seems to feel that if Arabs and Jews would recognize each other as human beings and understand each others' needs, the conflict could be solved or ameliorated.

Some interviewees felt that Israeli society discriminates against several minorities such as Arabs and even women, "this is a macho society." They feel that social gaps are growing because the strong have more connections making it easier for them to advance.

One interviewee cast the blame on the people themselves, indicating that education is the cause of Israel's financial woes (and those of the Arabs in particular). In this context he also mentioned the influence of 'other cultures,' name-brand consumerism and wasting money, "ostentatious behavior and showy consumerism, imitating others – all these cause financial problems."

3. Security

The security issue was addressed on two levels: Israel vis-á-vis other countries, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

One of those interviewed said the source of the problems between Jews and Palestinians is extremism on both sides. Another said that lack of knowledge and understanding between the parties is the cause of the problems.

With regard to external security threats, one interviewee said "the State of Israel is surrounded on all sides by enemies who want to destroy us."

Road safety:

The interviewees referred to the many road accidents, one linked the accidents to reckless driving.

4. Prospects for the future of the State

According to one interviewee, the country is deteriorating on every level: economic-social, cultural and educational. In his opinion, the only thing motivating the country is fear of enemy attack.

About the interviewees

1. Personal identity

Among both male and female interviewees the variances in their personal identities were based on national and religious characteristics.

Some of those interviewed defined themselves mainly on the basis of their national identity: the Druze and the Bedouin defined themselves first and foremost as Israelis, and the Druze said that his second identity is Druze. The Bedouin interviewee said he "can't stand people who say they don't feel Israeli or don't think of themselves as belonging to Israel."

The urban Christian and Muslim interviewees (one of each) defined themselves as Palestinian Arabs living in the State of Israel.

The rural Christian interviewee and the rural Muslim interviewees defined themselves primarily by religion. The Christian also described himself as an Arab. Two of the Muslims also described themselves as Israelis.

2. Attitude toward the State

The interviewees vary regarding their attitudes toward the State of Israel, though the overall picture is one of belonging and commitment to the State. However, they expressed many reservations that they feel as minorities.

Most of the interviewees see their futures and the future of their children in the country.

Their commitment to the State is demonstrated by remarks such as, "I have a commitment to the State in the same way that an Egyptian, for example, has a commitment to his country, Egypt"; "the State of Israel is the state of us all... we must all guard it in every respect." Several interviewees expressed pride in the country.

Some interviewees mentioned that Israel is perceived as a democratic country in comparison with the Arab states, although some of them, who feel that this image conflicts with the discrimination against Arab citizens, aspire

to change racist laws. One interviewee said he has no sense of belonging and does not believe he is being represented by the state's institutions.

Others claimed "the State gives me many things that Arabs do not receive in other countries."

The interviewees would like to contribute toward improving the situation of the country and that of the Arab citizens, "it's impossible to always be asking what the country is doing for me... each one should ask himself what he's doing for the country." They think that Jewish-Arab cooperation in social, political, and employment issues could be beneficial for both sides. One interviewee said he only buys articles made in Israel out of concern for employment.

3. Attitude toward Palestinians

When the interviewees refer to the similarity between themselves and Palestinians, they also draw comparisons between themselves and Israeli Jews. It would seem that as the perceived distance between them and the Israelis increases, the distance between them and the Palestinians diminishes.

There is some variance in the responses of interviewees with regard to their attitude toward Palestinians. Some relate to them as brothers and believe that a deep cultural-spiritual and historical tie links the Palestinians in the territories, the Palestinian refugees, and the Palestinians in Israel, "the only difference is that some of us chose to remain in our homes during the days of the Nakba." Another interviewee said he is pleased there is a cultural connection between Arabs in Israel and Palestinians, and happy that they do not try to imitate the Jewish culture.

One of them also said that Arab and Palestinian achievements are of far greater interest to him than the achievements of Israelis. This feeling goes hand in hand with the sense of not belonging to the State.

Others think Arabs in Israel more closely resemble the Jewish citizens of Israel, and apart from language and religion, they have no ties with the Palestinians: "we need to feel closer to the Jewish Israeli citizens because we live among them on a daily basis"; "the time has come to internalize that whoever has lived here more than forty years... and whoever was born here, is Israeli and not Palestinian." They would not want to live in a Palestinian

state, "the Arabs who want to live in Palestine should go to Jenin."

At the same time, it can sometimes be seen that the only similarity they perceive themselves as having with the Jews is a negative one, "the world regards the Israeli as a schemer and exploiter. Israeli Arabs closely resemble the average Israeli who behaves disgracefully in tourist locations."

4. Attitude toward Sherut Leumi (National Service) / army service

There is some variance in the responses of interviewees regarding *Sherut Leumi* / army service. Only the Druze and Bedouin interviewees are in favor of army service and ascribe importance to it. Such service contributes not only to the individual (service adds to education and knowledge), but also to the State and the minority sector (service helps strengthen the ties between the sector and the Jews). The other interviewees object to army service. One of them said that although he recognizes the army's importance for the country, he is opposed to serving in the army because some officers are unethical. Another interviewee said that in his opinion the Jews are not interested in having the Arabs serve in the army either.

As regards *Sherut Leumi*, once again there is a variety of responses. One interviewee is in favor of compulsory *Sherut Leumi* as an alternative to army service. The importance he attributes to *Sherut Leumi* is similar to the importance attributed to army service: it contributes to building a person's character, it contributes to the State, and it is a means of bridging between the Arab and Jewish sectors.

It appears that most of those interviewed feel that by contributing to the State through *Sherut Leumi* or army service, they could be accepted by Israeli society. Some of them even openly express the hope that in this way they could obtain equal rights.

Nevertheless, one interviewee said he will not enlist because his financial situation does not allow it, and he prefers to work and earn a living.

The most extreme opinion was expressed by an urban Muslim who said he regards *Sherut Leumi* as a form of collaboration that shows implicit approval of a policy (the 'occupation') to which he is opposed. He feels that *Sherut Leumi* is "the first step towards enlisting in the army."

5. Recreation

Compared to other groups, the Arab interviewees watch more television. The subject matter varies, some watch sports while others watch reality shows or investigative programs. Two interviewees said they only watch Arab series or programs from Arab countries.

Nearly half of those interviewed surf the internet. One interviewee (the Druze) only surfs the internet to watch programs because it is forbidden to use the internet for interpersonal communication. Others spend time on social networks like Facebook. Some of them prefer hiking or going to the ocean when weather permits.

The interviewees spend time with friends and family, hiking, or in cafés. Apart from one, none of them go to nightclubs or pubs, "such places are more for Jewish society because everything is more open there."

6. Influential figures / role models

Two interviewees cited Arab leaders and spiritual figures as their role models. There are differences of opinion, however: one of them admires extreme leaders like Nasrallah, "because now more Israelis understand that nothing can be achieved by force." The other one said he is influenced by leaders and cultural and spiritual figures, "who don't try to make themselves look good and act in a subservient manner to the Jews." (The interviewee used the Hebrew expression '*Aravi machmad*', literally 'pet Arab,' which is roughly equivalent to the derogatory American expression of 'Uncle Tom.') He emphasized that he refers to people who strive to build mutual trust between both sides, not to extremists.

Two of those interviewed cited Israeli politicians as role models. One also referred to members of his family, his parents and his older brother.

7. Political viewpoints

Most of the interviewees expressed negative views of Israeli politics. "Israeli politics are dirty, the people are false, they're only looking for money"; "none of them are worth anything... all the politicians lie and cheat." As a result, say the interviewees, they take no interest in politics and some of them did not even vote in the last elections, their attitude being that nobody is worth it or there is nobody to represent the Arab positions. One interviewee

said he was also disappointed by the Arab leaders, they do not care about their public, "the Arab leaders in Israel only know how to cry, they don't know how to obtain anything for the simple [Arab] citizen."

One interviewee said that in his opinion women are missing in politics.

The Bedouin interviewee said he and his entire family support the Labor Party. At first they only voted for the Labor Party because his grandfather told them to. Now, according to him, they understand that it is "the right way."

8. Attitudes to peace

Most of those interviewed support the proposed agreement, but most of them do not believe it will be materialize. Some say the leaders on both sides are preventing peace. In other words, the citizens want peace but the politicians don't. One interviewee thinks the leadership should be replaced to give the younger generation a chance, "the present leaders only know how to make war." One interviewee (the Druze) said he doesn't believe the Palestinians want peace as much as the Israelis want it.

The reservations about the peace agreement are mainly connected to the right of return. They do not agree that the right of return should be limited only to the Palestinian state and believe a suitable solution must be found for the Palestinian problem. Furthermore, they are opposed to demilitarizing the Palestinian state.

One interviewee is opposed to the peace agreement, saying he wants one state for two nations under Jewish leadership, "the Palestinians – as we all know – fight among themselves... they can't run a country."

9. Environmental protection

Although some interviewees feel environmental protection is important they are not personally involved in it.

One interviewee expressed anger against the State, "before we can raise our consciousness about protecting the environment... the State should see to it that the garbage is collected from the Arab neighborhoods!"

Another interviewee thinks that Arab society in general is not sufficiently aware of the subject. He thinks it will take a long time for Arabs to start relating to it.

Female Arab Adolescents and Young Adults

Characteristics of the Interviewees

The report is based on interviews with 7 Arab females aged 16–26: a Bedouin from the north, an urban Christian, a rural Christian, a rural Muslim, a Druze, a Muslim from a small village, and an urban Muslim.

Responses of Female Arab Interviewees on Various Topics Sense of Discrimination

Some of those interviewed (the rural Muslim, the urban Christian, the rural Christian, and the Bedouin) spoke of racism and the lack of equality between Jews and Arabs. These opinions were expressed in general, "a racist State, there is no equality between citizens, it is completely illogical that this is a democratic country and yet all the policy makers are racists!" The opinions were also specific when relating mainly to discrimination. Complaints were leveled at the entrance requirements to academic institutions, "the entrance requirements are really difficult compared to the entrance requirements for Jews and the grants the Jews receive because they are post-army... that's why there's only a small percentage of Arabs in academic institutions, especially in the important professions." Another interviewee claimed that Arabs, including those who served in the army, are discriminated against: "there's a sense that they're doing everything to prevent us from attending university or college."

The young adults encounter difficulties when seeking work. They complain that even Arabs who served in the army have difficulties obtaining work.

"In the rare case of an Arab obtaining a high position, it is of course unusual and exceptional. They always see you as an Arab as if you have a lower status than a Jew."

The future of the Arab citizen is perceived as uncertain.

On the other hand, the Druze interviewee maintained that racism is only shown towards those who do not accept the Zionist view, "but whoever

contributes and is loyal to the country is treated equally." She added that unemployment is prevalent not only among the minorities, "the phenomenon of illegal workers who fill work positions must be prevented."

It should also be mentioned that the Christian Arab interviewee claimed there is also racism in the Arab sector.

Differences of opinion were expressed among the interviewees regarding the level of democracy in the country: one said "there is excellent freedom of speech and democracy in the State." Others continued to speak of racism and discrimination.

There was discrimination with regard to entrance requirements for academic institutions, "the entrance requirements are really difficult compared to entrance requirements for Jews and the grants the Jews receive because they are post-army... that's why there's a small percentage of Arabs in academic institutions, especially the important professions."

It was claimed that racism exists but it is only expressed toward those who do not accept the Zionist ideas. However, anyone who contributes and is loyal to the State, is treated equally.

Assessment of the situation in the country

1. Society

The young generation emulates football players and fashion models, not scientists and religious figures. The young generation lacks many of the things they see in the West and tries to obtain them by imitation.

A Christian from a rural village claimed that superstition is the result of lack of knowledge and understanding. In her opinion, this tool is employed by those on a low socio-economic level to deal with their difficult situation.

Violence:

Interviewees spoke at length about physical and verbal violence, "in this country, the average person is usually cruel, racist, and violent." It should be pointed out, however, that violence was not attributed only to the Jewish sector, on the contrary; interviewees spoke of their society (the Muslim from a small village): "in our area there are people like the mafia, criminals

everybody is afraid of, and they control everything that happens here... everyone pays them protection money, they have illegal weapons... even the schoolchildren have firearms and other weapons, and they boast that there are firearms at home, so the schoolchildren grow up with the sense that weapons are something essential to their lives... if you don't belong to a crime family and you don't have powerful friends on your side, you can't live." The problem of drugs was raised as well: "children leave school in the middle of the day to smoke cigarettes or do drugs... and to drink and get drunk..."

They point the finger of blame at the State for its inaction, "the police don't do anything to deal with it, and even if they would help, there's no punishment." But it was also said that violence stems from the education at home and the influence of the media, "some parents think it makes the children into men."

Societal gaps:

Societal gaps were claimed to be the result of the lack of equality but the same argument was used regarding the favorable light in which the government relates to those with a high socio-economic background, "money talks."

One interviewee (Muslim) even added that there is "financial hardship among both Jews and Arabs."

2. Security

On the one hand a Muslim interviewee claimed to feel more secure because the IDF and the police are protecting her, but on the other hand, when discussing violence it was said that the State does not do enough do contend with problems of violence in society, and there is not enough punishment.

Personal security is lacking, "there is constant fear in the street, both of violence and of terror."

Responses of Female Arab Interviewees on Personal Issues

1. Personal identity

The interviewees revealed a wide range of elements of personal identity: Palestinian, Christian Arab Israeli, law-abiding citizen, Israeli Arab, religious Muslim, Druze.

2. Attitude toward the State

Apart from the Druze, all the interviewees portrayed different aspects of the country. Despite their harsh criticism of the State of Israel most interviewees are aware of the advantages of living in Israel. These advantages are mentioned when life in the State of Israel is compared to life in the neighboring Arab countries, not to mention the life they anticipate in a Palestinian state, if it is ever established.

A Muslim interviewee said, "if I have to choose between living here or in Palestine, obviously I'll choose to live here." Another Muslim said that "the IDF and the police give me confidence because they protect me." Another interviewee (Christian) went even further, saying that "there is freedom of expression and democracy in the State."

Predictably, the Druze interviewee was highest in her praise of the State. According to her, Israel is a good country among the countries, especially compared to the neighboring Arab states. It has freedom and freedom of expression, democracy, unemployment benefits, medical insurance. "I would never move anywhere else in the world!" She is happy here, "the life and culture suit our way of life." She feels Israeli in all respects, all her brothers served in the army and would have done so even had it not been compulsory.

By contrast, two interviewees displayed only negative feelings towards the State. One of them, a rural Muslim, maintained that the State of Israel is an occupying country. She wants the country to be an Arab state with all that implies. Another (Bedouin) interviewee is content with a "state for all its citizens." She felt it was "important to clarify that not all Bedouin serve in the army and love Israel. The Israelis have taken over our people and our culture," she said adding she is concerned that "the Arabs are beginning to envy and imitate the Israeli people, not necessarily in positive behaviors..."

3. Attitude toward Palestinians

Apart from the Druze, all the interviewees expressed a sense of connection with or at least sympathy for the Palestinians. The intensity of their sense of affinity ranges from a strong feeling, "I feel the blood tie of brothers. I admire their steadfastness regarding the establishment of a Palestinian state and I'm sorry that Israeli Arabs are controlled by 'Israelitization' so they don't contribute to their Palestinian brethren," or "I feel a familial kinship even when I don't know them, when they tell me they're Palestinians," and "I feel they are my brothers, we have the same blood."

Some expressed a lukewarm relationship, "only a certain relationship because of language, culture and values," or "the Palestinians are downtrodden, spiritually strong, prepared to do anything and any type of work," or no more than token sympathy, "I support their struggle but feel no connection with them."

The Druze, on the other hand, feels no connection with the Palestinians apart from feeling sorry for them. "I hope they will establish a democratic state like the State of Israel," ... "As long as they support terrorism and choose Hamas leadership... there will be no peace." A Muslim from a small rural settlement claimed that she has some connection with Palestinians because of language, culture and values. An urban Muslim regarded the Palestinians as downtrodden, spiritually strong, and prepared to do anything and any labor, "not like Israelis..."

4. Attitudes toward Sherut Leumi / army service

The interviewees do not at all share the same opinion of *Sherut Leumi*. Their attitudes cut across religious boundaries. For example, in the opinion of one interviewee (a Muslim from a rural settlement) it is forbidden for Arabs to do *Sherut Leumi* because the release papers are the same as those of the army and "it is forbidden for Arabs to contribute to anything that represents Zionism." In contrast, another (urban) Muslim is in favor of *Sherut Leumi*, because "it contributes to their community," but she feels that Arabs should not serve in the army.

A Christian Arab also believes it is the correct step, "because it is regarded as volunteering for society and community and it also contributes to the State." The Druze interviewee did *Sherut Leumi*. The Bedouin interviewee is strongly opposed to Arabs doing *Sherut Leumi*. She is opposed to anything that might contribute to the State of Israel.

5. Recreation

Patterns of recreation range from spending time at home or going out with friends, "my father forbids me from going out much," or another one (Druze) who said her parents forbid her from leaving the village, "I must be home before nine at night," while some said they go with friends to restaurants and cafés and go for walks and the like.

At home they pass their time surfing the internet and watching television. They mostly surf on Facebook and watch mainly Arab television channels.

6. Influential figures / role models

There is some variance among interviewees with regards to influential figures and role models. Role models range from "political commentators and trustworthy politicians like Shimon Peres," (Druze) or "Shimon Peres who tries to achieve peace and coexistence," (Muslim), to spiritual and sports figures (Palestinian or Arab poets, writers), religious leaders or Arab politicians (Arafat was mentioned), or leaders of the Arab national struggle, spiritual figures such as Mahmoud Darwish, politicians like Barghouti or politicians like Azmi Bishara who are considered extremists.

7. Political positions

Politicians have a negative image: "they don't contribute anything, they shamelessly lie to the citizen." Their attitude toward Arab politicians is not sympathetic either. For example, a rural Christian complains that "the Arab parties are frightened and servile," she would not take part in elections and only voted Hadash out of respect for her parents.

8. Attitudes to peace

Two interviewees have no faith in the chances for peace, one believes that both nations want peace, but she doesn't believe there will be peace because of the positions of the leaders on both sides. The second blames only Israel,

"there is no chance of a peace agreement because of the way the Israelis behave. The Palestinian people want peace and are prepared to make concessions." One (urban Muslim) hopes for peace, "I'm sick of the wars and the killing... each side must make some concessions, the public wants peace but the leaders are extremists." Another, more somber, assertion was "I think in coming years we are approaching another period of war and killing."

As regards attitudes to a peace agreement, the majority of interviewees opposes demilitarizing the Palestinian state, if it comes into being, "I don't agree that Palestine should be demilitarized, I think a Palestinian army can prevent terrorism." One interviewee is opposed to demilitarizing the Palestinian state and also supports the Palestinians' right of return to the State of Israel.

More extreme views were expressed as well: one state for two nations and the Palestinians' right of return, or a Palestinian state from the Jordan to the sea, "but if there's a two-state peace agreement, the Palestinians must be the ones to determine the nature of the agreement."

In contrast, the Druze said that "the most important aspect of a peace agreement is security and preventing terror... I'm ready for any agreement that guarantees peace."

9. Environmental protection

It seems that in the Arab sector, low prominence is given to environmental protection. Although it is perceived as important, the subject "hasn't yet gathered momentum in our Arab villages." Involvement in environmental protection is only practiced on a personal level by not littering in the street, recycling bottles, and so on. Some interviewees are apparently unwilling to separate the issue from the context of the tension between Jews and Arabs. The Bedouin interviewee is opposed to environmental protection activities, "why should we protect the State when the State does not protect us?"

Part Two

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Commentary on Youth in Israel

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Chapter 7

Response to the Report on the Identity of Israeli Youth, 2010, with a Focus on Youth at Risk

MK Isaac (Buji) Herzog, Minister

The study discussed in the present volume, on the situation and attitudes of Israeli teenagers and young adults in 2010, reflects more than a decade of work examining the traits, attitudes, and views of youngsters in the various segments of the Israeli population. It enables us to track changes over time in their desires, their aspirations, and their attitudes towards various aspects of the country in which they live.

The study is important because these teenagers and young adults will be the shapers of the Israeli society of the future. Presumably, the traits, aspirations, and desires that they express in the study will have a substantial impact on Israel in the coming years.

In addition to worrisome data, such as indications of growing differences and polarization between groups of Israeli teens, there are findings that attest to the youngsters' aspiration to live full, productive lives as adults in society (e.g., the importance that they ascribe to building a happy family and acquiring higher education).

In addition, the study shows a significant degree of involvement and desire to participate in and contribute to the society in which we live (as manifested in the substantial percentages of youngsters, both Jews and Arabs, who are now or were at one time involved in volunteer or public activity).

An in-depth analysis of the findings indicates an urgent need to pay

special attention to these teenagers and young adults, to have discussions with them, to initiate and maintain a dialogue that can influence their views, to enable them to realize their personal aspirations to the best of their ability, and to encourage them to take part and be involved in the social and public fabric of Israeli society. Strengthening the backbone of Israeli youth and molding their personal identity are pressing needs. After all, it will be up to them to form the basis for a robust Israeli society in all senses in the coming years. A conscientious society that engages in normative, principled behavior – the sort of society that influences community life in all ways.

As minister of social affairs and social services, I cannot ignore the fact that when we discuss the various segments of the teenage population and the aspects of life covered in this study, we often neglect a certain group of girls and boys with whom I have become more intimately acquainted, sometimes on a personal level, in my years as minister of social affairs: girls and boys at risk.

Youth at Risk: Background

These boys and girls are represented in all segments of the population: native Israeli Jews, recent immigrants, *haredim*, and Arabs. Their problems and hardships make it difficult for them to formulate their own viewpoints, take action to realize their personal aspirations, and play a significant part in society on the individual and public levels. The information gathered on these youngsters indicates that a significant percentage (16%) of Israeli teens aged 12–18 (more than 100,000) are at risk, and this is a warning sign – one that must not be ignored!

These boys and girls became the focus of public attention in the late 1980s as a result of several incidents that received extensive media coverage and made the public and policymakers aware of the difficulties and dangers faced by these children and teenagers. Over the years, in the wake of studies and incidents indicating that this was a growing phenomenon, there has been a turnaround in the thinking about this group as an integral part of the population of children and teenagers in Israel.

The focus is on concern for the children themselves and their family members, as individuals who need assistance, based on their unique needs in coping with difficulties in all areas of life: physical survival, health and development, a sense of belonging to a family, learning and acquisition of skills, well-being and emotional health, a sense of belonging to society, involvement in society, protection from others, and protection from their own dangerous behaviors.

The challenge that I faced when I took on the position of minister of social affairs and social services four years ago focused on meeting the needs of youth at risk and in crisis. I had to institute a long-term strategic action plan to reduce the prevalence of risk and crisis as much as possible and reintegrate the children and teenagers in normal, normative life.

The plan, known as "The National Program for Children and Youth at Risk," was launched four years ago by the Ministry of Social Affairs together with partners in the ministries of Education, Health, Immigrant Absorption, and Public Security. It is one of the flagships of my ministry's work to this day.

There are many ways of viewing states of risk among children and teenagers, and each professional is inclined to see them from the perspective of his or her own field. For instance, most educators characterize boys and girls at risk primarily based on school attendance: those who attend school versus those at risk who drop out of school. Workers in the health system tend to view states of risk in terms of behaviors that are hazardous to health: involvement in dangerous actions, or use and consumption of alcohol or drugs. People in the social services focus more intently on the social situation of these boys and girls, their involvement in deviant behaviors such as crime, running away, or vagrancy, and their relationships with their families. All these perspectives share the understanding that youth at risk are boys and girls who are not exercising the rights assured them by the international Convention on the Rights of the Child to grow, develop, acquire skills, participate, and feel a sense of belonging to society. Many of them are also exposed to danger from others (abuse or neglect) or as a result of

their own behaviors (e.g., in the case of drug users or juvenile delinquents).

The National Program for Children and Youth at Risk currently operates in 72 local authorities throughout the country, with preference for socioeconomically weak localities. In all of the program localities, a survey of all children and teenagers at risk was carried out – for the first time in Israel – giving us a close-up look at their needs and difficulties.

An in-depth examination of the survey data shows a problematic social situation among Israeli youth. Sixteen percent of them will have a very hard time realizing their expectations of a happy family, higher education, and involvement and influence in society. These children and teenagers basically have no solid anchor on which to rely and do not receive the support they need from the people around them. They have no place where they can experience success and accomplishment. Instead, in many cases they experience failure, alienation, and loneliness.

Continuing to neglect this group of youngsters is dangerous because, without treatment and outside involvement, they will enter adult life in despair and frustration, not believing that they can succeed or exert an influence. They will pass these feelings on further, as parents who produce the next generation of youth at risk. I believe that many youth at risk have little contact with other Israeli teens – and those who do have contact with them are perceived as abnormal.

Altogether, some 151,000 children and teenagers at risk were identified in the localities in which the program operates, one-third of them boys and girls aged 12–18 and the others younger. The proportions among Arabs and immigrants are higher than among native Israeli Jews. In addition, the proportion among boys is higher than among girls (60% of teens at risk are boys).

The most frequent difficulties experienced by boys and girls at risk fall into two categories, which the survey found to be extremely important to teenagers and young adults: Some 75% of youth at risk are contending with difficulties in their relationships with their parents and their parents' attitudes towards them. A similar percentage (70%) have difficulty in school and with the acquisition of skills: although few of those identified actually drop out of school, about a third are frequently absent and half of them have low

academic achievements. About half of the boys and girls at risk have social and emotional difficulties.

The survey data also indicate that the risk among teenagers is generally manifested in difficulties and problems in multiple aspects of life. Half of them experience problems and difficulties in the family, in school, and in their social and emotional life.

The situation report on youth at risk leaves us no choice but to do all we possibly can to extricate them from the state of risk and crisis and give them the opportunity to be treated as the equals of everyone else, exercise their rights, and succeed in the future. This is a basic obligation incumbent on everyone who seeks to create a healthy society and a state that strives for justice and equal opportunity.

Consequently, the government has resolved to invest special funding and resources in this program: a multiyear budget of NIS 155 million per year. As I see it, the program is creating a genuine revolution whose achievements will not be measurable for another decade. Future governments, whoever they may comprise, must do nothing to harm the program, cut its budget, or eliminate it. It is essential to ensuring the next generation and is especially benefiting teens at risk from underprivileged population segments and disadvantaged localities.

The Present Study and Youth at Risk

With respect to the study to which this article responds, youth at risk are often ignored by surveys and studies on the views and attitudes of youngsters, despite constituting a significant proportion of the Jews, Arabs, and other groups in Israeli society. A review of the needs of teens at risk indicates that unless they are identified and given assistance in a variety of aspects of life, they will be unable to realize the expectations that are so important to all Israeli youngsters: building a happy family and acquiring an education. Moreover, they will have difficulty playing a significant part in and contributing to the development of Israeli society.

In recent decades, Israeli society seems to have changed. Haze and confusion have developed.

I have been saying for a long time that we are no longer a "chosen people." Values have lost their force among many people, and instead of a society striving to fulfill a Zionist vision based on social solidarity, we have become a society in which individual needs take absolute priority over the community and the majority. We have become a more individualistic, less idealistic society. But most of all, violence has become a prevailing norm in all walks of daily life. Patience and tolerance of differences have lost their significance. The result has been polarization and greater disparities between groups and sectors, between periphery and center, between poor and rich, between religious and secular, and between recent immigrants and native Israelis.

These changes have penetrated deep into all strata of society, leaving a profound impression on today's youth. We have excellent young people – much more curious, eager to participate, exert an influence, and be a part of what is happening in the country. They are even prepared to assume personal responsibility.

But unfortunately, many young people are confused. They seem to have lost their way. Some of them have become shallow and desensitized. A major contributing factor in this regard is the ratings culture that dominates the television screens. The public discourse has deteriorated, focusing on hedonism and emphasizing alienation. The new cultural heroes produced by reality shows have shunted aside the heroes of the past: intellectuals, authors, artists, and great leaders.

Politics in Israel and abroad has also had a major influence on the youth. In this context, too, confusion abounds, placing many at a crossroads where they are looking for a path to follow and sometimes leading to radicalization.

But most important of all, in my opinion, is the rift between parents and children in all segments of society. Such a rift is no doubt natural in adolescence, a stage on the road to independence and one's own separate identity. But I believe, especially based on my personal observations as a parent and a public figure who meets parents and their children, that this rift has deepened in recent years.

Specifically, openness with children and the discomfiture and helplessness that parents feel about their status make the parents less significant in the eyes of their adolescent children. We are paying a price for this openness. Parental authority is suffering. Parents do not notice distress signals. They listen less, are less alert, and do not always probe thoroughly. Dialogue has turned into "tie-breaking" wars and sometimes even leads to extreme acts. This situation poses complex challenges – first and foremost the need to identify what has gone wrong.

I believe that most Israeli teenagers love the country in which they live. But then they face a question: What is the country? Where are its borders? And the argument quickly spills over into the public and political debate. On issues such as security, education, immigrant absorption, and assistance for the weak, I am sure that young people are willing to get involved - if only we help them, define the areas of activity for them, give them a hand, and show them the way. If only we emphasize to them the value of contributing to the group, to society, to the community. Not at the expense of the "self" but on the contrary, based on the idea that one who gives actually gains. When they seek their way alone, they are likely to go astray, and then the way back is much, much harder. Our goal as parents, as a community, as a society, and certainly as public figures is to instill the principle of equality without giving up on diversity, because this is the soul of our culture and our freedom. In the past 60 years, we have experienced tremendous, glorious achievements. But we face very tough questions that cannot be swept under the carpet. Questions of ideology, Zionism, mutual responsibility, tolerance, public and individual integrity, social polarization, and the generation gap. And the youth are the ones who are expected to cope with these weighty questions and find answers. No wonder they sometimes flee.

So what should we do? We should be strong and reinforce the principle of our shared destiny. We should work hard on a daily basis to enable all Israeli youngsters to express themselves freely and achieve self-actualization. It is important to expose youth to involvement, responsibility, ethics, and mobilization on behalf of others. To make it clear to them that Israel is a

Jewish, Zionist, and democratic state, a multicultural state that gathers in exiles and strives to close gaps. To warn them of the dangers that lurk. Not to see them as living in their own bubble. To view them as an integral part of Israeli society, to include them as much as possible. To internalize that they are winners.

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Chapter 8

The Young Generation's Vision: What Kind of Country Would They Like Israel to Be?

MK Michael Eitan, Minister

Thirty years have passed since I finished serving as chairman of Herut Youth and Likud Youth, and to this day I see myself as a disciple of Ze'ev Jabotinsky and Menachem Begin, the founders of the liberal Jewish nationalist movement. When asked recently to respond to the results of a survey of the young generation's views on various political and social issues, it occurred to me that then, too, when I was young, studies were published from time to time showing "extremist" views among young people on the very same issues: doubts as to the effectiveness of democracy, a yearning for strong leadership, disparities between religious and secular Jews, lack of faith in the possibility of peace with our enemies, and mutual hostility between young Jewish and Arab Israeli citizens. I reminded myself that my views on various topics have changed over the years (as has the situation around us). I warned myself that the generation gap may affect the attitudinal gap for better or worse. And after all that, when I peeked at the questions and answers, at the unresolved conflicts, at the views of young Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel in 2010, I wondered whether the young people of today, too, are destined to read similar results of an identical study fifty years from now. And perhaps even worse, can anyone guarantee that the destructive potential bottled up in these attitudes will not explode and demolish the foundations of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state even before then, levying a price in blood?

I hope young people today in all sectors of the population read the writing on the wall and realize that the greatest challenge for their generation is to show that this country can enable all its citizens to live full, complete lives, as *haredi* Jewish Israelis or as secular Jewish Israelis, as Muslim Israelis or as Christian or Arab Israelis, as supporters of the left or the right, as immigrants or natives – all under the rubric of the State of Israel. I wish them success where my generation and I have failed: preserving the Jewish state. I was pleased to read that the survey found the Jewish character of the State of Israel to be growing stronger among young people. The Jews are a people with a rich history and heritage, a long chain of generations dispersed around the world who have faced persecution and attempts at annihilation in almost every generation. When I close my eyes and think about the most important element in my collective identity, it is that we - the present link in this chain - can be proud to have had the privilege of having the State of Israel established in accordance with a United Nations resolution as a state in which the Jewish people would enjoy the natural right of every nation to sovereignty in its homeland. This resolution was not accepted by our enemies, and sometimes even our fellow Jews do not recognize this basic right. There are those who reject Judaism as a nation and define it merely as a religion, while others claim that our nationhood does not necessitate political sovereignty as the other nations have. In this context I see national education as an important factor in the preservation of the national collective identity and in the right to self-determination in an independent political entity in the Land of Israel. This is an important challenge. Unfortunately, although it is such a natural, simple matter for the English, the French, the Germans, and others, we have to struggle for it and will have to continue to do so in the future. Our ability to prevail in this struggle against those who have plagued our nation on various pretexts throughout history depends first and foremost on our determination and our persistence in working toward this common goal.

The State of Israel was established by virtue of the natural right of the Jewish people and by dint of international recognition, including a United Nations resolution to establish a Jewish state in the Land of Israel. My generation's parents lived in one of the most important eras in the long,

unique history of the Jewish people. They lived at a time when the nation experienced the calamity of the Holocaust and the miracle of political rebirth. They worked and fought to liberate the country, to proclaim independence, to absorb immigrants, to build up and develop the land, to make the country prosper, and to fortify the state against unceasing attempts to wipe it out as a sovereign Jewish entity and to expel its inhabitants.

My generation has been forced time after time to contend with the issue of the right of the Jewish people to an independent Jewish state in the Land of Israel. It is clear to everyone that France is the land of the French, and no one denies that the French state is entitled to preserve French heritage and culture. The same is true of the English, the Germans, and other nations. In recent years, all Israeli governments have recognized the right of the Palestinian Arabs to self-determination in the Land of Israel. But when the right of the Jews to have a Jewish state in the Land of Israel comes up, people call it into question, coming up with various theses to explain why the Jews have no right to an independent nation-state in their historical homeland. Unfortunately, the demand that all reference to Jewish nationhood be eliminated from the basic principles of the State of Israel is expressed not only by foreigners and enemies but by people in our midst who want to define Israel as the state of all its citizens instead of a Jewish state.

I am not ignoring all the questions that arise when we define Israel as a Jewish state. Can a state be Jewish? And if so, how is this manifested? Should the concept of Jewishness be defined on the basis of religious beliefs? National affiliation? Can religion be separated from the Jewish nation-state? And if we have difficulty defining who is a Jew, how can we define the Jewishness of the state? But it is impossible in a survey, as a research instrument, to address the complexity of the issues. They all become dichotomous: either Jewish or democratic.

One of the important tasks of the young generation is to create a broad consensus regarding principles that will enable Israel to endure as a Jewish state, a state in which Jewish nationhood is combined with Jewish religious values by means of compromise. The religious constitution that the Jewish people accepted at Mt. Sinai cannot serve as the constitution of the State of Israel insofar as it is a democracy, but on the other hand Israel as a Jewish state

cannot be apathetic to that religious, national, and historical constitution and to the results of its development with the aid of the Oral Law and *halacha* over the generations. In the course of history, religious and national values have become irrevocably intertwined, and our commitment to our Jewish identity mandates that we keep them interconnected through compromise and balancing of the religious and national elements and of the two of them with other values.

A Democratic State

While being pleased at the increased identification with the Jewish character of the state, advocates of liberalism cannot help but lament undemocratic attitudes that are beyond the pale.

Modern democracy is undergoing a radical change. Against the backdrop of disillusionment resulting from the horrific acts perpetrated in the name of the majority in the previous century and the alienation felt by the public in many democracies from the political parties and politicians who represent them, the global democratic discourse is now focusing not on government by the people but on protection of human rights and the rights of minorities from the arbitrariness of the majority or those speaking in its name. Bills of rights and covenants on human and civil rights are being adopted by national legislatures in all democratic countries and by international legislative bodies, bringing about a constitutional regime that includes judicial review of government actions, insofar as they infringe on human rights and the rights of minorities. In addition to judicial review within countries, there are international judicial forums for the protection of human rights.

Churchill described democracy as the worst form of government except for all the other forms. Due to the flaws of democracy, young people are tempted, as expressed in views shown in the study, to prefer some other form of government whose drawbacks they are not aware of. But it is important that we warn ourselves: Democracy cannot be taken for granted. Its existence requires supportive public opinion, a fighting press, elected officials who are committed to it, and a law-enforcement system capable of defending it against its assailants while remaining faithful to the principles of defensive democracy.

The struggle for the democratic character of the state is a daily one,

manifested in thousands of cases of friction between citizens being turned down by the government when they insist on exercising their rights, or cases in which the government unlawfully demands that citizens carry out or refrain from carrying out acts, while wrongly infringing on protected human and civil rights. Almost every country in the democratic world has a written constitutional document that includes a bill of human and civil rights. The written constitution or bill of rights is of educational importance; all citizens learn it from a young age and internalize its principles, and it forms one of the anchors of democracy.

Israel has neither a written constitution nor a bill of rights. Since the establishment of the state, Israeli democracy has awaited a constitution. The basic laws have created a constitutional regime based at best on a crippled constitution, as attempts to draft a constitution (including an unprecedented effort by the Law Committee that I personally led when I chaired the committee) have thus far failed.

I call on the young generation to take action to establish a constitution in Israel. The difficulties in establishing a constitution are not insignificant, and the constitution itself will not resolve the disputes between Jews and Arabs or between secular and religious Jews. Nevertheless, a constitution can bring about important agreement on the rules of the game and the boundaries of the disputes. The struggles will continue to be waged but in a controlled fashion, and with emphasis on elements of the constitution and bill of rights that pertain to us all.

The constitution should also delineate protected Jewish principles, such as the Law of Return, language, Jewish festivals and holidays, and kashrut in public institutions. In addition, the constitution should grant minorities recognition not only of their personal right to full equality but also their collective right to cultivate their language, culture, heritage, and religion, and it should respect their festivals.

The process of establishing a constitution should be a dialogue between all segments of the population, and should tackle topics that have so far not been addressed. Perfect solutions will not be found for all of them, but, as stated, rules will be laid down for further discussion and decision-making on issues pertaining to the various rifts in Israeli society.

A constitution must also address social issues. The state should encourage entrepreneurship and free competition and limit government involvement to regulation, which is important, but which should primarily be smart regulation rather than involvement by the government itself in the economy. However, the government must intervene when it comes to reducing disparities and maintaining reasonable disparities between low-income populations and those that have earned much more. The country's ability to thrive depends on its ability to include everyone in the shared life of the citizenry, while making sure that minorities can exercise their right to civic equality and maintain their culture and traditions. The young generation must establish a constitution for the State of Israel. Nevertheless, a constitution will not resolve the disagreements.

The information age that is just beginning provides means that never existed previously for creating innovative dialogue between citizens and government. Information technology now makes it possible to infuse content into a new kind of democracy based on the principles of open government: transparency, accountability, and public participation. The legal status of the individual versus the government has also changed within countries and in international law. The level of development of information technology is directly related to the quality of democracy and to governmental willingness to use the technology. These two are also important components of the economic potential of the state of the future.

When I started reading the results of the study, I warned myself that to a certain extent the differences in attitudes are a reflection of the generation gap. Young people tend to be more extreme in their views and eager to fight for what they believe in, whereas adults are battle-weary and have learned from experience, and therefore they are more moderate in their views and more willing to compromise.

Or is it objective reality that has changed over the decades, therefore mandating a change in views? Perhaps it is simply that the young people are capable of freeing themselves from the chains of ideology in view of changing circumstances. Perhaps young people are able to detect the new winds blowing and be open to their influences. One way or the other, if I had the opportunity today to write an updated, revised edition of our roots and our

future, how would I express the Likud Youth's vision of Israeli society and the Israeli state in 2060? In what kind of State of Israel would I want to live fifty years from now if I were twenty years old today?

In 1980, Herut Youth were still vacillating, under my leadership, over how to preserve the idea of a Jewish state extending over both banks of the Jordan River. As the song said, "This one is ours; that one is, too." In contrast, recently, thirty years later, I sent a letter to the members of the Likud central committee – young and old – about the need to adopt the Netanyahu policy of two states for two peoples. Thirty years later, we have adjusted the goals of the liberal national movement to changed circumstances, and as a result the Likud chairman and the prime minister declared a policy of striving for peace based on agreement on two states for two peoples – or more accurately, three states (Jordan, Palestine, and Israel – the Jewish democratic state) on the two sides of the Jordan.

The study in the book looks at the young people of today in terms of issues related to our overall vision of the kind of state we want Israel to be. I would like to conclude my article with my own vision:

- In terms of the conflict with the Palestinians, from my present perspective looking ahead, I see no way of resolving the conflict without territorial compromise. We have to make every effort, but to stop short of jeopardizing the very survival of the state. Under these constraints, we have to come up with a policy formula and reach a solution of "two states for two peoples," as the prime minister put it. The preliminary basis for discussion is the road map and various proposals put forth by various people, ranging from our American friends to the spokesmen of the Arab League.
- It is important to establish a constitution for Israel that outlines the nature of the relationship between the individual and the public, as well as the relationship between different communities. We have to understand that the rifts and the various communities will not go away on their own. Instead of trying to ignore each other, we would do better to attempt to give each community its own place. Our strength stems from willingness to integrate those who are different, maintain cooperation between communities, and reduce tensions.

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We must instill democratic values through the education system. In addition to dealing with theory, we have to put these values into practice, increasing cooperation between citizens and the state by means of various information technology platforms. Through the information technology revolution, which is still in its infancy, we can create advanced patterns of relationships between citizens and the state and among citizens.

- On the socioeconomic level, in the age of the global economy the state faces the challenge of encouraging entrepreneurship and free competition, while developing a regulatory system for the market and corporations. In addition, the government must find ways of reducing disparities, which have grown in recent decades and are leading to friction and lack of social solidarity.
- Finally, there is the vision of a Jewish state the place where we preserve our historical heritage, i.e., what we have to say as a Jewish people within our own state. We have to realize that we cannot exist as a halachik state, but neither can we ignore the Jewish character of our state, just as France has a French character and Germany has a German character. And Israel, like the other nation-states, must protect the rights of minorities and enable them to preserve their culture. One of the greatest challenges of the Jewish state is to show that this country can enable minorities to live full, complete lives both as Israelis and as Muslim Israelis, as Christian or Arab Israelis, under the rubric of the State of Israel. This is no simple challenge, but it is part of the overall vision.

Chapter 9

Attitudes and Identity of Ethiopian Youth in Israel

MK Shlomo Molla

I immigrated from Ethiopia to Israel as a 16-year-old boy in 1984, in Operation Moses, arriving after a grueling 780-km walk through the deserts of Sudan without my family.

In my experience, when we discuss the consolidation of the identity of Ethiopian youth, it is hard to describe the process as monolithic. Youngsters from Ethiopia undergo complex social and cultural changes that often result in a rift within the family, confusion, and loss of the self. Growing up in the midst of the immigration process leads to highly complicated situations. The absence of the familiar environment and the encounter with a foreign, alien environment, combined with language difficulties, cause Ethiopian teens in Israel to feel hurt and alone, different, unwanted, and rejected, in addition to having to contend with stereotypes regarding their black skin.

Our integration posed a complex Zionist challenge for the Israeli government and society and was a test of honor for all of Israeli society. Our new circumstances in Israel presented us with complicated challenges on our way to integrating in Israeli society. The tribulations of absorption that we experienced and that some of us are still experiencing have been more complex than for other immigrants: cultural and family codes disintegrated all at once, and conflicts between the rural tradition and the modern world intensified. The social and cultural gap and unclear identity have caused adjustment difficulties, manifested in part in a significant number of school dropouts, the collapse of the family hierarchy, delinquency, and sometimes even domestic violence.

Jewish families in Ethiopia had a clear patriarchal structure. Few children in

rural areas went to school, but they were expected to help out around the house and with the functioning of the family. The cultural codes were clear: a child would never disobey an adult and would not even look an adult straight in the eye. When we moved to Israel, everything turned upside-down. The teenagers for the most part are now the anchors of the family. They have to solve their problems on their own, earn their own living, and sometimes even support their families. Their families cannot provide them with a safety net because, in most cases, the parents and others around them are busy struggling to survive and integrate in Israel.

The consolidation of the identity and attitudes of Ethiopian teens occurs late. Ethiopian youngsters start out behind their native Israeli counterparts.

When I moved to Israel as an adolescent, I was confused, lost, and suffering from an identity crisis, but like many other young people, I also had a fierce desire to integrate. Society did not always make us feel welcome, and sometimes we encountered closed doors. We had to constantly prove ourselves and close huge social disparities.

Even today, Ethiopian youngsters face racism, whether or not they were born in Israel. Usually it is because of their black color, which they sometimes consider an obstacle to integration, even after 30 years of Ethiopian Jewry in Israel.

The State of Israel is measured socially not only by its integration of new immigrants but also by its ability to assimilate the culture and tradition that they bring with them. In the past, a melting-pot policy prevailed here. There was one culture, the Israeli-sabra culture, and everyone who came had to adopt it. The melting-pot policy erased cultures of origin in the name of the collective. Thus immigrants' names were changed, and their origins and all the traditions on which they had grown up were shunted aside until they virtually disappeared.

Young Ethiopian Immigrants and the Study Findings

I will qualify my remarks by saying that everything stated here about young people from Ethiopia and their attitudes is based not on a representative sample but on an understanding of and intimate acquaintance with the Ethiopian way of life and culture.

Questions of attitudes and opinions on issues that affect the individual personally are relevant to everyone in every stage of life, and in my opinion the answers will be identical. In this respect, young people from Ethiopia are no different in their goals and aspirations from others their age. They want to get an education, earn a good living, build a home, and start a family. The vast majority are rather optimistic about their chances of achieving their goals. However, the path to doing so is complicated and full of obstacles because they tend to start out behind others and come from a disadvantaged environment. In many of their families, neither parent is employed, so the young people do not have a positive role model for integration in society. In addition, society associates certain stereotypes and negative images with the Ethiopian immigrants. The result of all this is a crisis of confidence between the young people and Israeli society, and this crisis is exacerbated by the lack of a sense of belonging and loss of a sense of self-worth.

Nevertheless, many young people from Ethiopia will continue to aspire and want to do their part, will remain loyal to the state, and will want to serve in combat units and defend the country.

As for the issue of home, the Ethiopian Jews grew up on the idea of "Jerusalem of Gold" as the home of the Jewish people. They therefore have no doubt that, despite everything, Israel is the home of the Jews because the Jews have no other country.

With respect to religion and tradition, the Ethiopian immigrants tend to be traditional-religious and maintain that each person should live in accordance with his or her own beliefs. Over the years in Israel, many young people have chosen a secular way of life, but without giving up on Jewish traditions and customs such as a religious Jewish wedding and circumcision.

Like everyone else, young Ethiopian immigrants are exposed to and affected by the media, despite claims that the media love to present negative stories about the Ethiopian community. When we look back over the years at how the Ethiopian immigrants have been portrayed in the media, we can definitely say that they have not been given the respect they deserve. Unquestionably, the community is often mentioned in negative contexts: juvenile delinquency, drugs, domestic violence, poverty, neediness, and discrimination. The media have a significant role to play because they not only report and reflect reality, but also

create reality by establishing social patterns. If the media gave more space and more prominence to various populations that make up the Israeli social mosaic, without labeling or stereotyping, it would contribute to solidarity and to the integration in society of those who are different. The Israeli political system is completely different from the American one, for example. The Israeli system of government has no mechanism to provide for a substantive discussion of objectives, goals, and visions. In Israel, elections are still decided on the basis of the diplomatic and security platform; social affairs are marginal.

The Ethiopian Jews came to Israel because of their Zionist, ideological, and religious attachment to the country. In the elections, therefore, they vote on the basis of ideology and do not follow a candidate blindly like sheep. Ethiopian immigrants, including the young people, are an integral part of the debate over current issues: dividing Jerusalem, returning the Golan Heights, the peace process, Israeli political culture, and so on.

Over the years, relations between Ethiopian immigrants and the right-wing parties in the Israeli parliament have turned out to be complex. Most Ethiopian immigrants identify with the Likud. Aside from the ethnic and protest issue, there is a sense of loyalty to the party that headed the government that enabled the Ethiopian Jews to come to Israel in the 1980s. But the Ethiopian immigrants, including the young people – who are deeply involved in Israeli society and politics – are no longer bound to one party. Like many people in the various segments of society, they are becoming apathetic to politics and political activity due to the tough socioeconomic conditions that the young people have encountered.

Today, the young people, like their elders, examine each party and its leader and seek the leader who will bring about socioeconomic change in Israeli society, and of course greater security as well. Therefore young Ethiopian Israelis (and not only the young people) are not committed exclusively to parties on the right (the Likud, for our purposes); they will consider and even vote for a party identified as being in the center/left of the political map.

In the most recent elections, many Ethiopian immigrants voted for Kadima, a centrist party, for two reasons. One was my realistic candidacy and the desire to have an Ethiopian immigrant in the Knesset. The other was

the high esteem in which much of the Ethiopian community holds Kadima chair Tzipi Livni.

On the whole, Ethiopian immigrants are traditional-religious and liberal. Consequently, few will vote for extremist parties at either end of the spectrum. Shas, for example, will receive a handful of votes from families that became *haredi* in Israel and attended the party's schools and yeshivas. In addition, some will vote for Shas because it suits their social and ideological views and because of Rabbi Ovadia Yossef's ruling in 1973, when he was chief rabbi, that the Ethiopian Jews are unquestionably Jewish and should be brought to Israel.

Will there be an "Obama effect" in Israel, enabling dark-skinned people to achieve positions that were previously closed to them? I believe that even without such an effect, Ethiopian Jews have great potential to integrate and succeed in politics.

The Ethiopian community has to assume responsibility for its success. The community members must become more politically knowledgeable and involved and must develop a suitable political and strategic infrastructure. We have to invest in long-term political infrastructure with new, young candidates from the community, in order to be part of Israeli political activity and influence Israeli politics.

Over the years, Israeli society lost its social solidarity. We now seem to live in a judgmental society, where people who are different are not accepted – a society that is not egalitarian or pluralistic.

I have no doubt that if young Ethiopian Jews are given the opportunity to prove themselves in all areas of life, being judged solely by their talents and not the color of their skin, all of Israeli society will benefit.

I believe that the solution lies in education, in teaching active citizenship and taking responsibility, in allocating the appropriate resources and designing culturally appropriate programs with emphasis on sensitivity to cultural characteristics, educating for harmony and solidarity, for tolerance and patience. All these will help the youth consolidate their identity and attitudes and build up their self-confidence.

Chapter 10

Youth at Performances of "Hadag Nahash": The Law of Conservation of Energy

Sha'anan Street

"What happened to all the enthusiasm? Where did the energy disappear to?" I find myself wondering about these and other questions whenever I think about the essential contradiction between the audience reaction at performances of the Hadag Nahash (The Snake-Fish) Band (of which I'm a member) and the day-to-day reality in Israel, a reality I always feel is stuck in the same place, certainly as far as the "core issues" are concerned.

I founded the "Hadag Nahash" band together with a few friends back in 1996. I'd be exaggerating if I wrote that we founded the band out of a sense of rebellion, because there were a lot of reasons behind the five of us (that was then; now there are six of us) getting together to write and perform songs together (the foremost being the simple fact that "we felt it" - I mean, we enjoyed making music together). But still, there's no doubt that one thing that motivated us already back then - and to this day this is something we stand for - was to address the political and social situation in Israel from a point of view that we consider honest. In other words, we wanted to react to what was happening around us and be involved. We didn't want to ignore it and be content with surrounding ourselves with an aura of nothing but art. To live in a bubble didn't suit us. Over the years we wrote, recorded, and released to the radio songs with loaded subjects that weren't particularly "pop-like," like social and economic gaps, reservations we have about basic Zionist concepts, alternative heroism, violence against women, accidents in the IDF, the Jerusalem question, migrant workers, the culture of government, and more. Besides, like many other artists, we have our peace songs too.

At the beginning of this year, we released our sixth CD which, in the best tradition of "Hadag Nahash" includes a lot of songs with a political/social message. Towards the end of the year, I can look back and say with pride that 2010 was our best year yet. Our new CD sold more than 20,000 copies, which gives it "gold CD" status, and three different songs were in first place in the "Top of the Pops" (and another placed second). On top of that, we were chosen "The Year's Best Ensemble" on all the music stations on the radio, TV, and Internet. But we feel the biggest difference in our concerts. I'm counting my words here as I write, partly because I don't want to brag or to jinx it, but I think it's safe to say we've never had such success before in our concerts. We always had a following, and for years our concerts have been going over very well, but there's something different this year. This year we're selling lots more tickets, and I feel this audience knows us and sings our songs along with us much more than in the past.

And what do those songs that reached the top of the charts say? What are the words that the CD-buying audiences at our concerts sing with such spirit? "My taxes pay for weapons and I look through their sights,"²¹ for example, or "I believe that there's no equality here, that racism inside of us will lead to a disaster,"²² or "Aren't our border war and the violence that's paralyzing us connected?²³ And sometimes, right there on the stage, I observe the audience singing with us and listen to them, and sometimes I can hardly believe it! What happened to that passion? How did that critical energy disappear, and where to? All those throats prove there are so many who are with it, so why can't we detect the slightest sign of change? Actually, this question bothers me so much that sometimes it finds its way into the songs. For instance, in the song "I Believe," which I quoted a bit from at the start of this paragraph and which came out this year, the refrain is "And nobody gives a shit."²⁴ The stanzas present a long, frustrating litany of perversions, and the refrain already knows nobody really cares.

But energy can't just disappear, that's the way it is, so it's absolutely clear something has to happen to all those "change-supporting feelings" that burst forth so sharply and clearly in "Hadag Nahash" concerts. All that power has to be

^{21.} From "Shir Nehama" ("Comfort Song"), in Hadag Nahash's album "6."

^{22.} From the song "Ani Ma'amin" ("I Believe"), in Hadag Nahash's album "6."

^{23.} From the song "Od Ach Echad" ("One More Brother"), in Hadag Nahash's album "6."

^{24.} From the song "Ani Ma'amin" ("I Believe"), in Hadag Nahash's album "6."

channeled somewhere. It's also clear to us, maybe to our sorrow, that those intense feelings aren't directed toward making any social or political changes on a national scale (for the time being...). The audience sings at the top of their voices about the perversions and breakdowns in their beloved country, and then, within a few hours or days or years, they just stop concerning themselves. So what becomes of all that energy? Where does it go?

I don't have an exact breakdown of the age of our fans, just like I can't know exactly what power drives the hearts and minds of the people who come to our performances. But when I try to guess their age, I estimate that the great proportion fall in the age range covered in the research. And though I don't have any professional training, I think I can take a stab at guessing where they come from and where they're headed.

First, optimism. The research presents findings showing that Israeli youth are basically optimistic. This finding seems very logical to me. One of the things that makes "Hadag Nahash" unique, if I may say so, is in our mixing of messages that are not exactly gentle with music you could definitely label as optimistic. Although I'm sure some of our audience aren't listening to the words at all, I tend to think that's only a small, even a negligible proportion. The rest of our audience listen to the words to varying degrees. Everyone according to his tastes, how interested he is, and his habits. To me there's no question that the fact that "Hadag Nahash's" music is lilting and optimistic is a real key element of our general appeal. When people come to a "Hadag Nahash" concert, they're coming to a party, never mind the words.

When I think about our hit songs, it's easy for me to see that the vast majority make some social or political statement. This statement, even if it's not consensual, doesn't keep the song from succeeding. It's also clear that in certain cases there's nothing "threatening" in the main message. Take for example the songs about economic gaps and poverty. The research findings show that many adolescents think the government's lack of concern for the weak strata of society threatens the country's future. All the same, it's absolutely clear that if some young person takes up the cause of forces (or ideas, or songs) that support increasing the state's responsibility toward its weakened citizens, there's nothing defiant or dangerous about that. Thus, at one and the same time, some young person can identify with an alternative position and also not go too far out on a

limb. On the other hand, some of the songs, especially those dealing with peace and security, present more provocative positions. We manage to get these songs and this material across, in my humble opinion, to a great extent thanks to the same optimism we've been talking about.

As far as matters of the integration of Arab citizens in Israeli society go and how much they feel they belong, the research presents a picture that's complex. The impression a person gets from reading the research findings will be that the issue of the belonging and integration of Israeli Arab citizens remains unsolved. On the one hand, most of the young Arabs want very much to find the path that leads to integration. But on the other hand, it can't be denied that there's a deeply rooted isolation among the Arab population in Israel. "Hadag Nahash" is very aware of this dissonance. We've known for a long time that we're considered popular among young Israeli Arabs. We've got hundreds, if not thousands, of Facebook friends with Arab names, some of them very active. We've appeared at many events related to co-existence, peace, equality, and activism. Last year we even won the first Activism Prize.

Yet in our 15 years as a band, as much as we wanted to, we've never performed in an Arab city. Not only that – as far as I can remember, no Arab body has ever even asked us to appear. The only time there was any official interest was when we appeared at an event that kicked off the opening of "Midron Yafo," [the Jaffa Slope Park project] and our booking agent told us ceremoniously that the reason we were chosen to appear had to do with the fact that both the Jews and the Arabs of Jaffa are fans of ours. In short, although we feel that some of our work is penetrating, my feeling is it's as if the Arab youth are saying, "We love what you're doing, but we don't want anyone to know it."

Other elements from the research that resonated with me were the overwhelming sense (among Jewish youth) that Israel is their only home, how important human rights are to our youth, and their tremendous interest in the news. Regarding the home issue, I feel a bit strange tooting our own horn, even though that's what I'm supposed to be doing, but let's say it's happened more than once that I've read reviews of "Hadag Nahash" saying that even the most uncompromising things we say ultimately come from a place of caring. From a place of love. From a place where for us this country is home.

On the subject of human rights, the main thing I think of isn't a song, but

something we were involved in. A few years ago there was a huge outcry over the gay parade in Jerusalem. When the initial storm subsided, two things were clear. First: the parade that was planned was turned into a kind of rally inside a closed stadium. And second: all the artists who were scheduled to appear at the parade bowed out, apparently because they were afraid. All the artists, except for "Hadag Nahash." Another thing worth mentioning is that there are a lot of references in our songs to recreational drugs and their use, which is a classic case of "human rights." And as for young people's great interest in the news, to be perfectly honest, I don't think there's a single other band right now in Israel with material more "news-based" than "Hadag Nahash," certainly not in the mainstream. Like I've already said, "Hadag Nahash" has always been interested in responding in some way to the socio-political events in Israel. Of course a "Hadag Nahash" disc is a far cry from a news broadcast, but relating to the "situation" has always been a big part of who we are.

But of course the research findings don't include only positions that I agree with, but also some that are really foreign to "Hadag Nahash" and our material. Most striking of these: the way that Jewish youth overwhelmingly favor security needs over democracy; the inadequate importance that Jewish youth give to full political equality for all segments of the population; the scary belief of 60% of the youths that leaders are more important than laws; and the positive feeling shown by two-thirds of the Jewish youths for the racist idea that Arabs should be forbidden to be members of the Knesset.

And yet, many young people come to our concerts and sing our songs. Now more than ever. But the change isn't visible. Why not? I have a few theories:

1. A decreasing minority. With all due respect to "Hadag Nahash" and our work, there's no doubt that what's called the "Israeli Left" amounts to a world that's disappearing. Both the research findings and the results of the Knesset elections reinforce this claim. But as I understand it, what's likely to erode the ideology is actually being "stuck" in a group that holds to a minority ideology for a long time. Let's say an adolescent identifies 100% with a certain minority ideology. Word for word. He discovers it at the end of junior high, and he's in the minority. He finishes high school with it, and he's in the minority. Joins the Army

and is discharged holding to that same ideology, and he's in the minority. Enrolls with it in the university – still in the minority. It's logical to assume that at some point he's going to ask himself and those around him why he's so alone with his beliefs? It's no less logical that eventually the answers he gets will erode his worldview, at least to some extent. This is all the more the case when the ideological minority was once a majority but is now steadily shrinking. The student thinks, "If everyone has abandoned ship and I'm the only one who's staying the same as I've always been, I must not have a very good grasp of reality. Everyone else must be right. I guess it's time to grow up."

- 2. "There's nothing and no one to turn to." The Israeli Left has lost its way, leaving the young people who yearn for it anyway in one hopeless situation after another. There are no clear and discernible goals, and no decent leaders. The ideologies floating all around are considered either stale (and therefore minus the tidings that are so eagerly awaited) or too radical (and therefore irrelevant). The leaders are perceived as either part of the old, defeated generation or else as unable to bring about change to the extent necessary.
- 3. Winning is terrific that's another important point. How many victories do you get in this life? When there's ideological fuzziness, whether or not it's intentional, between the segments of the Left that are considered "logical" and the parties of the Center and moderate Right, there will definitely be those who will inch rightward. And why shouldn't they? Winning is great. Even if it's only in elections.
- 4. Volunteerism. Almost 40% of the young people questioned in the survey a surprisingly high and very admirable percentage reported being active now or in the past in a voluntary organization. Indeed, Israel is a place with many unfulfilled needs and, as it turns out, very many people who are willing to help. We have in our midst 45,000 non-profit organizations, and my guess is you can find young people volunteering in almost all of them. First of all, I really salute them. My heart goes out to the volunteers, and I'm proud of all of them. However, such a great number of non-profits and of volunteers has to raise questions. My fear is that such great numbers somehow contribute to the perpetuation of the socio-political deadlock and

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to the fact that there's no striving on the part of the system to resolve core problems. The energy the young people invest in various volunteer efforts could theoretically have been better directed toward swaying the entire system such that all the citizens of the country could feel the impact, and not just the non-profits and those they support. But that isn't what's happening, and somebody's benefiting. On the one hand, there's no question that you have to take off your hat to the masses of volunteers and non-profits that are helping relieve the suffering of too many people in this country. You can try to understand the volunteers from a psychological standpoint too. "I'm a good person," the adolescent says to himself. "I can and want to help, but I also want to see results. I'd much rather volunteer for a non-profit and have something to show for it. That's better than wasting my time working on a systemic level with zero chances of success." These feelings are also supported by the feeling that "whoever saves a life, it is considered as if he saved an entire world." What's the truth? I can't presume to say. It might be true. Maybe all the non-profits and volunteers are eventually going to lead us all in a new, healthier direction. With close to 40% of our youths volunteering or having volunteered, I wouldn't dream of writing such a possibility off.

5. "New Age" – anthroposophy, yoga, vegetarianism, and so on – there are many differences between all these names, but they all have one thing in common: they're all about change, both personal and social. I don't have any data on the numbers of young people who adopt, in varying degrees, one or more New Age systems, but it's my impression that we have a phenomenon here. When someone adopts a specific New Age teaching, just like a political ideology, he can single himself out from other people (and sectors), and also believe he's doing something to mend society. Then too, like in the last item, I feel that many who long for a different society and a different life in our country are channeling their energy in directions that are personal and apolitical. And also, like in the last item, I think it's a distinct possibility that striding in the direction of the New Age isn't the end of the story. We may very possibly see large numbers of New Age youth leading the whole country to a new, healthier place. Time will tell.

Chapter 11

Young Arab Women in Israel: The Impossible Integration of Gender and Ethnicity

Ibtisam Mara'ana

I'll never forget the day I filmed Du'aa, heroine of my film "Lady Kul el-Arab," on her high school graduation ceremony. She was 16 1/2, a lovely Druze girl from the village of Sajur in the North. Her classroom-homeroom teacher was the master of ceremonies. Now, with his students about to go out into the world, he implored them from the podium:

You are now at a crossroads. Each one of you has his dreams, his quirks, his aspirations. Please believe in yourselves, even if others do not believe in you. Your dreams will collide with obstacles. Don't give up. You will always be able to attain your dreams.

Hundreds were at the ceremony – students, parents, people from the community, faculty, and other guests. Everyone applauded enthusiastically at the convincing words of the teacher. Du'aa also listened carefully to what he said, and at the end of the ceremony she celebrated the end of high school with her friends. They danced together, and at the same time parted ways. Some of her girlfriends were already engaged and wanted to get married and start raising a family, and some were thinking about further study. But for most, the future looked less clear.

As a young teen Du'aa had several dreams. One was to become Miss Israel. She set out to make this dream come true. She registered in the Israeli competition and easily passed the initial screening. She also decided that this

was the time to change her name to Angelina, an international name. With this name, she felt closer than ever to realizing her great life's dream: to be Miss Israel, and use that as a springboard to start an international modeling career. Except that all too quickly everything went wrong, and what had been a teenager's dream became the nightmare for a whole community. Angelina, the first Druze woman to take any meaningful steps in the Israeli fashion world, found herself at the heart of a complex conflict, in which the tradition and values of our society collided with her valiant attempt to choose her own way in life.

Within a few days, the lovely young woman found herself sequestered, accompanied by three bodyguards assigned to protect her against three men from the community, who were arrested by the police on suspicion of threatening to murder her.

Ultimately, moments before she might have paid with her life to achieve her modest dream, she decided to withdraw from the competition and returned to her parents' home, frustrated and utterly broken.

To me, Angelina's dream symbolizes the dreams of young Arabs, or to be more precise, of young Arab women. From the moment the dream or the personal vision clashes with or contradicts the values of society, it is likely to become the nightmare of the dreamer and of her society.

A free society encourages its boys and girls from an early age to fashion their own vision and strive to realize it. But it turns out that in the final analysis, not only doesn't Arab society help its young men and women follow new paths; in many cases, with regard to the women, it even inhibits and hinders them in the pursuance of their dreams.

Society prefers to guard its cultural, ethnic, and religious codes and values closely. It would rather preserve traditional gender roles than allow the individual the freedom of self-fulfillment, out of the fear of the agitation and disorder this could cause within society. This is precisely what the conservative Druze community tried to do in the case of Du'aa (Angelina). Society activated all its power to obstruct Du'aa's progress, instead of acting as a stable, supportive base, so that she could successfully cope in the face of the back-biting Israeli society.

Angelina's (Du'aa's) story is one of very many that happens all the time in Arab society, regardless of what religion or customs the woman is following. This society usually acts as a tribal, conservative, patriarchal, survivalist society, with a religious affinity that has been intensifying lately. It is a minority group waging a daily battle against Jewish Israeli society for equal rights and for recognition by the establishment as a national minority group with equal rights in the country.

In general it is easier for me to talk about young women than young men. Through my work as a film director who photographs and documents, I observe from the sidelines and sometimes even intervene. I experience the life paths of the women and how they must cope, an experience that is totally different from that of young Arab men.

From the outset, they consider their status and rights to be inferior to that of the men. From a very young age, they are victims to customs and social values that first and foremost discriminate against them because of their gender identity. They are limited in the choice of their future and in their unfettered ability to mold their dream or their future and turn it into reality. There are two main reasons for this: the first is their gender identity, if we take as an example the choice of a future occupation or professional career. We still see young women continuing to perform the classic roles that have always been meant for girls, like teaching, law, and other occupations recognized and accepted by society, occupations that do not give rise to questions or quandaries in the community.

The liberal professions (for example, arts, acting, film, design, fashion, journalism, advertising, marketing, business, and other areas) remain the secret dreams of very many young women who come up against a lack of support from society, which views these professions as a threat of sorts to the social and family unit, by virtue of their being free professions whose schedules and procedures are completely different from those of the standard professions.

The second reason for the frustration of the dreams of young men as well as young women is limitations in the workplace. Adolescents are well acquainted with the reality of their being a minority group suffering from an inequitable, discriminatory, racist attitude within the country. They are aware

of the fact that certain professions will be closed to them in the future because of their affiliation with an ethnic minority group considered by Jewish Israeli society to be a threat. Actually, from a very early age Arab girls find themselves engaged in conflict on two fronts. They have to cope with the reality of their lives within their society, which does not regard them as having rights equal to their male peers, and also with the reality of their future in a country which does not consider them citizens having rights equal to women in Jewish society.

For example, if we consider an Arab girl who grew up in an inequitable Arab society, perhaps in addition to religious coercion, with a conservative education and rigid social codes, how is this girl to see her future in a country that also discriminates against her because of her ethnic affiliation?

For young women in general, especially if they are Arab, it is much harder to articulate a vision or to dream. Society for the most part acts to suppress their aspirations, and the state helps with the final burial of their dreams and their future. Young Arabs need a tremendous amount of strength, fortitude, and ambition to succeed in realizing their vision in the state of Israel. And young Arab women need the strength of steel and enormous courage to successfully breach the cycles of social and national oppression. Just as the young woman is about to free herself from her bonds and smash through what is walling her in, she is not allowed to forget the prices she may be required to pay for what she is doing. Many elements, pressures, and manipulations will be arrayed against her to remind her just what her place is in society. It doesn't matter the magnitude of her act or the step she has chosen to take; she will have to pay an exorbitant price the moment she decides to act in furtherance of her personal, emotional, and mental needs concerning her private life.

The list of sacrifices is long and varies from one society, religion, and region to the next. But it is always the woman who pay the price; males remain untouched.

Here are some examples of the types of prices the woman pays the moment she deviates from the path her society has marked out for her:

- What will her neighbors and the residents of her village say?
- The "romantic" price ("You will never get married!" "No man will ever want you...").

The stigma of being an "anis" – old maid – an Arabic expression referring to a girl who has passed a certain age, depending on the norms of the period, without having married (I, according to society, have already "earned" this title).

The most difficult price of all is what is called "killing to preserve the family honor," a cruel and despicable price that Arab girls and women continue to pay to this day. These girls are heavily influenced by tactics of intimidation and terror from within society that cast a sinister shadow on the emotional, mental, and of course physical levels of their worlds and lives.

Nearly every Arab girl in Israel is conscious of or has experienced one of these types of intimidation, exerted upon her by her family or her closest circles. Society uses men to activate these mechanisms, but it also uses women, who become an oppressive force against women and are not less aggressive than men. This powerful combined force acts to suppress every personal desire the woman has to act as a free individual, with equal rights and a vision of her own.

A male is not called on to pay any social price, nor does society judge him. The state judges him if or when he commits any offense as a citizen, and he is sometimes forced to pay the price of racism and discrimination directed against him because he is a member of a minority. This is in contrast to young Arab women, who will be judged by and will pay a price to the society to which they have a local, ethno-traditional, and identity-defining affiliation; as citizens, by the state and the establishment; and by the discriminatory and racist Jewish Israeli society.

In my work, when I film mature Arab women who are no longer young girls and I ask them my favorite question – "What are your dreams?" – in most cases the response is silence accompanied by a flood of tears. Sometimes I get the most painful answer of all – "I've forgotten what my dreams are."

In 2000, I established the "Communications and Television" major at the Fureidis Village High School. I taught practical film, and after two years I became a *mechanechet* of a 10th grade class in the school. [The Hebrew

mechanech (male) or *mechanechet* (female) is sometimes translated as 'home room teacher,' but means far more than that – an educator and mentor of the students.] Fureidis is the village I grew up in, so that I was privileged to know every student personally. I was acquainted with the family background of every boy and girl as a consequence of my being a native.

The number of girls studying "Communications and Television" with me was relatively equal to the number of boys, although it was harder for the girls to get their parents' permission for their choice of major. The tremendous gap was noticeable in the class: it was much harder for girls to go out to film or to wander around freely with cameras, and more than once I would contact the parents personally to persuade them to allow their daughter to join the rest of the class on an organized school trip to Haifa to view a film in a movie theater.

Practically everything required that the girls struggle mightily and bravely to combat the rigid conventions and sanctions that are arrayed against them to keep them from carrying out class assignments. A small number would surrender and give in to the social pressures, but a courageous few were actually able to achieve a bit of what they demanded.

After several months of being a *mechanechet* I wrote the following letter, in January 2003, to the school principal:

Dear Principal,

I would like to share with you the thoughts and feelings I have been having lately.

The horizon or the educational vision that I adopted on the day I assumed my job as *mechanechet* of grade 10/04 seems to me today to be further away than ever.

My feeling stems mostly from my sense of profound frustration at seeing the tremendous discrepancy between realizing the vision and the difficult reality in which we all live today.

We can all bear witness that the economic, social, diplomatic/political situation is hard for us all and impacts on the lives of every single one of us as teachers, as well as on our children in school.

This is manifest in a feeling of uncertainty, confusion, and a pessimistic view of the future.

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What I want to know is, how can we help ourselves and them to achieve their vision? Do we even have a vision? Is it something that can be shared? And who is responsible for this vision?

I continued working at the school until 2006, when I resigned from the educational system. My letter testifies that Arab society is trying to develop and to change. It is making great efforts to do so. There are educators, leaders and key people, who are doing a great deal to contribute to society's progress and the future of the youth.

Unfortunately, Israeli policy has been operating for decades and continues systematically to darken the futures and the visions of the key people and of youth in Arab society. Arab society unquestionably has a lot of internal work to do. It must generate great changes in order to fight parochialism, tribalism, and the oppression of women, and to enable and support freedom of the individual so that it is not necessary to pay a social and personal price, such as the price Angelina, for example, had to pay.

On the other hand, it is the state itself that is the strong and the leading link. The state of Israel must give equal rights and opportunities to Arab society. It must regard Arab society as an additional sector capable of contributing to the state. But instead, it regards Arab society as a diseased body, to be severed from the whole of Israeli society.

Chapter 12

Isra-Russian Youth: Post-Israeli Nationalism or Post-Jewish Zionism?

Boris Zaidman

As I approach writing this report on the social, political, and ideological identity of the youth of the Former Soviet Union, I should point out that I am no sociologist, academic and researcher, or expert on surveys. All I am is a writer. And so, thanks to the wisdom of the sponsors (The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and Macro - The Center for Political Economics), I've been asked to write my report from that perspective only. A writer is not a researcher but an observer, sometimes bewildered and amazed at the events around him. A writer, as David Grossman has defined it, is a kind of a "pickpocket." He filches reality; he filches human stories, and concocts a concentrated microcosm of the social phenomena surrounding him. And so, I will summarize even before I begin and say that everything presented to you in this article is a kind of pocket-picking by an obsessive observer, by a lecturer, by a man in almost daily contact with the student population, but one who is not a certified interpreter of local social processes. And obviously, since I dwell within my community, there will always be those who, rightly or not, will refute my arguments, overturn them, and come up with a thesis that is the polar opposite of mine. Especially since this is a report by an immigrant from the FSU about immigrants from the FSU.

The attitudes of the young immigrants from the FSU – today the CIS – who have been living in Israel for a few years are formed quickly and clearly, perhaps too quickly, perhaps with a too-sharply contrasted clarity. The rapid formation of social and political attitudes is generally dictated by the survival instinct. The more subjects on which you form an opinion, and the more quickly, the less

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estranged you will feel, your sense of belonging will grow, and the more quickly you will feel an integral, organic part of the human, social, and geopolitical tapestry to which circumstances have brought you, whether this was your doing or the choice of your parents or your immediate family.

As such, the social assumptions and political attitudes that are formed "instantly" in the minds and spirits of many young people from the CIS may seem at first glance extremely paradoxical (that is, paradoxical as we, veterans or natives of Israel, take their measure). At the same time, the view of the "outsider," not imprisoned or fixated with right- or left-leaning notions, secularism or religiosity, ruler or governed, may have the "freshness" and the objectivity that we, the veterans and the "natives," have lost in the course of our years here.

We may liken how the youth of the CIS express their opinions about "the goings-on in our town" to the child at the court procession pointing and crying out, "Look, guys, the emperor is naked!"

It is not my intention to belittle their ideas about disentangling our social-political messes, since these can also be tested as "finger in the dike" solutions (as long as we're talking about fables and fairy tales), along the lines of the Dutch boy who found the most effective, simple, and quick solution to save the town and its inhabitants.

We will begin with the socio-geopolitical paradox presented by Russian youth, whom I will henceforth refer to as "Russian youth" or simply "Russians," although the label is politically incorrect. The label is, however, an accepted fixture in sectorial Israeli society (and is even accepted among the "Russian" young people themselves, as seen in in-depth interviews – see Chapter 6, "Face to Face: Interviews with Adolescents and Young Adults in Israel").

Most Russian youth crave a government that is secular, but at the same time nationalistic. To the "locals" (as the natives and veteran Israelis are called by the "Russians"), the combination of secularism and nationalism seems a paradox. It could be called a social-political *shatnez* [reference is to a topic in Jewish law, forbidden cloth containing both wool and linen, "mingled stuff"]. After all, the segmentation we are used to is:

- Religious/national/nationalistic/right-wing
- Secular/pluralistic/liberal/left-wing

This segmentation does not apply to Russian youth. The ideological foundation of their education in the period of the Soviet Union was utterly atheistic, and after the death of the Soviet Union, at the birth by Caesarian section of the CIS, it became utterly nihilistic, that is, it was stripped of all ideals. The secularism of the state is indispensable in the eyes of this public, since some of them cope with the question of their very Jewishness, conversion, and citizenship from the moment they arrive here. And they get more than a little "generous help" from the religious-rabbinic Establishment, which was not a factor at all in their former lives (in fact, it did not exist).

On the other hand, the well-known Russian nationalism, pan-Slavism (just like pan-Arabism), has also rooted itself in the hearts of the youth who emigrated from the CIS. While Russian nationalism had existed in the USSR, it was revealed in all its nakedness when that union broke apart. For eight years Russian supremacy was nurtured by that country's president, today the prime minister (and still president, to all intents and purposes) of the Russian Federation – the true "strong man" – Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.

Therefore, upon their arrival, most Russian youth crave a political framework that is at one and the same time secular and nationalist here as well, a stable political framework based, as I see and understand it, on one dominant ruling nation that dictates its agenda to the subordinate minority. Otherwise, the framework would collapse, as it collapsed in the 1990s in the satellite republics of the FSU.

Among the "Russians," the concept of "a state of all its citizens" assumes a significance different from the one that we, veteran Israelis, are accustomed to, because of the Israeli legislation linking citizenship with religious affiliation. Generally, the notion of "a state of all its citizens" is dearer to the hearts of the liberal-pluralist-leftist wing of the Israeli population. Furthermore, this notion is the heart's desire of Israeli Arabs. But astonishingly, the Russian sector, which no one can "fault" for political liberalism and an excess of pluralism, gives its boundless support to the notion. The idea of "a state of all its citizens" is as incontestable to the Russians as it is because it completely cancels out the religion-based superiority of Israeli citizens listed as being Jewish.

It must be taken into account that the first encounter many "Russians"

have with their non-Jewishness only happens on their arrival in Israel! Why is this? The answer is very simple and well-known in the Israeli reality. In the Soviet Union and later in the CIS, the nationality (read "religion") of a person was determined by the father's religious affiliation. This is the exact opposite of the *halachic* [Jewish law] parameter, which dictates that it is actually the Jewishness of the mother that determines her offspring's Jewishness. Patrilineality (as it was practiced in the Soviet Union and today in the CIS and the Russian Federation) was of course adopted from Christianity. Thus, hundreds of thousands from the Soviet Union and the CIS who according to the "Russian" parameter were born Jews suddenly find themselves non-Jews – that is, second-rate citizens, as they see it – when they arrive in Israel, of all places! In their nearly wall-to-wall bias in favor of "a state of all its citizens," they see first and foremost a solution to their own identity problem, and not that of Arab Muslims and Christians in Israel.

In its paradoxical support for the hyper-democratic notion of "a state of all its citizens," the very public which, as we have said, could hardly be described as pluralistic and liberal in its social and political views, is making a sharp right turn in its attitude towards the existing governmental mold of its "new homeland." A precondition for the continued existence (we might even say "survival") of the country is, in the eyes of Russian youth, the crucial need for a prime minister who could be called the "strong man." There is a powerful longing for a kind of "omnipotent president" (a "democ-tator," as the Russian saying goes), whose government does not rest on any coalition balance of power and who is able to steer this leaky ship (the state of Israel) in the stormy sea of the Middle East. On the one hand, the parents of the same Russian young people experienced the Soviet dictatorship firsthand, both physically and mentally. On the other hand, both they and their children also experienced the near anarchy that followed the dissolution of that same dictatorship throughout the 1990s (in the Soviet Union/the CIS). This dualistic experience left no room for doubt: a strong personality-based government system - almost an autocracy - is what ultimately will make it possible to establish not only a viable political framework, but also a normal day-to-day existence, and even the relatively clear and confident vision people can have of their future.

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Let us add to this longing for a strong man at the helm the fact that in the Israeli reality, the balance of power in any coalition with only a scant majority is in the hands of "Shas" and the ultra-Orthodox parties. These parties, which traditionally (pardon the pun!) control the Ministries of Religion and the Interior, and which determine to a significant degree the civil status of the "Russians," are regarded with hostility by the overwhelming majority of the post-Soviet public. Hence, we come to the even more polar paradox of the longing for a strong, decisive autocracy... in a state of all its citizens!

I have no doubt that until the 1990s, such an ideological potpourri had never been seen in Israel's socio-geopolitical reality. In other words, until the one-million-strong Russian immigration. It may thus be easier to comprehend the reason for this public's massive support for the personality and doctrine of Avigdor Lieberman, whom the Israeli man-in-the-street defines as a fascist, but whom the "Russian" public considers the right man at the right time.

Even more paradoxical is the way Russian youth relate to the issue "two states for two nations." The dregs of their parents' and sometimes even their own past have left them with the feeling, and even with the certain knowledge, that a multi-national state is a formula for what ordinary folk would call mayhem. The problem of inter-national, inter-religious, and inter-ethnic co-existence is critical in the FSU and poses a permanent threat to the continued existence of the Russian Federation. Therefore, in any discussion of "two states for two nations," most Russian young people favor a clear-cut demographic division - them there and us here. On the other hand, in the post-Soviet view, a wide expanse of territory is a basic and built-in pre-condition for the existence of any political framework. The FSU extended over a sixth (more than 16%) of the earth's land mass. It is the post-Soviet view that it is virtually impossible to sustain a state and a government on territory as tiny as that of the state of Israel. That is when support for the ideal of "two states for two nations" collides with the characteristically Russian question, "But what else is there here to split?"

The notion of the division of a state whose width at its narrow waist (after the future establishment of the two states) would be some 15 kilometers and whose length can be traversed in a drive of just a few hours, and most of

whose open, unpopulated area is uninhabitable desert, and whose borders and capital are the basis of international debate – such a notion deters and repels the average (if there is such a thing) young Russian person. And here may be the basis for an understanding of Russian youth's support for the "not one inch" principle, which has nothing to do with the idea of "the whole Land of Israel," "our historic right," and "the graves of the Patriarchs."

Hence, we can conclude that the deep-rooted segments of the Israeli public view the social-political fusion in the perspective of the post-Russian younger generation as utterly "exotic," little-known, and offbeat. Therefore, neither of the traditional social-political baskets – not the leftist stereotypic liberal/secular/democratic and not the rightist stereotypic conservative/religious/nationalist – is able to encompass the Russian sector, and particularly its youth.

These exotic mixes are not the product of a lack of understanding of the Israeli socio-geopolitical maelstrom. The autonomic, almost autarchical, point of view on which they are based is simply different. It results from the completely different reality into which they were born (a reality no less convoluted than the local one) and from which they were displaced, sometimes by family – or survival-related default, straight into the Middle East bazaar in general and – double entendre intended – the Israeli *shuk* [market] in particular.

And finally, since I've been asked to write this report from an author's perspective (and I'm uncomfortable with this title after having written only two novels), I present as an example a short story that I wrote for a weekly column that I've titled "Pet Russian." This short story, based on the reality I grew up with, probably expresses better than anything else the foundation for the autonomous – both progressive and regressive – view of the Israeli reality in the eyes of the immigrant population from the CIS. Again, all levels of the established Israeli public refer to this population, (and whether one likes it or not, this is a solid linguistic fact) as "the Russians."

And with that I present the story I have promised:

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The Stereotype

That's how it is with stereotypes. They always trip you up.

The taxi-driver, for example, the one you flagged down on Ibn-Gvirol, with the bracelet, the lovingly-tended all-purpose pinky fingernail, and the square ring, suddenly turns down the clatter of the dispatcher, and asks if *Kol Hamuzika* [the classical music radio station] won't disturb you... because they're about to broadcast *The Marriage of Figaro*, performed by the Prague Opera. And this production, by the Prague State Opera, is one he must, simply must hear. So what did we say, Ramat Aviv Gimel? The meter, or should we settle on 35 shekel?

And who are you, with your shaved head, your hyper-framed glasses? Aren't you a broken stereotype? After all, you're also putting on pretensions that you're a Northern yuppie. Originally not from some "Ramat" (Aviv or Hasharon) but a Southy. One of those who grew up between the Pathological Institute and Abu Kabir. The product of drab housing projects of frustrated Russians, of "hyperactive Bucharians with flashing teeth and beaten-down gaze." So go ahead. Act like you're, like, part of the scene till the cows come home...

And just like that, with all that schizo, one Saturday night you're on your way to the mall. Ramat Aviv, naturally. And what do you need the mall for? Aspirin. At the Superpharm. And that actually breaks another stereotype. Of the mall.

And the security guards? Every one a broken stereotype. Mummified in jackets and ties, sporting shiny badges. Looking more like bodyguards than mall guards. Bodyguards of some minister without portfolio, or a Russian oligarch with a very big portfolio.

And they're standing there on the alert, armed with metal detectors that they're itching to use to swat the behinds of those entering (both sexes), who pass by them as if they're made of air, on their way to their daily shopping devotions.

But you, you pass by them quickly, these guards, not that you're condescending or scorn them. You're simply scared to death. Of those metal detectors. Because besides being schizophrenic, you're also a hypochondriac. And go know what happens to your male chromosomes when that gizmo touches you near your belt. So even if it looks to them like you're a snob, that's not it. So they know. It's the fear. Of the radiation.

So that same aspirin Saturday night, I approached the gates of the mall. And from a distance I already picked out the gatekeeper. **The real one.** Not the Russian stereotype. A sort of 21st century model of Officer Azulai. Short and squat, timid. Thrown off by all those Ramataviv-broads who are penetrating through him as if he were CO_2 . But all the same he doesn't waver and doesn't just stand there holding his detector. He's serious and carries out his duty faithfully. His uniform's two sizes too big for him. Must've inherited it from the Russian student who stopped working here and handed his detector down to him. He even has a tiny mustache. Mini-Amir-Peretz. Black and just-so. Respect.

You don't even pay much attention to his name stamped on the badge on his lapel. Because it's not going to say "Alex" or anything like that. Maybe "Albert." Maybe "Sasson." In short, a classic stereotype, not broken. Someone who could've come from the 'hood, from the "South."

And then I decided to encourage him and say something nice. It's late, there's no pressure, it's just you and him. Sort of a meeting-of-cultures. So when he finishes humming to you on your male genes, you pause at his side for a second and say/ask casually:

"Boss, that thing in your hand, the detector... that's not for castrating? You know, radiation, that kind of stuff..."

And he raises his head, gives you a scornful-pitying smile, scratches the tip of his mustache with his pinky, sighs a little, and says in perfect Hebrew with a heavy Moscow accent:

"Look, in any encounter between masses containing various electro-magnetic fields, the molecular structure of the – that is, your – organic mass will of necessity be damaged."

And he adds:

"But there are not yet any studies that prove any long-term cumulative injury. *Shavua Tof* [Have a good veek].

And already he's got the next bag to check and you're still planted there, your blockages gaping wide open, not budging, disturbing him "in the performance of his duty."

Chapter 13

"The Smallest Shall Become a Thousand, and the Least a Mighty Nation" (Isaiah 60:22)

David Hadari

"Seventy faces has the Torah," the Sages taught us, asserting the legitimacy of multiple interpretations of the Written Torah. These are legitimate as long as they are given in a suitable framework and do not conflict with the Oral Torah and the tradition given to Moses at Sinai.

When preparing to write an article based on Dr. Mina Tzemach's survey of the opinions of Israeli youth on various issues, and reading the interpretations given to the results of the survey in the chapters of this book, I cannot but be reminded of this expression. Below I hope to provide a different angle from that offered by the authors and statistical analysts, who I believe have not analyzed the survey objectively, but rather interpreted it according to their own worldview.

I am not embarrassed to admit that my interpretation is a product of the environment in which I grew up and of my role as deputy mayor of Jerusalem, representing the National Religious population of the city. This population's opinions are mostly derived from Jewish tradition, which states that the Jewish people belong in the Land of Israel, and that its purpose is to live according to the Torah.

Analysis of the Findings: Interpretation and Terminology

The survey examines the correspondence of participants' responses with socio-demographic characteristics such as nationality, age, gender, religiosity (*haredi*, National Religious, traditionalist, or secular), and political identity

(according to an "aggregated" division into Right, Left, and Center).

The findings are analyzed using statistical tools, or so it is claimed, in order to gain a thorough understanding of young people's views on issues of religion and state, to examine their perceptions of themselves and their attitudes towards society and the state. The respondents were also asked their opinions on social and economic issues and on political issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the possibility of Israeli-Arab coexistence.

Moreover, it is claimed that the opinions on all these subjects, together with the perspective of time (three surveys were conducted over twelve years) would make it possible to determine the political, social, and national direction in which Israeli youth are leading the country.

However, the statistical data can be interpreted in various ways on the political, social, and national levels, and the "conclusions" – i.e., sentences and statements that are presented as conclusions – are not based on any "scientific" data and are not connected clearly to the statistics. These statements distort the presentation of the data, so that in my opinion the situation is not appropriately portrayed. It seems that this bias promotes certain views and beliefs, while weakening other views and beliefs. Even if this was done unintentionally, it should be noted that these statements are not analyses of statistical findings, but rather expressions of opinions and viewpoints.

For example, we find a conclusion on political views:

In light of the long-range history of the schisms between secular and religious Israelis with regards to political stances, there is no reason to think that the situation is likely to change in the near future. In other words, as the percentages of religious and *haredi* Jews in Israeli society continue to grow, we foresee a corresponding increase in so-called Right-wing views; in other words, less support for democratic values and the peace process. However, not all the Right-wing trends among the youth can be attributed to an increase in the number of religious Jews. (Part 1, Chapter 4: Israeli Youth – Where are they headed? Analysis of political trends based on a quantitative research study.)

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And again:

Implications of the Right-wing viewpoint include more hawkish attitudes and ultra-nationalism regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the lack of economic-social significance. In addition to these, another import of the "Right-wing" approach as we see from the results of the surveys, means: less support for democracy and the values that are its basis. (Part 1, Chapter 4: Israeli Youth – Where are they headed? Analysis of political trends based on a quantitative research study.)

Are these answers to the question "What are Right-wing opinions?" or "How do you understand opinions identified with the Right?" No. Rather, they are statements based on the incorrect assumption that "Right-wingers" are opposed to democracy and the peace process.

Why do the authors find the Right-wing worldview worrisome in connection with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Their personal opinions, which are clearly on one side of the political map (not the Right), are obvious here.

In other words, if you are a "Right-winger," you must be "hawkish" and "ultra-nationalistic" – expressions which the authors adorn with a certain connotation corresponding to the term "extremist" – and as we will see later, you are certainly not "democratic." We can conclude that the Left is claiming ownership of the values of democracy and peace. In this context I note that the term "diplomatic process" would have been more suitable than the biased term "peace process."

In my opinion, anyone familiar with Israeli society and especially the religious sector knows full well that democracy is a basic value upheld by the National Religious sector in community and synagogue life, educational institutions, and politics. One of the most democratic parties is the National Religious Party, which has a central committee of 1,000 members, elected by tens of thousands of party members from all over the country. Other parties have much smaller democratic institutions, necessarily causing their representatives to be chosen less democratically.

Data Analysis without Relevant Background

Other statements presented as conclusions based on the statistical findings show that the background for analysis is fundamentally lacking, and therefore the interpretations are inaccurate. An example is the premise for the interpretation of questions concerning the relationship between the Right and Judaism.

A whole passage, cited here, shows that the summary of findings was written without even a basic understanding of the Jewish world. The analysis following it is inaccurate and biased.

In order to halt the erosion of democracy-based values, we must first understand the source of the trend. There are two possibilities: one, that the essence of a religious lifestyle or the world-view of the Jewish religion contradicts democracy. In other words, the fact that a person is a believer or observant Jew causes him (or her) to be less democratic. A second possibility is that a decline in favor of democracy results from other attitudes connected to religion, but not necessarily that religion itself disqualifies democracy. For example, perhaps religious world-views are significantly correlated with ultra-nationalistic positions. The more that democracy is perceived as allowing entry to forces that weaken the Jewish national identity of the State, it is considered a threat.

According to the second approach, the problem is not that Judaism disqualifies democracy but that the classic Zionistic formulation – "A Jewish and democratic State" – simply does not work in practice. Instead of a winning combination that involves only monitoring of the Jewishness-democracy balance, the two concepts are evidently viewed as contradicting one another. Thus the State's citizens feel that they are forced to choose between them. For the religious sector, Judaism is supreme – this is also true for some secularists who embrace the national identity. Or perhaps some non-religious but nationalistic Jews exchange security for religion. In any case, one or the other (Judaism or security) subjugates the values of democracy and peace. (Part 1, Chapter 4: Israeli Youth – Where are they headed? Analysis of political trends based on a quantitative research study.)

I can by no means agree with the statement that the terms "Jewish state" and "democratic state" are incompatible. It is true that Israel, as a Jewish state, gives preference to Jews. But democracy remains a very important value and is integrated in Judaism, just as Judaism is integrated in democracy. If any data contradict this statement, I would suggest examining them before reaching wrong conclusions.

Moreover, various questions such as those concerning gender and religiosity are examined non-uniformly. For example, the findings are based on interviews with a middle- and upper-class secular population and with middle- and lower-class traditionalists.

Contribution to the State

On the issue of contributing to the state, the survey proposes the following conclusion at the end of the first section of the analysis:

Connection to political identity:

A higher proportion of adolescents and young adults who map themselves on the Left of the political spectrum say that their most important aspirations are to contribute to the State and acquire an education. On the other hand, they are more pessimistic than the others.

(Part 1, Chapter 2: Attitude Survey Results: Social-Political Identities of Israeli Youth.)

We can see that this conclusion is based on respondents' answers to questions about their objectives and aspirations, by age and sector. However, it is based in part on an incorrect assumption about military service – that religious youth serve less. A more profound analysis shows that the percentage of religious youth (especially aged 21–24) who serve their country in various ways, including military service at a later age, the regular army, and National Service, is equivalent to that of secular youth. In other words, here, too, the analysis was performed without full attention to all the data.

I believe that if there were also a parameter indicating the "quality" of

military service – that is, the significance of one's contribution through active service or service as an officer – we would find that the religious population is characterized by high-quality service far beyond its share of the population. The conclusion would be that compared with the secular, the National Religious sector contributes to the state equally if not more.

Participation in Israeli Society

In analyzing the data on participation in Israeli society, the survey analysts differentiate among three behaviors and feelings: military service, a sense of belonging to Israeli society, and volunteer activity in a civic organization on behalf of society. The analysts decided not to combine them into a single index, possibly because the Arab respondents do not serve in the army.

In addition, the survey looks at the connection between objectives that are important to the respondents and their expectation of attaining these objectives. In the Arab sector we find that the lowest expectation is contributing to society, along with the *lowest* expectation of economic success. This finding results from the fact that when asked what subjects are important to the respondents' personal future, the Jews mention contributing to the state as well as money and family, whereas the Arabs speak of higher education and then raising a family.

In other words, the survey analysts demonstrate that the Arabs perceive their chances of contributing to the state as the lowest. The survey almost completely ignores the fact that this perception is a result of the Arab sector's lack of interest in contributing to Israeli society and its view of higher education as the most important goal.

This perception is to be compared with the astounding finding that religious youth are twice as willing to contribute to the state as the secular, even at the expense of higher education.

In this context we may note that the two objectives perceived by the Jewish respondents as having the highest probability of being achieved are contributing to the state or society and raising a family.

Concerning the data and findings in this chapter in general, we may assume that military service is a melting pot of Israeli society and a basic

"ticket" to feelings of belonging to Israeli society. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Arabs do not feel they belong, and that a similar trend apparently exists among the ultra-Orthodox. An interesting finding about the religious sector is that feelings of belonging are relatively low in the younger group but higher in the older group. As a representative of the National Religious sector, I believe that this is because the younger people are usually in the "religious world" of the yeshiva high school, synagogue, youth movement, or neighborhood in which they live; when they are older, military service may create a sense of belonging to Israeli society as a whole.

Perceptions of Personal Safety and National Security

The survey analyst correctly notes a number of differences between the younger and older respondents in the 2010 survey:

The second new and interesting trend revealed in the survey is the gap between the younger respondents (15- to 18-year-olds) whom we call the adolescents, and the older respondents (21- to 24-year-olds), whom we call the young adults. The young adults were found to be more ultra-nationalistic, less democratic, and more hawkish, but also pragmatic in certain issues such as the need to achieve the two-states solution. All this points to a new trend, a finding which raises many questions regarding the source of the change [...]

...perhaps we are viewing a unique phenomenon particular to the present generation of youth who reached adulthood at the height of the Second Intifada and the relentless terrorist attacks accompanying that period. Perhaps these experiences were what increased the youths' cynicism regarding chances for peace, and their anger at all threats to the State and its identity. (Part 1, Chapter 4: Israeli Youth – Where are they headed? Analysis of political trends based on a quantitative research study.)

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I believe that this phenomenon is indeed a result of exposure to life in the shadow of real terrorism and not only what is called a "feeling of fear" or "feelings of terror." In other words, for those who were youths during the second intifada and are now adults, this is not only a sensation. They have full and concrete knowledge that the enemy is trying to create a reality of terror and fear. This explains why the security of the state is such a strong value for them.

Many of the adults who experienced this period are sure – or, if you will, have a perception of being sure – about what the likelihood is of progress in a diplomatic process of negotiations with the Arabs.

Belonging to the Jewish People

To me, this is the most important and interesting part of the survey. Unfortunately, according to some people, feelings of belonging increase with religiosity, and secular youngsters think the Jewish people is less interesting than their other connections, or perhaps they perceive it as a religious value that has nothing to do with them.

A small minority among us think we are a people like all others. Due to a confusion of identity, this minority feels closer to other peoples than to the Jewish people. I believe that this confusion among youth can be explained by their never having experienced anti-Semitism.

We must find some way of deepening the Jewish identity of secular youth and their sense of belonging to the Jewish people. This is a national objective!

All systems, including those of the religious institutions, must make it clear that even those who do not keep the commandments are good Jews and that we all support them. As the Sages said, "A Jew who sinned is a Jew."

A clear majority of Jewish respondents in the survey (between half and two-thirds) said that the Jewishness of the state is important or highly important to them. Religious youth aged 15 to 18 perceive this issue to be even more important than the 21–24 age group. This may be due, as we said, to the fact that the younger group is under the roof of religious institutions.

In any case, we must remind ourselves that we live in a Jewish state and

that this is what makes us unique. We must act to prevent secular youth from disregarding the Jewish people as a whole, because such a process may lead to real disaster in the course of a few generations. The corresponding question for Arab youth concerned the importance of Israel's being a "country of all its citizens" Unsurprisingly, a higher percentage of this sector regarded this as important.

If we address both questions – that of the importance of the Jewish character of the state to Jews and that of the importance of Israel as a "country of all its citizens" to Arabs – we can conclude that *the stronger is one's sense of belonging to Israeli society, the stronger is one's Jewish identity*. On the other hand, as expected, in the Arab sector there is a strong feeling that Israel should be the state of all its citizens.

It is possible that in the Jewish sector there is another factor influencing this attitude, namely, the sense of "a threat to the survival of the state," as the survey terms it. The Jewish respondents were obviously referring to the security threat, while the Arabs apparently considered the plight of the weaker segments of society a threat to the future survival of the state.

In Conclusion

It is well known that in the early years of the state, the young people were the pioneers who paved the way for others. They contributed the most to the country, both by literal self-sacrifice and through their uncompromising support for Zionist values and efforts to strengthen the Jewish people then returning to its land.

As time goes on, certain things seem to be taken for granted. It is as if the state and the Jewish people could be maintained by inertia, without any need for self-sacrifice by the younger generation. I believe that this is why some young people today do not feel connected and obligated to the Jewish people and to the State of Israel.

In recent years, we have unfortunately heard many voices defending the countries around us, to the extent that the importance of peace between us and our neighbors has come to override the basic values of peace among ourselves and unity of the Jewish people in its natural land without apologies.

In response to certain trends among the youth over the years, we must remind ourselves and our children again and again of our profound historical values, passed down from generation to generation since the Exodus from Egypt and the giving of the Torah, and expressed in the Declaration of Independence at the time of the establishment of the State of Israel.

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While the young lead the way, they can do so only if they respect, value, and learn from the older generation.

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Chapter 14

Young People in Israel – 2010: Comments on a Conducted Survey²⁵

Prof. Natan Sznaider

How can we comprehend an incomprehensible world? It seems that modern societies implode (and not only in Israel). Basic institutions and principles are in a process of dissolution. So how can we expect young people to trust untrustworthy institutions? I will use the metaphor of the "flying fish," a new logic of order is at place here which undermines the "either-or" categories of trust and mistrust, left and right, family and state. It all becomes an "as well as" category.

The relevant question today would be: How the overwhelming flood of signs and colours belonging to the obsolete world of Either/Or could be countered by a repertoire of colours, forms, and signs appropriate to the emerging age of the "as well"? What would the signs, emblems, colours, figures, and images of the age of the "as well as" look like? Can the Either/Or be consigned to the past? Not yet.

Surely, we can observe some kind of right wing populism among young Israelis. And we can, of course, observe the same kind of tendency (maybe not as concentrated and maybe not as clear cut as in Israel) in Europe as well. So, doesn't the rebirth of right-wing populism, the emergence of democratic racism in Europe and in Israel (and other parts of the globe) tell us the very opposite? Namely that people and especially young people are thinking in dichotomies and terms of exclusiveness.

No, the explanation is to be found in the absence of any clear perspective

^{25.} I would like to thank Mrs Hagar Tzameret-Kertcher for comments along the way. Of course, all errors are mine alone.

from which to assess a world whose boundaries and certainties are in flux. The inability of the dominant institutions and the academic, political elites to grasp the nature of this new world of "as well as" and to shape it in a positive way is a function of the calibre of those institutions and the legacy of their origins. Thus, young people are being asked questions in terms that made sense a long time ago, but maybe don't make sense anymore. As social scientists, we think comparatively almost by second nature. To be able to compare means that your data mean more or less the same over space and time. Thus, we do want to compare data sets for 1998 and 2004 to come to conclusions in regard to increase, decrease, improvement, or worsening of certain tendencies. As if time is not fluid, as if societies of 1998 are the same societies of 2010 - we do our business as social scientists as usual and clap our hands over our heads about young people out of sync with "our" progressive and democratic values. These young people just don't "behave as we" expect them to. Thus, the social sciences (including us social scientists) have become part of the problem instead of the solution.

Young people today might be thought of as the products of a world of Either/Or, of the hegemony of nation-state politics over the national economy, of frontiers that function effectively, and of clearly demarcated territorial sovereignties and identities. But is this really true? This can be illustrated with reference to almost every burning issue of our times. It is a mockery of mankind (and of the social sciences) to proclaim the ideal of full employment in a world full of mass unemployment and the rapid growth of precarious jobs. And then to expect of young people to trust institutions.

It is a mockery of mankind to proclaim that the world is secure when it is clear that it is not. Why wouldn't a large number of young people (2/3) declare as their highest aspiration to have a happy family? What else is there? And why is this supposed to be wrong? And this even happens at a time when even family structures break down.

It is a mockery of mankind to preach the love of strangers when we see how conflicts arise in multi-ethnic societies. We can again clap our hands over our heads looking at the data and realizing that about half of the Jewish youngsters fear any kind of integration with the Arab population. What do we expect? Are these young people supposed to believe in "Love thy Enemy as Thyself"?

Perhaps we should start looking at the other side and see that there is almost half which does think like that. More than half (54%) of the surveyed Jews are indifferent towards Arabs. I am not sure that such a high percentage of indifference (i.e. not making a difference) could be found in many European countries. Even looking at the 25% which express "hatred" and the 12% which express "fear" tells the reader that there are 75% which did not think that "hatred" is the correct variable and that there are 88% who reject "fear" as a variable. Moreover, do we know what "hatred" means for those young people? Does it mean the same for those who ask than to those who respond? Maybe "hatred" means "dislike" and why wouldn't 25% of the surveyed Jews "dislike" or even "hate" Arabs? Any other result would have been even more surprising. It also confuses and collapses political and social categories. One can indeed imagine Israeli Jews who "dislike" Arabs and want to reach a political settlement whereas there are people who "like" Arabs and prefer not to grant them citizenship rights. Categories like "fear", "hatred" etc. have different meanings in political and social contexts. We all know students who "hate" their teachers. What does this actually mean?

It is a mockery of mankind in an age of climate change and global financial crises to proclaim that industry and the market economy will be able to solve the problems that industry and the market economy created. Again, why not have a happy family after all? It is the inconsistency of the world which, of course, makes people lose their trust. But wouldn't it be irrational to trust since trust means consistency over time and control over the future? Thus, we do not only talk about loss of trust in institutions. That would be bearable. I think we can even talk about the loss of trust in the reality of the world and this loss of the world, this worldlessness, is part of the answers we get from these young people here in Israel and in many other places. Thus, it is not about left and right (political categories of a lost past), and not about religious and secular anymore. These may be obsolete categories. It's not about democracy and integration. It's not about tolerance towards the Other. Thus, we could argue that young people are "pessimistic" but what does pessimism actually mean? If it means that the world is not clear anymore, why call it pessimism? Thus, we could argue that young people are more rightist, but what does it mean that they value "Jewish" over "democratic"

when both concepts are in total limbo. This is why these young people are "flying fish" trying to make sense out of their life worlds.

At the start of the 21st century, globalization represents a challenge to the integration of the temporal and spatial durability of the human essence of modernity. At the same time, as a result, the basic institutions of nation state sovereignty move into the foreground and with them the question of whether the developments of the last decade constitute an epochal break within modernity. And in Israel this is the case too. History and borders are no longer the only form of social and symbolic integration. In the age of globalization cultural and political self-images can be reduced neither conceptually nor empirically to a territorially fixed space and viewpoint, and this is true for Israel as well.

Clearly, Israel (but not only Israel) is facing difficult times. Clearly, the hostile relations between Israel and the Arab world (including part of the progressive Left in the USA and Europe) do not only express political conflict between nations, but go deeper; and it seems that these surveyed young people feel it strongly enough. They know/feel that the hostility towards them expresses an historical ambivalence toward the Jews (in Israel). And this is the big distinction between Jewish young people in Israel and young Jews abroad.

Bernard Avishai in his comment already pointed out the differences between Israeli youngsters and their Jewish American counterparts. It seems quite clear that here in Israel we see the emergence of Israeli Judaism, a process which has been in the making for quite some time. There is, of course, a spectre haunting Israeli discourse and the survey reflects this quite well. This is the spectre of an alleged "Kulturkampf" between so-called Orthodox and even more so-called secular Jews. Even many people in Israel believe in this alleged dichotomy as if it were a last stronghold of a lost world of a normal Israeli secular state. People talk about a "Jewish Democratic State" as if the concepts of "Jewish", "Democratic" and "State" somehow make sense for all the speakers involved. Many even believe that the separation between state and religion is part of what it means to be democratic. This sounds good enough but does not make any sense for a political community like Israel is. Thus, it is not Israeli young people who are

moving to the right - an easy way to interpret the results at issue here - but it is the exceptionality of the Israeli political community which does not provide an alternative secular vocabulary to express political views. At stake here are the basic principles of Israel, the terms which provide legitimacy. Some Israelis are still stuck in a conception of an Israeli state as conceived by Theodor Herzl in his writings. Writing from a Central European background, he believed in the possibility that Jewish ethnic and religious identity could be separated from a civic and territorial one. He believed in a "State of Jews" and not a "Jewish State", whereby the category of Jews could be expanded to include many others, in order to create an Israeli nation. But this remained Herzl's utopia; a fairy tale, if you will lived by some niches in central Tel-Aviv. The political community founded in Israel was a Jewish State and the proximity between the Jewish catastrophe in Europe and the founding of the state of Israel made it impossible to conceive of an Israel beyond the boundaries of the ethnic Jewish group. This first of all means the conceptual, political and existential separation between those defined as Jews and those defined as non-Jews.

Israel has turned into place where religion and nationhood are one and the same. Therefore, "left" and "right" are just symbolic terms. They don't have any meaning in the Israeli context and young people don't live according to political principles which were determined by the Cold War. This is especially true for Israel, where Cold War concepts were overlaid by concepts from a different political vocabulary, which could be termed "political theology". Whereas in different places in the world, modernity undermined religion as a factor of integration, the Jewish national movement turned religion into a central symbol of integration. Thus, democracy in Israel cannot be measured by variables like secularization and relation to religion. This is the reason why the so-called Kulturkampf is virtual at best. Naturally, there are Jews in Israel who believe, and those who think that God is dead. There are Jews who go to synagogue, and those who go to the beach and drive around in Jeeps on Sabbath. And there are those who believe that the others are no real Jews. And it is this dichotomy which is taken as an illusion of a conflict within Israeli society. But this is a staged conflict. Thus the so-called variable "religious" suggests a dichotomy which does not exist.

Thus, you may believe in God or in the army, in the end it's not a very different faith as the Hebrew term "Bitachon" (security) means and once meant trust in God as in "Blessed is the man who trusts in the Lord, and whose security is the Lord" (Jer.17). Today the word is usually understood as "national security." Thus, it is clear that the army is the only institution still being trusted. It is firm trust, like the trust in God.

One can see this trend also in the rising interest in the Holocaust. The numbers are rising across all kinds of divides. Clearly, this may be connected to the increased number of trips to the sites of extermination in Poland. More than 20,000 Israeli youngsters now visit the sites of extermination in Poland each year. Those voyages to Poland are pilgrimages. Children listen to survivors who tell their stories and become witnesses of those who suffered. The authenticity of the sites is preserved through the exterior of the camp. Israeli security guards make sure that the students move within a closed space of "Israeliness" with all the appropriate symbols of flags and symbols. These children do not learn the "history" of the Holocaust. They are supposed to relive it in a kind of Magical Mystery Tour which constantly moves between notions of weak Jews and strong Israelis, between Kaddish (the Jewish prayer of mourning) and HaTikva (the Israeli anthem which means Hope). This all takes place in a country called Poland, but it might as well be on the moon. It does not really matter. This is, of course, not the only explanation for the indifference young Israelis feel towards Germany. Indeed, it might be a surprising finding to see an increased interest in the Holocaust and a decreased resentment towards Germany. Apparently, in the mind of the young Israelis, the Holocaust seems to be disconnected from Germany. Young Germans may feel the same way. They don't identify the Germany of 2010 with the Germany of 1933. To be a "Nazi" has become in both countries a metaphor for the evil doing of people you don't agree with. One may call this the success of Holocaust education. One may also note that apparently 20,000 Israelis live in Berlin alone, a city which has turned into a magnet for young people all over the word. History first of all means time, and even more than that linear time where events are ordered on a temporal string. Modern technology has lined up with ancient myth making to do away with that kind of time consciousness. There is no history. There is an eternal

present – as life on Facebook symbolizes more than anything else. In such a setting, resentment against Germany would fit an earlier mode of historic consciousness. I am also quite sure that the Holocaust turned into more of a "Polish" event than a German one. Germany is indeed considered an enlightened and attractive country. There is no reason why it should not be considered part of larger Europe. Israeli young people here are not different than young people all over. World War II belongs to another world; the Cold War is not part of their actual memory. However, the Holocaust is an ever enduring present out of place (or at least in Poland) and out of history. It is part of Israel's national religion.

Thus, so called secular Jews (which is at best a Zombie category, since there are no secular Jews in Israel) have no other language available for political legitimacy than the language of sacredness. One can even say that a tiny minority - which pushes an agenda of a civic and territorial nationalism in the spirit of Herzl through its slogan "a state of all its citizens" - are considered a political margin among Jews and conceived almost as traitors. It is like joining the enemy. Thus, without religion, Zionism does not exist. Even those who consider themselves "left" think in terms of a two-state solution, i.e. ethnic separation, where Jewishness can be upheld. Again, the categories of Left and Right have none but some kind of internal meaning here. Thus, the exercise of Jewish sovereignty in Israel means also that Jews in Israel and Jews outside of it are on a continuous of separation. They won't be part of a common community of fate for long - as some people would like to see it. No Law of Return will change that in the long run. It is exactly this exercise of Jewish political sovereignty, which divides Jewish life worlds inand outside Israel. Jews in Israel define their Jewishness through national, ethnic and religious exclusivity; they actually do not have another choice. Jews outside of Israel do not have many choices either. They need to defend their interests as Jews in believing in the separation between state and religion and in the ethnic and cultural pluralism, whereas exactly these principles would undermine the Zionist project in Israel. Thus, Israeli Jews and Jews outside of Israel might not share any commonalities in the long run. But this needs a more thorough investigation.

Chapter 15

American Jews and the Attitudes of Young Israelis

Prof. Bernard Avishai

For virtually any young American Jew, what would jump out from the data tracking attitudes of young Israelis is the divergence between Jews and Arabs regarding co-existence, acceptance of "the other" – call it "social integration." Up to 80% of Israeli Arabs express positive attitudes toward integration (a willingness to have Jewish friend, and so forth), but just under 50% of Jews as so. This mirrors almost exactly the split Jews expect in America, except that over there, it is the Jews who exhibit the most positive ideas about integration (revealingly, about 80% voted for Obama in 2008), while the non-Jewish, white, Christian majority-in-decline tends to be about evenly split between liberals and people with more reactionary views. (The latter gains clout during hard economic times.)

America is a much larger and more complex country, of course, but the data are intriguing nevertheless. For they imply what common sense suggests, that although the liberalism of American Jews regarding integration may have something to do with Jewish values, the protections that favor integration in America also happen to be in the *interest* of Jews, who have always been a minority seeking social advancement. As Philip Roth put it, this was a community growing up valorizing Roosevelt, LaGuardia, and Justice Brandeis. The very high proportion of liberalism among educated Jews was, and is, very much like the high proportion of liberalism among educated Israeli Arabs, who have become something like America's Jews in this ironic respect. It reminds one of John Maynard Keynes's famous adage – or at least the negative version of it – that it is

hard to get people not to believe in a principle when their life depends on their believing it. A related point: Approximately 40% of young Israeli Jews believe (about a third, strongly) that the state should not offer civil marriage. One may infer that this very substantial group considers it natural, or at least defensible, that the state make intermarriage very difficult, or that halachic law governing personal status be the law of the land, or that rabbinic authority be a part of state authority, or all three; that this negative attitude toward civil marriage is a proxy for skepticism toward the rights of citizens in civil society more generally, and reflects the proportion of Israeli Jewish youth that one can characterize as religiously Orthodox to some significant degree. Not coincidentally, this 40% turns out to be roughly the proportion that has little or no faith in the Israeli judiciary, which is widely considered to be the country's most consistent defender of secular rights.

Again, American Jewish youth, much like their parents, would tend to look at responses of this kind with suspicion and disdain, though many might moderate their criticism of Israel in public. Indeed, the theocratic tinge to certain Israeli laws, the prominence of political parties seeking to extend halachic privilege, the national Orthodox caste of the settlers, the fierce determination of Greater Israel supporters – all of these things – cannot be irrelevant to the growing alienation from Israel that American Jewish college students profess. And the fact that some "pro-Israel" activists on campuses overlook discrimination against Arabs in Israel, demand equality for Jews in America – and invoke the "war on terror," or "the new anti-Semitism," when caught in the contradiction – only deepens the alienation.

Consider this growing chasm. About half of American Jewish young people marry non-Jews; all Jews take civil marriage completely for granted. One searches in vain for any recent poll that bothered to ask whether young Jews favor the separation of religion and state in America. The response would be near 100%. Nor do Jews tend to feel comfortable with American counterparts of Israeli theocrats. According to a recent Gerstein Agne poll, American Jews oppose, by nearly 80–20%, forming even tactical alliances (to support Israel diplomatically, say) with evangelical Christian groups. I mean rightist American groups whose attitudes toward religion and state

roughly mirror those of the 40% of young Israelis who oppose civil marriage. Yes, some young American Jews, like young evangelicals, for that matter, make allowances for Israel – the "Jewish state" – and overlook violations of the very secular principles they rely on in America. But the steady rise of national and "ultra" orthodoxy in Israel, along with its association with settlements and occupation, almost certainly explain why more than half of American Jews under 35 said that they "would not view the destruction of Israel as a personal tragedy." Only 54% profess to be "comfortable" with the idea of a Jewish state at all.²⁶

No doubt, all of this begs the question of whether Israeli Jews and American Jews mean the same thing when they speak about "Jews" in the first place. In fact, they do not. During WWII, of course, many grew to believe what classical political Zionism suggested, that Jews around the world constituted a single people, even an incipient nation, rooted in shared (if attenuated) religious practices or memories of the Eastern European hinterland. If this were still true, then the data regarding attitudes of young Israeli Jews might well be contrasted with attitudes of young Jews in the United States, something like the way those of New York Jews might be contrasted with Quebec Jews, or, indeed, attitudes of Israeli Jews might be contrasted with Israeli Arabs.

In fact, however, the ways young people in Israel experience Jewish identity diverge so fundamentally from the ways American Jews do that, it is hard to see what comparisons prove. For most secular (including traditional but non-Orthodox) Israelis, about 60% of young people, Jewishness is more or less coterminous with Israeliness, though Israeli nationality is not even recognized in the Registry of Populations. A young secular Israeli speaks the Hebrew language, which implicitly resonates with verses of Torah, or the poetics of traditional liturgy, or the lyrics of traditional music, or the precepts of Jewish law; one lives in the ancient land and considers oneself privileged to share in popular Hebrew culture, from television to the stage; one serves in the army, builds a business, or builds a home, which – given the terrible events of the 20th century – feels the positive culmination of modern Jewish

^{26.} http://www.aish.com/jw/s/48918377.html

history. One celebrates in one's family, and as public holidays, the traditional festivals of Judaism's calendar. One lives, in short, in a modern, globalized national home, and being a Jew mostly means being a free citizen of the Jewish nation. (One is Jewish in the sense that one is home with all the myths, frustrations, ambitions, and sentimental attachments this implies. Ordinary life gives "identity" the way trees give apples.)

In America, however, Jewish identity is quite different for young people with secular values and no particular connection to Orthodox Judaism. It may be any one or combination of responses to quite different perceptions, and it requires a positive act of, well, identification. There are young people who, because of a strong connection to a parent or grandparent, embrace the pathos of the immigrant Jewish experience; think of writers like and readers of Michael Chabon. There are young people who consider it a particular privilege to have "Americanized" by overturning American orthodoxies and taboos with Jewish iconoclasm; think of Philip Roth a generation ago, or Jon Stewart today. Again, there are young secular Jews who think of themselves as the quintessential American minority, the ontological victim of Western civilization, and take their Jewishness as a way of defying bigotry and valorizing constitutional liberties and civil rights. Correspondingly, there are young secular Jews whose organizing historical fact is the Holocaust.

In a famous poll published in 1999 by the American Jewish Committee, 98 per cent of American Jews said they consider the Holocaust to be an important or very important part of their identity. But only 15–20 per cent said that they observe Jewish religious obligations and traditions – the sands around which secular Israelis make their pearls.

Perhaps the most important shaper of Jewish identity in America today, for better and worse, is the high drama of Israel – the Jewish state in conflict, arguably a strategic partner for America. Since the 1967 War, Israel provided a kind vicarious international identity for many young American Jews, a surprisingly large number so long as Israel's moral prestige seemed unchallenged. One could think of Israel as a kind of psychic comfort, the best *answer* to the Holocaust, or at least the place Jewish continuity was assured, even if (as has been the case) Jewish numbers in America declined. One could think of Israeli heroes like Moshe Dayan giving the lie to schlemiel

images of comedians like Woody Allen. One could come to Jerusalem and enjoy a kind of Epcot Center of Jewish culture; or think of Israel as a big Jewish convention is which American Jews are super-delegates. One could practice one's identity by standing up for Israel, as AIPAC does, in the American ideas marketplace. One could depict America in a competition against world evil – first the Soviets, now "terror" – and depict Israel as America's power forward in the Middle East.

Even people who reject the Manichean political ideas promoted by the Israel lobby take a certain psychic comfort from the drama of Israel. Many current supporters of J Street, for example, seem more interested in Israel's moral performance then they are in Israel's cultural contradictions. They consider themselves Jews, they say, by holding Israel's occupation up to the implicit criticism of Israel's "prophetic tradition," though most seem to restrict themselves to a few verses from the late Isaiah. In the same sense that Israel under siege, or misunderstood by a hypocritical world, seems a pillar of identity for AIPAC supporters – the necessary *foil* for AIPAC supporters – some J Street supporters seem unlikely to know what to make of Jewish identity were the occupation to end. They may quote a Leonard Cohen poem against Netanyahu, but would be hard pressed to make a *practice* of secular Jewish life any more than Cohen could.

Which brings me to the last archetype among young American Jews, and the most likely to find a like-minded community in Israel. I mean, of course, Orthodox Jews, or Conservative but Halachic Jews, for whom synagogue attendance is a weekly (or biweekly) routine. Polls show that this is about 20% of American Jews, though the number is somewhat higher among young Jews. By all measures, this group tends to be most activist in parochial Jewish institutions, the most uncritically supportive of Israel, the most rightist in American political terms, that is, the most Republican. This group is also most sympathetic with evangelical Christians, ironically, and the most competent in the ways of traditional Judaism, from knowledge of Hebrew, to mastery of Jewish texts. This is the only American Jewish sub-group that lives in a cultural and religious mental atmosphere much like an Israeli sub-group, that of the national and modern Orthodox, especially in greater

Jerusalem. For this group, Israel, or at least a significant part of Israel, is not just an abstraction; and the Jewish state means something quite like the extension of synagogue life to politics. Peter Beinart recently made the point,²⁷ eloquently, which polls and elections support, that unlike these Orthodox Jews, the majority of American Jews tend to be progressive and liberal in most things, and that the reactionary cast of leaders of American Jewish institutions could not possibly appeal to them – that AIPAC, ADL, and so forth were positively turning off young people on their campuses. Specifically, he argued that the Israeli leadership's brand of "Zionism," insofar as it had turned on tribalism and religious orthodoxy, do not engender a sense of identification with Israel among the very people it most wished to attract.

Beinart seemed to conclude from this that a progressive Jewish leadership in America was therefore a kind of answer; that if such a leadership adopted a Zionism more in step with peace and civil rights movements in Israel, it would have more success in bringing young American Jews around. It would, correspondingly, help cultivate appreciation for what was special about Israel, support secular Jewish culture, defend Israeli self-defense, and so forth. For my part, I strongly sympathize with the notion that there is a misfit between the American Jewish majority and their leadership. Indeed, I welcome the advent of J Street, for all the obvious reasons.

But is it really true that, if a reactionary leadership is turning young Jews off Israel, a progressive leadership is likely to turn them on? If Israel were a social democratic paradise, like Denmark, or Degania before 1948, would *this* bring young Jewish liberals back to support Zionism? Actually, this seems unlikely. If we buy into Beinart's argument it will be hard to understand, first, why liberal American Jews would naturally have drifted away even from Israel and, second, why the American Jews who feel most passionate about Israel are not only *bound* to be Orthodox, but why they potentially connect to Israeli secularists in ways American liberals cannot – connect to secular Israeli artists, writers, musicians, etc., by drawing from common cultural roots, even as they threaten Israeli

^{27.} New York Review of Books, June 10, 2010.

secularism by making common cause with the Israeli orthodox right.

For the real *Kulturkampf* among Jews over the past century, even in America, was always between, on the one hand, people who thought of Jews in terms of victimization and rescue and, on the other, Jews who thought in terms of cultural revolution. The former, who usually gravitated toward "political Zionism," tended to focus on the psychology of powerlessness, depicted the militant state as a kind of therapy, counted on Antisemitism to define Jewish identity. For them, all Jews (including Diaspora Jews) were nationals, because their efforts at assimilation would lead to disaster. Think of Max Nordau once, or Martin Peretz today.

The latter, "cultural Zionists," have tended to focus on modernizing a failing Hebrew religious vernacular, which they considered their patrimony, and loved and hated in equal measure. They thought assimilation of Western Jews into liberal society was perfectly possible – and *that* would be the disaster. They saw the state as custodian of a unique cultural opportunity, which could be inclusive of anyone coming to the land and participating in the revolutionary national life. Again – and anyone who was once serious about cultural Zionist ideas would know this – Israel and America are not parallel universes for Jews, where the only important political question is, Are you progressive or are you reactionary? For there is also the question of cultural affinity. For most American Jews, to be "liberal" means to wade in, as a sovereign individual, to the cultural currents of Anglo-American life.

All of which leave us with a conundrum. For most young American Jews, the obvious alternative to being caught up in the web of Jewish congregational life, Halachic orthodoxy, and a kind of tribalist loyalty to Israel, is *not* becoming a fellow traveler of Israeli liberals, or reading *Haaretz* in translation, or going to the J Street Conference. The alternative to all of this is simply becoming indifferent to Israel, and losing, almost utterly, the cultural threads – Hebrew, liturgy, Torah – out of which secular Jewish life comes into the world, kicking and screaming against Orthodox rabbinic smugness.

Ironically, then, it is from among the Orthodox group in American Jewish life that one is likely to find not only people to connect with Israeli theocrats, but also some subset of young people who, for whatever reason find

themselves in revolt against the Halacha of their families. It is *they* who will connect with Israeli liberals. What makes Israel unique – the cultural adventure that it was and is – is not simply Jewish military power, but the evolution of a modern national home, the development of a secular Jewish life, the fusing of Jewish civilization with liberal values – the "Jewish and democratic" thing.

You see, the people who made this modern Israeli culture first had to know the liturgy, Torah – that is, a whole world evoked by the Hebrew language. The poet Yehuda Amichai had to know the prayer for the dead, God full of mercy, *El Maleh Rahamim*, before he could give us the ironic poem, "God full of mercy / Were God not so full of mercy / Then there would be mercy in the world / And not just in Him." For emancipation to be poignant, there has to be an *ancien regime*. Otherwise, there is nothing *but* abstraction. What comes out feels false. The secular world of Tel-Aviv is justly famous for its cosmopolitanism, but it is hard to think of young Israeli artist, from the painter Eli Shamir to the writer and satirist Etgar Keret, who is not in some kind of dialogue with Jewish tradition. Secular Israelis who reject the tradition entirely, or who try to live on some combination of imported drama and exported technology, often report a sense of ennui; and they should not be shocked when their children join West Bank settlements or linger on the banks of the Ganges.

Young American Jews, then, at least those who seriously bother with being Jewish at all, are working through a problem. They are instinctively, well, moderns, but those who are really equipping themselves to be "modern Jews" will start their journey in the closed circles of synagogue orthodoxy, much as Achad Ha'am did. They will seem, at first, relatively easy prey for rightist ideas; they may *seem* the last people to identify with the progressive spirit and peacenik politics of many secular Israeli writers, artists and scholars.

And yet they are the first people – or at least the only young Americans – who have a real shot at appreciating what modern Hebrew writers, artists and scholars are up to. No matter the politics, they are going to *care* about what becomes of Israel because that is where their cultural action will be. They will love Israel, not because of what it does, but because of what it is. Given

its Hebrew culture, Israel is the only place on earth where the struggle to be an emancipated individual can still be Jewish in this best sense. (Jon Stewart might get Amichai's poem, but will he get the joke?)

Clearly – or is this clear enough? – there is no moral advantage to being a modern Jew in Israel or a modern American with a vaguely Jewish pedigree. My point, however, is that if we really hope to understand what makes progressive Israelis tick – the 55–60% who *do* stand for coexistence – young American Jews will need more than admiration for their progressive "values." They will need to speak their language. And if they want to look for progressive leaders of an American Jewish community, as opposed to an American Jewish "demographic," they might consider the searchers, however reduced their numbers. People like Beinart himself, perhaps, who marinated in halachic life and punched his way out. They will be odd birds with a love, not only of what seemed ethically universal in Jewish civilization, but what seemed specifically beautiful.

Chapter 16

Israeli Youth, 2010: Refractions through the Prism of the German Shell Youth Study, 2010

Prof. Mathias Albert

The Third FES and Sixteenth Shell Youth Studies, 2010

Launched in 1953 and conducted for the sixteenth time in 2010, the Shell youth study (Shell Jugendstudie)²⁸ has established itself not only as the leading report on the life situation, attitudes, values, and political opinions of young people in Germany, but even more as one of the most visible regularly conducted social science studies in the country. Publication of the study, traditionally funded by the German branch of the Shell oil company, usually attracts extensive media interest, probably attesting to the importance attached to young people in a rapidly aging society.

In 2010, for the first time, the data for the FES youth study and the Shell youth study were collected in the same year. While this in itself does not remove all the obstacles to comparability in a strict sense, it at least assures that when the results of the two studies are read side by side they are not distorted by vastly diverging global contexts in different years (as might be the case, for example, if one compared data from before the global financial crisis with data collected after its outbreak). That said, it should be noted from the outset that the biggest difference between the Israeli study and the German one concerns their scope. While not entirely limited to it, the Israeli study is highly focused on broad political issues, i.e., perceptions and

Shell Deutschland Holding GmbH (ed.), Jugend 2010. 16. Shell Jugendstudie (Frankfurt/M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag).

opinions regarding state and society in Israel, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the relationship between religion and state, and so on. The German study also looks at the political opinions of young people, yet they are only one aspect of a study that seeks to paint a more comprehensive picture of a generation, also covering education, leisure activities, values, the extent and quality of media use, attitudes towards one's own body, and more. This difference in scope notwithstanding, a number of the questions used in both studies are from the standard "toolbox" of relevant research on political attitudes and opinions, and thus in a few cases direct comparisons on specific points are possible.

Keeping the differences between the two studies and the limits of comparability in mind, this brief essay will reflect on some of the basic similarities and differences between young people in Israel and Germany. The purpose of this exercise is to get some sense of which findings of the third FES study should be attributed to the specific social and political context; and which may be attributed more to commonly shared life situations of young people in modern, (post-) industrialized societies.

Which Youth?

One rather substantial issue that may seem at first glance to be a fairly insignificant methodological matter concerns the ages of the young people surveyed in the FES and Shell studies. Whereas the former examines two age groups (15–19 and 21–25), the latter looks at young people between 12 and 25. The relatively early starting age in the German case reflects the fact that in Western countries in recent decades, the transition from childhood to youth has been taking place earlier and earlier. This is true in a variety of contexts, including sexual maturity and integration into consumer and leisure markets. However, whereas entry into the stage of "youth" occurs within a fairly narrow age range, the exit into adult life in most Western countries has become extremely blurred: As routes into the job market become more and more varied and sometimes uncertain (in Germany the notion of a "generation internship" was quite popular for a while as a way of summing up this trend), young people tend to live longer with their parents and

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postpone starting a family until later in life, and the point when they leave this phase of life and become adults is increasingly arbitrary (a matter further complicated by the fact that many people try to present themselves as "youthful" well into their fifties and sixties). Thus, there are almost no rites, practices, or commonly shared experiences left to mark the passage from youth to adulthood. This point is emphasized here because it is a significant difference between Jewish Israeli youth and young people not only in Germany, but in Western countries in general. Although it cannot be fully equated with the transition from youth to adulthood, military service in Israel provides a very solid marker for that transition, due to both the relatively large percentage of the generation involved and the duration of service. While in the present study the importance of this step is evidenced by the sometimes marked changes in political attitudes during this time, in general it means that while in many respects the development of young people in Israel is comparable to that in numerous other Western countries, in terms of the transition from youth to adulthood this comparability is extremely limited.

That said, it should also be noted that there are many similarities between young people in Israel, Germany, and elsewhere. They are all part of what can be termed "global youth." They share many specific aspects of a global youth culture, including consumption patterns, styles of expression, and fashion statements. They are all part of a generation that did not witness the emergence of the Internet from its precursors (e.g., Telnet), but grew up taking its availability for granted. And they are part of a contemporary generation that in general seems to be returning to an emphasis on the emotional security afforded by family and friends in order to counter the competitive demands of the education system and the job market.

Most importantly, however, young people in both Israel and Germany share a rather high degree of optimism regarding their personal future despite what might be perceived as mitigating circumstances (seemingly endless political conflicts in the Israeli case; the effects of the global economic downturn and the problems of a radically aging society in the German case). Young women and men in both countries seem to share a basic pragmatism in the sense that their relevant social contexts, most notably family and friends, afford them a sufficiently secure base from which they can

optimistically seek to manage their own future unhampered by factors that would seem to make this difficult.

Youth and Politics

When reading what the FES and Shell studies have to say about youth and politics, it is necessary to point out that the Shell study remains more limited to very important but comparatively general questions regarding political views, trust in institutions, attitudes towards democracy, willingness to engage politically, etc., whereas the FES study asks about quite a number of more specific issues. The present observations thus pertain only to areas where the two studies touch upon similar issues. First, however, it is interesting to note that a general question on youth and politics in the Shell study - probably the single most noted one in public debates - is not included in the Israeli survey: namely, the question of whether young people are interested in politics at all. I can only speculate at this point about whether this question was not raised in the Israeli study because of an assumption that it would be pointless in an extremely politicized social environment. Certainly, even those who are not generally interested in politics gave opinions on more specific questions. Yet it would be quite illuminating to have more information on whether particular expressions of opinions on specific political issues are influenced by a general interest in politics. Irrespective of the unavailable data in this case, it is safe to say that when young people in both Israel and Germany say they dislike politics, they are mostly referring to politicians and political parties. Thus, whereas in the Israeli case political parties are the least trusted on a list of eight different (kinds of) institutions (with the IDF ranking first), in the German case political parties rank twelfth of thirteen, only marginally before the banks (with the police ranking first). This observation, together with the finding that young people in both countries strongly support democracy as the preferred means of legitimizing political authority in their respective states, shows that in both cases there is ongoing skepticism not regarding democracy in general, but regarding democracy as organized through political parties. Whether political parties will be able to (re-)gain the trust of young people in the

future will influence the future political culture in both Israel and Germany. It is probably not an exaggeration to assume that any optimism regarding the possible resolution of intricate conflicts will suffer if trust in those charged with seeking solutions is low. Regarding the political identity of young people, there appears at first glance to be a marked difference between the Israelis and the Germans. Young Israeli Jews lean strongly to the right: in the 15-18 age group 57% describe themselves as "right" or "moderately right," whereas only 16% describe themselves as "left" or "moderately left"; in the 21-24 age group the numbers are 66% and 10%, respectively. While Arab youth lean more to the left, the most noteworthy finding here is that more than a third of young Israeli Arabs have difficulty situating themselves on the political spectrum between left and right (compared with less than a tenth of the Jews). In Germany, young people in 2010 (as well as traditionally) describe themselves as being farther to the left: 38% are "left" or "moderately left," 18% "right" or "moderately right." However, while this may seem to be a striking difference in political identity, the disparity may narrow somewhat - if not evaporate completely - if we take into account that the spectrum of political identity from "left" to "right" probably means quite different things in the two cases. As also becomes clear from the results of the FES youth study, among Israeli youth not only are political identity and opinions on major issues (e.g., the relationship between religion and state, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) very closely correlated, but the formation of a political identity can be assumed to be inextricably intertwined with the formation of opinions on such issues. In the German case, the situation in recent years has been almost the opposite. Two decades after the end of the Cold War, "left" and "right" have definitely lost their function as symbols of comprehensive worldviews and ideologies for most young Germans. In some cases self-identification as left or right and opinions on specific political issues are even less closely related than before. It would be only a moderate exaggeration at present to say that political identity among young Germans is more a result of specific cultural and other social contexts, whereas in the Israeli case it is part of an ongoing struggle to deal with questions that are constitutive of or existential for Israeli society.

Conclusion

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The last-mentioned observation underscores the fact that young people in Germany and in Israel are, of course, first and foremost embedded within their respective national societal contexts. They share a lot when it comes to issues related to their specific stage of life. Most striking here are the high levels of optimism regarding their personal future.

Studies like the third FES and sixteenth Shell youth studies, alone and read in comparison, are useful instruments for getting a sense of where societies are heading. Young people, after all, are in a certain sense seismographs of possible futures. It is thus a pity that similar studies are not conducted in many countries on a regular basis, let alone read in comparison.

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Part Three

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Background Information and Demographics

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Chapter 17


Periodic Demographic Data about Israeli Youth

Ziv Rubin

Introduction and General Facts

In this chapter we present demographic data and statistics regarding the population of adolescents and young adults in Israel as the foundation for, and background of, the survey. This analysis is also based on long-term trends from the period of the establishment of the State of Israel up until the most recent data published by the Central Bureau of Statistics and other bodies, headed by the National Council for the Child. The data is presented by country of origin, gender and religion.


The Central Bureau of Statistics data show that in 2008, about 1.16 million youths aged 15 to 24 lived in Israel. (In this report, the entire youth population is sometimes sub-divided into categories of adolescents and young adults). The percentage of youths out of the entire population declined from a level of around 17% to 18% in the mid 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, until it reached 15.9% in 2008. In the 1950s, the youths (aged 15–24) constituted about 15% of the entire population. The difference in the percentage of youths (of the population) between the time-periods is a result of the changes in the composition of the population of the State of Israeli when it was founded and today's composition. A large proportion of Israeli citizens in the early years of the State were immigrants, therefore the percentage of children and teenagers was lower. But the youth percentage rose until it reached a peak of 20% at the beginning of the 1970s. In the 1980s the percentage of adolescents and young adults fell to 17.5% and from then on, it has been slowly though gradually decreasing.



Graph No. 1: Population of Israel and youth (aged 15–24) in Israel, between 1955–2008 (thousands)

The population of Jewish youth aged $15-24^{29}$ is 889.800 and they comprise 15.2% of the general Jewish population. Arab youth number 272,000 and they comprised 18.5% of the entire non-Jewish population in Israel from 1955. Their percentage of the minority group went up to 19.4% in 1975, then rose again to an average of about 21.5% in the 1980s. In the 1990s, this percentage dropped a little to an average of about 20.5%, and declined further at the beginning of the 2000s to 18.1%. However, in 2008 it rose to 18.5%. The gap between the percentages of youths in the Jewish population, and the percentages of youths in the Arab population, show us that the Arab population is younger as a result of a higher birth rate.

^{29.} The population of Jews and others includes: Jews, Christians that are not Arabs and people without religious classification.




Graph No. 2: Youth in Israel, according to religions

The rate of increase in the number of Israeli youths (every five years from 1955 to 2005) was 15.8%. During the same time period, the entire population grew on average by 14.7% every five years. Yet the growth rate in the number of Jewish youths (15–24) every five years is only 14.5%, in contrast to the corresponding growth rate of the non-Jewish youths, which is 23.9%.

Today there are about 232.300 Muslim youths in Israel. In the 1950s, the ratio of Muslim youths to Jewish youths was 1:10, while today it is 1:4. The rate of increase in the number of Muslim youth jumped to more than fifty percent (per five years) at the beginning of the 1970s and then dropped to about 18% between 1985 and 1990. It declined further to 11.6% between 1990 and 1995, and rose again in the last five years to the level of 20.1%

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Graph No. 3: Number of youths aged 15-24 in Israel, between 1955-2008, by religion


There are 21.500 Christian Arabs in Israel and they constitute 1.8% of the entire youth population. The number of Christian youths in Israel is larger – 24.400 because about 2% of non-Arab youths in Israel are Christians. From the 1950s till today, the percentage of Christian youths (out of the entire youth population in Israel) has steadily ranged from 2.2% to 3.3%.

There are 23.300 Druze youths in Israel, constituting 2% of Israel's entire youth population. In the past, the number of Druze youths was estimated together with youths from other religions because they only constituted several thousands. This segment of Druze youths rose from 1.2% in the 1950s to 2.1% in the 1980s, and from then on their percentage has remained almost constant.

Continent of origin of Jewish youth

Today, there are 707.300 Jewish youths who were born in Israel. The percentage of Sabras (native-born Israelis) among the adolescents and young adults, rose from 36.6% of all Jewish youths in Israel in 1960, to 89% in 1990.

In the 1990s, as a result of the massive aliya from the Former Soviet Union (FSU), the percentage of 15- to 24-year-old Sabras declined and reached 84.2% in 2008. The proportion of Jewish youths born in Europe or America and made aliya to Israel also decreased from 17.2% in 1960 to 7.9% in 1990, then rose again in the 1990s as a result of aliya. In 2008 their proportion reached about 13.3% (about 90.2% of this group had made aliya after 1990).



Graph No. 4: Continent of origin of Jewish youth in Israel

By contrast, the percentage of Jewish youth (15–24) born in Asia and Africa decreased significantly from 46.2% in 1960 to about 2.5% in 2008; the vast majority of these were born in Africa. Of the Israeli-born youth today, about 65.7% have fathers born in Israel, 6.5% have fathers born in Asia and the rest are distributed almost equally between fathers born in Africa or Europe-America (about 14% in each group).

Family Status

In 2008, 99.6% of 15- to 19-year-old adolescent male youths and 96.5% of females of the same age were also single. Of the young adults aged 20–24, 88.6% of the males were single compared to only 70.6% of the females the

same age. The average age of marriage for Jewish males (first marriage) is almost at the same level today as it was during the 1950s, though it went down over the years then rose again. In 1952 the average age of marriage was 27.3, in 1980 it was 25.5, and in 2008 it was 27.9.

The average marital age of the Christians 29.7. Is among the Muslim and Druze there were changes in the opposite direction: the average age of marriage for male Muslims rose from 24.5 in 1970 to 26.1 in 2008, and the average age for Druze rose even higher, from 23.2 to 27.4. In any case, the data show that most (male) youths of this age-bracket are not married.

The average age of first marriage of Jewish females remained around 22 rather constantly from the 1950s to the 1980s. From then on it rose gradually and reached 25.7 in 2008. The *median* age for Jewish female first marriage also rose gradually throughout the last fifty years, from 21 to 25.4. The average marriage age of Muslim females rose gradually from 1995 and by 2008 had reached 21.3; Christian females – on the verge of 24 throughout the last twenty years and in 2008, reached 24.9; Druze females – rising from the 1980s (it was 19.4 in 1984) and reached 22.5 in 2008.

As we see, women marry at younger ages than men, thus the segment of married women among the youth is greater than the corresponding proportion of married males. When we compare age of marriage among religious profile groups, we discern gaps that stem from cultural disparities and traditional mores (level of affinity to tradition). Thus, in 2008, 89.1% of all youths (24 years or younger) were single, 91.1% of Jewish youths were single, slightly less among the Christians, 93% of whom were single. The percentages of unmarried men in the Muslim and Druze populations had been almost identical in the past but a gap has appeared in recent years. The percentage of non-married Muslim young adults is now 80.8%, while the corresponding rate in the Druze population is 82.7%.

Place of residence (districts and sub-districts)

The distribution of residences of the adolescents and young adults in the various districts of the country, is very similar to the distribution of residences of the entire population since most of the youth live with their parents in the same households. The areas in which youths (aged 15-24)

constitute a higher proportion of the population are the younger areas in which there are more families with children. Thus we see that, while almost equal percentages of youths live in the cities of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv (13.9% and 13.8%, respectively), in Jerusalem they constitute about 18% of the regional population while in Tel Aviv they constitute only 13% of the residents. In other words, the Jerusalem population is "younger." The Jewish population of Judea and Samaria is also younger: 49.100 youths live there and while they only constitute 4.2% of the total youth population in Israel, they constitute 17.3% of the entire Jewish population of Judea and Samaria.


About 18.7% of the adolescent population lives in the North of the country, and represent 17.6% of the entire population of the area. About 11.8% live in the Haifa area where they constitute 15.7% of the area's population; 22.7% live in the Central area where they constitute about 15% of the area's population. Finally, about 15% of the youths live in the South where they constitute 16.6% of the area's population.

Most of Israel's youths (91%) live in urban localities, as does most of the entire population.

Youth in the workforce

Many Israeli youths work, or actively look for work even if they are presently unemployed, and the numbers are as follows: 367.700, representing 31.6% of the 15- to 24-year-old age group, belong to the civil workforce while 8% of the adolescents (aged 15–17) and 42.1% of the young adults (aged 18–24) are part of the civil workforce.

Israeli youths constitute a percentage of the civil workforce that has been gradually declining over the years. In the 1950s, youths aged 14–34 constituted about 47% of the workforce, with the following breakdown: the working 14- to 17-year-olds were about 37% while the 18- to 34-year-olds were 57%. In the 1960s, the proportion of youths under age 34 in the workforce declined to about 44% of all the workers in the economy, while in the 1970s and 1980s the proportion rose to around 48% and in the 1990s the percentage fell back to 44%. From the beginning of the 2000s, it seems that the downward trend is continuing: in 2008, the proportion of under-34-year-olds in the workforce dropped to 40.8%.



Graph No. 5: Workforce by age groups

Trend-reversals regarding the percentages of youths in the workforce stem from two factors that work in opposite directions. The first factor is the ongoing decline of the participation rate of the entire Israeli population in the workforce, starting from the 1950s, which continued during the 1960s when it reached a proportion of just under 50%. Then the trend changed at the end of the 1970s until workforce participation reached 52% at the beginning of the 1990s – close to the figure observed during the 1950s. From then on the percentage has been rising, and today is 56.5%.

The second factor relates to the different workforce-participation patterns of the various age groups, which have been rather apparent throughout the years of the existence of the State of Israel. The percentage of 15- to 17-year-olds in the workforce had been declining throughout the years except for recently, during which the rate has stabilized at around 9%. The participation rate of the 18- to 24-year-olds fell at the beginning of the 1970s but has been climbing relatively slowly since and now ranges around 42%. On the other hand, the participation rate of the 25- to 34-year-olds has been rising: from 61% in 1970 to 76.9% in 2008.

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The natural explanation for the relative drop in the work participation rate of youths is the increase in educational level: there are many more 14- to 17-year-olds who complete their high school studies today, as well as a higher percentage of 18- to 24-year-olds who acquire post-high school educations. Therefore, a higher percentage of youths defer their entry to the work-force by several years in order to study.

This process has an effect on the dependence ratio (for adults) that defines the connection between seniors aged 65 and above (pension age) and the number of people aged 15 to 64 (work age). The dependence ratio is indicative of the ability of the work-age population to finance the social welfare needs (pension and health) of the seniors who have retired from the workforce. The dependence ratio has been growing greatly in the developed nations and the forecast is for a jump of about 40% in European countries in 2030 and more than 50% in 2050. However, due to the relatively young composition of the Israeli population, the dependence ratio is only about 15.7% and is expected to reach 22% in 2030.

There are 189.300 young females who are part of the workforce, constituting 13.7% of all working women. The proportion of 15- to 24-year-old females out of the entire population of working women has always been higher than the relative percentage of the youth population in the workforce (13.7% versus 12.4%, a gap of 1.3%). The reason is because women (over 24) usually also devote time to taking care of family and home, thus there is a pattern of females entering the workforce at a very young age, then leaving it after several years (e.g. to raise young children). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the discrepancy we address now, between the percentage of female youths in the female workforce and the overall percentage of all youths (both genders) has been decreasing over the years from 12.7% in the 1950s to 1.3% in 2008. Accordingly, the workforce participation rate of married women (aged 18–24) in the workforce has been gradually increasing from around 30% in the 1960s–1970s to about 49.6% in 2008.

The number of unemployed youths is about 46.500, which means that about 12.6% of the youths in the workforce are not actually employed. The percentage of unemployed youths, out of the overall number of youths who

are included in the civil workforce, has been rising since the 1970s. Then, it had been less than 10% but by the 1990s it had reached about 20%. Evidently this was a result of the massive aliya (from the FSU) that led to an increase in the unemployment rate of the entire population in a short period of time. In recent years (from 2003) there has been a decline in the unemployment rate of youths, in accordance with the general decline in the unemployment rate.

Poverty and household income


A survey of household incomes of the Central Bureau of Statistics of 2008 found that about 257,500 Israeli youths are categorized as poor according to the official poverty line (about 22% of all youths). The incidence of poverty in households with 15- to 24-year-olds is 21.38%, versus a poverty incidence of 19.91% in the entire population. The net average household income per capita in 2008 for households with at least one youth, was NIS 3,166 compared to NIS 3,998 in Israeli households as a whole.

There are large gaps in poverty incidence between households with Arab youth and those with Jewish youth; the incidences are 46.07% and 15.11%, respectively. In comparison to 2000 there was a sharp increase of more than four percent in the incidence of poverty in households with youth – from 16.98% to 21.38% in 2008.

Education

The numbers of youths aged 15–24 who studied in high schools (as the last educational institution they attended) was 804,798, comprising 69.4% of all youths in this age bracket. Among the entire group, 4.2% studied in a post high-school non-academic institution and only 11.8% studied or still study in an academic institution. On the other side of the coin, 5.1% of youths only attended elementary or junior high school. Finally, 59.400 youths (2.1%) studied or study in a yeshiva.

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Graph No. 6: Education level of 15- to 24-year-olds in Israel, 2008

The percentage of 18- to 24-year-olds with more than nine years of education was 87% in 1980, this rose to 97% in 1990 and remains at this level today. In the school year of 2008–2009 there was an increase in the drop-out rates from the high school educational system (grades 9 to 11 – the years with the lion's share of drop-outs from the school system) and reached about 5.1%, in contrast to 4.8% in 2006–2007. (In the early 1990s, the drop-out rate was 7.3%; the rate then declined afterwards.) The percentage of 18- to 24-year-olds with any kind of post-high school education rose from 21% in 1980 to 24% in 1990, then 30.6% in 2000, and today has reached 30.9%.

The percentage of non-Jews in the educational system has been increasing: in the early 1980s; 58.3% of the non-Jewish 14-to-17-year-old population acquired 9-12 years of study. During the early 1990s this rose to 78.3%, and in 2008 the 15- to 17-year-olds with 9-12 school years already reached 94.2%.

In the early 1980s, 14% of the non-Jewish 18- to 24-year-olds completed 12 or more years of schooling. In the early 1990s this percentage shrank to about 10.6%, while in 2008 the percentage of non-Jewish youths who acquired a post-high school education reached 28.2%.

According to the data of the 2009 State of the Child in Israel Annual Statistical Abstract of the National Council for the Child, there is a

significant difference between the Hebrew and Arab educational systems in Israel. The percentages of students studying in both educational systems start off at similar levels at young ages (until tenth grade – age 15), but then drop off more sharply in the Arab educational system than in the Jewish one. As we see in the table below, the gaps between the Hebrew and Arab educational systems grow over time as the age of the students increase.

Age	:Percentage of students in the		Con
	Jewish sector	Arab sector	Gap
5	97.1	94.5	2.6
13-6	96.8	97.5	-0.7
14	97.3	96.3	1
15	96.5	90.5	6
16	96.4	88.1	8.3
17	90.9	82.9	8

 Table No. 1: Percentages of youths who attend school, according to population group and age (2009)

The reason for the gap that grows together with the increase in age, is the high drop-out rate of Arab students in the higher (mainly ninth and tenth) grades of the educational system. The drop-out rate from the Hebrew educational system between the 2007/8 school year and the 2008/9 school year was 3.2% (from both ninth and tenth grades), in contrast to 11.5% from ninth grade and 6.4% from tenth grade in the Arab sector. The drop-out rate in the Hebrew educational system was a bit higher than the Arab sector for grades eleven and twelve: 11th grade – 6.3% (Hebrew) versus 5.5% (Arab), 12th grade – 1.9% versus 1.6%, respectively. The total drop-out rates from the educational systems in grades 9-11 (the main drop-out ages are 14-16), between the academic years of 2007–2008 and 2008–2009, were: 4.2% in the Hebrew sector in contrast to 8% in the Arab sector.

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
Demographics of Israeli youth: 1998 and 2004 in Contrast to 2010


So far we have presented general data about youth in Israel. The current study compared attitudes of Israeli youth over three time periods, using the same questions in 1998, 2004, and 2010. In this section we present comparative data in accordance with the same three time periods of the survey.

Population

The Israeli population grew by 22.8% between 1998 and 2008 while the growth-rate of the youth was almost half of the entire population growth rate: 12%. The growth-rate of Jewish youth in contrast to that of non-Jewish youth was much lower: 4.9% in contrast to 35.5%.

There were no sharp changes in the composition of the youth population, except for a natural increase in their number. The percentage of Sabras within the Jewish population rose a little from 82.6% to 84.2%; the proportion of youths whose fathers were born in Israel rose from 37.3% in 1998 to 48.6% in 2004, and to 55.3% in 2008; this was a significant change that resulted from the maturation of the Sabra population. A slight change took place in the rate of unmarried youths, mainly among females aged 20–24. The unmarried rate of these young women rose from 61.7% in 1998 to 67.4% in 2002 and 70.7% in 2007.





In 2008 the downward trend continued in the percentage of youths out of the entire Tel Aviv population: While youth had constituted about a third of the Tel Aviv population in the 1950s, this percentage fell to 17.8% in 1998, then to 15% in 2004, and 10.7% in 2008. No analogous changes were evident in the rest of the regions of the country over the years.

The labor market

A slight drop took place in the participation rate of 15- to 17-year-olds in the labor market from 9% in 1998 to 8.7% in 2004 and 8% in 2008. There was also a drop in the participation rate of 18- to-24-year-olds, from 43.5% in 1998 to 42% in 2004; in 2008 the participation-rate reached 42.1%. By contrast, the rate of youths who did not participate in the labor market rose from 73.2% in 1998 to 75.5% in 2004 and 76.9% in 2008. Regarding the youth unemployment rate there was a mixed trend: a moderate increase of 3.4% took place between 1998 and 2004 (from 17.1% to 20.5%), but by 2008 a drop of 7.8% had taken place and the unemployment rate of youths was only 12.7% that year.

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Education

The rate of youths studying in high schools (or those who had studied in high school but not beyond that level) dropped a little from a level of 70.5% in 1998 to 69.4% in 2008. A slight but steady increase took place in the percentage of youths who studied or are studying in academic institutions, from 10.4% in 1998 to 11.2% in 2004, finally reaching 11.8% in 2008. This corresponds to the steady decline in the rates of youths with post-high school (but non-academic) educations: from 7.7% in 1998 to 6.4% in 2008. At the same time a slow, steady decline was recorded in the percentages of youths who only reached elementary or junior high school levels: from 8.8% (1998) to 6.1% (2004), then 5.1% in 2008.

Among the non-Jewish population, large increases took place in the high school and post high school educational levels: an increase of 7% took place among 15- to 17-year-olds who had acquired 9 to 12 study years in 1998, reaching an average level of 95% in 2004 and 2008. Meanwhile the percentages of 18- to 24-year-olds who acquired more than 12 years of study rose from 25.6% (2004) to 28.2% (2008).

Regarding youth in the Hebrew high school system: in the 2004–2005 academic year, 70.6% studied in the Mamlachti (State School) system; 18% in the Mamlachti Dati (Religious State School) system, and 11.4% in the *haredi* (Chinuch Atzmai) school system. Since then, the percentages of students in the Mamlachti and Mamlachti Dati systems have dropped, reaching 68.8% and 18.3% respectively in the 2008–2009 academic year. Meanwhile, there was a 1.5% increase in the *haredi* (Chinuch Atzmai) school system, reaching 12.9%. This increase is an extension of the trend that began in the 1990s. Then, 73.5% of all high school students studied in the Mamlachti schools, 17.7% in the Mamlachti Dati, and only 8.7% in the *haredi* system.

International comparison of the demographic data

In 2008, Israeli youths constituted 15.9% of the entire country's population in contrast to an average percentage of 12.5% (of youths) in the 27 countries of the European Union (EU). The percentage of 15- to 24-year-olds in Israel is

among the highest in Europe. Lithuania and Macedonia have similar youth population rates of 15.9%, while the rates in all the other European countries are lower than Israel. In Italy, for example, the youth population rate is 10.2%; in Greece and Spain – 11.2%; in Portugal and Germany – 11.6%; and 12.1% in Holland.

Even when we examine the average rates of **all** the European countries they were still lower than Israel; in 2007 the European youth population rate was 13% in contrast to Israel's 15.4%, while 15.3% of the total Eastern European population was aged 15 to 24. The youth population percentages in North America (in 2007) were also lower than Israel's with an average of 13.8%: United States – 13.9% and Canada – 13%. In Asia and Africa the youth population rates were higher than Israel's with rates of 18.1% and 29.4%, respectively.

The percentages of Israeli youths who attend educational institutions are: 65% of 15- to 19-year-olds, and 20.6% of 20- to 29-year-olds. By contrast, the average rates in the OECD countries (the 30 countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) are: 81.5% and 25.1%, respectively. The only member of the OECD with a lower percentage than Israel is Mexico, with 48.8% and 10.9% respectively. In Poland, for example, 92.6% of the 15- to 19-year-olds study as do 31% of the 20- to 29-year-olds. One reason for the low study rates among 15- to 19-year-old Israelis is army service that prevents the youth from studying at ages of 18 and 19. Many young Israelis in the 20- to 29-year-old group take extended trips abroad after their army service and before they begin their studies; this may explain the low study-rate in the Israeli 20-to-29 year old group. However, there is no formal data regarding the frequency and duration of these post-army trips among Israeli youth.

When compared to youth in other countries of the world, the participation of Israeli youth in the labor market (at ages 15 to 24) was lower at 31.6% in 2008, in contrast to 44.5% in the 27 EU countries. The United Nations data (of 2005) for most countries of the world, corroborates this finding regarding Israel's low rate of 31.5% (for 2005) in contrast to average rates of: 60.4% in Africa, 46.4% in Asia and 44.6% in the entire European continent.

As of 2005, Israel is ranked number 13 in the world; this means that there are only 12 other countries with lower youth-participation rates in the labor

market. These countries include: Armenia – 25.05%, Lithuania – 29.75%; Saudi Arabia – 29.1%, Egypt – 30.15% and Qatar – 30.4%.

Again, army service also explains the low participation of young Israelis in the labor market.

Summary

The demographic data presented above demonstrates several trends among youth in Israel that stem from changes in the relative sizes of the various population groups of youth in Israel.

The percentage of youth out of the total population is indicative of family size. When there are lower average numbers of persons per household, as per the trend in Western culture, then the percentages of youths within the entire population are lower too. Thus the percentages of youths out of the total Israeli population have always been low. Meanwhile, small family size is mainly correlated with the level of women's education because educated women tend to work outside the home more and have fewer children. The percentage of educated Arab women in Israel is lower when compared to the rate of educated Jewish women. Employment rates are also much lower among Arab women; only 26.2% of non-Jewish women participate in the labor market, in contrast to 56.7% of the Jewish women. Thus, the growth rate of Arab youths is much higher than Jewish youths, and the ratio of Arab youths out of the entire Israeli youth-population is much higher. But if we analyze only the Arab group, we discover a reverse trend: Arab women have become more educated over the years and the average number of children per family has decreased. Thus today, the growth-rates of Jewish and non-Jewish youth in Israel are comparable.

The average age of marriage for men varies between Jews and non-Jews as the result of the difference in religious and secular rates in the two groups, because religious youth tend to marry at earlier ages. While 17.8% of the Jews define themselves as religious or *haredi*, 49.6% of the non-Jews define themselves as religious or very religious. Thus, the male age of marriage has declined relatively slowly over the years and over population sectors, while the average age of marriage for women has hardly changed.

At the same time as the State got older, the percentage of Israeli-born Sabra

youth has increased in the entire Jewish youth population. This rate is diverted from its stable trend only as a result of anomalies such as waves of mass aliya, as what happened in the early 1990s during the mass aliya from the FSU.

Two additional factors that, taken together, show evidence of a progressive trends among the youth, are higher education and participation in the workforce. The numbers of youths who are high-school graduates has grown over the years, and a similar trend has taken shape regarding the percentage of those who continue on to post-high school or academic studies. These two factors have raised the entry age into the labor market, and decreased the rate of working youths. In addition, there has also been progress toward equality between the genders. The participation rate of young girls and women in the workforce has risen steadily.

Israel is an unusual and complex country from many aspects and for many reasons, one of which is the high percentage of its young population. An international comparison demonstrates that the population of Israel is very young, among the youngest in the world, when compared to EU and OECD countries.

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All of the Above: Identity Paradoxes of Young People in Israel

The 2010 Youth Study of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung constitutes the third survey conducted by the Foundation in collaboration with the Macro Center for Political Economics. Its purpose was to examine the attitudes and ideological perceptions of adolescents and young people in Israel. The impetus for the first study was the occasion of Israel's fiftieth Independence Day in 1998. The second survey of the series took place in 2004, in the very midst of the Second Intifada We can extrapolate, from the youths' points of view, how our society is likely to look in the not-too-distant future. These viewpoints serve as seismographs for societal changes and future developments. The results of the study in front of us document the reality of the lives of vouths who face a world that lacks security and clarity. Their attitudes and values are influenced by life in the State of Israel: after 62 years of existence, Israel still feels threatened by its neighbors and is far from making peace with the Palestinians and Arabs in general. The youth has developed a dialectic response to the reality of a complex, contradictionladen world. In general they have created a basic pattern of "All of the above": this worldview does not resolve the contradictions in their perceptions of reality, but integrates them into their personal attitudes. Basically, while the youths are in favor of peace with the Palestinians, many reject compromises in the peace process and prefer the status quo. They view democracy as an important basic value, yet about half would prefer if Arab Israelis were not represented in the Knesset. The complex and emotionally charged circumstances in Israel do not arouse their general fear or apathy. Instead, they display robustly positive, optimistic attitudes vis-à-vis everything connected to their hopes for the future and their personal welfare: marital partner, family and profession.



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