Yemen Cross-Sectoral Youth Assessment: Final Report

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from USAID/EGYPT

By Education Development Center, Inc. (EDC)

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Acknowledgments

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The assessment has benefited from the generous contributions of time and guidance of many individuals from Washington, DC, to Egypt, to Yemen. EDC would especially like to acknowledge Dr. Towfick Sufian and Ameen Alkaderi, who went above and beyond the call of duty to ensure the assessment’s success and exhibited enduring patience, flexibility, and understanding when the assessment was postponed twice. They also reworked the team expectations to include the training in Cairo. A special thanks goes to Towfick Sufian, who stepped in as the Yemen Team Leader and without whom this assessment would not have been possible, and Ameen Alkaderi, who served as facilitator for 17 of the focus groups. Thanks also to other members of the Yemen-based team: Hamood Al-Audi, the social scientist, Nadwa Al-Dawsari, the conflict specialist, Fahmia Al-Fotih, youth assessment specialist, and Abdullah Al-Thawr, Abeer Al-Absi Assessment Associates. We also acknowledge Ms. Nadwa Al-Dawsari, who came to Washington along with Towfick Sufian, and Raidan Al-Saqqaf, who also helped talks in Washington, DC, following the data collection phase.

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Finally, we would like to extend appreciation to the youth and adult informants who participated in interviews, roundtables, and focus groups across Yemen. Our understanding of youth was greatly informed by their critical insights, as well as their enthusiasm and ideas for what a USAID/Yemen strategy designed to empower youth should look like.

Paul Sully, Team Leader
Executive Summary

Under the EQUIP3 mechanism, USAID/ Yemen tasked the Education Development Center (EDC) to conduct a rapid cross-sectoral assessment of youth in Yemen with funds provided by Section 1207 of the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act to establish or promote stability in certain key countries. The guidelines for these funds are to focus on unstable areas; address urgent threats; and be of short duration, holistic, and multisectoral.

The Yemen Stability Initiative (YSI) endeavors to address alienation among disaffected, disenfranchised, vulnerable youth ages 15–24. It addresses their difficulties through an array of activities and programs to increase their civic participation, life skills competence, health, violent extremism management and mitigation capabilities, and livelihood opportunities. As such, these activities complement and, where appropriate, augment best practices in working with vulnerable youth in Yemen, including those conducted by the Government of Yemen and current USAID/Yemen programs in democracy and governance, health, primary education, and agriculture/economic development.

Concerns for the safety of expatriates resulted in two delays in getting this assessment underway and changes in the assessment methodology and personnel. The revised methodology called for EDC to train the Yemeni members of the team in Cairo to conduct the assessment, and to add two conflict specialists, one international and one national, to the team. These additions were intended to deepen the analysis of disaffected youth and violence in a stronger response to support the stabilization initiative supported by 1207 funds.

Through concentrated work over a three-week period, the seven-member local team (Team Leader/Education and Governance Specialist, Social Scientist, Conflict Specialist, two Youth Research Specialists, and two Youth Associates) conducted 25 youth focus groups and some 16 group interviews with 120 key informants to determine current and potential capacity within Yemen to engage and empower youth. Special efforts were made at every level for full participation of young females, given their high illiteracy rate (36 percent) and low participation in the formal economy. Disaggregation of data collected by gender was the norm.

Focus group and key informant interview notes were translated into English and distributed to the writing team, which included four U.S.-based members in Washington, DC, and the Conflict Specialist and Education/Government Specialist in Yemen. The writers refined the literature review, sorted data into tables, analyzed results, made recommendations, developed a monitoring and evaluation framework, and wrote different sections of the report.

Multisectoral Analysis of Key Youth Issues

Stability. Yemen faces serious economic, political, and governance challenges. Corruption is endemic, and insider deals, embezzlement, and procurement problems are commonplace. The security sector has been involved in abuse, torture, and arbitrary arrests. Prisons conditions are horrible. Students are not safe in school, and freedom of speech and opinions is limited. The judiciary is ineffective and is controlled by social ties and bribery as well as pressured by the executive branch. Judges have been
subject to harassment, reassignment, or dismissal for ruling against the government. Corruption plagues the civil service as underpaid employees resort to making money through bribes and illegal means.

New conflicts are emerging, and old ones are escalating. The Yemeni government has fought with the followers of the Shiite cleric Hussein Al-Houthi in the Northern governorate of Saada since 2004. Historical grievances in the South have manifested themselves in escalating tension with clashes and mass demonstrations and calls for secession. Al-Qaeda and Islamic militants are increasingly active in the country. Tribal conflicts remain fierce and have been escalating since 1995.

Unstable Economy. Yemen’s respectable 3.9 percent average annual growth from 2000–2007 has been primarily due to an increase in oil production and prices. In 2005 oil revenues accounted for 29 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and 73 percent of total public revenues, funding significant elements of the national budget (mostly government salaries). Thus far, the government has not invested oil revenues in other sectors that have the potential to create more jobs for the country’s growing population. Due to lack of investment, the private sector has not grown significantly either in terms of goods and services produced or employment. A serious and growing water shortage is also limiting economic growth.

Three areas are targeted for USAID programming — Sana’a, Taiz, and Aden. In Taiz, Yemen’s second most severely impoverished area, 24 percent of the urban population and 42 percent of the rural population live in poverty. The poverty rate in Sana’a City is 15 percent; in Aden, it is 17 percent. Needs of these marginalized people are slowly being addressed in the outskirts of these cities, where they are now represented in local government councils.

Population Pressures and Growing Youth Bulge. At 3 percent, Yemen’s population growth rate all but cancels out economic growth. The population has doubled since 1990 and is set to almost double again by 2025 (from 19.7 million in 2004 to 38 million in 2025). Close to half the population is under age 15, and another one-third are between the ages of 15 and 29.

Rising Rates of Youth Unemployment. The inability of the economy to create sufficient jobs for a rapidly expanding number of workers (39 percent growth in only nine years) has meant a rapid increase in the number of unemployed people. Different studies show different unemployment levels (The World Bank estimated 35 percent in 2005), but all agree that unemployment has been rising rapidly, particularly among youth, and that the youth rate is roughly twice that of adults. Boys start working at an average age of 13 and girls at age 18. Men usually accept any job regardless of their level of education; pay tends to be their sole criterion for the type of job sought. In general, working conditions are harsh. Women are more selective (more than half are not in labor force) and prefer socially acceptable jobs.

Illiteracy and Educational Attainment. Many more boys (87 percent) attend primary school than girls (63 percent). Hindering female attendance are the limited number of segregated schools and classrooms, lack of trained female teachers, lack of sanitation facilities, long distances to school, high opportunity costs as perceived by parents, and early marriage among women.
Wide Range of Health Concerns. Yemen has high infant mortality (75 per 1,000 live births). Nutrition among the young is poor: 58 percent of children under age 5 were stunted for age and 41 percent of Yemeni children were underweight for age in 2003. Thirty-two percent of men in urban areas of Yemen participate in qat sessions on a daily basis, and an additional 8 percent report they chew the mild stimulant on a weekly basis.

Findings

1. Reasons behind youth violence and extremism. Youth violence and extremism are associated with the exclusion and isolation they experience within their families and communities, as well as the injustice they face under weak and corrupt law enforcement and security systems. This finding refutes the mainstream assumption that youth resort to violence because of lack of tolerance to other religions or the West.

2. Low communication and high isolation. Most youth focus groups highlighted parents’ lack of understanding of youth’s needs, reluctance to communicate with their children, violence and suppression of children, and overprotection of children. Youth feel their families and communities do not value and appreciate them, which pushes them to the streets where they mix with the “wrong peers” and become vulnerable to recruitment by extremist groups.

3. Disconnect between school and employment. Secondary school and university curricula do not provide students with necessary skills and tools to prepare them for life. Students finish their studies memorizing theories and then discover these theories do not help them get jobs. They said schools lack basic practical learning tools, such as chemistry labs, where students can practice what they have learned in books. The youth say this leads to frustration and lack of self-esteem, which leads to failure in their studies.

4. Uneven access to political processes. Youth widely perceive that only people with connections and power can obtain jobs, access to study opportunities, and government services. Most youth feel hopeless because their aspirations are blocked by corruption, which leads some of them to resort to violence, such as carjacking government cars, kidnapping foreigners, and blocking roads to pressure the government.

5. Law enforcement inefficiency, corruption, and tribal revenge. Many young people feel their rights are violated by people who are “above the law” and take revenge when the system cannot bring guilty parties to justice. The youth also pointed to arbitrary arrests, unfair trials, and delays in processing cases through the law enforcement system. Some youth described prisons as places where innocent people or those committing minor crimes are so mistreated that they become all too willing to commit violence against the government.

6. Unemployment and poverty exacerbate vulnerability and hopelessness. Young people are torn between social pressures, which demand they continue their education, work, and start a family, and economic hardships. The absence of guidance and role models frustrates youth, who find themselves unable to manage increasing cultural and life demands. In Aden and Taiz, facilitators found it difficult to get the youth groups to even talk about their dreams and hopes for facilities or programs that they would like to see.
7. Dominant role of religious extremists. Half of the focus groups mentioned the misunderstanding of Islam, spread of extremist Islamic views, and lack of observance of Islamic values as serious problems. Several groups from Aden, Sana’a, and tribal areas said that, along with the weak role of religious preachers and scholars, extremist groups are trying to recruit youth who are eager to learn and have passion for their religion.

8. Aggressive behavior modeled in the media. One-third of the focus groups said one important reason behind youth violence, gang formation, and drug abuse is exposure through the Internet, video games, and action or violent movies.

9. Manipulation by political parties. A few focus groups said political parties and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) associated with them use religion to strengthen their position and brainwash youth with religious passion, sparking antagonism and violence in order to create gaps between the youth and their families and communities.

10. Triggers. Increasing prices, higher dowries, deteriorating living standards, and upcoming elections, to say nothing of ongoing tension with Shiite extremists in the North and recent Al Qaeda terrorist attacks against foreign and Yemeni government sites, no doubt will be strong trigger factors for even more conflict and extremism in the months ahead.

Recommendations

Young Yemenis want training and activities that will get them on the road to economic self-sufficiency, as well as places to go to enjoy and productively spend their leisure time. They want to be heard by their parents and elders and to participate in the civic life of their communities. They want teachers and leaders whom they can look up to and who can provide sound guidance and connect them with people and institutions that will directly help them improve their lives. Preferred program options tend to be in the areas of communications and awareness, recreation, sports and culture, workforce development and training, youth leadership and organizational capacity building, and research on youth issues. However, the multitude of national policies and plans to benefit Yemeni youth has yet to be translated into action. Therefore, the recommendations presented here focus on local strategies to catalyze quick implementation, regardless of which program areas are pursued. There are NGOs doing youth sector programming that operate at the local level in the three select cities. Lists of them appear in Appendix 8 and elsewhere in the report.

1. Adopt a “bottom-up local approach.” USAID should prioritize action at the local level for rapid implementation efforts, building on the wealth of NGO experience that allows local capacity to implement youth projects while communicating and coordinating with national offices charged with implementing the National Youth Strategy.

2. Empower youth as decision-makers and actors. To help youth participate in their own development, young men and women should be among those in key planning and implementation positions.
3. **Saturate support by focusing on a few selected neighborhoods in Sana’a, Taiz, and Aden.** Create high-impact examples where a cluster of multisectoral services is focused at the local level to engage youth in positive ways. By amassing resources to serve a few places well, programs can attack the roots of extremism that are systemic and not merely limited to specific neighborhoods or social classes.

4. **Take programming to “the streets.”** Emulating the highly successful community health model used in international development, create a youth outreach program staffed by vetted, trained community youth known for their people skills, integrity, and capacity to learn. They could engage and informally converse with youth peers in places where they gather, giving advice, teaching basics on self-care, and referring them to existing centers and programs while working with NGOs to make these spaces more youth friendly.

5. **Create youth training.** Create short-term training programs that respond to the most urgently felt youth needs. The assessment found that among the most desired were: self-awareness and life skills, hobbies and interests, community service, and practical work skills. These could be developed into certificate programs, and advocates could seek to affiliate the best programs with local technical schools and colleges.

6. **Create female-only safe spaces for traditional young women.** Encourage communities to set aside places for females or restrict their use to females at specific times. These “ladies-only” locations for study and leisure were stimulated by traditional family restrictions on the mobility of young single females, and they would address harassment by males, which was a very common complaint.

7. **Intentionally address attitudinal change.** Address low communication, isolation, and hopelessness among youth by working through Muslim religious clergy to foster positive messaging and dialogue about the potential of youth. Additionally, awareness campaigns in the media and through Internet portals for youth could highlight positive youth and community engagement activities funded by USAID and others, as well as offer career guidance, tips and training on family life skills, and training for peer-to-peer help. Youth would be central to planning and executing these media strategies.

8. **Support state-of-the-art training for youth workers.** Convene high-quality training events where youth outreach workers, NGOs, volunteers, government, and private groups receive youth-centered nonformal education and development activities. To provide a vision of what is possible, NGOs and universities might take advantage of the U.S. State Department professional visit program to encourage mid-career youth worker staff to seek exposure to exemplary youth programs through regional or international study tours.

9. **Connect school and work.** Both Yemeni youth and employers report a serious disconnect between their needs and the education youth receive. With “saturated local level” programming, youth outreach workers would be trained to facilitate private-public sector partnerships to communicate and connect the needs of the marketplace with nonformal and formal education options.
10. Increase knowledge about youth. Study centers for inquiry, dialogue, reflection, and data gathering on youth perceptions and youth issues as an ongoing aspect of community or neighborhood life will assist Yemeni society to more directly respond to youth needs. The centers would document, disseminate, and encourage discussion of issues such as unemployment, economic deprivation, political corruption, poor educational quality, lack of social justice, lack of physical security, and the cultural gap between youth and their elders.
### List of Acronyms

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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASA</td>
<td>(Microfinance intermediary in Bangladesh)</td>
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<td>BEDP</td>
<td>Basic Education Development Program</td>
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<td>CTO</td>
<td>Cognizant Technical Officer</td>
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<td>DG</td>
<td>Democracy and Governance</td>
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<td>DMFA</td>
<td>Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Democracy and Governance</td>
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<td>EDC</td>
<td>Education Development Center</td>
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<td>EO</td>
<td>Employment Office</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>FFP</td>
<td>Fund for Peace</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GoY</td>
<td>Government of Yemen</td>
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<td>GPC</td>
<td>General People’s Congress</td>
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<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<td>GWCC</td>
<td>(local Yemeni organization)</td>
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<td>HESP</td>
<td>Higher Education School Program</td>
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<td>HRITC</td>
<td>Human Rights Information and Training Center</td>
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<td>IFAD</td>
<td>International Fund for Agriculture Development</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>LMIS</td>
<td>Labor Market Information System</td>
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<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>ME</td>
<td>Management Entity</td>
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<td>MoHE</td>
<td>Ministry of Higher Education</td>
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<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
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<td>MoSAL</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor</td>
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<td>MoTVET</td>
<td>Ministry of Technical-Vocational Education Training</td>
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<td>MoYS</td>
<td>Ministry of Youth and Sports</td>
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<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
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<td>NED</td>
<td>National Endowment for Democracy</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
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<td>NODS</td>
<td>National Organization for Developing Society</td>
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<td>NYS</td>
<td>National Youth Strategy</td>
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<td>PDRY</td>
<td>People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen</td>
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<td>PVO</td>
<td>Private Voluntary Organization</td>
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<td>SCER</td>
<td>Supreme Elections Commission</td>
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<td>SFD</td>
<td>Social Fund for Development</td>
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<td>SFYP</td>
<td>Second Five Year Plan</td>
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<td>SOUL</td>
<td>(Local Yemeni NGO)</td>
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<td>STC</td>
<td>Save the Children</td>
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<td>TVET</td>
<td>Technical Vocational Education and Training</td>
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<td>UNCDF</td>
<td>United Nations Capital Development Fund</td>
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<td>UNDG-ECHA</td>
<td>United Nations Development Group Executive Committee on Humanitarian</td>
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### Assistance

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<th>Acronym</th>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFPA/RH</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund/Reproductive Health</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<td>YAR</td>
<td>Yemen Arab Republic</td>
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<td>YEDI</td>
<td>Youth Economic Development Initiative</td>
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<td>YLF</td>
<td>Youth Leadership Forum</td>
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<td>YMHA</td>
<td>Yemeni Mental Health Association</td>
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<td>YSI</td>
<td>Yemen Stability Initiative</td>
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<td>YSP</td>
<td>Yemen Socialist Party</td>
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1. Purpose and Scope of the Assessment

Under the EQUIP3 mechanism, USAID/Yemen tasked the Education Development Center (EDC) to conduct a rapid cross-sectoral assessment of youth in Yemen under a 1207-funded mandate to focus funds toward a United States Government (USG) interagency goal of stabilization in Yemen. The 1207 mandate is part of the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act that created the funds to establish or promote stability in certain key countries. The guidelines for these funds are to promote stability; focus on unstable areas; address urgent threats; and be of short duration, holistic, and multisectoral.

This youth assessment is part of a growing interest in international youth programming within USAID and across the United States Government. In Yemen, this effort is overseen by the USG’s Yemen-based Development Working Group and implemented by a Program Manager who began in February 2008.

The Yemen Stability Initiative (YSI) endeavors to address alienation among disaffected and disenfranchised youth. It improves program offerings to address the difficulties of vulnerable at-risk youth ages 15–24 through an array of activities and programs to increase their civic participation, life skills competence, health, conflict management and mitigation capabilities, and livelihood opportunities.

The assessment focus was to better understand how the living conditions and environment of marginalized youth affect their levels of social, political, and economic disaffection; their existing developmental assets; and their priority needs and aspirations. It relied principally on opinions of stakeholder groups and youth cohorts about existing and proposed youth development services and interventions, and the community systems, structures, and spaces that might become available to young people in the future.

The scope of the assessment is framed around three areas: description of the research methodology and findings, program design options for at-risk youth that employ a cross-sectoral approach, and draft monitoring and evaluation framework. The 1207-funded program design options (proposed in Section 7) are to complement and, where appropriate, augment best practices in working with vulnerable youth in Yemen. The current USAID/Yemen portfolio includes programs in democracy and governance, health, primary education, and agriculture/economic development.

2. Recommendations

The team that carried out this assessment developed 10 recommendations for the Youth Stability Initiative based on its focus groups and other research.

Adopt a “bottom-up local approach.” USAID should prioritize action at the local level for rapid implementation efforts, communicating and coordinating the planning with national offices and those who have adopted or assumed roles as part of the National Youth Strategy. For example, the Japanese-funded youth consortium work in progress is one effort that is assuming an implementation role. The National Youth Strategy as a top-down effort has been repeatedly postponed and not funded.
Empower youth as decision-makers and actors. Wide gaps exist between the needs and opportunities for youth to participate in their own development. Yemeni youth have a blend of personal and social needs to develop self-identity while also creating connections to the community.

Two examples of ways to do this:

Require each project to have male and female youth under age 28 in key implementation positions. While projects have youth-focused institutional capacity, they have low levels of youth involvement as implementers.

Require each prospective implementation partner to detail a youth engagement plan as part of a youth project proposal. These plans can be key to increase youth NGO capacity, boost youth energy and involvement in other efforts, and elevate NGO responsiveness to youth needs.

Saturate support by focusing on a few neighborhoods in Sana’a, Taiz, and Aden. With the limited resources currently available, create high-impact examples where a cluster of multisectoral services and opportunities at a focused local level can demonstrate how communities can engage youth in positive ways that can lead to changes in the youth and in their communities.

Take programming to “the streets.” Create a youth outreach program staffed by community youth. The streets are a social space of refuge to escape tensions at home. The “streets” include unstructured public places where youth spend time, including qat sessions and other non-directed or sometimes criminal activity settings where youth are idle or active just to “do something.” The highly successful community health model used in the development field is an example in which community members known for their people skills, integrity, and capacity to learn are recruited and trained in basic skills of nutrition and health care to be keen observers of family health matters. Through dozens of informal conversations in the course of a week, they give advice, teach people self-care basics, and make appropriate referrals to special facilities or programs. In like manner, youth outreach workers can be identified and trained in leadership, youth development, and outreach skills to attract their peers to existing centers and programs and make referrals to other existing opportunities. They can also provide feedback on making spaces youth-friendly.

Create training programs to respond to the most urgent needs. For short and urgent 1207-funded training, programs should be created to respond to the most urgently felt community youth needs. The assessment found that among the most desired areas are self-awareness and life skills, hobbies and interests, community service, and practical work skills. “Finding one’s voice” and developing mastery of something, for example, a hobby, are ways to develop self-awareness. “Finding one’s voice” is a process that can result from feeling pressure to speak out on matters of opinion or persuading someone to do

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**A Note on Extremism**

Extremism is not limited to a specific neighborhood or class. It is systemic. Extremism historically was not assumed to be connected to violence. Being an extremist meant holding religious or political views at one of the ends of the spectrum, out of the “mainstream.” While it is accepted that not all religious extremists are violent, the connection in Yemen between religious extremism and violence is assumed. Moreover, criminal violence is distinct from extremism violence.
something. These kinds of programs would be communication-focused. They can include essay writing, debating, writing editorials, creating youth journalism groups, or charging a small group of youth to organize a rally about something important to them, such as on creating an information and education day about opportunities for youth.

High-quality and well-received programs can also be developed into certificate programs with local technical school affiliation. Effective programming will require taking several steps some concurrently. First, start a dialogue with a technical school. Next, determine if a certification process already exists for any private technical school or community center-based technical training (e.g., IT skills in a classroom that is open to non-students after school hours). If a new certification process is needed, then begin a conversation with the certifying authority, the government. Focus on what is needed under the current regulations and on what might be negotiated if it appears too high (i.e. too long, too costly, or not sufficient teacher availability). Lastly, secure the services of an expert in the technical area, a curriculum specialist, and a trainer and hold a workshop on the process of turning the technical area into a certifiable program. The government’s certifying officer should be part of the training and help determine the content and competency level for a testing process. The program officer from an NGO could serve as the catalyst to bring people together, organize the training, recruit students, and guide tweaking the course offering until it fits the context appropriately.

Create female-only safe spaces for traditional young women. The assessment found a high desire to have “female-only” locations for study and leisure, in part stimulated by traditional family restrictions on the mobility of young single females. These spaces would also address harassment by males, a very common complaint. Communities can be encouraged to begin by setting aside places exclusively for females or by restricting these places for female-only use at specific times.

Intentionally address attitudinal change. Low communication has contributed to ad hoc responses by youth to seek social spaces, but they still feel isolated. Hopefulness can be achieved in three ways:

Work through Muslim religious clergy to foster positive messaging and dialogue about the potential of youth;

Develop awareness-raising campaigns to highlight positive youth and community engagement activities funded by USAID and others. Youth can be engaged in creating campaign media content;

Use media technologies to connect young people to reduce their isolation. Many youth already seek friends at Internet cafés and seek friends on the Internet. Expand the positive options by offering career guidance, family life skills tips and training, and peer-help training.

Support state-of-the-art training for youth workers. Convene high-quality training events where youth outreach workers, NGOs, and government and private groups are offered staff and volunteer development opportunities on youth-centered nonformal education and youth-engaged development activities. Collaborate with the U.S. State Department international visitor programs to enable mid-career youth worker staff to seek international (U.S.) exposure through study tours. A study tour to the
United States, for example, may include visits to Beacon Schools in New York, the Latin American Youth Center in Washington, DC, a City Year location in any city, a Youth Corps network member, AmeriCorps headquarters and local programs around Washington, DC, a Youth Build location, a member of the National Youth Leadership Council, the State of Maryland service program, and/or Campus Compact (university-level community service). The common theme of these groups is that they work with youth in multiple ways, and youth participation and management are at very high levels. Effective youth work training combines work experience, civic participation, and leadership to serve a cross-section of young people. Some target “at-risk” youth and offer good comprehensive youth programming. In Yemen, the ideal team to participate in such training would be at a vertical level and include a council member/mayor, NGO program director, NGO youth staff, and active youth leaders. Each cluster would represent one urban target community area so they could bond, get excited and stimulated, and talk about and process the pros and cons of each location visited. In addition, a U.S.-based specialist could help facilitate the discussions and help interpret the U.S. model.

**Connect school and work.** Youth report a serious disconnect between their needs and the education they receive. Subjects are irrelevant; technology is outdated; teachers are not qualified. On another level, youth continue to see education and training as more important than work. They assume education will automatically lead to work, yet private- and public-sector informants said young people often lack employability and technical skills. With “saturated local-level” programming, youth outreach workers can assist private-public sector councils to communicate and connect the needs of the work marketplace with nonformal and formal education options.

**Increase knowledge about youth.** Youth knowledge is not automatically acquired even if youth are a significant part of the population. Study centers for inquiry, dialogue, reflection, and data gathering on youth perceptions and youth issues as an ongoing aspect of community or neighborhood life will assist Yemeni society to more directly respond to youth needs. For example, during the assessment focus groups, youth did not connect youth violence with perceived international injustices such as the Iraqi war and the Palestinian issue. This finding contrasts with adult views of a principal cause of violence.

### 3. Assessment Methodology

The original plan for the Yemen cross-sectoral youth assessment called for on-the-ground field leadership by two U.S.-based experts and one U.S.-based technical advisor who would remain in the United States. The assessment was delayed twice due to security concerns for expatriate presence in Yemen, and a third delay was imminent when the Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO) suggested that EDC train the Yemeni members of the team to conduct the assessment.

Cairo was chosen as the training location, EDC submitted a new technical approach with the revised plan, and the Yemeni Education and Government Specialist added the role of Yemeni Team Leader to his responsibilities. Additionally, one U.S.-based specialist was replaced by a U.S.-based training specialist, and a training design was quickly put together. At the urging of USAID/Washington and with concurrence of USAID/Yemen, two conflict specialists—one international and one national—were added
to the team. These additions were intended to deepen the analysis of disaffected youth and violence in a stronger response to support the stabilization initiative supported by 1207 funds (see Appendix 10: Report on the Cairo Assessment Techniques Training and Appendix 11: Assessment Field Work by all Yemini Staff: Some Lessons Learned).

3.1 Design and Principles

The new assessment design called for intensive, four-day training of the Yemeni team in Cairo, followed by ongoing long-distance coaching by telephone and Internet. Focus group and key informant interview notes were to be translated into English, inputted into soft copy, and emailed to the U.S.-based Team Leader for review and distribution to other U.S.-based team members. An EQUIP3 part-time U.S.-based research intern was added to the team to support the sorting of data into tables and into usable pieces for analysis and report writing.

Two Yemeni specialists, the Team Leader and the Conflict Specialist, were designated to join the USAID/Yemen CTO in Washington, DC, after the assessment for a debrief, review of the data, and discussions of program options and other issues.

The key original deliverables remained the same: an assessment report containing a description of the research methodology used and a detailed description of findings; program design recommendations/options for a cross-sectoral approach to addressing stabilization in Yemen through targeting youth at risk of disaffection; and a draft monitoring and evaluation framework to use as a starting point in measuring the inputs, outputs, outcomes, and results of the Youth Stabilization Initiative over the life of the program.

The final configuration of the Youth Assessment Team consisted of both U.S.- and European-based and Yemen-based personnel. The U.S.- and European-based members include the Team Leader/Youth Development Specialist, Conflict Specialist, Youth Programming Analyst, Training Specialist, Project Technical Advisor, and Research Assistant. The Yemen-based members included the Team Leader/Education and Governance Specialist, Social Scientist, Conflict Specialist, two Youth Research Specialists, and two Youth Associates. The USAID CTO committed his efforts to assist the group and was considered an ex-officio team member.

Several authoritative national reports have summarized the status of youth, government and donor programming strategies, and NGOs addressing Yemeni youth. The U.S.-based team reviewed a sampling of these studies.

Among their key responsibilities, the Yemeni team members addressed critical gaps in knowledge via in-country qualitative and quantitative data collection, developed in large part through focus groups of youth, ages 15–24, in Sana’a, Aden, and Taiz. USAID/Yemen chose the cities, and the team identified youth and adults for focus group participation and interviews through their networks of NGOs and other professional contacts. The team also interviewed knowledgeable adults from the government, Parliament, religious institutions, local councils and leadership, private sector, academia, legal system,
and education. In three weeks of concentrated work, the seven-member local team conducted focus group discussions and individual and group interviews to determine the current and potential capacity within Yemen to support an enabling environment for youth engagement and empowerment and to recommend promising interventions to USAID to support the stabilization initiative.

**Assessment Guiding Principles**
Guiding principles of this process included the following:

- **Working with and through a bilingual (Arabic-English) Yemeni Assessment Team:** While the Youth Assessment Team consisted of both U.S.-based and Yemen-based personnel, all field work was exclusively Yemeni. This allowed all activities to be carried out in Arabic and all people in the focus group and interview settings to be Yemeni.

- **Working in partnership with USAID and in consultation with the 1207 Working Group:** The U.S.- and Yemeni-based teams were in frequent communication with the CTO as the Mission and 1207 representative. The CTO also conducted key informant interviews among USAID staff and other donors.

- **Engaging Yemeni youth as team members:** As part of the assessment team, EDC engaged two Yemeni youth associates, one male and one female, who participated as note takers and translators. Having local youth researchers as part of the team helped ensure that youth and youth stakeholders were fully engaged in the development process.

- **Listening carefully to the voices of youth:** Successful youth development initiatives need to be grounded in understanding the knowledge, attitudes, and perceptions of at-risk youth. Thus a major component of the assessment included focus groups with Yemeni youth, ages 15–24. To reflect the diversity in this population, youth from different parts of Yemen were included.

- **Taking into account the views of key stakeholders:** The participatory process was strengthened through Arabic-language discussions conducted by the Yemeni assessment team staff. The team worked to understand the views on youth development and youth needs of key stakeholders, such as community members, civic and religious leaders, representatives of government agencies, private sector representatives, donors, and academics. Support from these key stakeholders is considered a crucial factor in the success of a subsequent youth program initiative, so it was important to take time during the assessment phase to understand their views.
Guiding Principles of the 1207 Mandate
In addition to the foreign assistance framework, 1207 guidelines were used to shape the standards around which future program options can be evaluated. The guidelines are summarized as:

- **Stability**: Promote stability by building capacity to address conflict and instability
- **Focused**: Highly focused on unstable areas; failure to act could lead to open conflict
- **Short**: Address urgent or emergent threats or opportunities that regular foreign assistance cannot address, but can be tied into longer-term assistance options
- **Urgent**: Focus short term—security stabilization or reconstruction coordinate with longer-term development efforts by government
- **Holistic**: Holistic perspective, multiple sectors.

Intentional Engagement of Young Females
Special effort was made at every level for full participation of young females and girls. Disaggregation of data collected by gender was the norm.

Sustainability
While the focus of this activity is to generate options for short-term and urgent work, connection to longer-term development efforts aimed at sustainability beyond program implementation frames this effort as launching a pilot activity rather than a stop-gap measure.

Assessment Training Overview
The Yemen cross-sectoral youth assessment project changed from an assessment done by U.S.-based experts to an assessment conducted by Yemeni specialists trained by EDC. The assessment was under time pressure to move ahead quickly. The new design called for an intensive training of the Yemeni team over four days in Cairo, followed by ongoing long-distance coaching of the team. Among the key responsibilities of the Yemeni assessment team members was addressing critical gaps in knowledge via in-country qualitative and quantitative data collection activities. This was developed in large part through focus groups of youth ages 15-24 and interviews with key adult informants.

Evaluation of the Training
Overall, the training received high marks for preparing the focus group facilitators, building a strong and empowered team, and setting the stage for a successful assessment effort. After the field assessment, the Yemeni team members felt that with an all-Yemeni team in the field, they received more honest expressions of beliefs and opinions by youth and adults alike. The main criticisms of the assessment training were that there was too much to cover in too short a time and the extended discussions about the focus group questions detracted from the learning.

3.2 Conflict Analysis Framework
The conflict analysis in this assessment report uses the framework developed by the United Nations Development Group Executive Committee on Humanitarian Assistance (UNDG-ECHA). Although this
framework is a conflict analysis, it was found suitable and applicable to the violent extremism analysis based on the assessment findings. The framework (Figure 1) is used to analyze factors of violent extremism mentioned during the focus groups discussions. The United Nations presents three categories of conflict factors: structural factors, proximate/motivational factors, and triggers.

Figure 1: Conflict analysis framework

Structural Factors
Structural factors are pervasive and long-standing factors that become built into the policies, structures, and the culture of a society and may create a pre-condition for violent conflict. There are three kinds of structural factors. Political factors focus on the nature of the regime and governance issues. It is widely believed that societies that live under endemic corruption, political repression, and dominance by the executive are more susceptible to extremism. Along the political dimension, security factors highlight conflict and violence aspects that tolerate extremism. Unresolved historical grievances and periods of insecurity can provide the environment for radical groups to operate. In addition, it is important to look at whether the police and security forces are seen as part of society or as serving the elite and regime’s interests or as a “state within a state.” Socioeconomic factors may reflect long-term economic development, as well as aspects of social cohesion. Persistent economic crises and instability may fuel extremism as they cause growing discontent and perhaps economic disparities. In this regard, it is important to look at access to or exclusion from, for example, employment opportunities, education, and services. This increases the possibility of the “formation of grievance-driven movements founded on shared experience of exclusion or discrimination.” Socioeconomic factors may also include lack of economic and social opportunities, unequal distribution of resources, poor governance, and a culture of violence.
Proximate/ Motivational Factors

Other factors are likely to contribute to the escalation of these structural factors. In this regard, it is important to look at trends and development with relation to structural factors. For example, it is important to look at the political development in the country. Are things deteriorating or improving? Are the elections flawed? Are things remaining stable? Looking at the security sector, it important to ask: Is discontent growing with the military? Is the region clamping hard on the opposition? Are security forces involved in human rights abuses and arbitrary arrests?

Socioeconomic motivational factors focus on the trends in the economy. For example, are poverty, inequality, and unemployment increasing or decreasing? Is access to basic services widening or curbed? Examples of motivational factors can also include access to light weapons, the destabilizing role of neighboring countries, the war economy, and refugee flows.

Cultural-religious motivational factors are based on the notion that religion and culture do not change overnight, but the manner in which people relate to or deal with these issues may cause significant transformation over a short period of time. If people feel that their religion or culture is under pressure or threatened directly, they will react. In this regard, it is important to look at the trends of treatment of religious groups and issues in the country.

Triggers

Compared to structural and motivational factors, triggers are single acts or events that may escalate a problem related to structural factors. Some triggers can be anticipated, but others cannot. Examples of triggers include growing discontent in the military, increasing civil action, flawed elections, violent repression of peaceful demonstrations by the government, coup attempts, sudden change of government, assassination of key opposition leaders, economic collapse, and foreign invasion.

The distinction between the structural and proximate/motivational factors can be illustrated through the conflict iceberg analysis analogy where proximate factors are the tip of the iceberg while structural factors are deeper, larger, and not immediately visible. Once structural factors exist together, they can be exacerbated by proximate causes or triggers that then result in violence.

3.3 Definitions

Terminology in the conflict and extremism field has many definitions. In this report, unless otherwise noted, the following definitions are used or assumed unless otherwise stated in a quote by an individual:

Radical – one who may hold extreme political or religious views.

Radicalization – the process by which a person or group moves from a common or “mainstream” political or religious belief or action to a more extreme minority-held belief or action.

Extremist – one who holds political or religious views considered outside of the “mainstream” or “centrist” of a nonviolent political or religious group.
Violent Radicalization – “the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas that could lead to acts of terrorism” (Country Assessment Tool on Countering Radicalization, 2007, published by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Violent extremism – engagement in violence where violence is rationalized by political or religious views

4. Context and Background

4.1 Stability Issues

Since 2005, Yemen has been classified among the top 23 countries in the world whose stability situation is “alert” in the annual Failed States Index published by the Fund for Peace. Yemen faces serious economic and political challenges and suffers from serious governance problems. Corruption is endemic. According to the Fund for Peace, insider deals, embezzlement, and procurement problems are all common. The security sector has been involved in abuse, torture, and arbitrary arrests. Prisons conditions are horrible, and freedom of speech and opinions are limited. The judiciary is ineffective and is controlled by social ties and bribery as well pressured by the executive branch. Judges have been subject to harassment, reassignment, or dismissal for ruling against the government. Corruption plagues the civil service as underpaid employees resort to making money through bribes and illegal means.

New conflicts are emerging and old ones are escalating. The Yemeni government has fought with the followers of the Shiite cleric Hussein Al-Houthi in the Northern governorate of Saada since 2004. Historical grievances in the South have manifested themselves in escalating tension with clashes and mass demonstrations and calls for secession. Al-Qaeda and Islamic militants are increasingly active in the country. Tribal conflicts remain fierce. According to a recent study by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), tribal conflicts have been escalating since 1995.

History

Yemen resulted from the 1990 unification of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) in the North and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the South. The two countries began negotiating unification since the early 1970s. They had border clashes during the 1970s, but progressed in their unification negotiations by the late 1980s. The collapse of the Soviet Union deprived South Yemen of its major economic support, which greatly contributed to unification.

The former ruling parties shared power during an interim period. Until the first elections took place on April 27, 1993, both parties shared positions in government. Military units were translocated so that southern military units were positioned in northern areas and vice versa. However, unification was done hastily without the necessary steps to merge the military and civil administration to ensure a safe transition. Serious differences between the leaders of the two former regimes led to a series of political and economic crises that has put the stability of the country at stake. In 1991, about 1 million Yemeni workers were expelled home from Gulf countries as a reaction to the perception that Yemen supported Saddam Hussein. This caused a shock to the already fragile economy of the new country. Given the
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Yemen Socialist Party’s (YSP, from the South) opposition to the General People’s Congress’ (GPC, from the North) support for Saddam Hussein, this issue furthered the tension between the two parties.

The country’s first elections in 1993 resulted in the GPC winning 122 out of 301 Parliament seats, compared to 54 by the YSP. In addition, Islah, an Islamist party, won 62 seats and shared the coalition government with the two parties. Due to differences in population size, the YSP lost its previous 50 percent share of power even though it won all Southern seats. The relationship between the two parties deteriorated and led to a secession attempt by YSP leaders and a brief civil war in 1994. The GPC achieved a landslide victory in 1994. The YSP was defeated and its former leaders escaped the country. The regime confiscated properties of the YSP; as YSP came out of the war very weak, GPC was well positioned to rule the country alone. Islah, as the major opposition party, was part of the government coalition until 1997 when the GPC managed to win 73 percent of the vote and form the government alone.

Public Unrest
At the political level, growing public discontent manifested itself in a number of conflicts. In 2004, fighting broke out in the Northern region of Saadah between the government and a few thousand followers of Shiite cleric Husein Al-Hoothi. Al-Hoothi formed an opposition group called the Believing Youth. The group rebelled against the government’s relationship with the United States, accusing the Yemeni government of taking actions to please the United States at the expense of its own citizens.

In the South, grievances over unfair distribution of resources and uneven economic development led to further political tension and violent incidents. In May 2005, 36 people were killed in riots in Aden protesting a price hike processed by the government. In 2007, Southern Yemeni veterans who were dismissed after the 1994 war demanded a return to their jobs and compensation. When the authorities did not respond to their demands, they formed an NGO and started peaceful demonstrations across some Southern governorates. In September 2007, riot police clashed with them, killing two demonstrators and injuring dozens. Meanwhile, police dispersed demonstrations in Aden where demonstrators were demanding the release of arrested veterans. In April 2008, thousands of protesters, mainly youth, protested rising food prices for 50 days. The protests turned violent as angry youth started blocking roads and burning tires. The growing unrest in the South has reached the level that people openly state their desire to secede. In the April 2008 riots, youth were chanting ”Get out, colonization”—meaning the Sana’a regime—and ”Revolution, revolution, South."

The political scene continues to be alarming. Activists from the opposition and Southern governorates have been arrested. Recently, the opposition coalition decided not to participate in the formation of the Supreme Elections Commission (SCER) and threatened to boycott upcoming elections. Their conditions to participate in the elections include release of political prisoners and reform of the SCER, which they see as biased and intentionally loosely managed in previous elections so the GPC could achieve landslide victories.
Serious Economic Challenges
Since 1994, Yemen has restructured its national and international economy as part of a World Bank-International Monetary Fund (IMF) program. Although successful in 1995–1996, economic recovery has since slowed as a result of conflicts with neighboring countries (Saudi Arabia, Eritrea), continued political tensions, and decline in oil revenues. By 2004, the World Bank and IMF expressed displeasure with the weak government performance with regard to structural adjustment. The head of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) expressed concern over increasing indicators of budget deficits and fiscal problems and criticized the government for absence of transparency and pervasive corruption.

The country has achieved reasonable, although variable, economic growth rates over the past decade. The gross domestic product (GDP) grew 3.9 percent on average over the period 2000–2007.\textsuperscript{13} Growth in GDP over the last decade has been heavily influenced by oil revenues, which substantially improved due to an increase in production and prices. In 2005, oil revenues accounted for 28.7 percent of the GDP (2004 prices), 72.9 percent of total public revenues, and 92.9 percent of exports.\textsuperscript{14} Other economic activities in Yemen consist of services (38 percent of GDP); agriculture (15 percent); manufacturing, utilities, and construction (10 percent); and government services (10 percent).\textsuperscript{15}

The Yemeni government continues to use its oil wealth to fund significant elements of the national budget (mostly government salaries). However, this chronic dependency on a single unstable and finite\textsuperscript{16} revenue source could result in macroeconomic instability. Thus far, the government has not invested oil revenues in other sectors that have the potential to create more jobs for the country’s growing population. Due to lack of investment, the private sector has not grown significantly either in terms of goods and services produced or employment. As reported by government labor sources, there is only a minimal job creation rate of around 4 jobs per 100 for existing businesses and 2.5 jobs per 100 for new businesses.\textsuperscript{17}

Increasing Terrorism and Extremism
Current situations in the country—including political crises, continued deterioration of the economy, and increasing public discontent about corruption, uneven economic development, unfair distribution of resources, price hikes, and lack of employment opportunities—have exhausted the Yemeni government and offered a favorable environment for Al-Qaeda. At the government level, Yemen has been a U.S. partner in the war on terror since September 11, 2001. Prior to that, in the early 1990s, many Yemenis who fought with Afghan Arabs against the Soviet Union returned home and brought with them a form of radical Islam. Slowly they became a node in the Al-Qaeda system.\textsuperscript{18} The suicidal attack in 2000 that killed 17 U.S. Marines on the U.S.S. Cole in the seaport of Aden marked the beginning of Al-Qaeda operations in the country. It was followed with an assault on the French tanker Limburg in 2002 off the coast of Mukalla in Hadhramout. In early 2003, the Yemeni government acknowledged that several senior Al-Qaeda operatives were still at large in Yemen, with many militants in the countryside.\textsuperscript{19}

Analysts say a second generation of Al-Qaeda is thriving with Yemen’s offering of safe havens for militants.\textsuperscript{20} Yemen seems to be a place for Al-Qaeda to regroup and recharge. Many non-Iraqi Islamic militants fighting the American forces in Iraq are Yemeni. In late 2007, the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Hamza Al-Muhajir, called upon Yemenis to send fighters. On November 29, 2007, the chief of Al-Qaeda in Yemen, Nasser Al-Wehaishi (Abu Basir), answered that he would immediately comply.\textsuperscript{21} Analysts say Al-Qaeda in Yemen has turned to wealthy and sympathetic Saudis for money and support.
as the Saudi authorities managed to halt Al-Qaeda operations there. On August 11, 2008, Yemeni security launched an attack on an Al-Qaeda cell, killing and holding a number of Al-Qaeda leaders, among whom were Saudi Al-Qaeda leaders.

Attacks by Al-Qaeda have increased since 23 militants escaped a Yemeni jail in 2006. Under its leader, Nasser Al-Wehaishi, who was among the 23 escapees, Al-Qaeda is becoming more active. In July 2007, suicide bombers killed seven Spanish tourists and their two Yemeni drivers. Several attacks against oil pipelines did not succeed. In March 2008, mortar rounds fired at the American Embassy missed their target and hit a nearby girls’ school, where they killed a guard and injured dozens of students. On July 25, 2008, an Al-Qaeda group in Yemen claimed responsibility for an attack against a military camp in Sayoon city in Hadramout. On September 17, 2008, a massive suicide twin attack against the American Embassy in Sana’a resulted in the death of 19 people, including the 6 attackers.

Al-Qaeda operations in Yemen have recently targeted both Western and Yemeni government and military personnel and sites. Deteriorating security, political, and economic situations are feeding into the thriving of Al-Qaeda. Yemen faces serious challenges ahead, most important of which is the possibility of economic collapse in an oil-dependent economy. While 75 percent of government revenues come from oil, oil is expected to be fully depleted from the country by 2014.
A Profile of Three Regional Cities: Sana’a, Taiz, and Aden

Sana’a
Sana’a, a city of 2.07 million, is the capital of Yemen. Its incidence of poverty is among the lowest in the country, due to the amount and constancy of government employment and the recent construction of new government and educational facilities, hotels, restaurants, and the like. Additionally, Sana’a has light industry, in the areas of food processing and natural gas, and is a center of commerce and banking. Sana’a has a Chamber of Commerce that includes companies of all sizes from various industries. The chamber provides information to members as well as opportunities for networking. The Vocational Training Foundation is an emerging effort to link public and private providers of training with one another, private sector companies, and public sector authorities with responsibilities for technical-vocational education.

Taiz
Taiz is a city in the Yemen Highlands near the famous Mocha port on the Red Sea. It is located at an elevation of about 1,400 meters above sea level, with 2.67 million inhabitants (of which 600,000 are in the City of Taiz alone) in the entire governorate, including those in rural areas. Its economic base is coffee, grown in the surrounding landscape together with the mild narcotic qat and other vegetables. The city's industries include cotton-weaving, tanning, and production of jewelry. Taiz cheese is also renowned throughout Yemen. Since the 1970s, Taiz has been the most industrialized part of Yemen. It has a wide range of light manufacturing, such as plastics, confectionaries, soap, cooking oil, and cigarettes, and service-based activities, such as hotels and restaurants. Taiz is notable in that it has a large private sector consortium called the Hayel Saeed Group with its own training center that offers courses in management, electricity and electronics, and other skills to meet the needs of its companies. The group has expressed interest in collaborating with vocational institutes in the province.

Aden
Aden is a port of major historical significance on the Red Sea. Its location, only four nautical miles from one of the largest shipping corridors in the world, provides it with a vital competitive advantage. The refinery and port complex (including the Aden Container Terminal and the Mo’alla Terminal) are the principal sources of employment in the governorate, which has an estimated population of 700,000. Aden’s other major industries are fishing, tourism, and food and catering (hotels, restaurants, etc.). Despite Aden's competitive advantage and ambitious plans to expand its port, private investors are reluctant to come forward because of perceptions of corruption, lack of security, and serious challenges to the government in providing basic services to both citizens and investors. Thus, Aden has been less than successful in attracting investments to expand employment and services, and in defining effective and sustained urban poverty reduction strategies. Much like Sana’a, it includes companies of all sizes in various industries.
4.2 Social Issues

Population Pressures and Growing Youth Bulge
The total population of Yemen in 2006 was 22 million with a growth rate of 3.0 percent. This translates into a doubling of Yemen’s population since 1990. With an annual growth rate of 3.0 percent (the world average is 1.2 percent), Yemen’s population is set to almost double again by 2025 (from 19.7 million in 2004 to 38 million in 2025). As such, Yemen is a country of youth. Close to 50 percent of the population is under age 15, and another one-third is between the ages of 15 and 29. Yemen’s median age is currently 15.4 years and is expected to increase to only 16.6 years by 2020. These concentrations of youth form a “youth bulge” in terms of demographic structure of the country and have important social consequences for youth.

Rising Rates of Youth Unemployment
The inability of the economy to create sufficient jobs for a rapidly expanding number of workers over the last decade has meant a rapid increase in the numbers of unemployed. Specifically, along with rapid labor force growth from an estimated 4.1 million in 1999 to 5.7 million in 2008 (39 percent increase in only nine years), unemployment increased from 11.5 percent to 18.7 percent (63 percent increase). Other studies suggest even higher unemployment; for example, the World Bank Factbook 2006 indicated 35 percent of the labor force was unemployed at that time.

Three major reasons explain the rapid expansion of the Yemeni labor force: (1) high birth rates resulting in 190,000 new young entrants into the labor force each year, (2) the continuing need to absorb the 1 million migrants who returned to Yemen from neighboring countries after the first Gulf war, and (3) the modest increase in recent years of Yemeni women entering the work force (from 23.6 percent in 1999 to 27.8 percent in 2008). Between 2001 and 2007, the Yemeni labor force grew an average of 3.8 percent per year (3.3 percent among men and 5.3 percent among women).

These demographic and economic conditions result in an increasing rate of youth unemployment. The unemployment of youth ages 15–29 is, as with many of Yemen’s neighbors, a major problem, with a rate that is double that of adults (18.7 percent as compared to 8.4 percent in 1999, and estimated at between 31.2 and 37.4 percent in 2008), as shown in Table 1. Boys start working at an average age of 13 and girls at age 18. Men usually accept any job, regardless of their level of education, and prioritize income earned over job social status. In general, working conditions are harsh. Women are more selective and prefer socially acceptable jobs.

Table 1. Estimated range of youth unemployment rates, 1999–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>RANGE OF YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT RATES (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>20.2 23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>23.5 27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>26.4 31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>29.1 34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>31.2 37.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: A National Employment Agenda for Yemen Towards an Employment Strategic Framework
Younger members of the 15–29 year-old cohort progressively account for a larger share of youth unemployment. Some 175,000 unemployed, or 37 percent of the unemployed, were new entrants into the labor market. Seventy-five percent of the unemployed were first-time job seekers, and this percentage is likely to increase each year. Gender inequalities, which are pervasive in the wider labor market, are particularly marked among youth, with only 8.8 percent of 15–19 year-old boys inactive versus 51.9 percent of girls; and 8.6 percent of young men ages 20-24 versus 65.5 percent of young women of the same age.

Rural Poverty
Yemen is one of the world’s least developed countries. Its per capita GNP was US$971.91 in 2007, and it was ranked 153rd out of 177 countries in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index in 2008. Poverty—and extreme poverty—in Yemen is located predominately in rural areas and in particular the rural governorates of Amran, Shabwah, and Al Baida. At the national level, poverty declined in Yemen between 1998 and 2005 specifically in the urban regions. According to the UNDP, among the three areas targeted for USAID programming—Sana’a, Taiz, and Aden—Taiz is the most impoverished with 24 percent of its urban population and 42 percent of its rural population living in poverty. Taiz is Yemen’s second most severely impoverished area, after Shabwah. The poverty rate in Sana’a City is 15 percent; in Aden, it is 17 percent. Needs of the marginalized people in Yemen—often labeled as akhdam, ahgur, or abid—are slowly being addressed in the outskirts of cities, including Taiz, Aden, and Sana’a. An effort to provide a voice to these groups is increasing, particularly in Taiz, and they are now represented in local government councils in the three areas.

Gender Gap
Yemen currently ranks extremely low in terms of gender equity. Out of 128 countries included in the Global Gender Gap Report 2007, which ranks countries based on economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, political empowerment, and health and survival, Yemen claimed last place for the second year in a row. Yemen significantly lags behind other countries in two gender-related areas regarding youth: female literacy among youth ages 15–24, and adolescent motherhood. In Yemen, 36 young women are literate per 100 literate young men. Yemen does not have the worst overall adolescent motherhood rate in the world, but it does not fare well compared to its neighbors, and whereas most countries’ rates have fallen, Yemen’s has increased, from 15 percent to approximately 17 percent in 2007. Early marriage, lack of educational opportunities, and lack of legal rights are significant problems facing Yemen’s young women today.

Nevertheless, the picture is not as bleak as it appears, as Yemen has made small improvements with regard to gender. Female literacy rates have improved from around 10 percent in 1990 to close to 30 percent in 2004. Girls’ enrollment in primary school has increased from 47 percent in 2000 to 63 percent in 2004. Additionally, women’s rights issues are at the forefront of the government. Through its Women’s National Committee, Parliament is now discussing a series of legislative initiatives addressing early marriage, polygamy, treatment of wives and children, adultery, and other issues. The Cabinet of Ministers formed a ministerial committee to redraft certain laws, and in the past year, the Cabinet has brought forth some amendments, which are in the process of being circulated through Parliament. Still, the situation for women and girls in Yemen is extremely difficult, and more efforts must be made to create sustainable change in these areas.
Illiteracy and Educational Attainment
Yemen has one of the largest gaps in the world between the net primary school attendance rates of boys and girls—87 percent versus 63 percent, according to UNICEF. A recent impact assessment of projects under the Social Fund for Development (SFD) program found that 22 percent of girls drop out of school between the ages of 11 and 12. The main factors that hinder them are the limited number of segregated schools and classrooms, lack of trained female teachers, lack of sanitation facilities, long distances to schools, and high opportunity costs as perceived by parents. Additionally, early marriage is common among women in Yemen and significantly diminishes their access to education and employment. Efforts to further increase the enrollment rates and reduce dropout rates are continuing through the Basic Education Development Program, launched in 2005 by the Government of Yemen in cooperation with donors, which incorporates the World Bank/UNESCO Education For All Fast Track Initiative launched in Yemen in 2004.

Wide Range of Health Concerns
According to the World Health Organization, healthy life expectancy in Yemen at birth is 49 years and total life expectancy is 61 years.44 The infant mortality rate is 75 per 1,000 live births45 and the maternal mortality ratio is 430 per 100,000 live births.46 Nutrition among the young is poor: 58.2 percent of children under age 5 were stunted for age and 41.3 percent of Yemeni children were underweight for age in 2003.47

Thirty-two percent of men in urban areas of Yemen participate in qat sessions on a daily basis and an additional 8 percent report they chew the mild stimulant on a weekly basis.48 Ten percent of women from the same demographic report chewing qat daily and 4 percent weekly. Numbers in rural areas are higher, where 40 percent of men and 13 percent of women chew daily.

Mental Health and Psychological Services49
Social stigmas surrounding mental health issues—and subsequently psychological care—still persist in Yemen and are often grouped along with myths, superstitions, witchcraft, jinn, and devils. Despite these perceptions, mental health services have increased in recent years. A recent survey by the Yemeni Mental Health Association (YMHA) counted 3,580 professionals in Yemen with a minimum of a bachelor’s degree in psychology. The report noted, however, that psychology departments at Yemeni universities generally concentrate on instruction and do not provide services or research in the local
community.

**Media Connectedness**
A recent poll of 3,500 youth in seven countries across the Middle East and North Africa, including Yemen, showed Arab youth get information from multiple sources including television (67 percent), the Internet (52 percent), newspapers (47 percent), friends (42 percent), family (36 percent), school (32 percent), radio (20 percent), and mobile phones (17 percent). Of these options, youth identified television (45 percent) and the Internet (33 percent) as their most trusted sources. Main trends of media usage in the region and in Yemen in particular include the following:

- Regionally, 70 percent of Arab youth enjoy television programs with religious content and 57 percent identified television as a means to enhance women’s rights. Another 37 percent of Arab youth think programs should focus on sexuality and sex education.

- Arab youth prefer Arab-region programming content (43 percent)—such as Al-Jazeera—more than nationally owned television stations (34 percent).

- In Yemen, there are seven broadcast stations and an estimated 23 televisions per 1,000 people; household television access is approximately 43 percent.

- Sixty-eight percent of the Yemeni population is covered by mobile telephony.

- Yemen has six AM and one FM broadcast stations, two shortwave stations, and an estimated 1.05 million radios (50.6 per 1,000 people).

**Internet Use: Religious Content and Online Discussion Forums**
Arab Internet usage is characterized by an emphasis on religion and the willingness to openly discuss politics, religion, and sex in discussion forums. According to recent studies, eight of the 100 most visited Arabic websites are Islamic religious sites, and no other language group debates as fervently on the Internet as Arabic speakers. Popular religious sites are typically not radical in nature, but rather promote a “moral renewal of the individual.” During a key informant interview, USAID Democracy and Governance Officer Salwa Mohammed Al-Sahi mentioned the Egyptian-born, London-based preacher Amr Khaled as a model of successful youth engagement.

Amr Khaled’s website, established in 2002, is not only the most popular site in the Arab world, particularly among Arab youth, but also is the most frequented religious site in the world. Remarkably, 36 percent of his site traffic is attributed to discussion groups alone.

Due to the success of Arab discussion forums, blogging was not as important in the Arab world before 2004. Youth in the Middle East began to grow frustrated over the uncivil tone in discussion groups and censorship and started blogging. Since 2005, Arabic blogs have rapidly increased in popularity among Arab youth. Podcasting is also in use and ranges from secular music to Qu’ranic recitations. Podcasts tend not to be overtly political, but are an important trend and viewed as a useful tool for individual

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“Amr Khaled has given youth what the governments have failed to do. He has given them self-identity, pride in being youth, and understanding of good citizenship...he transformed long ignored democratic values into live, dynamic and appealing concepts that make sense to youth and adults alike. “
– Key Informant in Sana’a
expression. Some researchers have observed that podcasting is more popular among secularists than Islamists who prefer the online forums.63

5. Findings

The previous section describes current issues related to Yemen’s stability and social system. With these conditions as background, the assessment team conducted focus groups with youth and interviews with a wide range of adult stakeholders about issues of concern to youth. The findings from interviews with youth and adults are summarized below.

5.1 Voices of Youth

For three weeks in August and September, two sub-teams held 25 focus groups, in which 287 youth participated. More than one-half of the participants were from Sana’a. Aden and Taiz made up the remainder. Twenty youth interviewed in Sana’a came from tribal areas. Females constituted 56 percent of the sample group. The largest sample group was Sana’a females, at 37 percent of the total sample size. The second largest group was made up of Sana’a males, at 19 percent of the sample size. Eighty-two percent of the participants were ages 19 to 24. Nearly 60 percent of the youth were in school; many of those out of school were secondary and university graduates. In sum, while there was good diversity of respondents across ages, locations, genders, and school status, the results may be a little weighted toward Sana’a educated females. (Appendix 3 lists the composition of the focus groups, and Appendix 4 provides the protocol and questions used during the discussions.)

5.1.1 Youth Violence

Youth violence is a growing problem in Yemen. The number of violent incidents and terrorist attacks by young people has increased over the last few years, many against Westerners and Western facilities. More recently, violent extremists have also targeted government facilities. On July 25, 2008, a young man bombed himself in a Yemeni security camp in Sayoon city in Hadramout. Youth also take active part in regional riots, clashes with the government, and tribal conflicts. In a recent study conducted by the National Democrat Institute for International Affairs, youth were found to take a major role in sparking new conflicts and exacerbating existing ones.64 The Believing Youth is a rebellion movement that has been fighting the government since 2004 with the Shiite cleric Hussein Al-Houthi.
The analytical section that follows on youth violence is based on the opinions of youth who participated in the assessment. The field meetings with youth from five governorates revealed political, economic, and social structural and proximate factors to address, as shown in Appendix 5. They reflect the need for long-term and sustainable solutions. According to the youth, none of these factors is a direct cause of conflict, but they reinforce each other to create an environment that increases vulnerability to extremism and violence. Results of the focus group meetings portray a window of opportunity for short-term programs that can feed into long-term solutions.

A major finding in this assessment stresses that youth associated violence and extremism with the exclusion and isolation they experience within their families and communities, as well as the injustice they face under weak and corrupt law enforcement and security systems. This finding refutes the mainstream assumption that youth resort to violence because of lack of tolerance to other religions or the West.

**Low Communication and High Isolation**

In 60 percent of the focus groups, incidences of isolation and communication discord were significant. The youth highlighted violence and suppression against children and youth in the family, overprotection of children, lack of understanding of youth’s needs, and reluctance of families to communicate with their children. The participants said young people are under pressure because they feel their families and communities do not value and appreciate them, which leads to isolation. According to the participants, this pushes them to the streets where they mix with the “wrong peers” and become vulnerable to recruitment by extremist groups.

**Family Life Issues and Social Exclusion**

The 85 percent of focus group participants who identified families’ devaluing and disrespecting youth as a problem said these feelings push youth to spend most of their time on the streets. They said communities have few or no facilities for young people, such as sport clubs, parks, or affordable places to learn skills such as languages or computers. As expressed by the youth themselves, feeling isolated,

“Because of suppression that is practiced by family towards the young people, young people become violent.”
– Focus Group Member

“We cannot be forced to live like our parents did. We belong to a new era. Youth opinions should be respected and their future aspirations should not be crossed.”
– Young man from Aden

“Youth are forced to hang out in the streets. They have nowhere else to go.”
– Focus group member

“I wish I can work on my small cart all the time just to make sure I make my everyday living.”
– 16-year-old boy from Taiz

“Young people who are poor and feel devalued by their communities and families could find resort with extremist groups who provide them with financial and emotional support.”
– Tribal youth
having no means to express themselves freely, and having few options of places to spend their time lead some young people to violence to “express themselves” or “to be different.” They then feel recognized, something which their families and communities deny them.

Two focus groups also mentioned the culture of early marriage, which puts pressure on youth who are expected by their families and communities to start a family when they cannot afford to do so because of deteriorating life standards, high dowry prices, and limited job opportunities.

**Disconnect between Needs and the Education Provided**

Five focus groups in the three governorates complained secondary school and university curricula do not provide students with necessary skills and tools to prepare them for life. For example, they finish their studies memorizing theories and then discover these theories do not help them get jobs. They said schools lack basic practical learning tools, such as chemistry labs, where students can practice what they have learned in books. The youth say this leads to their frustration and lack of self-esteem, which leads to failure in their studies.

**Uneven Access to Political Processes**

Youth in 40 percent of the focus groups expressed their frustration over their observation that only people who have connections and power can obtain jobs and access to study opportunities, while those who are poor and powerless are excluded. They observed that youth feel hopeless because they feel their aspirations are blocked by corruption, which leads some of them to resort to violence.

Focus groups participants in Aden and the three tribal areas of Mareb, Al-Jawf, and Shabwa mentioned unfair distribution of resources as an issue. Those areas have been experiencing political movements and tension recently in which reform and equality between citizens of the different governorates are strongly demanded. Tribal youth in the focus groups said they resorted to carjacking government vehicles and blocking roads to pressure the government to deliver services, release prisoners, or provide jobs. They said the government often fulfils the demands of tribesmen who carjack government vehicles and kidnap foreigners.

Moreover, 45 percent of focus group participants mentioned law enforcement inefficiency and corruption as motivations for violence. They explained young people whose rights were violated by people who are “above the law” take their own revenge when the current system cannot bring those people to justice. The youth also pointed to arbitrary arrests, unfair trials, and delays in processing cases through the law enforcement system.
In tribal areas, the culture of revenge killing is part of the social system. Although most tribesmen no longer condone it, young people think that the absence of law enforcement institutions in tribal areas is a factor for why people resort to revenge killing.

**Low Access to Financial Resources**

Economic problems, including unemployment (65 percent) and poverty (52 percent), were stressed as circumstances that exacerbate youth’s vulnerability to extremism. Young people are torn between social pressures, which demand they work and start a family, and economic hardships. The absence of guidance and role models frustrates youth, who find themselves hopeless and unable to manage increasing cultural and life demands. The level of frustration and hopelessness came out clearly in the focus group meetings in Aden and Taiz with out-of-school youth who could not continue their education. Facilitators found it difficult to get the groups to talk about their dreams and hopes for facilities or programs that they would like to see.

"You go to one of those religious schools. They preach issues like the making of traditions in which they attack traditional values or 'the Star of David.' We have never heard of such names before. Here comes this young guy who is still very young and raw and attends this lecture where there is a man with [a] big beard talking a bit of politics and a bit of everything. The young guy went back home fighting with his family and trying to convince them that TV watching, girls’ education, and many other normal things are forbidden in Islam. This was a person I knew very well."

– Young girl from Sana’a

**Violence in Schools**

Two focus groups talked about teachers abusing their students, which they believe influences children and reinforces violent behaviors. Some focus groups talked about gangs forming in schools.

**Dominant Role of Religious Extremists**

Approximately one-half of the focus groups mentioned the misunderstanding of Islam, spread of extremist Islamic views, and lack of observance of Islamic values as serious problems. Five focus groups from Aden, Sana’a, and tribal areas said, along with the weak role of religious preachers and scholars, extremist groups are trying to recruit youth who are eager to learn and have passion for their religion.

**Aggressive Behavior Modeled in the Media**

Thirty-five percent of focus groups said one important reason behind youth’s violence is exposure to it through the Internet, video games, and action or violent movies. Two focus groups in Taiz mentioned that watching violent movies has contributed to the formation of gangs in some neighborhoods of the city as well as in some schools. They also mentioned the increasing problems of drug use.

**Manipulation by Political Parties**

Twenty percent of focus groups said political parties play a role in contributing to youth violence and extremism. They said some political parties use religion to strengthen their position and brainwash youth with religious passion, using them in a political game. This perception also extends to NGOs associated with political parties, as expressed by Aden youth. They said that these organizations spark antagonism and violence between youth in particular and people in general that sometimes create gaps.
between the youth and their families and communities, as well as between people within the communities.

**Prisons as Violence Academies**

Two focus groups mentioned the problem of mixing youth suspects with criminals and extremists in jail. Khaled (name changed), a young tribal man, told the story of a 17-year-old boy, captured along with some Al-Qaeda suspects, whom he met when he was on a mission as a security officer in a Yemeni jail. Marks of torture were everywhere on the young man’s body. When Khaled talked to him, the boy said not only would he get revenge when he leaves jail, but also he would convince his friends to take revenge from this unfair government. When Khaled asked the security forces about the boy, they told him he is very dangerous because he memorized the Qu’ran by heart. Khaled himself was dismissed from the military because he tried to help a person get a free trial but was blocked. One group mentioned the abuse of juveniles in jails creates extremists out of them.

**Islam under Attack**

Two focus groups said youth resort to extremism because of international injustice: that is, when they see what is happening in Iraq and Palestine, they feel Islam is being attacked and are easily recruited into extremist groups. One of the groups referred to the cartoons published in Denmark attacking Prophet Muhammad. Two other groups said youth become violent because of Western attempts to spoil their culture through satellite TV and Internet.

**Price Hikes and Increasing Dowry Prices**

Young people are frustrated that prices are increasing, living standards are deteriorating, and dowry prices are high. The country has experienced a number of price hikes since the early 1990s due to political tensions, economic crises, and the country’s commitment to a structural adjustment program with the International Monetary Fund.

**Upcoming Elections**

It is expected the upcoming elections will be a strong trigger factor for violent extremism because of four conditions: (1) political tension among political players in Yemen (described in the background section of this report); (2) youth identifying political parties as using religion for political purposes; (3) ongoing tension with Shiite extremists in the North that has reached the outskirts of Sana’a; and (4) the recent increase in terrorist attacks against foreign and Yemeni government sites. Arbitrary arrests of Al-Qaeda suspects that followed the recent terrorist attacks against the American Embassy and other attacks against government and security sites are also expected to trigger more violence among youth.
Lack of Safe Places
Youth with no safe places to spend time will go to the streets and be recruited by extremist and violent groups.

5.1.2. Where Youth Spend Time
The youth were asked where others like them spend the most time in an average week. Within the focus groups, they were asked to rank locations and also describe the benefits and disadvantages of each place.

The “Streets” as a Place of Refuge
The streets and shopping are highest on the list of places where youth spend time as a place of comfort. As one person said: “Streets and shopping are [a] second home for youth.” Going out and being away from home at these places afford them opportunities to seek connections with friends and acquaintances. Meeting and making friends was the most often cited reason to spend time in all three top places—to spend time with friends, meet new people, talk, exchange ideas on their future, discuss social and political topics, and talk about fashions and gossip. They admit the streets also have shortfalls because they are a gathering place for violent activities, begging, and theft of money, wallets, and bags.

Table 2. Top places where Yemeni youth currently spend time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CURRENT PLACES</th>
<th>TOTAL %</th>
<th>TOTAL #</th>
<th>SANA’A %</th>
<th>TAIZ %</th>
<th>ADEN %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shopping/Street</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qat Session</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet Café</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutes</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charitable Society</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garden, Beach, Park</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosques</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night Club</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport Event</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trips/Tourist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>77</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on 25 focus groups of Yemeni youth ages 15-24. Participants were asked to list the top three places, activities, and programs where youth like them currently spend time, e.g., in Sana’a 21% of the focus groups ranked shopping/street among their top three selections.

Seeking Out Connections
Several youth remarked an Internet café is a “fun place” and a place to “meet new friends.” They say they make both Yemeni and virtual friends. As one said, “I meet new people from the world; for example, I have new friends from some Arab countries who I only met through the Internet.”
sessions also are cited for making friends and for family gatherings. Importantly, youth also say at these places, they can find solutions for problems and discuss future plans.

An Internet café has the distinction from other top places as a place to do research and secure new information on science, technology, and education. One youth characterized it as a “window to the world.” However, some youth complained Internet cafés allow youth “access to sexually explicit websites that damage beliefs, culture, and customs.”

Qat for better and worse
Qat sessions were rated among the top places frequented by boys and, to a lesser extent, girls. They have mixed feelings about this activity. Some claim it is part of Yemeni tradition and culture and a good place to meet friends, find solutions, escape psychological problems that occur elsewhere, help youth avoid drugs, and “prevent youth from going to worse places like nightclubs or joining extremists.” On the other hand, some see qat as a bad addiction, a waste of money and time, leading to health and psychological problems. Some youth complained that parents neglect their children when they are in qat sessions. One felt the tradition of qat chewing diminished Yemeni society: “Because of qat, Yemenis are viewed as cows by other people.”

Homes as a Last Resort
In contrast to public places, the home was considered a good place to “strengthen family ties,” a place “to rest,” and a place “to study.” Youth had many comments about the disadvantages of spending time at home. Girls associate home with isolation, lamenting “all the places outside of the home are for men except for centers that teach Qur’an”; “the society has forced the girls to be in homes.” In other words, home is less a choice of females than a place where they feel trapped. Boys expressed some resentment about time spent at home. One boy remarked, “Every day the same routine, sleeping or doing nothing.” And one girl observed, “A boy sitting home causes problems for his family because he is sitting free-handed and empty.” The words used by some to talk about home life were “isolation” and that homes increased “depression” among youth. One girl captured the plight expressed by others: “Due to the long time a girl is ‘locked’ in home, this causes her to be closed minded and her ambitions are killed.”

Harassment of Young Women
Girls frequently raised the issue of harassment by boys. One girl said, “I like to date, but I don’t like anyone to chase me other than my boyfriend.”

Statements about harassment by girls included home life. Brothers and fathers were cited as perpetrators of emotional, physical, and sexual abuse toward young females in the households. There is no information about the prevalence, but many indicated it as an issue.

Gender Similarities and Differences
There was great similarity in the tabulated results between the females and males about the top three places where they spend most of their time: out on the street and shopping, Internet cafés, and qat sessions. Home ranked as fourth for both females and males. Females’ verbal statements provide a more nuanced understanding of the tabulations. They widely noted they enjoy less freedom of
movement than males. For example, girls in Taiz are not able to go to an Internet café unless accompanied by their father or a brother. Also, some favorite places for females, such as parks and gardens, are no longer acceptable and off limits, as parents view these places with suspicion as places to meet with boys.

5.1.3 Desired Places, Activities, and Programs

Youth were asked to rank desired places, activities, and programs “that do not exist now that would help make life better for people like you and your families.” They were also asked who they thought should operate and run the programs.

The top rankings were vocational training, youth centers, health and sports clubs, and art and gifted centers. Employment opportunities were ranked fifth.

The focus groups showed more distinction based on age cohort rather than on gender. For example, the only young boys’ group (11 urban male participants from Taiz) did not select any of the top four total selections and instead prioritized libraries, art centers, and tourist attractions. Similarly, only one of the two girls groups (12 urban female participants from Sana’a) placed vocational training—the number one overall desired place—as a top three selection. Interestingly, both the young girl and young boy groups from Taiz ranked libraries as a top desired place whereas none of the older groups did. Although the percentage of young groups (15 percent) was significantly less than the older youth groups (85 percent), the findings suggest that younger Yemeni youth are more interested in going to places to study and be entertained and do not feel the same desires as the older youth to develop vocational skills and participate in youth centers.

As expected due to the higher number of older youth groups, both male and female older groups (ages 19–25) generally mirrored the total findings of the assessment. Eight out of nine of the older male groups stated vocational training was one of their top desired places. A few exceptions were recorded: an older male group was the only group to suggest Islamic centers as a desired place (4 urban male participants from Taiz), and female older groups were the only cohort to suggest charitable centers.

The descriptions below are the result of clustering similar types of activities and places. More detail is helpful to further understand what each of these places means to the youth.

Table 3. Top places where Yemeni youth want to spend time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESIRED PLACES</th>
<th>TOTAL %</th>
<th>TOTAL #</th>
<th>SANA’A %</th>
<th>TAIZ %</th>
<th>ADEN %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Training</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Centers</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Sports Clubs</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art and Gifted Centers</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### DESIRED PLACES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunities</th>
<th>TOTAL %</th>
<th>TOTAL #</th>
<th>SANA’A %</th>
<th>TAIZ %</th>
<th>ADEN %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charitable Centers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Library</td>
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<td>Cinema</td>
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<td>Computer Centers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islamic Center</td>
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<td>Tourist Attraction</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on 25 focus groups of Yemeni youth ages 15–25. Participants were asked to list the top three places, activities, and programs where youth like them want to spend time, e.g., in Sana’a 28% of the focus groups ranked vocational training among their top three selections.

### Vocational Training for More than Technical Skills

The top-ranked activity is vocational training. Focus group descriptions included the following: A low-cost or free place for those who have dropped out of school. Vocational training should have human resource and youth leadership development content as part of the offerings. They should provide “applied learning” for university graduates and also offer language study. Some should be “ladies-only” language institutes. Some believe the centers should support microfinance activity.

Desired coursework includes computer skills, computer programming, design, Qur’anic teachings, carpentry, plumbing, decorating, glass painting, electricity, first aid, automotive mechanics, accounting, and cosmetology.

When asked who should operate these places, the list included government, local community, private sector, local NGOs and qualified specialists, social workers, and psychologists. One respondent said “private sector supervised by Ministry of Education and qualified staff.” Youth felt the strongest about government’s role in vocational training over any of the other top programming areas.

### Multi-Purpose Youth Centers

Youth centers ranked second highest. The youth centers described sounded, in some cases, like vocational centers, but the identification of a center indicates the vision that it be a multi-purpose place. The Sana’a older boys’ groups, who were all university graduates, put it this way: “Big cultural, entertainment club that contains a lot of facilities and different services (e.g. Internet, swimming pools, restaurants, parks, billiards).” The centers should be places to “practically practice what they have acquired in their academic studies.” They should be places for cultural forums and have an educational satellite channel. They should support youth with psychological and social issues. And they should be led by young people: “We want to see young leaders because they understand our needs. We get sick of seeing the same elder faces in civil society.”

Unlike the vocational training choice where government appeared as one of the operators, the desire was to see these centers managed by the local community, local and international specialists, the private sector, youth NGOs, and trainers from inside and outside the country.
Health and Sports Clubs for Females
Health and sports clubs are ranked third highest. Females were very keen on this option and qualified very strongly that there be designated “sports clubs for girls.” They want swimming, horseback riding, fitness, makeup and nutrition, as well as chess and “modern games.” One focus group of girls captured the vision this way: “Sports club for girls with big landscape, branches in different parts of the country, and with low cost.” Another girls group in Aden wanted more “parks.” The boys in Aden talked highly of a “football stadium.”

They think the Ministry of Youth could be actively involved, plus private sector ownership, but managed by male and female youth. One male from Sana’a cautioned, “We have very few health clubs but their staffs are usually unskilled and unqualified and know nothing about health issues.”

Arts and Gifted Centers for Personal Expression
Arts and gifted centers are ranked fourth highest. They are envisioned as centers that support and encourage outstanding and gifted youth. Their work would include “discovering” as well as developing talented youth in such programs as singing, drama, photography, art, science, entertainment trips, painting, poetry, art of speech, and sculpting. A male in Taiz commented, “If the gifted youth doesn’t find someone to sponsor him, he gets frustrated and the consequence will be turning to violence.” Art and gifted centers were the choice of males in all cities and for females in Sana’a and Aden, especially among older in- and out-of-school youth. The management and support of these centers were envisioned as run and supported by private sector, or by youth NGOs, funded by a local authority, “sponsored by any sector,” or the government social fund.

Employment Opportunities
Employment opportunities are ranked fifth, to include companies that provide experience certificates for new graduates and establish projects that generate job opportunities. A female in Sana’a observed, “Companies always require a number of years of experience in [a] youth resume, but who will give you the experience if not a company will hire you with what you have at the moment.”

In one focus group session of marginalized youth with large families and high unemployment, the males were asked why they dropped out of school. They replied, “We can’t afford even the cost of a note book and a pen, not only this, but life is getting worse and worse, and our families are starving of hunger, we couldn’t stand this, we were forced to go out and accept to work as street vendors or sweepers with any rate in order to provide kids with something to survive." From this same group, “We are lost, no jobs, no education, no one is helping us to overcome poverty. What can we do? Instead of wasting time in the street for nothing, we can gain something by going to the mosque cleaning it, learning and memorizing Qur’an and Sunnah, attending lectures there. This will help us a lot to be spiritually fine, and the most important thing here is that Allah will be satisfied about us, and by doing so we are preparing for the day of judgment to escape the torture in that day.”

Tribal Youth
While the current places youth spend time and their desired places are consistent with the rest of the youth sample, tribal youth also want forums to address revenge killing. Characteristic of lives in a more
violent culture, they also indicated carjacking as a way to influence government to get services and have demands met.

5.2 Adult Key Informants and Stakeholders

5.2.1 Key Informant Findings
The assessment team interviewed and led roundtable discussions with 16 groups with more than 100 key informants in Sana’a, Aden, and Taiz. They included senior staff with the Ministries of Youth and Sports, Education, and Endowment; leaders of local governments and local councils; religious leaders and preachers; academic and vocational education administrators and faculty; Members of Parliament and of the Members of Parliamentarians’ against Corruption Group; leaders and members of NGOs; justice and law enforcement officials; private-sector leaders; public figures; and scholars, researchers, and university students (see Appendix 2 for a breakdown by numbers of those interviewed).
5.3.2. Adult Perceptions of Reasons behind Youth Violence

As during the focus group discussions with young people, the adult informants were asked how they would explain violence and extremism among youth. Five principal reasons emerged: lack of educational opportunities, unemployment, poverty, absence of law, and injustice (Table 4). It is noteworthy that adults did not cite the principal cause put forth by the youth (family issues), and they placed far more importance on perceived injustices by the West as a cause of violence than did the youth.

Yemeni Perceptions of Violence

It is instructive to be aware of how nationals perceive violence in their communities. Interviews with key informants produced the following classifications of violence:

**Punishable violence**: violence that young people know is wrong, such as stealing. They understand there are laws against it and that, if caught, punishment of some kind is the accepted consequence.

**Righteous violence**: characterized by the perpetrator’s denial that any wrongdoing has occurred. Punishment for this kind of violence is not acceptable. Informants identified three causes for righteous violence:

- **Adaptive justice**: vigilante activity where there is no rule of law in which perpetrators assume they have the right to exercise the law and punish the wrongdoer.
- **Religious freedom**: if it is perceived that one’s right to practice religion freely is jeopardized, preserving that right through violence is seen as acceptable.
- **Political participation**: in an intolerable governmental situation where those who govern perpetuate injustices and access to political participation is impossible, resorting to violence is seen as acceptable.

**Tribal revenge** is still practiced in discrete northern areas of Yemen. The custom developed recently between tribal communities and while it is considered uncultured and regrettable by most Yemenis, it is tolerated by many.

To further clarify Yemenis’ understanding of violence, *extremism was historically not assumed to be connected to violence*. Being an extremist meant holding religious or political views at one of the ends of the spectrum. While it is accepted that not all religious extremists are violent, currently in Yemen, the connection between religious extremism and violence is assumed.

The meaning of political or religious radicalization remains open. One can be a political and religious radical and not assumed to be violent.
Educational Opportunities
Most informants rated education as the key youth issue and also the top cause of violence. The educators and academics observed the role of education in development and the lack of both in increasing violence: “When there is no development, there is violence and extremism.”

Unemployment
Employment is considered a productive way to spend time. Among Aden local council members, employment appears to be more about youth engaged in a positive activity and less about income. Violence is “... a reaction to frustration which is generated from unemployment, free time with no available ways and places to spend the free time. There are no good public places for youth to spend their time in.” Adult respondents generally agreed the creation of job opportunities for qualified employees in small and medium enterprises will solve the problem of unemployment.

Poverty
The key informants and the youth agree that unemployment and poverty are key factors that promote youth’s vulnerability to extremism. They say unemployed, very poor young people have too much free time and are frustrated and hopeless; hence, they are more likely to be influenced by extremist groups. However, one senior ministry official strongly rejected poverty as the only cause of violent extremism: “Poverty is not the only reason for extremism, because the extremist usually contributes with his money to violent actions as a deep belief in the sacred job he is doing.”

Table 4. Adult informants’ attributions of youth problems and reasons for violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUES</th>
<th>YOUTH PROBLEMS</th>
<th>REASONS FOR VIOLENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Justice</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of Law</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Job Availability</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Political Participation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Freedom</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Frequency of citation among 16 roundtable and key informant groups.

Absence of Law
Absence of law was not considered a top problem for youth, but adults ranked it among the top three reasons for violence. It was an adult admission of their own shortcomings, best captured by the local government leaders and public officials of Aden who said, “The appropriate dealing with violence is to solve the problems/issues of young people and eradicate the reasons behind violence and extremism by wisdom and hard work and not by violence and power.” Youth in the focus groups agreed and talked about the problems of corruption, favoritism, and inefficiency.
Social and International Injustice
At the majority of key informant meetings, adults stressed that international injustice and the interference of Americans and the West in Muslim countries were huge factors behind youth violence. They also cited “cultural invasion,” which they meant as the West’s attempt to spoil Yemeni decency and culture through media. They maintained these pressures make youth feel vulnerable and resort to extremism to protect their religion and culture. In contrast, a minority of youth focus groups (4 out of 25 groups) raised these issues as giving rise to violence. This key issue was one of the larger disconnects between adults and youth.

Family Impact Not Recognized as an Issue
The adults focused on external society and national and international issues as direct causes of violence. They barely mentioned the family issues that were among the major concerns of youth: low levels of communication to youth by adults, lack of recognition of youth needs for personal identity and expression, restrictions on young people’s movements, and sometimes abusive behavior toward youth coupled with high family demands.

6. State of Youth Programming in Yemen

The state of youth programming is in transition, struggling to respond to the government’s reform of the traditional formal education and health systems, as well as develop new initiatives through the private and nongovernmental sectors. The formulation of the National Youth Strategy (explained below) was a first step in articulating these needs. Two cornerstones of youth programming in Yemen are the reform and expansion of access to the formal education sector, as well as capacity-building and funding of the local youth service sector. This section highlights the status of these public, private, and nongovernmental initiatives.

6.1 The Government’s National Strategy for Youth

Beginning in 2004–2005, the World Bank enlisted Ministry of Education staff to plan and coordinate a comprehensive strategy to address issues of children and youth from birth to age 24. They supported government staff with a number of experts and consultants to create a strategy and a planning process that resulted in a report entitled *Making a Multi-Sectoral Approach Work for Children and Youth*. The report disaggregates by age groups 0–5, 6–14, and 15–24 years, using a life cycle framework.

The strategy identifies the main issues, government responses to the issues, emerging gaps, and issues and priority areas for increased concentration. For the 15- to 24-year-old group, it details six strategic choices that address the education and employment connection, promote healthy behaviors, and increase youth inclusion and participation in national development and issues around national and cultural identity.
The National Youth Strategy has 52 key activities with a budget of US$52.5 million. The strategy includes involvement of the youth education, health, employment, and communication sectors. Component 2 of the strategy commits to strengthening national identity, youth inclusion, and participation. Activities include awareness-raising campaigns targeting youth in which youth organizations and other appropriate communication channels mobilize youth and encourage them to participate at local and national levels.

The international organizations and countries donors who proposed to finance the strategy include the World Bank, the Netherlands, UNFPA/RH, GTZ, UNICEF, WHO, UNDP, Youth Fund, France, German Federal Ministry, National Democratic Institute, National Endowment for Democracy, Save the Children, Oxfam, Population Council, Arab Youth Council, and the Islamic Bank. Listed under government financial resources are the Population Council, Human Rights Information and Training Center, the Democracy School, Youth Leadership Forum, SOUL (Women and Children’s focused local NGO), Youth Forum (Taiz), Ministry of Interior, and Ministry of Youth and Sports. The amounts in the estimated budget are not broken down by donor.

As of this date, the National Youth Strategy has received no official funding. Although it represents good programming options of various lengths of implementation time, priority levels are not well distinguished or sequenced in phases. A plan with this scope requires political will and much capacity. Informants from inside and outside the national government indicated this plan is “only paper” at this point. The World Bank has shown reluctance to further engage officially with government ministries at this time about the plan.

6.2 Formal Education Institutions

The educational system can prepare a young person to become a productive member of society. Conversely, lack of access, poor-quality schools and teaching, and a disconnect between education and the workplace squander the opportunities that education can afford. This section briefly describes Yemen’s basic (primary), secondary, and university institutions, pointing both to progress and shortfalls.

Basic Education: Progress, but Far to Go
The Yemeni basic education system reached some important goals by 2006, yet has substantial work in terms of access, quality, and relevance. The country has achieved important targets in terms of gross enrollment of primary education, now estimated at 87 percent, although with higher rates for boys (100 percent) compared to girls (74 percent). These statistics largely reflect the gains by the government in increasing access and schools, particularly in rural areas.

However, a host of other issues now face the system, including high dropout rates, quality of schools, gender gap in access, and limited access to secondary and higher education.

High Dropout Rates, Particularly for the Rural Poor
While increasing numbers of children are entering and attending school, many do not complete the primary grades or move on to the lower secondary level, a UN development goal of basic education for all. Primary dropout rates are shockingly high, at around 40 percent system-wide and with little gender differentiation. Only 60 percent of those who start school complete the basic education cycle. To
address this issue, the Ministry of Education is now undertaking quality-enhancement and infrastructure programs to improve education, working with USAID and the World Bank.

Many children and young people are pulled out of the education system because of high rates of poverty. As found in many poor developing countries, children living in poverty tend to begin school later than those with more resources and are the most inclined to drop out of school. Thus, despite improvement in primary enrollment rates, current trends suggest Yemen remains far from its goal of universal primary education. Dropout and repetition rates continue at unacceptable levels and indicate that efforts to increase access to, retention in, and completion of primary and lower secondary education need to be specifically targeted to the poorest children.

Project Example: Equal Access Paving the Road for Rural Satellite Learning

Japan is working to improve the education levels of the rural poor in Yemen through a $1.8 million investment to fund a youth program through Equal Access. This California-based international NGO combines community and education development programming by on-the-ground teams with broadcast and digital text downloaded to satellite radios and receiver-equipped computers. The program will be implemented by an NGO consortium to support capacity-building of community-based institutions including local NGOs, municipalities, and local authorities. This consortium will seek to create mechanisms for developing and delivering social and economic services such as high-risk youth reintegration into the education system, job placement, treatment of substance abuse, and sexual exploitation. It will also work to strengthen community-based approaches for rehabilitation and reintegration of marginalized youth.

Shortage of School Infrastructure, Poor Staff and Services Alongside poverty considerations is the critical need for school infrastructure, particularly in rural areas. Low enrollment numbers (the lowest in the Middle East and North Africa) reflect the nationwide shortage of the requisite infrastructure. School facilities and educational materials are of poor quality, classrooms are too few in number, and the teaching faculty is inadequate. In September 2004, the World Bank approved a US$65-million project to improve the quality of basic education (grades one through nine). Under this program, classroom facilities will be expanded and upgraded, curricula and educational materials improved, and the Ministry of Education’s capacity to implement new programs and resources strengthened. Yemen’s government increased spending on education in recent years—from 4.5 percent of GDP in 1995 to 9.5 percent of GDP in 2003.

Lack of monitoring of schools and poorly trained teachers is another significant problem. Key informants and focus groups described misconduct of teachers in schools, including violence against students, smoking in classes, and pressuring students for bribes to pass their classes. In addition, key informants mentioned the absence of important non-class activities, such as drawing, music, sports, and other skill-development activities, as a problem. With the absence of guidance and counseling services in schools, students receive no help to cope with and absorb changes in their lives.
Expansion and Quality Improvements of Secondary Education

Between 2001 and 2005, the secondary education enrollment rate increased by 42 percent. In 2005, 40 percent of secondary school-age students attended school (55.7 percent of males and 25 percent of females). However, these national figures mask considerable differences between urban and rural areas. In Sana’a City, for example, 57 percent of secondary school-aged girls are enrolled in secondary school. The downside of rapid expansion of secondary education is that quality remains poor. The dropout rate remains high at 35 percent. Reasons include wide population dispersal that limits access to all communities, high population growth, and a largely young population with increasing demands on educational services coupled with a lack of financial resources, educational facilities, libraries, laboratories, and curriculum development. Costs of operation, maintenance, and renovation are high for aging schools.

Profound Mismatch between Education and the Labor Market

Youth in Yemen, by and large, are ill prepared for the limited jobs available. They do not possess the skills and knowledge base required to meet the demands of potential growth sectors within Yemen or the skilled labor needs of the wider Gulf region. This fundamentally constrains the growth potential of Yemen in the regional and global economy, with serious implications for poverty alleviation and social stability.

This assessment highlighted a number of problems associated with this mismatch that contribute not only to unemployment and poverty among youth, but also to their vulnerability to extremism and violence. Key informants, stakeholders, and the youth themselves largely agree that the educational system relies on memorizing information and does not encourage students to think creatively or to challenge and explore ideas or theories, the traits increasingly sought by employers to remain competitive in the global economy. The current system weakens students’ ability to learn and makes them susceptible to passively accepting the ideas of others and becoming easily influenced by extremist groups. In addition, the curricula are very dense and too vague to engage young students. This causes lack of interest in school and increases dropout rates and failing of exams.

Low Business Perceptions of Technical Vocational Education

Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET) is an important component of the Yemeni education system with a mandate linked directly to the social and economic development of the country. Recently, TVET gained importance as an instrument of national policy to alleviate poverty alleviation, develop the labor market, and rationalize the education system.

In 2001, the Ministry of Technical-Vocational Education and Training (MoTVET) was created through the consolidation of training activities previously undertaken by the General Authority for Vocational and Technical Training, the Ministry of Education, and other public providers.

“The educational system is the main reason behind unemployment.”
— Young man in Sana’a

“Teachers smoke in classrooms and pressure their students to give them bribes as a condition for them to pass exams.”
— Mosque preacher from Aden
A common perception by the business community is the TVET system produces graduates with low and inappropriate qualifications. More than nine in ten employer respondents to the 2003 Labor Demand Survey, for example, reported difficulties in filling vacancies, and 85 percent of respondents cited the main obstacle as the unavailability of the required skilled labor. At the same time, employer respondents reported an extremely modest need for more employees, so it appears that employers have difficulty in replacing skilled employees who leave as opposed to recruiting additional new employees.

Clear evidence of private sector frustration with the public TVET system can be seen in a growing trend to outsource training needs to private institutes that can guarantee quality or to set up their own vocational training centers and youth development programs, as in the case of some of the bigger manufacturing firms such as Hyal Sa‘eed or oil companies such as Nexen. Local councils, although mostly absorbed in providing infrastructure services to their communities and limited by funding, are starting to address youth unemployment. For example, local councils in Aden are funding marginalized youth to start a cleaning company.

Mixed Impressions by Youth of TVET
The 25 youth focus groups conducted for this assessment had little experience with TVET, as only four groups mentioned the (Technical) “Institutes” as a “place where they spend time.” In response to a follow-up question asking about the “benefits and shortfalls” of the top three beneficial places or activities where they spend time, the four groups provided a mixed impression of the quality and relevance of the Technical Institutes. Interestingly, none of the focus groups mentioned getting a job as a benefit from technical training.

Reforms in Higher Education
Higher education in Yemen includes 7 public and 11 private universities. Total student enrollment in 2005 stood at 170,500, down from 174,000 in 2000 due to the introduction of more rigorous entrance criteria. Female enrollments grew by 10 percent in this same period. Approximately 40,000 students graduate annually. Most private universities are located in Sana'a and cater to students who cannot enter state universities because of low grades but who can afford the tuition fees of the private universities.

Limited efforts were made under the Second Five Year Plan (SFYP) 2001–2005 to update the curricula and teaching methods in some universities. Unfortunately, the impact was minimal, and the link between university education and the needs of the labor market remain very weak. This weakness has translated into an increase in unemployment among the educated, including university graduates, many of whom have had to accept low-paying jobs that do not correspond to their skills and areas of study. Despite the demands of the job market for more technical personnel, higher education enrollments in Yemen are more than eight times the total of secondary and post-secondary vocational enrollments.

“Some people go to the institute not for studying, but just to run away from the atmosphere of home. But in the end, the Institute studies finish and this person ends up at home again.”
– Female focus group participant
Urgent Need for Employment Services and Guidance

Students at all levels of education would benefit from a robust system of employment services, labor market information, and career guidance, but Yemen has not come close to establishing such a system. The International Labour Organization (ILO) and UNDP supported a labor market information system (LMIS) set up by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MoSAL) in 1999, but it probably endeavoured to do too much with the scarce resources available. The result was low awareness and scarce use of the information and services offered by MoSAL Employment Offices (EOs).

The 2003 Labor Demand Survey showed less than one-quarter of business establishments were aware of the existence of the EOs, and only a small fraction (1.5 percent) had ever contacted them. Even fewer (0.5 percent) used the EOs for hiring new workers. Virtually all hiring was, and continues to be, made through personal relationships (97 percent). Among those youth who did use the EOs, only an estimated 2–5 percent found employment through them.

The LMIS has been poorly maintained since the ending of UNDP/ILO support in 2006. Although there are continuing plans to revive it, the system of the LMIS and EOs is unlikely to be resurrected soon.

6.3 Youth Institutional Mapping

A large and vibrant nongovernmental sector of youth organizations exists alongside the formal education system. In 2008, a Yemeni-German technical cooperation project conducted comprehensive mapping research on the state of youth organizations in Yemen. The findings illustrate the growing number and capacity of youth-based institutions in the country, as well as distinguish where these organizations are operating.
This report provides nation-wide information on five main aspects of youth programming:

- Types of youth organizations, classified by main protectorates and cities;
- Capacity of organizations to implement effective projects;
- Participation of youth in planning and decision-making within the organizations;
- Alignment of organizations with reproductive health goals of the national children and youth strategy; and
- Dreams and needs of youth organizations.

It assessed 301 youth organizations across the country, and ranked these organizations by capacity, youth participation, and influence of the donor community. Nongovernmental and other institutions were classified as youth organizations. The study found most Yemeni youth organizations consist of volunteers, while paid employees are less common. Many organizations target youth, but consist mostly of adult staff. Most organizations target larger societal problems, such as basic education and health, but strongly rely on youth volunteers. And some Yemeni youth organizations are not NGOs, but are strongly backed by government agencies. Using a Yemeni classification of youth organizations, 166 organizations out of the 301 organizations were classified as “youth organizations.”

It was also found that many NGOs were not functioning well in the area of youth participation in leadership and program implementation.

**Significant Institutional Capacity**

The findings of the German assessment show significant institutional capacity of Yemen’s youth organizations. More than one-quarter (27 percent) of the institutions are ranked as high capacity, almost one-half (48 percent) are ranked moderate capacity, and only 21 percent are ranked low capacity. The institutional criteria include the strategic orientation and operation of the organization, as well as measures to indicate cooperation and learning capacities. As the report notes,

> The majority of assessed organizations, representing 48% of the total sample, are classified as having moderate capacity. These are the typical small-scale, but active organizations. Their activities are often limited to basic training like handicrafts, alphabetization, or private lessons for students, but they are carried out regularly and have a visible impact. Most of these organizations work only in one village, city or area.”

**Moderate Direct Youth Participation**

To a large extent, the youth organizations target resources and services to youth, yet have only moderate direct participation of youth in making decisions, implementing activities, and evaluating activities. Only 34 percent of the organizations have high participation of youth involvement in their activities. The largest group of youth organizations, representing 36 percent, has only a low level of youth participation. These results suggest the traditional adult-provided service model persists in youth organizations throughout Yemen.

**Role of Powerbrokers and Influence Makers**

The issue of “influence” is measured in the GTZ research study in an attempt to understand the power relationships of the organizations by outside elites and individual powerbrokers. A majority (46 percent)
of the assessed organizations stated a moderate level of influence. Twenty-six percent of the organizations are supported by one or a few influential people, reflecting a high level of influence.

Additional Findings
Other interesting findings reveal that rural NGOs have limited relationships with the government or donors and are isolated in terms of support and funding. Secondly, members of female organizations are criticized for being active, and many families do not allow their daughters or wives to join any type of youth organization.

Youth Organizations in Sana’a, Taiz, and Aden
The research allows the organizations to be distinguished by specific geographical locality, and provides rankings, beneficiaries, program services, and funding sources for all of them. Appendix 8 provides in-depth information for the youth organizations reported in the youth mapping research. Table 5 below highlights key statistics and information about the organizations in Sana’a, Aden, and Taiz.

Table 5. Youth organizations in Sana’a, Aden, and Taiz

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY CHARACTERISTICS</th>
<th>SANA’A</th>
<th>ADEN</th>
<th>TAIZ</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of youth organizations</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of youth organizations ranked at moderate to high levels of institutional capacity</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of youth organizations ranked at moderate to high levels of youth participation</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of youth organizations targeting programs to males</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of youth organizations targeting programs to females</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of youth organizations targeting programs to unemployed poor youth</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examples of program services offered</td>
<td>Wide range of courses on health, HIV, livelihoods training, sports, religious education, and culture</td>
<td>Large number of sports and camp activities; Limited courses offered on livelihoods; several youth human rights groups</td>
<td>Basic courses in livelihoods training, health, religious education, and life skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of donor funding</td>
<td>Government, foundations, and international</td>
<td>Mix of local and international donors; few with</td>
<td>Government funding through the Social Fund,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Additional conclusions about youth organizations in the three areas include the following:

- **Strong presence of NGO youth organizations in all three localities.** The good news is all three localities have strong and capable youth organizations, based on the evidence of the youth institutional mapping. However, most governmental and donor resources go to larger nongovernmental and quasi-governmental institutions. Smaller organizations are hungry for resources, and require greater and more systematic capacity-building to offer effective programs.

- **All three localities have limited youth participation in planning, implementation, and evaluation of programs.** This finding mirrors the national sample, whereby youth organizations effectively target youth but do not bring them into the process. Incorporating youth into all aspects of development programming is an important recommendation from the youth institutional mapping exercise, and holds for Sana’a, Aden, and Taiz.

- **Targeting of program services to specific groups of youth.** Targeting of services is an important characteristic of the Yemeni youth organizations surveyed. Almost one-half of the organizations in the three localities target specific needs, ages, or gender. A handful of youth organizations target gender (e.g., Boy Scouts and Girl Guides, Hawa Women’s Handicraft Association, Female Juvenile Care Center Aden). Many youth associations are dedicated to specific interests and career paths (e.g., American Electronic Association of Yemeni Inventors and Researchers, Blind Care and Qualification Association Taiz).

Alongside these youth membership organizations are programs dedicated to meeting the needs of at-risk youth. The following are examples of well-known youth organizations dedicated to providing youth services, social projects, summer courses, and livelihoods training:

- **Life Makers Foundation in Taiz, Sana’a city, Aden, and three other Yemen sites:** An example of the new wave of youth programs dedicated to developing youth skills and development as well as stabilizing Islamic ethics and tolerance in society. Offers a wide range of program activities, such as career counseling and planning, volunteerism, and personal development; health projects and workshops; religious courses and education; and weekly youth meetings.

- **National Organization for Developing Society (NODS Yemen) in Taiz, Sana’a City, Aden, and eight other Yemen sites.** Targets youth, mosque preachers, students, women, and poor and illiterate segments of society. The four main programs encompass: 1) targeted program for “achiever” youth; 2) literacy program primarily for women; 3) mosque preacher program to promote human rights, democracy, and conflict resolution; and 4) vocational and technical training programs to more than 8,000 youth.
The National Cultural Youth Center in Taiz, Sana’a City, and five other Yemen sites builds youth capacity through training and education; makes youth aware of their rights and responsibilities; and promotes sports competition. Largely funded through international donors and corporations, it provides livelihoods training, religious competitions, health education, and sports competitions.

Youth Leadership Development Foundation (YLDF) in Sana’a currently serves over 1200 youth, men and women. YLDF’s mission is to increase youth participation in social, political and economic aspects of society through education in vocational, communication, leadership and life skills. The Girls World Communication Center (GWCC), established in 1998 as the first language center exclusively for girls, was the predecessor to YLDF and in 2005 GWCC, along with the Youth Economic Development Center (YEDC), was incorporated into YLDF. Programs include short term and long term English courses, computer/internet, marketing and sales, business English, basic and business management, business planning and development, and accounting.

The Youth Institutional Mapping report points to several main trends and recommendations about youth organizations. First and foremost is the need to promote youth direct participation in youth programs. Through leadership capacity-building and inclusion activities, projects must enable young people to take the lead, creating “youth programs, for youth and by youth.” Secondly, larger organizations and mostly urban-based programs have most of the funds. Remote rural areas of the country and smaller organizations receive little in terms of governmental or international funding. Thirdly, there is a need for more gender programming, with options for traditional women who will not participate in a co-ed program. Finally, more institutional networking and coordination are needed. Examples of such networks are youth organizations, donor coordination, and local governance support networks.

6.4 Major Donor Initiatives

A large number of international donors in Yemen finance youth and childhood initiatives in education and health, including USAID, World Bank, UNICEF, UNDP, USAID, GTZ, and Japanese and European Union funds. The following highlights some of the key donors in the country and their main initiatives.

USAID/Yemen
USAID’s overall goal in Yemen is to support U.S. governmental foreign policy objectives in the war on terror by helping to develop a healthy and educated population with access to diverse economic opportunities. The program focuses on the five target governorates of Amran, Sa’ada, Al-Jawf, Marib, and Shabwa, long known to be the main sources of, and havens for, domestic and international terrorists in Yemen. It supports basic education, emergency relief, food security, and other nongovernmental programs. Table 6 highlights various program initiatives of USAID/Yemen that relate to youth multisectoral approaches and extremism activities. A complete listing of USAID/Yemen programs can be found in Appendix 7.

Four programs currently target specific groups of youth or youth-based activities:
- Parliament and Political Parties Program (DG) provides capacity-building to political leaders and influence-makers, including youth leaders. These programs assist by establishing electoral district boundaries, encouraging voter registration, enhancing women’s participation, and improving campaign financing and election monitoring.

- Conflict Mitigation Program (DG) offers capacity-building to local governance and tribal councils. Activities include promoting peaceful resolutions to conflict through dialogue, outreach, and anti-violence youth campaigns. USAID also assists tribal leaders in their efforts to resolve longstanding conflicts that delay much-needed democratic, economic, and educational reforms.

- Youth Empowerment Program (Youth Stability Initiative) encourages youth leadership through training and media activities. This program targets frustrated youth, both male and female, who are recent immigrants from rural regions. This program is the best example of a targeted youth program to promote healthy and productive behavior.

- NGO Support and Community Development Program offers specific resources to local communities to address development programs countrywide, as well as to strengthen local nongovernmental institutions.

Table 6. USAID/Yemen programs in key youth sectors: Education, health, livelihoods, and democracy and governance (DG)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAM/STRAGIC OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>TARGET AUDIENCE</th>
<th>GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parliament and Political Parties (DG)</td>
<td>Capacity Building</td>
<td>Members of Parliament, Political parties leadership and staff</td>
<td>Sana'a, Countywide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization (DG)</td>
<td>Institutional Reform, delegation of fiscal and executive authorities</td>
<td>Local/Governorate</td>
<td>Aden, Abyan, Shabwa, Marib, Countrywide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Mitigation (DG)</td>
<td>Capacity Building</td>
<td>Tribal Leaders, Tribes in Al-Jawf, Marib, Shabwa, Amran</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhancing Government Effectiveness (DG)</td>
<td>Increasing systems</td>
<td>Govt: Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>Sana'a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Corruption (DG)</td>
<td>Capacity Building</td>
<td>Anti-corruption agencies</td>
<td>Sana'a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Education (Education)</td>
<td>School renovation, raining</td>
<td>Children 5–14; teachers and headmasters</td>
<td>Marib, Shabwa, Amran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Education (Education)</td>
<td>School renovation, raining</td>
<td>Children 5–14; teachers and headmasters</td>
<td>Hodieda, Rayma, Dhamar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal and Child Health (Health)</td>
<td>Awareness, Basic Healthcare</td>
<td>Children 0–12; families,</td>
<td>Sa’ada, Al-Jawf, Marib, Shabwa, Amran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Target Group</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Youth Empowerment Program (YSI)</td>
<td>Encouraging youth leadership</td>
<td>Frustrated youth (M/F) 15–30; recent immigrants from rural to urban; promising leaders and opinion leaders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME Competitiveness Project (YSI)</td>
<td>Employment Generation</td>
<td>Qualifying SMEs in selected promising sub-sectors of the local economies</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>School Councils (Education Pillar)</td>
<td>Establishment of S. C.</td>
<td>Children 5–14; teachers and headmasters</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Women in Development (Women Pillar)</td>
<td>Empowerment of Women NGOs in Development</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>English Language Training (Education)</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Youth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulbright; Humphrey Scholarships (Higher Education)</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Youth/Adults</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Support (NGO) and Self-help Fund (Amb. Fund)</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Development (Civil Affairs)</td>
<td>Various - short-term</td>
<td>Selected communities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: USAID/Yemen

Other Donors

USAID/Yemen coordinates with others in the donor community to ensure that the impact of relatively scarce donor resources is maximized in response to Yemen’s nearly overwhelming needs. In the health sector, after the United States, the three largest bilateral donors in 2004 (most recent figures) were Germany ($3.74 million), the United Kingdom ($3.74 million), and the Netherlands ($2.24 million). The Netherlands, Germany, and the World Bank have also taken a strong lead in donor coordination, especially relating to donor support of Yemen's Health Sector Reform proposal. The Japanese continue to have a modest equipment program. Five multilateral donors also had significant health programs in Yemen in 2004: World Bank ($10 million), UNFPA ($2.4 million), WHO ($2 million), the European Union ($6.23 million in 2004), and UNICEF ($2.1 million). However, almost none of these donors work in the five remote governorates targeted by USAID.

In education, the two largest bilateral donors are the Netherlands ($18.6 million) and Germany ($9.2 million) in planned levels for 2004. The United Kingdom began scaling up funding for programs in basic education in 2006 and the Japanese began building schools in Taiz and the Ibb governance in 2003 and in 2007 pledged additional funding for school construction in Sana’a. There were also three multilateral donors with significant basic education programs in Yemen in 2004: the World Bank ($24.7 million), World Food Program ($6.3 million), and UNICEF ($2.6 million). A range of donors (World Bank, Germany,
IFAD, UNDP, FAO, Netherlands, Abu-Dhabi Fund, Islamic Bank) are providing approximately $20 million per year in agriculture projects, but none of this assistance reaches poor farmers (especially women) in the USAID five target governorates, according to USAID/Yemen.

7. USAID Program Design Options

Yemen is a poor country with a fast-growing, large youth population that is becoming dangerously restless and alienated due to a breakdown of the country’s economic and political systems, poor-quality educational system, and inability of a weak central government, preoccupied with fighting armed tribal groups, to provide its citizens with basic security and social justice. The government has not been able to cope with high unemployment, economic deprivation, and the forces of modernization that are contributing to a growing cultural gap between young people and their elders. As recent bombings and conflict attest, young people are becoming increasingly susceptible to religious extremism and individuals who incite violence. In the face of this situation, USAID’s overall goal for the Youth Stability Initiative should be to reduce youth alienation and isolation through immediate, positive youth development activities targeted to social places of extremism recruitment.

While most stakeholders are completely oriented to policy and medium- to long-term solutions, this project should emphasize short-term interventions that in very concrete ways begin to realize the

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Success Story: Help for Unemployed Yemeni Youth

The Youth Economic Development Initiative program (YEDI) held a ceremony to mark the graduation of its first group of young trainees. The ceremony was conducted under the patronage of the Minister of Youth and Sport, Mr. Abdulrahman Al-Akwa. Ms. Kabul al-Mutawakl, the head of YEDI, summarized the program in the Yemen Times:

“The program is called YEDI and it is run by CHF-international organization and GWCC, a local organization. The program started in last January... We are targeting the youth who are not working either [because] they have no job or they are not enrolled in schools or universities.

The idea of the program is just to give these youths a chance to find a job and have a better social economic life. We are targeting 500 persons (girls and boys) and the training we are giving them is all about administrative fields; basic management, accounting, sales and marketing, Photoshop, business planning and development and business English, photography, journalism photography. The trainers all of them are local and we give them also training of trainers coming international experts. We give them a training how to be a trainer in such subject. This is empowerment for trainers.”

Source: CHF International (http://www.chfinternational.org/node/20910)
dreams of the youth themselves, dreams that they expressed so poignantly in the assessment focus groups. Young people want training and activities that will get them on the road to economic self-sufficiency, as well as places to go to enjoy and productively spend their leisure time. They want to be heard by their parents and elders and participate in the civic life of their communities. They want teachers and leaders whom they can look up to and who can provide sound guidance and connect them with people and institutions that will directly help them improve their lives.

When addressing youth feelings of isolation, it is vital to focus on youth resiliencies. The practice of positive youth development, which addresses social resiliencies in the United States, has been strengthened by research work of the Search Institute. The institute identified 40 resiliency assets and “field tested” them among over 3 million youth. Most recently, the Search Institute, Peace Corps, and Education Development Center have tested the work internationally. Their conception of assets for youth behavior was well articulated recently in the *Morocco Cross-Sectoral Youth Assessment*, as these two excerpts suggest:

**The Interplay between Assets, Aspirations and Young People’s Immediate Environment**

> In Morocco, as in everywhere else in the world, young people have aspirations for the future. To achieve these they must both draw upon the human, social, financial and physical assets they have already accumulated, and do their best to access opportunities to develop additional assets. At each state of their development, young people interact with their environment, creating outcomes that influence their growth. Different cohorts of young people may engage differently with their environment, depending on what they have access to or perceive themselves as having access to. Young people are motivated by what they perceive to be positive opportunities. They then use their existing assets to seize these opportunities. This dynamic interaction between young people and their environment is at the core of youth development.82

**The Impact of Change Upon Young Moroccans:**

> As many stakeholders commented, young Moroccans’ vulnerabilities to change seem to be especially pronounced, as they are still in a life stage focused on the development of core human assets (including literacy and numeracy skills, critical thinking and problem solving abilities, technical-vocational and broad employability skills); the cultivation of social assets (including networks of supportive adults, community spaces and structures, peer groups and life partners) along with the accumulation of financial assets (such as financial literacy and access to both savings and credit services). The way attitudes are formed, behavior is reinforced, and young Moroccans’ immediate social, economic and political context either supports or frustrates their efforts to cope with change, all join together to shape young people’s approach to the world. These attitudes, behavior and context are often kinetic and mutually influence each other. They can either serve to engage that young person in positive pathways to the future, or push and pull them onto pathways marked by increased social conflict, growing disaffection and radicalized thoughts, and participation in socially negative actions including crime, violence and support for terrorism.83
The above two passages briefly explain the dynamics of human behavior and the assets development of youth that is at the leading edge of youth development programming. When applied to mainstream youth development programming, which includes youth of many risk levels, it is an elegant display of direct correlations of the presence of assets to well-being. Assets promote pro-healthy behaviors and protect against anti-social and negative behaviors.

For extremism work, assets development remains a promising theory of change. No body of comparable work has been done that applies in real time or the presence or absence of the assets as a “forensic analysis of terrorists.” This uncertainty is tied, in part, to the lack of a predictive causal model. The report provides an overview of non-coercive counter-radicalization policies and programs implemented by countries around the world. They involve a whole array of actors and require a cross-departmental approach to many of the issues. The approaches also demonstrate that radicalization processes are complex and multifaceted and may follow different dynamics in different places. The report also shows, however, that even though no one theory can explain all forms of terrorism and no one approach can address all the conditions that may lead to it, some common understanding and policies have begun to emerge.

This study of Yemen draws indirect conclusions about preventative work. For example, the third top reason for youth resorting to extremism according to the focus groups was a misinterpretation or misunderstanding of Islam. Thus, viewing Islam as a religion of peace could be considered an example of resilience. This is the rationale for the programmatic recommendation of supporting organizations that include religious figures and mosque preachers in youth issues and establishing dialogues with extremists to help challenge their violent orientations and promote the culture of religious tolerance and coexistence. In addition, the donor community should help countries and communities examine the optimum types of assets for their culture to nurture positive, socially responsible, productive, tolerant and contributing citizens.

7.1 Geographic Priority Areas

In order to have a visible impact with a significant number of people, USAID wishes to fund youth development interventions in Sana’a, Taiz, and Aden. With respect to targeting resources to particular neighborhoods or sectors within each city, this assessment found the greatest likelihood of success in combating extremism would be to concentrate youth development resources in the same spaces and areas that are used by extremists to cultivate youth, namely the streets or places where large numbers of young people gather.

7.2 Programmatic Priority Areas
In accord with Section 1210 (previously 1207) of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, funds are to promote stability, focus on unstable areas, address urgent and/or emergent threats in coordination with longer-term development efforts by government, and be of short duration, holistic, multisectoral.

Table 7 summarizes program options meeting these criteria that USAID might consider for implementation. Following the table are brief descriptions of the program options, as well as recommendations on how to sequence them to meet five short- and long-term stabilization objectives:

1. Improve youth-parent-adult communication to find common ground to address family and community concerns
2. Address needs and desires of youth through programs to enhance their livelihoods, skills, and leisure opportunities
3. Rapidly build youth leadership and youth connections to existing services within the community
4. Strengthen the capacity of youth service providers
5. Increase knowledge and understanding of youth issues in Yemen.

It is paramount to provide incentives to youth to join and continue their involvement in youth activities. As noted by international conflict specialist Laila Bokhari in her report *A Brief Review of Issues of Radicalisation among Youth* (Appendix 6), a portion of drift and recruitment to extremism can be attributed to vulnerabilities that have to do with unemployment, lack of access to social services, a sense of alienation, and marginalization. Youth will often mirror the larger society and not integrate unless an external or deliberate effort impacts them.

One successful example of how youth were motivated to positively interact with their community was the youth mapping pioneered by the Academy for Educational Development, along with EDC and conflict consultants. The mapping was adapted for use in Haiti, also a high conflict area, and helped forge social inclusion as the youth interacted with peers with whom they never would have associated otherwise due to education or class differences. The youth reported that they had fun getting to know other people in their communities because of a number of factors—including novelty and a sense of a deep connection with others. School dropouts who were avoided and marginalized before the mapping project became local celebrities, and the youth were easily recognized by their brightly colored new t-shirts and baseball caps (with a USAID logo prominently displayed) as they walked through town. These outward symbols became a source of pride, connection, and feeling of being valued.

City Year has implemented a similar concept in South Africa. They also incorporate easily recognizable t-shirts, as well as chants, slogans, and morning exercises in a public square accompanied by announcements before youth go off in teams to work. Crucially, in Haiti and in South Africa, an investment was first made in training. Learning a new technical skill (youth mapping) and receiving an opportunity to develop a life skill (confidence through public speaking and leading a group) are a few examples of how to connect with and incentivize at-risk youth.
Table 7. Summary of USAID program options to reduce youth extremism in Yemen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBJECTIVES</th>
<th>OUTCOMES</th>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION REQUIREMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Improve youth-parent-adult communication to find common ground to address family and community concerns | Lesser feelings of youth isolation and alienation  
Greater involvement of youth in community service  
Perceived improved communication between parents and children  
Perceived de-legitimization and reduction of extremist messages  
Perceived reduction of sanctuaries for those who preach and carry out violent extremism | Media and Awareness Services (multimedia campaign to promote intergenerational communication on key youth issues).  
Campaign to promote moderate Islam and peace  
Integrated role of moderate mosque preachers in youth issues  
Yemeni Youth Internet Portal | Coordination essential among different participating entities – media companies, mosque preachers, NGOs, and youth groups |
| 2. Address needs and desires of youth through programs to enhance their livelihoods, skills, and leisure opportunities | Decreased youth isolation and greater hope  
Higher family standard of living  
Greater youth literacy and employment  
Increased self-confidence and feelings of efficacy among youth  
Improved community health and youth-parent relationships  
Increased number of small businesses developed | Community sports and recreation  
Cultural activities  
Workforce Development:  
--Career guidance  
--Employment information and connecting activities between employers and jobseekers  
--Training in literacy, computer applications, life/employability, skills, entrepreneurship  
Personal and family counseling | Management entity would identify major NGOs/PVOs to implement recommended activities. Selection would depend on their areas of expertise, track record of effective programming, financial, networking and administrative capabilities, and flexible structure that facilitates quick customization or modification of programs |
<p>| 3. Rapidly build youth leadership and youth | Fast disbursement of | Training of youth outreach | Major activity of first year of the project. Corps of |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBJECTIVES</th>
<th>OUTCOMES</th>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION REQUIREMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>connections to existing services within the community</td>
<td>1207/1210 funds</td>
<td>workers</td>
<td>youth leaders would undergo intensive training to identify well-functioning programs and services and to help many more youth benefit from them</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Higher participation and impact of youth programs</td>
<td>Mapping of youth needs and services in selected neighborhoods</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greater and sustained youth leadership in community</td>
<td>Outreach to youth to encourage their connection with positive, existing programs and activities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Greater civic engagement among youth</td>
<td>Opportunities for community service and learning</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Strengthen capacity of youth service providers</td>
<td>Fast disbursement of 1207/1210 funds</td>
<td>Professional training in youth leadership and workforce development</td>
<td>Link with relevant programs in universities and colleges to develop curriculum, academic standards, practicum experiences, and candidate admission criteria and protocols</td>
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<td>Higher quality and more sustainable programs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>More youth participating in ongoing youth-related programs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lesser feelings of youth isolation and alienation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Increase knowledge and understanding of youth issues in Yemen</td>
<td>Increased understanding of youth employment and livelihoods development, health and living conditions, educational, civic engagement, and leisure opportunities, and family relationships</td>
<td>Research studies, workshops, seminars, forums, conferences</td>
<td>Research focus would be at several levels—national, provincial, local, neighborhood, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased understanding and dialogue on youth extremism issue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased number of youth participating in and developing studies</td>
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</table>
7.2.1 Improved Youth-Parent-Adult Communication

**Media awareness (TV, radio, newspapers):** Awareness would be accomplished through programs run by youth yet with the involvement of community leaders, teachers, and religious figures. Media should be utilized to bring the voice of the youth in the communities and schools through youth programs.

**Campaigns to promote moderate Islam and peace:** Campaigns would take places in places where youth frequently visit such as streets, clubs, schools, universities, and mosques. Mosque preachers, teachers, youth leaders, and tribal leaders should be involved in awareness campaigns.

**Integrate the role of moderate mosque preachers in youth issues:** The mosque is one of the most influential social institutions in Yemen. Mosque preachers are well received by communities, families, and youth. Families and parents often go to them for advice. The religious status that mosque preachers enjoy makes it important to first protect them from becoming extremists and then to encourage them to become partners in addressing extremism among youth.

**Muslim leaders visitor program:** Using the U.S. State Department’s professional visitor program, bring a small group of Muslim preachers to the United States for a tour, Islamic dialogue, and view of Muslim life in America. Introduce them to academics like Abu Nimer, associate professor at the American University's School of International Service in International Peace and Conflict Resolution and Director of the Peacebuilding and Development Institute, which offers unique summer peacebuilding courses for professionals in the field. While not a cleric himself, Dr. Abu Nimer has lead delegations of religious leaders from the United States to the Middle East and could be uniquely equipped to host such a group in the US. Connected to this or independent of it, provide up to $10,000 for each religious leader to

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**Success Story: Islam and Development**

NODS Yemen, a national organization headquartered in Taiz, started a program to integrate the role of mosque preachers in development, democracy, and good governance issues. Its goal is to help religious preachers become aware and involved in issues that concern people’s lives, such as women’s and children’s rights and democracy. The program included training of trainers to 175 mosque preachers and religious guides in seven governorates, including Taiz and Aden, during 2007. NODS Yemen is expecting to train another 150 mosque preachers by the end of 2008. It also trained 24 mosque preachers from the tribal areas to help them design and preach sermons that promote the culture of peaceful resolution of conflict.

During the training, many mosque preachers said their stereotypes about Western organizations were challenged. For example, some mosque preachers of the tribal areas said their initial belief was that the sponsors of the training were part of the Western conspiracy against Islam. By the end of the second training, a Salafi sheikh and one of the most distinguished mosque preachers issued a Fatwa saying that working with Western organizations that aim to help Muslims resolve their problems and develop their countries is a religious duty.
design a simple youth project proposal that promotes tolerance. Or, using the well-known MacArthur “genius awards” as the model, give “no-strings attached” awards for good work already done and provide an “honorarium” of $5,000.86

**Success Story: Promoting Peace**

In 2008, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) supported three local NGOs from Mareb, Al-Jawf, and Shabwa to hold several forums through which community leaders, youth, and tribesmen could come together to discuss ways to address tribal conflicts. Included was a campaign to reduce the impact of conflict on education, drawing on the idea of reviving the tradition of safe haven in tribal areas. Tribal leaders were encouraged to sign a Code of Conduct to protect students and teachers from conflict and to make educational facilities safe havens. In an unprecedented manner, the campaign launching gathered over 130 key and prominent tribal leaders representing 13 of the 18 main tribes in the three governorates. All expressed their support to sign the code of conduct, after a campaign with the following steps:

1. **Media:** A national newspaper volunteered two of its weekly pages to cover articles and news about the impact of conflict in the three areas and about the campaign message. NGOs disseminated over 1,500 copies in the governorates.
2. **Student seminar:** Students gathered with decision-makers, tribal leaders, elected representatives, and religious figures and told how conflict affects them. They demanded protection from tribes and authorities. Separate seminars and training for mosque preachers got them involved in the campaign.
3. **National conference:** Students and previously engaged tribal and community leaders appealed to other tribal leaders to sign the code of conduct.
4. **(Upcoming) Convoys:** Groups of students from the governorates will travel in peace convoys across the governorates to have the code of conduct signed.

**Success Story: Promoting Moderate Islam**

The Office of Endowment in Aden, which is responsible for monitoring mosques and mosque preachers in the governorate, had a program to enhance the spread of moderate Islam among mosque preachers. During the program, the Office organized seminars for more than 40 mosque preachers known to be very extreme and brought other moderate ones to facilitate a dialogue. The immediate result of the short program was that the extreme religious figures started talking about previously believed taboo issues (such as women’s rights) in a way they never had before.

Invite popular Muslim preachers to hold youth workshops: In the analysis of Arab media, it was noted that Amr Khaled’s website, established in 2002, is not only the most popular site in the Arab world, particularly among Arab youth, but also is the most frequented religious site in the world.87 Invite him,
or other like-minded Muslim preachers, to give an invitation-only guest lecture/workshop to clerics and another to a youth assembly.

**Yemeni Youth Internet Portal:** Provide a clearinghouse for youth information of all types: career, hobbies, service and apprenticeship opportunities, health, selling and buying things, participation in civic affairs, and other concerns.

**Sequencing of activities to support Objective 1:** All four types of these activities could begin almost immediately as they largely build on current experience and activities.

### 7.2.2. Youth Development Programs

**Community sports and recreation:** Playing fields, courts, and multipurpose buildings with professional leadership would be developed or enhanced in order to foster sports competitions, leagues, and other opportunities for supervised recreation, such as youth groups with opportunities for community service, hobbies, outings, self-help projects, and the like.

**Cultural activities:** Run by trained specialists, these activities might include music, art, poetry, drama, and competitions for talented youth, forums and discussions, opportunities for religious observance and scholarship, Internet access (in cybercafés), and literacy/numeracy/computer/English classes. Where resources and facilities are available, the activities could be centralized in a community library or as part of a community recreation facility.

**Workforce development:** These would include the following types of activities:

- **Career guidance and information:** Counselors would receive training in career development and how to leverage business resources to set up activities that would connect youth with employers (e.g., career/job fairs, job shadowing, visits to workplaces, internships, and a career library). In order to support career counseling, trend data might be developed in selected geographic areas on the number of people who work in particular industries and occupations, their wages, skill sets, and where to obtain the requisite education and training. Occupational data could be part of a regular household survey, or it could be a study of employers in a particular labor market region and/or in particular high-demand fields.

- **Employment information and connecting activities between employers and jobseekers:** Since activities in this area have tended to fail in Yemen, employers in two or three urban areas could be assisted to design and implement their own (labor exchange) system that connects them to job seekers, perhaps on a pilot basis. To succeed, the system would have to be simple, e.g., employers would list vacancies and job seekers would apply (with help from employment specialists) to fill them. Employers especially would have to perceive that the system helps them recruit talented individuals who help their enterprises become more profitable. A web-based system might ensure the confidentiality of both parties and could be kept up to date by expunging vacancies from the system once they become filled.
• Training in literacy, computer applications, life/employability skills, entrepreneurship: While these areas might be offered separately, the most effective and popular models integrate them in intensive, workplace-like settings that can lead to jobs or viable self-employment.

Personal and family counseling: Career readiness is often influenced by family experiences. Thus, local communities might organize awareness campaigns supplemented by counseling for families and community leaders on how to be sensitive to youth problems and help children communicate their problems.

Sequencing of activities to support Objective 2: These are medium- to long-term solutions that should be pursued since they constitute the core of what youth and stakeholders want. For the purposes of this project where rapid disbursement of funds and short-term results are called for, youth development activities ought to build on programs that currently exist during the first year, while planning occurs to develop new or further enhance current activities for Year 2. An exception might be for particular categories of youth, e.g. youth offenders, where to do nothing in the short term might increase the likelihood of extremist actions.

7.2.3. Youth Outreach and Mapping of Services

Outreach to youth to encourage their participation in positive, existing programs and activities: Outreach workers from strong NGOs would strive to connect youth in selected neighborhoods to existing services in the areas of livelihoods and workforce development, cultural enhancement, personal hygiene and counseling, community service and engagement, and recreation. Prior to outreach, caseworkers would receive 1–2 months of intensive training in youth and community leadership. This can start modestly with a series of short-term trainings that result in hiring paid youth outreach workers and a cadre of unpaid youth volunteers who work together to recruit youth participants. Communication is necessary, as is a paid staff that meets with the youth volunteers and the most active participants, i.e. the “regulars.” The youth staff should form a leadership cadre that regularly engages with the youth participants who show up for daylong trainings, educational events, rallies, and other youth events. Youth for youth and by youth programming ideas can create good social entrepreneurship, civic engagement, and services to youth. Adult guidance and staff who have fiscal responsibilities surround the activities with support, but the energy and creativity come from the youth. It is important to create a youth group dynamic—classified as things youth do together as a group such as team sports or whatever creates a highly youth friendly environment where their culture, voices, and faces are ever-present. That is the part of youth dynamic that people will show up to be a part of.

Juvenile offender rehabilitation programs: Program components would include positive counseling and developing skills to earn a livelihood. They would be structured to reward appropriate behavior to re-integrate youth offenders into society and ensure a separate system from the one dealing with adult offenders. Contact with those who have knowledge and experience of criminal activity raises risk levels in communities. This component involves work and training with law enforcement authorities, introduction of rehabilitative systems, and training.
Mapping of youth needs and services in selected neighborhoods: Part of the outreach above would be to identify exemplary NGOs and programs in targeted neighborhoods (spaces where youth gather), and to encourage more youth to participate in such programs.

Sequencing of activities to support Objective 3: Of all the program options, the activities to meet this objective should probably be implemented first, not only to meet the 1207/1210 conditions of rapid disbursement and targeting funds to places where large numbers of youth gather, but also to provide a visible, short-term benefit to young people by getting them involved in programs with experienced NGOs. The activities also begin to develop a core group of trained and experienced youth workers that can be built upon during later phases of the project.

7.2.4. Strengthening capacity of youth service providers

Professional training: Program personnel would receive 1–2 years of training, leading to certifications in youth development fields such as directed recreation and workforce development. This training would involve academic preparation and supervised fieldwork. The result would be professional youth workers with sufficient capabilities to earn the trust and respect of youth and community members, as well as higher-quality and more sustainable programs.

One way to build a professional training program is to understand how youth work is professionalized elsewhere. For example, city team-clusters of local councils and CBOs for policy level, manager level, and direct service level Yemenis could do professional visits to the US or other countries in the region. For instance, Jordan has examples of youth programming with high levels of interest from the Royal Family. USAID-supported NGO activity, local council engagement, and professional visits should overlap to “saturate” a specific geographical area with good ideas and resources to peak youth interests and demonstrate a professional and enlightened view of youth engagement. In addition, selected Yemeni staff could engage in professional apprenticeships with youth organizations in the United States. For example, the American Youth Work Center, publisher of Youth Today (a newspaper on youth work), has a long history of placing foreign youth workers in U.S. youth workplace environments.

Sequencing of activities to support Objective 4: Since well-prepared professionals are required to develop high-quality programs that will attract youth, the training and development of these youth workers should begin during the first year of this project.

7.2.5. Research to increase knowledge and understanding of youth issues in Yemen

Research studies, workshops, seminars, and other venues: Support for various venues to disseminate and discuss research (e.g., workshops, seminars, forums, and conferences) would occur with a focus on several levels—national, provincial, local, neighborhood, and others as needed. Issues to be investigated would include youth employment and livelihoods development, health and living conditions, education, civic engagement and leisure opportunities, family relationships, and youth extremism. Youth would help design and participate in the elaboration of such studies.
Sequencing of activities to support Objective 5: Research yielding baseline information should begin in neighborhoods or street places where large numbers of youth congregate. Such research would support the project’s first year outreach activities described in “Youth Outreach and Mapping of Services.” More comprehensive and detailed studies would be designed and carried out later with the participation of universities and NGOs.

7.3 Considerations for Determining Best Procurement Options

Seven considerations will determine best procurement options: 1) responsiveness to 1207/1210 guidelines, 2) in-country capacity, 3) capacity for rapid disbursement, 4) contingency funds, 5) appropriate technical capacity, 6) saturation, and 7) use of a management entity for sub-granting to local NGOs.

1. Responsiveness to 1210 (previously 1207) Guidelines: The National Defense Authorization Act created what were known as 1207 funds (now 1210) to establish or promote stability in certain key countries. As noted earlier, the guidelines for these funds are to promote stability, focus on unstable areas, address urgent threats, and be of short duration, holistic, and multisectoral.

2. In-country capacity: The timeline for these funds is two years. If the funds are to address urgent needs, the ability to rapidly disburse them will be enhanced if there is preference to those who have current in-country presence and technical and fiscal capacity to implement programs.

3. Capacity for rapid disbursement: The circumstances and the 1207 funding guidelines call for “urgent needs.” This indicates thoughtful and quick actions are valued over slow and deliberative options. Some agencies and organizations have better ability to rapidly disburse funds than others.

4. Contingency Fund: The Mission may wish to set aside up to 10 percent of the funds to respond to “trigger events,” the single acts or events, often unanticipated, that may escalate a problem related to more established structural factors. Examples of triggers include violent repression of peaceful demonstrations by government, coup attempts, fraudulent elections, and rapid rise in food costs.

5. Appropriate technical capacity: In its youth-mapping study, the German development agency GTZ ranked more than 50 youth NGOs with moderate to high levels of capacity. They also found widespread underengagement of youth in NGOs’ youth program implementation and operations. Youth engagement and professional development of youth outreach and some of the other recommendations may require technical capacities that are not fully realized in Yemen. In these cases, the Mission may wish to have short infusions of external trainers or send key nationals outside of Yemen for professional development workshops. There was enthusiasm among local councils and local political leadership during the assessment period for taking positive action for youth. It is recommended that any youth programming engages with local councils as they have a better track record than the national government in responding to local issues. Sub-awards to local NGOs could require the participation and/or consultation of local councils as a requirement to ensure their involvement.
6. **Saturation:** Maximum impact for these limited funds is tied to a geographical focus to “saturate” funding in a few areas. The issues in Yemen are systemic. By focusing in a few areas, the Mission can do holistic multisectoral programming among a localized community of stakeholders. It will have a greater likelihood to affect systemic change and create showcases of positive engagement for youth.

7. **Grant-Making Process through a Management Entity:** To launch the first phase of the activities, it is recommended that the project Management Entity (ME) identify and review the major local/international youth NGOS/PVOs who are eligible for program sub-grants and categorize them based on the agreed-upon programmatic activities. The main preferred criteria for selecting potential partners are:
   - NGO expertise in the programmatic areas;
   - Proven track record of youth project implementation in four site areas;
   - Strong financial, administrative, and networking capabilities;
   - Strong relationships and connections with local governments;
   - Compliance with USAID regulations and standards; and
   - Flexible organization structure that facilitates quick customization and modification of program activities in progress.

Given the changing conditions and various trigger events, all grants that are issued should be reviewed every six months, as part of a biannual review of grants-making, project performance, and monitoring of activities and beneficiaries. The ME project staff would work closely with local NGOs/PVO grantees to implement various short-term youth programs.

This cooperative and frequent review of grants-making and performance will allow for targeted and gradual capacity-building of local NGOs/PVOs who are not ready to launch larger-scale programs at an early stage. The main benefits of this approach are:
   - Established communication and feedback between USAID, the ME, and local youth organizations;
   - Increased knowledge of best practices and lessons learned regarding youth organizations;
   - Enhanced capacity to scale up projects and support institution building; and
   - Increased stakeholder “buy-in” to the process of youth development.

8. **Partnerships and Sustainability**

In order to enhance impact and sustainability as well as donor coordination, a multifaceted partnership approach should serve as the central tenet of the youth strategy. Partnerships can be formed at various levels of the project, and among a wide range of stakeholders. Figure 2 highlights key types of stakeholder partnerships based on these tasks.
Young people: Building youth partnerships and relationships is a central objective of this initiative, through which youth reduce their alienation and isolation within their own communities. Findings throughout the report cite the tremendous need to directly involve and engage youth within the decision-making, implementation, and evaluation of the project, in all types of partnerships: national governance youth leadership, regional planning and governance, national media campaigns, local community service outreach, and youth NGO organizations that reflect the “for youth, by youth” philosophy. The first stage of the program is oriented to short-term activities at the local community level, placing a special role on local youth action. Awareness and media programs will reach a larger national audience, as well as the evaluation and research activities. Youth are the critical players in all of these aspects of the programs. Youth NGOs already committed to ensuring active youth participation and leadership include the Youth Forum, National Cultural Youth Center, Media Youth Forum, and Youth Leaders Development Foundation. (See Appendix 8 for listing of youth NGOs.)
Community-based service organizations: Partnering with youth-focused national NGOs provides a number of advantages, particularly in regard to their strong links to community and youth stakeholders. Partnerships with NGOs also afford the chance to learn from local experience, scale up current activities, and provide NGOs with needed institutional development that can support their effectiveness. Most importantly, these community service organizations are already working in the area of youth development. The targeted geographical areas of Yemen have significant NGO service capacity in community services to youth, including the Life Makers Foundation, Social Services Center and Yemen Youth Meeting Club, Yemen Youth Union-Aden, 21st Century Center for Innovation and Development, and All Girls Association. These community-based service organizations provide a mix of services in sports and recreation, youth training, life skills, and youth leadership training.

Faith and community leaders: One consistent finding of the analysis relates to the need to involve faith and community leaders within the project. Various activities in the program relate to these groups: planning and youth mapping of all community activities, including those that are faith-based; local coordination with community and local government; and outreach and education programs to religious leaders. Existing NGOs already are conducting innovative and inclusive programs, such as the Life Maker Foundation, All Girls Association, and National Organization for Development of Society.

Workforce development organizations/private sector associations: An important finding of the report is the need to link workforce and skills education and training to the actual demands of the private sector, creating “demand-driven” training. Whether for livelihoods, small enterprise, or even the formal sector, youth and the NGO community must be educated on the value of private sector skills. Partnerships between workforce development organizations and private sector associations are a first step in creating this awareness. Various
workforce activities will encourage partnerships between youth workforce programs and the small business and livelihoods sector to ensure that the skills and learning offered through these workforce programs are relevant to the entry positions of youth. Specific NGOs that work in the area include the National Organization for Development of Society, Academic Electronic Association, and Hawa Women’s Handicraft Association, as well as a host of microfinance and livelihood institutions.

Regional, National, and International Donor Community: Yemen is a small country in terms of powerbrokers and key national stakeholders. Ministry officials, regional leaders, and donor officials have been attempting to fund targeted youth projects for some time now. The proposed recommendations provide core lessons on how to effectively target resources to youth, particularly with the objective of changing behavior toward extremism, an issue of national urgency. National coordination and partnership, particularly as it relates to the awareness and evaluation of the program, will allow for the lessons learned to be applied to future country programs and youth strategies.

National Research Community: Various research communities would be integral partners in the design, development, and evaluation of this program. This program largely reflects the blending of the youth and extremism research community in Yemen. Through the youth focus groups and key informants in the academic and security communities, the program identified the underlying behaviors and overlapping factors that shape youth extremism in Yemen. The program provides activities that will allow further inquiry on this important topic. Research institutions to be partnered in this effort are:

- Sana’a University. Graduate Studies and Scientific Research. Contact person is Dr. Towfick Sufian, Vice Rector for Graduate Studies and Scientific Research.
- University of Science and Technology (Private University). Research Center contact is Dr. Sidqi Hassan.
- DALL Centre (NGO). Contact person is Dr. Hamood Alawdi.
- 21st Century Centre for Innovation and Development (NGO). Contact person is Mr. Ahmed Kaid Al Asudi.
9. Monitoring and Evaluation Framework

This section highlights the main elements of a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework for a youth stability initiative for Yemen. The focus of this section is how to design an M&E framework for a program that addresses youth extremism and complies with the objectives of 1207 funding of the U.S. Department of Defense. In so doing, the first part of the section offers an illustrative framework of indicators related to the main objectives, outcomes, outcomes, and activities of the program. Second, it highlights the main elements that address the special nature of this program—to reduce youth extremism. Lastly, it identifies key existing information available to construct baseline and verification data.

9.1 Illustrative M&E Framework

Project Highlight: INTALEQ
An Example of Public-Private Partnerships

The INTALEQ (INnovations in Technology-Assisted Learning for Educational Quality) project is a public/private partnership initiative that will help Yemeni students “step up” to the future by giving them a chance to master the types of skills necessary to flourish in the 21st century. INTALEQ (which means “step up” or “launch” in Arabic) offers a replicable model for leveraging the power and pull of technology, not just to teach computer and internet skills, but to improve core teaching and learning in Yemeni high schools, particularly in the essential areas of math and science. INTALEQ’s overarching goal is: Improved acquisition of 21st century skills by Yemeni high school students, so that they are better equipped to find work, live productive lives and contribute to Yemen’s development as a stable and prosperous democracy.

Project beneficiaries include students, teachers, principals, supervisors and inspectors, as well as the public and private sectors in Yemen. The private sector will benefit from a deeper pool of talented and skilled young people to draw on for employment and the public sector will access models for the improvement of teaching and learning that can be applied to schools and grade levels beyond those targeted by INTALEQ.

INTALEQ will be implemented in a total of 20 schools in Sana’a, Ta’iz, Mukalla and Aden over a one year period. INTALEQ partners include the Yemeni Ministry of Education, USAID, the Haile Saeed Group, the Al Awn Foundation, and the Yemeni Ministry of Communication, Intel, Curriki and Education Development Center, Inc.
The M&E framework uses the main elements of the youth program highlighted in Section 7. The main goal of the program is to reduce youth extremism in Yemen. The main approach to achieve this goal is to prepare and engage youth in positive youth development approaches in Sana’a, Taiz, and Aden. The program targets specific social places where youth congregate, as well as concentrates resources within these specific social places. The concern is to mitigate violence through reducing entry by youth into extremist groups that promote and act violently.

As described in Section 7, five main objectives are proposed: 1) improve youth-parent-adult communication to find common ground to address family and community concerns; 2) address the needs and desires of youth through youth development programs; 3) build youth leadership within the community; 4) strengthen the capacity of youth service providers; and 5) increase knowledge and understanding of youth issues in Yemen, and the policies and programs that can address this issue. Illustrative indicators of program are presented in the final column of Table 8. Appendix 9 provides a more detailed listing of possible indicators for this program.

Table 8. Illustrative monitoring and evaluation framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOAL: TO REDUCE YOUTH EXTREMISM IN YEMEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>OBJECTIVES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Improve youth-parent-adult communication to find common ground to address family and community concerns</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<p>| 2. Address needs and desires of youth through programs to enhance their livelihoods, skills, and leisure opportunities | Decreased youth isolation and greater hope | Community sports and recreation | • Percentage of youth with access to resources |
|                                                                                     | Higher family standard of living | Cultural activities | • Percentage of youth trained in livelihood skills/entrepreneurship skills and placed in labor market |
|                                                                                     | Greater youth literacy and employment | Workforce Development: --Career guidance --Employment information and | • Percentage of youth that have returned for more education post-program |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBJECTIVES</th>
<th>OUTCOMES</th>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>ILLUSTRATIVE INDICATORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased self-confidence and feelings of efficacy among youth</td>
<td>connecting activities between employers and jobseekers</td>
<td>• Percentage of youth actively searching for career job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved community health and youth-parent relationships</td>
<td>--Training in literacy, computer applications, life/employability, skills, entrepreneurship</td>
<td>• Percentage of youth that report improved family relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased number of small businesses developed</td>
<td>Personal and family counseling</td>
<td>• Percentage of youth (over first year) who practice at least one sport activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Rapidly build youth leadership and youth connections to existing services</td>
<td>Fast disbursement of 1207/1210 funds</td>
<td>Training of youth outreach workers</td>
<td>• Percentage of youth-serving organizations that are managed by youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>within the community</td>
<td>Higher participation and impact of youth programs</td>
<td>Mapping of youth needs and services in selected neighborhoods</td>
<td>• Percentage of youth oriented toward advocacy efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greater and sustained youth leadership in community</td>
<td>Outreach to youth to encourage their connection with positive, existing programs and activities</td>
<td>• Percentage of youth-serving organizations that provide youth with a major voice in policy development and direction-setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greater civic engagement among youth</td>
<td>Opportunities for community service and learning</td>
<td>• Percentage of youth (over first year) trained in social/civic or leadership training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Strengthen capacity of youth service providers</td>
<td>Fast disbursement of 1207/1210 funds</td>
<td>Professional Training in youth leadership and workforce development</td>
<td>• Percentage of youth-serving organizations with youth representing at least 25% of their executive committees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Higher quality and more sustainable programs</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Percentage of youth-serving organizations that are managed by youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More youth participating in ongoing youth-related programs</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Percentage of participating institutions with improved management efficiency and disbursement execution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lesser feelings of youth isolation and alienation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Increase knowledge and understanding of youth issues in Yemen</td>
<td>Increased understanding of youth employment and livelihoods development,</td>
<td>Research studies, workshops, seminars, forums, conferences</td>
<td>• Number of Yemini researchers and experts on topics of youth and extremism issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>health and living conditions, educational, civic engagement, and leisure</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Percentage of number of youth participating in and authoring studies and field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>opportunities, and family</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.2. Considerations to Meet the Needs of the 1207/1210 Mandate

The proposed activities reflect a sound structure for a youth development program, with particular emphasis on behavioral change. Several aspects of this program are specific to the special goal of reducing youth extremism:

- First and foremost, the program emphasizes changing behavior and expectations of youth through communication, socialization, and positive youth experience. To achieve this objective, the program finances a wide range of activities open to youth, and provides an outreach network through the youth leadership program to ensure that these programs are relevant to them. The program stresses intergenerational communication and understanding, a missing element from most youth programs in the country.

- The program creates new social space and communication that create more positive experiences for youth. The emphasis on social space is an important element of the project, and various activities support this transformation. The main target areas of the project will concentrate on the existing gathering places of youth—the shopping mall, the street, and the market. Research shows these existing social spaces are dangerous recruitment areas for extremism.

- Rapid disbursement is a program priority given the urgency of the situation. The use of existing NGOs and other institutions, the training and professionalization program of their staff, and the selection of short-term youth services all provide a framework for rapid disbursement.

- Indicators must track and monitor the youth behaviors that contribute to extremism in Yemen. As discussed in the findings section, much can be learned from this project as it relates to the factors that shape youth extremism.

9.3 Existing Data Sets and Baseline Information

Several sources of household, education, and labor market data can be used in establishing the baseline information for the project:

- 2004 Yemen Population, Housing and Establishment survey information that includes a separate report (Second Report) on Population and Demographic Characteristics. This data set has been the
basic information for the compilation of village-level estimates of poverty as part of the World Bank Poverty Assessment, as well as the estimation of village-level income as part of the USAID Demographic and Health Census.

- 2003 Education Statistics Survey information that includes detailed educational statistics of all levels of education. Working with the UNESCO Institution of Education Statistics, there is continued monitoring of education statistics for the country.

- 2003 Labor and Establishment Survey information that includes a separate report entitled Labour Force Demand Survey in Establishments Sector, 2003. This information is now used by the ILO and the “Key Indicators” of labor markets in Yemen.
Appendices

Appendix 1: Documents Reviewed

Aden Local Councils. Fuad Al-Buraihi.


Civic Development Establishment- EFA. A Self-Help Program for Young Leadership in Yemeni Political Parties. A draft project presented to the Middle East Partnership Initiative.


Haq, Tariq A. Labour Markets & Youth Employment in the Arab States. UNDP/UNDESA Sub-Regional Workshop: Youth Policies & Strategies in the context of the MDGs. Sana’a, 2005.


Noueihed, L. “Yemen seen as both target and platform for al Qaeda.” Reuters India, 2008.


Republic of Yemen, Ministry of Education. The National Program for Integrating ICT in Education – First and Second Documents. Technical assistance provided by EDC.


USAID. Middle East Youth Media Initiative. Regional Youth Poll. 2008.


Project Documents Provided by USAID/Yemen


Instructional Leadership and Supervision Initiative Project, Funded by MEPI, Implemented by EDC.

SPA Review. *Proposal: Youth Center. Sana’a* 

The National Culture Center for Youth.

Youth Lawyers - Training Program on Pleading before Courts Skills & Human Rights.
Appendix 2: Key Individual Informants

Table 9. Summary of key informants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY INFORMANTS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government - Deputy Ministers and Directors General</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders from the local governments and local councils in the three governorates</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education specialists from General Education and Vocational &amp; Technical Education</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of Parliament and Members of Parliamentarians’ against Corruption Group</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders and preachers</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders and members of NGOs and civil society organizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice and law enforcement officials</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private-sector leaders and businessmen</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public figures, scholars, researchers, and university students</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal leaders and Sheikhs</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 10. Detailed list of key informants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Institutions/Organizations</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Key Informants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08/27/08</td>
<td>Sana’a</td>
<td>USAID Yemen</td>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>Salwa Al-Sarhi, DG Team Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/27/08</td>
<td>Aden</td>
<td>Ministry of Endowment Office</td>
<td>Local Representative for National Government</td>
<td>Sheikh Fuad Ahmed Al-Buraihi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/28/08</td>
<td>Aden</td>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>• Sheikh Saleh Salem Hulais, mosque preacher and educator&lt;br&gt;• Maher Assayed Abdullah, teacher and mosque preacher, local council member&lt;br&gt;• Shawqi Mohammed Moqbil, Imam and mosque preacher, local council member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/28/08</td>
<td>Aden</td>
<td>Governorate Office</td>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>Local Council Representatives:&lt;br&gt;• Um Al-Khair Assaedi, Head of Social Committee&lt;br&gt;• Aadel Alkhader Abdullah&lt;br&gt;• Hassan Ibrahim Maysari&lt;br&gt;• Mohammed Abdulghani&lt;br&gt;• Abdullah Ahmed Naji&lt;br&gt;• Nael Nasr Kulaib</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/28/08</td>
<td>Aden</td>
<td>Aden Governorate</td>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>40 officials and social participants including: deputy of the governorate, office managers, public figures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/30/08</td>
<td>Taiz</td>
<td>Al-Saeed Foundation for Science and Culture</td>
<td>Local NGO</td>
<td>Faisal Saeed Farae, Deputy General Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/31/08</td>
<td>Taiz</td>
<td>Hial Saeed Anam Group: Hawaban</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
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<td>Academics and Educators</td>
<td>Government and Academia</td>
<td>Mohammed Al-Fathly, Manager of Sana’a Education Office, Mohammed Khayth, Manager of Bani Al-Harith Education Office, Adel Al-Shami, Chief Manager of Sana’a Education Office, Jamal Abdullah Al-Juhiam, Social Researcher and Executive Manager of Dall Center for social and cultural affairs, Ahmed Haza’a Khalid, MA Student and Researcher, Sana’a University, Ali Mohammed Qais, Sheik Thakban, Bani Al-Harith, Najeeb Askar, Manager of education unit in the Director General of Education’s office, Abdussalam Al-Ghali, Manager of education unit, Azal zone, Sana’a, Ali Mohammed Zaid, General Manager of public relations at the Ministry of Education</td>
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| 09/08/08 | Sana’a     | Interview with Members of Parliament | National Government | • Abdulkareem Al-Islami  
• Ziad Al-Shami  
• Salem bin Taleb          |
| 09/09/08 | Sana’a     | Dal Cultural Center              | Elites             | • Researchers, lawyers, judges, youth, political activists, political party leaders (opposition and ruling), national NGOs |
|          | Sana’a     | UNICEF                           | INGO               | Rasha Jarhum, Communications Officer, Educational Programs                  |
### Appendix 3: Focus Group Member Informants

#### Table 11. Focus Group Informants

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*University Graduates  
**Secondary School Graduates  
***Out of school Youth  
****Age of participants unknown
Appendix 4: Focus Group and Key Informant Protocol

Appendix 4.1 Key Informant Interview Questions

**Two key guiding questions**

1. Who is doing what in the field of youth policies and programs?
2. What kinds of data and information about youth currently exist?

Descriptive data are most valuable when disaggregated by: male and female: 15-18 years and 19-24 years (legally not the entire field of youth in Yemen, but a sub-set); urban and rural youth; and education level (can be tied to literacy or more specific data, e.g. years of school completed.)

Geographic locations – try to build statistical and qualitative descriptions of locales of interest. These data can be part of that description:

Focus groups and key informant interviews provide these additional background statistics and qualitative information on the geographic location. These can be compared to national statistics to arrive at an above- or below-average assessment:

**Statistical:**
- Crime rate
- Unemployment rate – by age group if available
- Population density – people/square kilometer
- Literacy or level of education

**Qualitative:**
- Presence of public figures who act as “spoilers”- disruptive against cooperative and stable acts. Names of the public figures (to determine whether there is agreement that this person is a “spoiler”)
- The presence of those who publicly advocate for violence
- Areas where incidences of tension have occurred, e.g., demonstrations due to high prices
- Informal economy activity or any other common “reputation” or descriptor that local people use to describe a place.

**General questions - for specific sector informants. See below by sector and also further below for the Yemen Rapid Organizational Capacity Assessment Profile Tool:**

1. What are your program’s current connections with youth? What type? Where?
3. Where are the youth in your plans? What is the status of these plans?
4. How do you assess youth needs?
5. What do you think the youth need?
6. What measures have you taken to reduce youth unemployment? Improve youth health and wellness choices and outcomes? Provide literacy or other livelihood skills? Advanced youth civic participation? (See below for more sector-level questions)

7. What can be done to prevent this/address this?

8. Where is the problem? (Geographic? Cohorts/Groupings? Risk groups/most vulnerable?)

9. What types of crime are committed by youth?
   (Comment: Questions should not be about facts or areas of conflict unless you discover it is not readily available; however, questions should be about plans, strategies, or steps that are under discussion or in circulation at the moment)

10. What makes young people go to extremism and violence?

11. Is there a plan or strategy to address youth violence and/or extremism?

12. What are examples of exceptional work being performed on behalf of and with youth by you or other organizations?
   - Name of Program:
   - Purpose and key activities of program:
   - Target beneficiaries (youth and families) (as specific as possible on age range)
   - Implemented activity locations (as specific as possible – neighborhoods, governorates)
   (Or, get details to fill in later – get contact information to research later- see below for the Yemen Rapid Organizational Capacity Assessment Profile Tool for the full range of questions)

13. Is there a program type or approach to youth that if there were funding, you would recommend starting?

14. Are there any reports or studies that address or reflect youth issues recently finished or underway now that would be useful to us? Details?

Sector Informant Questions
The following can be asked at a ministry at the national level or their counterparts at the local levels, the local office of the national ministry, or the local government office that addresses local-level sector issues.

Educators/Ministry of Education: Do they have information on school enrollments? Grade repetition? Completion and dropout rates, achievement, and skill certification levels? What educational options are available to youth after they graduate primary school? Does the Ministry of Education administer nonformal or second-chance programs that can be accessed by out-of-school-youth, or are other agencies responsible for these programs? Are current programs that serve out-of-school youth effective (formally and properly evaluated)?

Youth Specialists/Ministry of Youth: What kinds of government-sponsored youth development programs currently exist? Whom do they reach? What kinds of services do they provide? Have they
been evaluated? Who is currently active in the National Youth Strategy that was developed recently through the help of the World Bank? What is the status? What does it cover? Is it effective?

**Workforce/Ministry of Labor:** What statistics exist on rates of youth employment and unemployment? Is there an effective labor exchange that connects jobseekers, especially youth, and employers? Do out-of-school youth have access to government-sponsored skill training programs? What skills are covered by these programs? How do they measure student achievement? Is there labor migration to areas outside of the home area or country?

**Economics/Entrepreneurship/Ministry of Commerce** (or those that address Economic Growth): What are growth areas and potential of industry or economic activity that are growing or declining? Stimulus and educational programs do you consider should be directed to youth?

**Health providers/Ministry of Health:** Are there wellness data, live birth, smoking and substance abuse statistics? Major concerns of youth health? Current efforts targeting 15-24 year olds? Campaigns?

**Agriculture/Ministry of Agriculture:** What is the situation with jobs/farm growth? Training opportunities? Supports for agricultural-related businesses?

**Justice/law enforcement:** What are crime statistics by locale (neighborhoods, governorates); areas of most concern for violence; are areas where most ex-prisoners live tracked? Where do they live? Are there re-engagement programs with family and communities? Are there major issues or people or groups of people being tracked in USAID’s geographic area of interest?

**Civil society participation:** Who are active in civic participation programs for youth? Status and work of political parties to offer safe and acceptable ways to participate in community affairs?

**Religious academics/imams/religious Leadership:** How are Islam and the mosques creating an atmosphere to engage, prepare, and encourage the positive contributions of Yemeni youth? What are the priorities? In what ways are they helping families? Are the youth directly involved? What do they see as the biggest challenges and the best responses to those challenges?

**Youth-focused and youth-Serving NGOs:** Which NGOs offer youth programs? Whom do these programs reach? What kinds of services do they provide? Have they been evaluated?

**Business people/private sector:** What are the country’s major economic sectors? What information exists about the demand for labor in these sectors? What skills do employers expect youth to have when they enter the workplace? What are the names of major industry associations and to what extent do their activities target youth?

**Bilateral and multilateral donors:** Which types of youth programs are funded by other donor agencies? Do these programs complement current or planned USAID youth programs? How could USAID collaborate with other donors to facilitate youth activities that USAID would like to sponsor?
Appendix 4.2 Focus Group Questions

About 90 minutes.

Question and Activity Routine:
Greetings . . . . [Do the prepared introduction about the program – keep it short . . . no right or wrong answers... confidential].

1. Please give us examples of the different places, activities, or programs in the neighborhood where young people like you spend time during an average (non-vacation) week. They can be formal places or informal places or activities, as well as more formal programs.

Facilitator - With blank cards in hand, write down places on individual cards. Expect 7 - 12 places. Keep the pace steady and slow enough for the note taker – sometimes asking when it is not clear: That is not clear to me, please tell me more about this place? What does one do there? What does the place look like? [it is ok if the place mentioned is far away out of the neighborhood - like in the next governorate or one who goes to work in Saudi Arabia regularly]

Note taker – Write down places, if there is extra evaluative statements made like why someone likes it (they will be asked for more detail but ok to write down now) or any rich detail that will help the reader be clear about what the place is.

2. We want to better understand these places, activities, and programs you mentioned and what gives people like you the most benefit. Please work together as a team and talk about these items on the cards. Use these clips to indicate how much benefit these places have for young people like you.

You can put the clips on the cards with 1 clip meaning less importance and 5 clips representing much importance. Use the talking tool [ball or squeezy toy] to keep order about who talks. You can move the clips around until you arrive at an agreement.

Facilitator – Give them the chance to complete the work. They are negotiating with each other and not simply voting. Negotiating means they have to talk about it and describe why it is more or less beneficial. Voting is quick and nonverbal. The facilitator can encourage them. . . Is this it? Is every one participating?

Note taker – Make notes on the comments about the benefits each of these activities, places, and programs have for them.

3. I am going to separate these cards by the number of stones that are on them. The top half will go here and the bottom half there. Describe these places in the top half. In what ways do they promote benefits for young people like you?

Facilitator- Probes- Talk more about what do you do there? What is important to you about this place? Is it the activity? Are there people you go there with, or that you meet or find there? Location?
Please explain. Use the talking tool [ball, squeezy toy] to allow everyone to talk and participate. Make sure the conversation is slow enough and specific about the places for the note taker. 

**Note taker** – You are making sure the descriptions are clearly labeled to the place.

4. So, we know that even good things that have benefits also can have shortfalls. Let’s talk about these places and activities again; this time, tell me what the shortfall or disadvantage is. Talk about each one. . .

**Facilitator**- Let each one be discussed slowly enough so the note taker can take notes on them. If it goes too long and they are really talking a lot more than time allows, it is okay to say: *we need to move on to the next question.* . .

**Note taker** – Be sure to provide quotes about strong points.

5. I want to make a new list of activities, places, and programs with you. This time I want you to think of the future aspirations and hopes of people like you and their families. . . what new place, activity, or program that does not exist now would help make life better for people like you and their families (or tribes). Again, place, activity, or program. . . use the tools to allow people to talk one at a time. . . let’s hear from everyone . . .

**Facilitator**- Write down each new item on a card. Probe: What would go on there? What part of your life would be made better for you? What role could youth take to make it happen? Where would the activity be located for people like you to be able to take advantage of it? What days and hours would it be in operation? Anything about the staff or volunteers? All probes need not be answered for each activity – it is a sampling to get some richer detail about the new ideas.

After you have several cards, lay them down in a random order. . . You can put the clips on the cards with 1 clip meaning less importance and 5 clips representing much importance. Use the talking tool [ball or squeezy toy] to keep order on who talks. You can move the clips around until you arrive at an agreement. If the time is short, do a “quick vote” . . .cut the discussion and let them only vote on the general idea and not necessarily exactly as described.

**Note taker** – List them with the details; make sure you match the descriptions with the activity. If they say they have seen such a program somewhere else, note that down.

6. Okay, now I want you to help me understand another aspect of youth behavior . . . some young people like you, in some parts of the country resort to violence. What are the reasons they do this?

**Facilitator**: Repeat the reasons to slow it down and allow the note taker to write. Careful Probe: *What do you think about these reasons? What can youth or the neighborhood or the community do to prevent violence? Promote peace?* Help verbally match the prevention activity to the type of violence if the youth make that point. . . . so the note taker can record it . . .

**Note taker**: Note down reasons and if they match up to a way to prevent to the type of violence or the location, make the notes as specific as possible.
7. Is there something else that you think is important about the aspirations and challenges and lives of youth for us to know? If you don’t want to tell us, write it down. (Don’t have to put name on paper)

Facilitator: Show the group that you have paper and pencils and provide sheets of paper and something to write with to anyone who signals for it.

Note taker: Fold and collect the writings quietly, being careful not to show anyone what is written. Do not read until after the activity has ended. Label the paper with the focus group number.

Thank you.
Appendix 5: Reasons that Youth Commit Violence as Identified By Youth Focus Groups

Note: the number of groups who mentioned the factor is indicated in parenthesis next to each main and sub factor

**Structural Factors:**

**Socioeconomic:**

- **Social isolation (15 groups):** Youth experience suppression and sometimes violence by their families. They feel devalued and unappreciated. They resort to the streets where they mix with peers and become vulnerable to the influence of extremist groups.

- **Poor educational system (5 groups):** Does not provide necessary skills for youth. As a result, youth cannot meet the demands of the labor market and end up jobless. This creates frustration among youth, which makes them vulnerable to extremism. Also, teachers practice violence against students, which reinforces violent behavior among them. Participants mentioned gangs being formed in schools.

**Political/Governance:**

- **Endemic corruption (10 groups):** Creates injustice and inequality. Mostly, young people with connections have access to education and job opportunities, while powerless youth are excluded. This creates frustration and violent reaction.

- **Unfair distribution of resources (2 groups):** Areas that are marginalized and do not receive equal services as opposed to other areas in the country. Examples are Aden and the tribal areas. In tribal areas, youth resort to blocking roads and kidnapping foreigners to pressure the government to deliver services and provide jobs.

- **Corrupt and inefficient law enforcement system (11 groups):** Arbitrary arrests, unfair trials, and delay in processing cases in court.

**Cultural:**

- **Revenge killing (5 groups):** A practice or tradition in tribal areas. Although acknowledged by tribes to be a negative tradition, absence of law enforcement institutions in tribal areas make people take revenge on killers who are not brought to justice.

**Proximate/Motivational Factors:**

**Socioeconomic:**

- **Too much free time and no places to go (11 groups):** Youth are suppressed by their families and resort to the streets. They are jobless and have too much free time, but there are no places where they could spend their time. Youth become vulnerable to recruitment by gangs and extremists. This helps them feel recognized and appreciated.

- **Economic (16 groups mentioned unemployment, of which 13 also mentioned poverty):** Youth are unemployed and under social pressure because society expects them to get married. High dowry prices and deterioration of living standards prevent them from fulfilling that expectation. Frustration and hopelessness make them vulnerable to violence and recruitment by extremist groups that provide them with emotional and financial support they didn’t receive in their families and communities.
• **Education (2 groups):** Abuse of students by teachers reinforces their violent behavior. Focus groups talked about gangs being formed in schools.

**Religious and Cultural:**
• **Misunderstanding Islam (12 groups):** By young people who do not understand that peace is the essence of Islam.
• **Operating Extreme groups (5 groups)**
• **Media (9 groups):** Exposure to violence in media, movies, Internet, and video games reinforce violent behaviors among youth.

**Political/Governance:**
• **Political Parties (5 groups):** Political parties use religion to strengthen their political position and in the process brainwash the minds of the youth who are passionate about Islam to beat their opponents.
• **Security (2 groups):** Abuse of juveniles in jails, abuse and torture for Al-Qaeda suspects, unfair trials.

**External Factors:**
• **International injustice (2 groups):** America’s policy in the region, what is happening in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine. This makes young people feel that their religion is being attacked and so they take revenge
• **Western intentional attempts to spread immorality in the Muslim world (2 groups):** In the Arab and Islamic world by Western media. This makes youth feel that their culture of decency is vulnerable and they react with violence.

**Triggers:**
• **2009 parliamentary elections:** With the level of political tension and economic problems that the country is facing, the upcoming elections are expected to trigger violence in different places of the country, especially Aden.
• **Price hike:** The government has been talking about an upcoming price hike. In the past, price hikes caused riots in major cities and wide discontent. This has resulted in increasing the tension in the South and the rise of a movement calling for secession of the South.
• Arrest of political activists and journalists.
• Massive and arbitrary arrest of Al-Qaeda suspects.
• No places for youth to spend their free time.
Table 12. Analyzing the strength of factors mentioned

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<td>Economic (poverty)</td>
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<td>Misunderstanding Islam: that Islam is about peace not violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Too much free time and no places to go</td>
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<td>Corrupt and inefficient law enforcement system and institutions</td>
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<td>Endemic corruption</td>
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<td>Exposure to violence through media and Internet</td>
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<td>Operation of extremist groups</td>
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<td>Political parties</td>
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<td>Poor educational system and abuse by teachers</td>
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<td>International Injustice: what is happening in Iraq and Palestine</td>
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Table: This table is inspired by the Country Assessment Tool on Countering Radicalization, 2007, published by the Denmark Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Appendix 6: International Conflict Specialist Report

Title: A Brief Review of Issues of Radicalisation among Youth
Author: Laila Bokhari
Role: International Conflict Specialist (Consultant)

A Brief Review of Issues of Radicalisation among Youth

29 September 2008

Laila Bokhari
EDC – International Conflict Specialist (Consultant)

BACKGROUND
In support of the National Children and Youth Strategy of the Republic of Yemen, USAID/Yemen has contracted the EDC to conduct an assessment of vulnerable at-risk youth ages 15-24. Furthermore, through a range of programmes, the U.S. Government is already actively working to counter violent extremism in Yemen. The Yemen Stability Initiative (YSI) is seen as one such initiative to improve the relationship between the Government of Yemen and its growing youth population in remote areas. The aim is that such initiatives will contribute to immediate stabilization and to stem a growing tide of extremist activity – activity that may lead to further violence and conflict.

The aim of this section is to review some of the issues relevant to radicalisation among youth. The section is based on both the author’s own research and on findings by colleagues within the field of radicalization and conflict. The findings are based on research done in various parts of the world, mostly in other Muslim majority countries or in Europe among Muslim populations. The piece is based on a presentation given to the EDC team in Cairo, August 2008.

DEFINING RADICALISATION
As with terrorism, radicalisation has been seen as difficult to define. It opens up a whole range of debates and sensitivities. The way we use and explain terms is important. Being sensitive enough, so as not to stigmatise, and specific enough to guarantee academic nuances, is important. However, for practical usefulness, and in order to try to identify youth vulnerable to radicalisation and/or violent extremism it becomes essential to try to define what we mean. One definition of radicalisation is that it is the process through which individuals or groups become increasingly more radical. The word “radical” is however debatable. How do we distinguish between ideas that are radical in the sense that they may lead to violent behaviour, and ideas that are seen as merely healthy deviations from the mainstream or conventional? “Healthy radical views” may lead to positive change and development of a system and/or a society. However, radical and extreme views may also lead down a negative path to intolerance, hatred, and violence – and thus be damaging for any society. It therefore becomes important to see vulnerable populations as those capable of expressing needs, grievances, frustrations, or feelings attracted to, and involved in, violent extremism. The challenge becomes to pick up on those vulnerabilities and grievances before they lead to negative expressions in the form of hate-related crime.
or violence. What a society would want is that such expressions of vulnerabilities and grievances are expressed through available non-violent channels.

A definition suggested by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs sees radicalization as “the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas that could lead to acts of terrorism.” The emphasis is here put on the fact that we are not necessarily talking of a criminal act yet (unless one criminalizes ‘hate-speech’ because of its link to inciting violence). Even if difficult to “measure” and define, it is important to separate between peaceful and violent radicalisation and extremism. It is not wide-open “radicalisation” that is troublesome, it is those which lead to violence. The challenge becomes in identifying the very vulnerabilities that may lead people or groups down this road.

The social psychologist Fathali Moghaddam speaks of radicalisation as “a staircase to terrorism”: it is the narrow path that an individual may follow towards a life of terrorism with the terrorist act being the uppermost and final step. Seeing radicalisation as a process is important, yet one also has to avoid that all radicals are suspects, and thus capable of becoming violent.

**Features of radicalisation**

When speaking of radicalisation we see it as a process, or rather: many processes. There may be several exit and entry points – and importantly, not all lead to violence. There are also examples of disengagement processes at play – exits or de-radicalisation processes which are helpful to look at.

Human beings do not exist in a vacuum. Their decisions are shaped by the social, economic, cultural, and political environment in which they operate. Mapping what one may call the “enabling environment” in which radical opinions and views, political violence, and terrorism become attractive can be as critical to understanding the process of radicalisation as it is to analyse individual histories and group processes. In fact, the study of terrorism and political violence has benefited enormously from a multi-disciplinary approach, and the same is true for research into the phenomenon of radicalisation. It therefore becomes important to look at the very local, regional, national and even global context that we operate in.

There are no simple explanations for radicalisation. Researchers agree that radicalisation is caused by a complex array of factors that varies from place to place. Increasingly it is seen that while aspects vary from place to place, there may be some generic factors we can analyse further. We will look at some of these below. Assessing youth vulnerability to radicalisation entails being open to address a number of factors that may lead to grievances. However, in this project, it is ultimately vulnerabilities that may lead to violent expressions that we are interested in – and interested to try to prevent.

Youth are an especially receptive group of people to new ideas and influences. They have demands and wishes – and are receptive to role models – positive and negative ones. There have been several attempts to “profile” who we see as potential terrorists. As the cadre of people arrested and sentenced increases, it is however seen that it is difficult to produce any clear “target groups”. The demographics

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of those being arrested are so diverse that many counter-terrorism officials and analysts say they have
given up trying to predict what sorts of people are most likely to become terrorists. Age, sex, ethnicity,
education, and economic status have become more and more irrelevant. But still there are some
indications. A recently completed Dutch study of 242 Islamic radicals convicted or accused of planning
terrorist attacks in Europe from 2001 to 2006 found that most were men of Arab descent who had been
born and raised in Europe and came from lower or middle-class backgrounds. They ranged in age from
16 to 59 at the time of their arrests; the average was 27 years old. About one in four had a criminal
record. One guiding principle for terrorist groups is, however, always to maintain the psychological edge
and the upper hand by doing things that are surprising to the enemy. This is why in many areas we have
seen younger and younger people being recruited as suicide bombers and women becoming attractive
as recruits, yet this is still rare. Similar research is done by Marc Sageman of more than 400 terrorists
around the world. He writes:

Most people think that terrorism comes from poverty, broken families, ignorance, immaturity,
lack of family or occupational responsibilities, weak minds susceptible to brainwashing - the
sociopath, the criminals, the religious fanatic, or, in this country, some believe they’re just plain
evil. Taking these perceived root causes in turn, three quarters of my sample came from the
upper or middle class. The vast majority—90 percent—came from caring, intact families. Sixty-
three percent had gone to college, as compared with the 5-6 percent that’s usual for the third
world. These are the best and brightest young people of their societies in many ways.

While young women are seen to be increasingly analysed as potential recruits to terrorist movements,
and we have recently seen examples of female suicide bombers in the Palestinian context, in Iraq and
Kashmir, the majority of the recruits are still young men, mainly 18 – 35 years old. It is however seen
that recruits in many parts of the world are increasingly younger. Also, even though it is seen that the
majority of those who commit terrorist atrocities are, indeed, men, there is a sizeable number of women
who are members and active participants of these organisations. Women have been involved in a wide
number of tasks in support of terrorist activity. Research indicates that the women’s motivation for
joining terrorist groups has increased in a number of conflict zones. Conflicts that are long-term have
lower barriers and are less worried about breaking social and cultural taboos.

The role of women in any radicalisation process is important. This process may involve many stages and
levels of involvement. Roles may include people such as the ideologues, the intellectuals, the
fundraisers, support-networks, the sympathisers, to the activists. Women as nurturers and educators of
a new generation here becomes important in a societal and organisational perspective. Similarly, in an

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3 Yassin Musharbash, Bin Laden’s Eurofighters, Spiegel Online International, 04.11.2007,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,476680,00.html
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20041101.middleeast.sageman.understandingterrornetworks.html
terror networks. Proceedings from a FFI Seminar, Oslo, 15 March 2006
(http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00077/Paths_to_global_jihab.77735a.pdf)
6 See Bokhari, L, Women and Terrorism – Passive or Active Actors? Motivations and Strategic Use, in Suicide as a
Weapon, NATO Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara, Turkey (Ed.), IOS Press (2007), and K.J.
Cunningham, “Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 26 (3), (May – June
increasingly harder counter-terrorism environment, organisations and recruiters may be aware of the value a female member represents as a weapon in reaching out. As Jessica Stern has noted, “The perception that women are less prone to violence, the Islamic dress code and reluctance to carry out body searches on Muslim women made them the “perfect demographic”. These are factors to keep in mind when looking at women as part of vulnerable groups.

Few terrorists seem to be poor; on the contrary, terrorists themselves seem to be well-educated and middle class. It is perhaps not wise to confuse the possible causes of terror with the identity of terrorists. To quote Karin von Hippel, “While terrorists themselves may not be poor and uneducated, we do have evidence that they tend to use the plight of the poor as one justification for committing violence and for broadening their appeal.” Therefore, we know that poverty and inequality are both used as a pretext for terror – and may recruit sympathizers – and in some cases “canon-fodder”.

Programmes should be designed according to distinct needs and requirements (and often parts of countries will need to be treated differently from other parts). While there will be factors that we can identify that may be generic, it is however important to see that each situation has its unique characteristics, background, and dynamics. Particularities in a specific country or region must be kept in mind (e.g. demographics, unemployment rates, etc). Importantly, also, there may be factors which are linked or inter-connected. Taking a broad view of what factors may lead to radicalisation therefore becomes important.

As will be discussed below, we see that there may be a multiplicity of causal pathways producing radicalisation. Similarly, despite what image Moghaddam suggests through his reference to a “narrow path”, radicalisation processes do not follow a fixed linear trajectory. There may be situations that can cause sudden turn-arounds, fast-forwards or other shifts in the process. One such factor may be closeness to a latent or active conflict, another is the level and acceptance of violence in any given society.

It is recognised that there may be a multiplicity of causal pathways producing radicalisation, and it is agreed that countering terrorism – yes, even preventing radicalisation – may begin with the de-legitimisation of extremist messages. Changing a narrative – the way a truth is shaped, formed and expressed – may here be an essential ingredient in a counter-radicalisation strategy.

**Identifying steps to radicalisation**

In the following we will try identify some of the steps we see that may lead a young person down a road to further radicalisation. The aim will, of course, be to hope to stop the process of radicalisation before a person becomes pushed and/or pulled into accepting and legitimising violent ideas and promoting violent behaviour.

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8 Karin von Hippel, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College, United Kingdom, from an article prepared for UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, 2004.
One: Underlying grievances
What factors and circumstances generate frustration and grievances? These are often defined as structural factors in a society – factors which are grave enough for a large number of people to become frustrated or feel anger or apathy. The underlying factors may be real or perceived, but are factors that may lead to conflict, feelings of alienation and discrimination. It is in this context we can see that underlying issues such as the level of poverty and the lack of “democracy” become important. While there is not seen to be any direct correlation between poverty and terrorism, poverty – or relative and perceived poverty – is often used as a factor relevant as an underlying grievance – a factor that may be used by others to explain the need for violence – a call for justice as a result of perceived or real injustices. General (long-term) frustration over national or global politics or historical events are also factors that may be underlying conflicts in society, as well as leading to feelings of humiliation – or apathy. Events such as ongoing “atrocities against Muslims globally” and “corruption and occupation” may thus lead to feelings of humiliation and in turn apathy. We can divide the structural grievances into four components that will be issues to address and may inform a programme design:

- A political dimension – key concerns are issues of governance, political systems, representation, the rule of law, power-sharing and conflict-management – do people feel represented? Do they trust their leadership?
- A security dimension – key concerns are issues of conflict and violence and the role of the security sector (police, army, intelligence etc) – do people feel secure? Do they feel secure for their children’s future?
- A socioeconomic dimension – key concerns are issues of welfare and livelihood, including employment opportunities and access to social services and education – are people employed? Under-employed? Can people realise their dreams, expectations?
- A cultural and religious dimension – key concerns are issues of religious observation, traditional forms of culture, external cultural influences, and public debate on religion and culture – can people voice their opinions? Feelings of humiliation? Can people practice religion as they want? Are religious leaders representing them?

Two: Triggering events and circumstances
While many may feel injustice, anger and frustration, not all turn to violence. A next step is to analyse what makes a frustrated person violent?? The role of the surrounding environment here becomes important – who are the peers, friends, leaders, role models? Are there individuals or groups who are able to frame certain claims that activists make on behalf of their audiences (media, elites, sympathetic allies, and potential recruits)? The importance of communication – and as such instigators – cannot be understated. Many speak of a moral awakening, “a crisis” of moral shocks, but they will have to be made aware of how to “operationalise” this frustration and awareness. These “shocks” may be the images of “suffering” by victims or the use of victim symbols from Kashmir, Palestine, Chechnya, etc. As such there may be certain events in the local, regional, or global picture that can provoke a person to action.

The “religious call” here becomes a factor. Often we see leaders using religious symbols, arguments, and interpretations to explain certain factors, or to motivate to action. This is powerful, and if nobody questions this logic it is often seen as a “truth”. Religious leaders in some societies enjoy immense
power; their word and role therefore becomes important – both in potential radicalisation and in avoiding such radicalisation. Importantly, it is often believed that a sense of unfairness and injustice has given rise to victimisation, fuelling grievances in the Muslim world that may further be framed in religious terms. Religion is rarely the cause per se of terrorism and political violence, but rather it may provide the narrative and language, the sentiments and emotions, through which political conflicts are expressed. Importantly it may also create a “following” and a community of sympathisers.

Unemployment and underemployment are often seen as a key factor to radicalisation. Not only can it feel humiliating to go for long periods unemployed, but also it may create apathy and a yearning to be taken seriously. Involvement in militant organisations may be an option for engagement and usefulness. Radicalisation may therefore also be a result of lack of other career options.

**Three: Operational factors**

Finally, what makes a radical person pick up and justify violence? These may be factors in the surroundings of the person – but importantly there need to be certain factors that “operationalise the triggers” – that push a person further into an organisation – or that makes a person actually seek out a movement. With youth this is especially seen as a vulnerable factor – as youth often go in search of groups, movements, and other young people “to belong to”, to listen to, or to be heard.

There are a few factors which here become important:

- **Group dynamics** in social movements can be extremely strong. We here see processes of socialisation at play, many join in with friends, or follow family members into a path or community. This may create strong *in-group/out-group* feelings – the creation of a distinct collective identity – through the use of “noms de guerre” (special call names), group affiliation, training, and “brothering”.

  - Yearning for a sense of community and a deeper meaning in life, small groups of friends and family from the same area may also bond as they surf Islamist Web sites and seek direction from Al Qaeda’s inspiration. In the last few years, Web sites carrying Islamist messages have increased tremendously, collectively forming a virtual jihadi university. “Graduates” pass through “faculties” that advance the cause of a global caliphate through morale boosting and bombings and specialize in “electronic jihad, media jihad, spiritual and financial jihad.”

  - In some societies – or within certain groups of society – *glorification of violence and martyrdom worshiping* have become parts of life. This may be within subgroups of society or movements. A group may take on rituals that can lead to a distancing and legitimising violence. Rituals are seen to include a process in which evil is made to look good or members are led to believe that they are doing “necessary evil”.

- A further factor may be the way groups can result in *moral exclusion* through processes in which people dehumanize/dissociate themselves from the wider society or from moral issues.

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CAUSES OF TERRORISM

There is quite a bit of academic literature on the subject of what causes terrorism. The following section is taken from research conducted at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), based on research from various areas around the world. The section above on identifying features of radicalisation and the following section on causes to terrorism may together create a basis for working out possible policy options. Some findings in the following sections are informed by a recent United Nations study, *Radicalisation and Extremism that May Lead to Terrorism* (UN Global Strategy on Counter Terrorism – Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that may lead to Terrorism).

Some agreed factors which may be relevant to radicalisation and identifying vulnerable youth are as follows:

*Relative deprivation and inequality*: Widespread perceptions of deprivation and inequality, especially among culturally defined groups, serve as the basic condition for participation in collective civil violence. Terrorism may be part of this violence.

*Terrorism by spoilers*: Peace processes based on negotiated settlements are frequently accompanied by increased levels of terrorism by rejectionist groups.

*The contagion theory*: The occurrence of terrorism in one country often leads directly or indirectly to more terrorism in neighbouring countries. Terrorists learn from one another, and new tactics are usually quickly emulated. Spillover occurs in a variety of ways.

*Terrorism and mass media*: Paradigmatic shifts in modern mass media appear to influence patterns of terrorism, by enhancing its agenda-setting function, increasing its lethality, and expanding its transnational character.

*Rapid modernisation* makes societies more exposed to ideological terrorism. Societal changes associated with modernisation create new and unprecedented conditions for terrorism such as a multitude of targets, mobility, communications, anonymity, and audiences. Socially disruptive modernisation may also produce propitious conditions for terrorism, especially when it relies heavily on the export of natural resources, causes widespread social inequalities and environmental damage, and creates mixed market-clientalist societies.

*Poverty, weak states, and insurgencies*: Poor societies with weak state structures are much more exposed to civil wars than wealthy countries. Economic growth and development undercut the economics of armed insurgencies. Economic growth and prosperity also contribute to lower levels of transnational terrorism.

*Democratisation*: States in democratic transition are more exposed to armed conflict and terrorism than democracies and autocracies. Because of pervasive state control, totalitarian regimes rarely experience terrorism. States with high scores on measures of human rights standards and democracy are less

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exposed to domestic ideological terrorism. Levels of transnational terrorism also seem to be highest in semi-authoritarian states, especially when undergoing a democratisation process.

**Political regime and legitimacy:** Terrorism is closely linked to a set of core legitimacy problems. Lack of continuity of the political system and lack of integration of political fringes tend to encourage ideological terrorism. Ethnic diversity increases the potential for ethnic terrorism. A high density of trade union membership in a population has tended to contribute to a lower level of domestic ideological terrorism.

**The ecology of terrorism:** Technological developments offer new and more efficient means and weapons for terrorist groups, but also increase the counter-terrorist capabilities of states. Transnational organised crime and terrorism are partly interlinked phenomena, and growth in transnational organised crime may contribute to increased levels of terrorism.

**Hegemony in the international system:** An international state system characterised by strong hegemonic power(s) is more exposed to international terrorism than a more multipolar system. High levels of bipolar conflict in world politics invite the use of state-sponsored terrorism as a means of war by proxy. A strongly unipolar world order or a world empire system, on the other hand, will experience high levels of transnational anti-systemic “anti-colonial” terrorism.

**Economic and cultural globalisation:** Economic globalisation has mixed impacts on transnational terrorism, depending on how globalisation is measured. Cultural globalisation, measured by the rate of INGOs, tends to cause higher levels of transnational terrorism, especially against U.S. targets.

**The proliferation of weak and collapsed states** seems to have a facilitating influence on terrorism. Failed or collapsed states, caused by civil wars, underdevelopment, corrupt elites, etc., may contribute to international terrorism in a variety of ways.

**Ongoing and past wars:** While terrorism in some cases is an armed conflict in its own right, terrorist motivations are often rooted in ongoing or past wars in one way or another. Armed conflicts also have various facilitating influences on transnational terrorism.

**Factors to keep in mind in the Yemeni context**
Yemen has long been seen as an important and critical area of both radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism. Ever since the October 2000 bombing of the navy destroyer U.S.S. Cole in the Yemeni port of Aden, there has been international attention on the region. Yemenis affiliated with al-Qaida were said to be behind the 2000 bombing in Aden, and analysts claim that terrorists live in Yemen, sometimes with government approval, and Yemen-based corporations are thought to help fund the al-Qaida network. The U.S. State Department calls Yemen “an important partner in the campaign against terrorism, providing assistance in the military, diplomatic, and financial arenas”. These are factors which may contribute to the radicalisation of youth in Yemen.

The country is seen to be poor, with high unemployment, and a weak central government; armed tribal groups are seen to be operating in outlying areas; and the country has porous borders, which makes it fertile ground for terrorists.
The country also has its own internal conflicts – some related to the tribal areas, others to conflicts across the borders in Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Also, the country has seen recruitment of radicals going to Iraq – some of whom have returned. These factors may have negative effects on the rest of society. Closeness to external conflict is here seen to have a possible radicalising effect. Al Qaida-related violence in Yemen is also an issue of concern. Similarly, as has been done in the neighbouring country of Saudi Arabia, returnees from Guantanamo should receive special attention and possible follow-up in terms of community-based programmes.

The above factors coupled with the presence of a large youth population and high unemployment is a reason why Yemen and its youth should receive special attention in terms of targeted programmes.

IN SEARCH OF PROGRAMMES AND POLICY OPTIONS

Identifying the vulnerable
Youth vulnerability to radicalization is an important yet difficult area of study. The challenge lies in trying to identify those who may be pushed or pulled towards radicalism – who is particularly susceptible to radical ideologies? Research shows that there is no clear profile as to who may become radicalised – some patterns may however be identified. It is essential to avoid stereotypes and generalisations which may cause further radicalisation.

Possible indicators may include:
- Perceptions of marginalisation, exclusion, or discrimination (levels of disaffection in society)
- Inability to affect political changes through legitimate and peaceful means (political representation, having a voice)
- Harsh treatment by the security services (self or family members)
- Unemployment and lack of opportunities for work and education
- Religious or ethnic persecution (representation, places of worship)
- A generational gap/generational conflicts (estranged youth, possible areas for youth participation)
- Lack of access to social services (general society)
- A sense of alienation, which is rarely related to their socioeconomic circumstances (political, cultural)
- Individualization: radicals tend to act outside traditional community bonds, such as family, mosques and other associations (how to engage those who do not get involved in groups etc).
- The group effect: the process of radicalisation may take place in the framework of small groups of friends who possibly knew one another before and may have had a common place of meeting or been part of a network of petty delinquency (levels of crime in society/neighbourhood).

Possible entry points for study may include:
1. What is the composition of current radical groups? Background, firmly anchored or alien phenomenon of society? Farmers, urban youth, students? (developing a demographic profile) – identifying role models and leaders of such groups
2. Emerging radicals – finding the vulnerable – identifying those groups in society that are frustrated, disaffected, and disillusioned – and how they involve themselves in society.
**Practical steps and policy options**

As part of the UN Global Strategy on Counter Terrorism, a working group on radicalisation and extremism that may lead to terrorism has conducted a study of member-states policies in the area. A recent report identified eleven key strategic issues (or types of programmes) which one can draw experiences from both in terms of preventing radicalisation (“counter-radicalisation”) and “de-radicalisation”. These include:

1) Engaging and working with civil society  
2) Prison programmes (e.g. working with youth juveniles)  
3) Education programmes  
4) Promoting alliance of civilisations and intercultural dialogue  
5) Tackling economic and social inequalities  
6) Global programmes to counter radicalisation (as part of development aid)  
7) Internet  
8) Legislation reforms  
9) Rehabilitation programmes  
10) Developing and disseminating information (awareness campaigns)  
11) Training and qualifying agencies involved in implementing counter-radicalisation policies

There are quite a few factors and policy options we see repeating themselves. The report provides an overview of noncoercive counter-radicalisation policies and programmes implemented by countries around the world. They involve a whole array of actors and require a cross-departmental approach to many of the issues. The approaches also demonstrate that radicalisation processes are complex and multifaceted and may follow different dynamics in different places. The report also shows, however, that even though no one theory can explain all forms of terrorism and no one approach can address all the conditions that may lead to it, some common understanding and policies have begun to emerge. The above list is an indication of this.\(^{11}\)

**CONCLUSIONS/In Search of Recommendations**

The following section includes suggestions for policy options based on the above background review of violence and conflict. Importantly, as has been seen by the above-mentioned cross-country survey conducted by the United Nations, increased attention is being given in a wide variety of states to non-coercive approaches to violent extremism that aim to prevent disaffected individuals to violence in the first place: “This reverses a previous reliance on ‘hard approaches’ and highlights a growing recognition among many states that military and other suppressive approaches alone are insufficient, and in some cases may even be counter-productive”.\(^{12}\)

Below are a few policy recommendations:

*Short-term policy measures*

\(^{11}\) For a full survey of the kind of programmes and the discussion see:  
\(^{12}\) Ibid.
• Increased efforts to identify and render harmless potential “radicalisation-entrepreneurs” by either prosecuting them, or guiding them to find more constructive ways to act out their activism.

• De-legitimization of extremist messages – this requires identifying from where such messages are spread – opinion makers, radical clerics, youth leaders, etc. Hamper the proliferation of violent extremist messages on the Internet (difficult issue, how to monitor).

• Identification of “radical voices”. An important target group are charismatic “gate keepers” such as radical clerics, “jihad veterans” (people who have returned back from Iraq, for instance, in the Yemen context – and Guantanamo returnees), and leaders in militant milieus who play a vital recruitment role.

• Prevention of the establishment of facilities and sanctuaries (empty, negative meeting places – black holes) in which radicals can spread their violent messages and their violent ideology, indoctrinate new members, and socialize them into a violent extremist (“jihadist”) worldview. Develop healthy meeting places for discussion, activity, and learning – sports, vocational training, languages, media training, etc.

• **Youth leadership programmes**: many of the target group interviews focus on the need for skills and training – vocational training, leadership skills, political management skills, administration skills – to develop “cultures” of positive exchanges and learning centres.

• **Awareness-raising programmes**:
  I  Many of the target groups focus on the need for places to learn and discuss issues at stake for youth – **meeting places** for discussion, places to “eliminate negative feelings”, outlets for opinions, media training. Key concerns are often seen to be corrupt leaders, lack of democracy, lack of places to be heard, apathy.
  II  **Awareness campaigns** – sending positive messages through media, TV, Internet – make youth create the message to be sent out, media training, journalism skills with the goal to create awareness and ownership of their own futures.

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**Annex A**

**Examples of Radicalisation – Pakistan**
Below is a section from a case study done in Pakistan. The context is different from the Yemenese but may inform some recommendations.
“With this study (undertaken in the period 2005-2008)\textsuperscript{13} I hope to explore “the individual level” of radicalisation in Pakistani through interviews with individuals and to have them tell me their “stories”. What processes and dynamics make individuals join radical movements, what is their reasoning, what happens, how and why?

The processes of socialisation and education have been seen by many as being crucial. Leaders, trainers and educators may have a certain amount of influence on the individual. The interviews conducted are both with leaders who may see their roles as being to legitimise, convince and educate, and also with individual men and women who have taken part in some way or other in the struggle.

Theoretically there are various ways of trying to understand or to look at factors that may motivate someone to partake in terrorism. Research shows that one may divide causes into two general categories: First, underlying reasons; grievances that give rise to terrorism, which may include political, historical injustices, alienation and humiliation. These can be seen more as structural challenges, including lack of democratic institutions, foreign occupation, corrupt regimes, unresolved conflicts, discrimination and atrocities against fellow Muslims. Secondly, there may be “happenings” that cause a sudden moral awakening – a sudden sense of anger and revenge – or a feeling of injustice. Quintan Wiktorowicz calls this “a crisis that produces a cognitive opening ... that shakes previously accepted beliefs and renders individuals more receptive to possible alternative views and perspectives”. These factors may include a financial (sudden unemployment or no possibility of social mobility), socio-cultural (humiliations, racism, cultural weakness), political (marginalisation, torture, discrimination, corruption) or personal (death or family-tragedy, victim of a criminal activity) crisis. Although Wiktorowicz’s empirical research is focused on Europe, his theoretical framework is useful in understanding what may be factors at an individual level.

Marc Sageman discusses in his work on understanding terror networks the importance of social networks – both at the levels of family and friends. Jessica Stern has, through her interviews with religious terrorists, asked questions as to why some people respond to grievances by joining religious terrorist groups. She also asks the question, as does Wiktorowicz, as to why some remain “free-riders” while others participate more actively. It is not uncommon, on the streets in Pakistan, to hear critical questions asked about the Musharraf Government – and the “Mush-Bush-Israel-India alliance” – including questions that imply sympathy for the Taliban or al-Qaida. But what makes some people give up their “ordinary” lives and choose to join extreme religious groups? Furthermore, what explains the interest that some people show for these movements, and how do they get in touch with them? Similarly, how are they convinced that this interpretation of Islam is the right one – and how do they explain their conviction to an outsider such as myself?

Motivations can be found at different levels and are often mixed: religious, political, financial, cultural or socio-psychological. In most of the cases I have found various, alternating motives. That is, some people point to the corruption of the Government, “the biggest Satan of them all America”, charismatic leaders who convince them, and also to religion as a way of legitimising an activity. These are the more external factors. Then there is a different layer which is more personal: the person’s background and personal experiences.

\textsuperscript{13} This section draws on material from: Bokhari, L, forthcoming (Gyldendal Publishers, 2009)
One of the main questions has been: What is jihad for you, and why is jihad seen as a duty? The ways the interviewees have reasoned has differed. Some have begun by telling me their background, their family stories, their educational background and the people who are important to them in their lives. However, the religious imperative is in most cases an underlying factor, which in different contexts is used either as a true motivation, explained as “the luggage of a Mujahid” by sympathizers of Maulana Masaud Azhar or as “Islam’s neglected duty”, by a former member of Hizb-ul-Mujahidin. For some, though, the religious motive seems to come after the political imperative, more as an attempt to legitimise a conviction. Some have explained jihad as “the tax that Muslims must pay for gaining authority on Earth. The imperative to pay a price for Heaven, for the commodity of Allah is dear, very dear.” Others have pointed to the “moral obligation of jihad” as being equally important as the duties of prayer and charity within Islam, but that “only a very few are lucky to be the chosen”. One former jihadist clearly stated that he joined for fear of being punished in the after-life, while another, according to his mother (and in letters from him to his mother) wanted his family to earn respect and honour in this life. Desire for adventure and the glamour of belonging to a militant group have also been instrumental reasons. As one interviewee, a former jihadist, told me: “to be in the Military was my greatest dream, when I failed the test to enter the Pakistani Army, I found somewhere else to prove my manhood. Guns and violence were appealing. And I thought I would come back and be cheered as a hero – for my country, my people and my religion”. Networks have also been important factors for some in explaining how they became involved in certain activities. Family ties, for example, daughters, sons or cousins of political figures, and friendship ties are also, for some, seen as bringing them into contact with terrorist activity.

All these questions have been instrumental in my meetings and interviews, and formed the discussions that have been held. The process of recruitment to radical Islamist organisations has been one of my points of discussion. The interviews have shown that recruitment to jihad occurs both in a top-down and a bottom-up pattern – that is, there have been both push and pull factors, often operating at the same time: the people interviewed claim their personal conviction, but emphasise the importance of someone introducing them to the “possibilities”. “
## Appendix 7: Complete Listing of USAID/Yemen Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program/Strategic Objective</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Target Audience</th>
<th>Geographic Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parliament and Political Parties (DG)</td>
<td>Capacity Building</td>
<td>Members of Parliament, Political parties leadership and staff</td>
<td>Sana’a, Country wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization (DG)</td>
<td>Institutional Reform, delegation of fiscal and executive authorities</td>
<td>Local / Governorate Councils</td>
<td>Aden, Abyan, Shabwa, Marib, Country wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Mitigation (DG)</td>
<td>Capacity Building</td>
<td>Tribal Leaders, Tribes in conflict</td>
<td>Al-Jawf, Marib, Shabwa, Amran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhancing Govt Effectiveness (DG)</td>
<td>Increasing systems efficiency</td>
<td>Govt: Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>Sana’a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Corruption (DG)</td>
<td>Capacity Building</td>
<td>Anti-corruption agencies</td>
<td>Sana’a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Education (Education)</td>
<td>School renovation, teacher-training</td>
<td>Children 5 - 14; teachers and headmasters</td>
<td>Marib, Shabwa, Amran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Education (Education)</td>
<td>School renovation, teacher-training</td>
<td>Children 5 - 14; teachers and headmasters</td>
<td>Hodieda, Rayma, Dhamar (TBC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal and Child Health (Health)</td>
<td>Awareness, Basic Healthcare</td>
<td>Children 0 - 12; families, parents</td>
<td>Sa’ada, Al-Jawf, Marib, Shabwa, Amran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Empowerment Program (YSI)</td>
<td>Encouraging youth leadership</td>
<td>Frustrated youth (M/F) 15 - 30; recent immigrants from rural to urban; promising leaders and opinion leaders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME Competitiveness Project (YSI)</td>
<td>Employment Generation</td>
<td>Qualifying SMEs in selected promising sub-sectors of the local economies</td>
<td>Aden, Abyan, Al-Dale’e, Lahej</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Councils (Education Pillar)</td>
<td>Establishment of S. C.</td>
<td>Children 5–14; teachers and headmasters</td>
<td>Sana’a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program/Strategic Objective</td>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Target Audience</td>
<td>Geographic Focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in Development (Women Pillar)</td>
<td>Empowerment of Women NGOs in Development</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Sana’a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking Reform (Economic Pillar)</td>
<td>Reform and Restructuring</td>
<td>Commercial and Agricultural Credit Bank</td>
<td>Sana'a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement Reform (Economic Pillar)</td>
<td>Developing Procurement Law</td>
<td>Government of Yemen</td>
<td>Sana'a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs Reform (Economic Pillar)</td>
<td>Increasing Efficiency</td>
<td>Government of Yemen Customs Authority</td>
<td>Sana'a, Hodieda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Language Training (Education)</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Sana'a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulbright; Humphrey Scholarships (Higher Education)</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Youth / Adults</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO Support (NGO)</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Country wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-help fund (Ambassador’s Fund)</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Country wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast Guard (Border Control)</td>
<td>Equipping, Capacity building</td>
<td>Coast Guard / coastal communities</td>
<td>Aden, coastal areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry points --airports and land (Border Control)</td>
<td>Equipping, Capacity Building</td>
<td>Passports control</td>
<td>Sana'a, country wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Military Training (Military Training)</td>
<td>Capacity Building</td>
<td>Special Guard / Commando</td>
<td>Sana'a, country wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter Terrorism Training (Military Training)</td>
<td>Equipping, Capacity Building</td>
<td>Anti-Terrorism Unit</td>
<td>Sana’a, country wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Education (Military Training)</td>
<td>Specialized technical scholarships</td>
<td>Explosives / other units</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Development (Civil Affairs)</td>
<td>Various - short-term</td>
<td>Selected communities</td>
<td>Abyan, Aden, country wide</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 8: Profiles of Youth-Serving Organizations in Yemen

This is an illustrative listing of youth service organizations in Sana’a City, Taiz, and Aden. Findings are based on *Youth Organizations in Yemen: A Report on the Mapping of Youth Organizations in Yemen*. 2008.89

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Name [Partners]</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Contact</th>
<th>Aim</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Sana’a   | **ALL GIRLS ASSOCIATION** [Marie Stopes International, Al Bara, Tulit, Yemeni Bahrain Ban, Save the Children Sweden] | Youth, especially girls | New University, beginning of Al Aldi Street, Sana’a City                | Ms. Arwa Jaralla +967-1-215-270 | Develop the personality and life skills of Yemeni girls. Qualify girls to be leaders and raise the community. | • Yearly youth meetings and festivals  
• Training courses: decoration, employment, writing a CV, first aid, personal development  
• Lectures: extremism, reproductive health, religion, national elections  
• Entertainment and educational trips |
| Sana’a   | **EBHAR FOUNDATION FOR CHILDHOOD AND CREATION** [Shawthab, Juvenile Center, Orphanages, UNICEF, Rada Barnin, Ffheidrich Ebert Stuftung, DED, GTZ, Naseej, Safis Exhibition Association, UNESCO, Al Jazeera Children Channel, Social Fund for Development, Ministry of Culture, General Author’s Authority, Red Crescent Association] | Children and Youth     | Saba Crossroads, Sana’a City                                            | Mr. Nabeel Al-Khater +967-1-561-1633 | Change society positively by art and creativeness. Bring societal awareness about children’s rights through art. Empower children to live in a better environment and make them participate in awareness. Empower talented youth. | • Exhibitions for painters and talented children and youth  
• Puppet-making and puppet theatre about reintegration of juveniles, early marriage  
• Training courses for street children: alphabetization, painting, sports (chess, fototball, basketball)  
• Training courses: first aid, cartoons, pottery, creating invitation cards, computer (basics, photoshop)  
• Awareness lectures: HIV/AIDS  
• “Tamkin” and “Ibda” Project: trained 20 girls (aged 18-24) in glass making weaving bed sheets, curtains, making cards, photography |
| Sana’a   | **LIFE MAKERS FORUM SANA’A** [All Youth Association, Life Makers Association, SOL Organization, Haytana Albeaah Association, Red Crescent, Social Fund for Development, Our Life Association] | Youth 200 members       | Al-Ragas Street, in front of Mua’ath Ben Jabal School, Sana’a City     | Mr. Najeeb Al-Gabre +967-1-201-863 | Transform the sporadic youth activities to a forum. Promote different fields (education, agriculture, health, economy), youth and children. Spread volunteering. Youth capacity building, fight unemployment and bad habits, environmental and health awareness. | • Training courses: health, environment, human development, rhetoric, planning, recycling trash, management, economics  
• Small loans project  
• Distribute school and Ramadan bags  
• Entertainment trips  
• Consultations: psychological on HIV/AIDS (Cooperation with Ministry of Health)  
• Awareness lectures: smoking, nutrition, taking political decisions  
• Participate in festivals, demonstrations and forums |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sana’a</th>
<th>LIFE MAKERS FOUNDATION SANA’A CITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Ora Organization, As Saleh Foundation, Cultural Center to Invited Colonies, Life Mkaers Forum, Sol Organization, Yemen Candles, Athar Organization Skills Center, Al Bina Organization, Expats Center, Al Amman Organization, All Girls Association]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| All ages, 300 people | Algeria Street, Sana’a City | Mr. Adnan Alwashali +967-1-446-469 | Participate in development and community building. |

- Orphans project: visits to the orphanage, activities, trips, distribute cleaning equipments, winter clothes, give the orphans awareness lectures (on employment, poverty, communicating with people) and training courses (carpentry, handicrafts, mechanics)
- “Future protectors” established in cooperation with UN, Right Start Organization (UK), Dubai Police, WHO, Monitor Foundation: Awareness about drugs (training clothes, lectures)
- “Follow the Prophet” show with a correct image of the Prophet
- Information Technology Awareness lectures
- Charity
- Invite famous lectures e.g. Amr Khalid
- Training course for media people in NGOs
- Visit patients in hospitals
- Training courses for members of the association

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sana’a</th>
<th>YOUTH LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[GIRLS WORLD COMMUNICATION CENTER (GWCC) AND YOUTH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CENTER (YEDC)]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Youth ages 18-25 Primarily youth ages 18-30, men and women | Kentucky roundabout, in front of “La Ilah Illa Allah” building, Sana’a | Ms. Safa’a Rawiyya +967-1-471-677 (GWCC) +967-1-230-593 (YEDC) | To increase youth participation in social political and economic aspects of society especially through education in vocational, communication, leadership and life skills. |

- Young leadership Program
- Young Women Leadership Program
- Human Rights Program
- Democracy Program
- Public Administration Program
- Young Business Professional Program
- Youth Civic Engagement Program
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aden</th>
<th>LIFE MAKERS ADEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Palestinian youth Association in Yemen, Al-Quds Youth Association, Science and technology Center (University of Aden), Aden Institute for Health Sciences and Technology, New Horizon Center for Training]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth and young adults (16-35)</td>
<td>Khor Makser, behind Faculty of Medicine, Aden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Mona Mohammed Abdul Wadod</td>
<td>+968-2-233-789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow the Life Maker’s objective: raise and advance the nation via development and faith. Youth capacity building. Raise the capacity of the different community groups. Assist youth to have an effective role in society’s development. Change the youth’s despondency into hopes and optimism for a better future.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charities: (bags for poor in Ramadan, fundraising for orphans)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training courses: starting small projects, Internet and computer, using one’s talents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lectures: reproductive health, fitness, how to live life with happiness, how to use free time, planning your life</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aden</td>
<td>SOCIAL SERVICES CENTER/ YEMEN YOUTH MEETING CLUB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[UNICEF, Swedish Programme, Tringle]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalized and poor youth aged 14-25 65 members</td>
<td>Alyosofi street in front of Al Fahr school, Shaikh Othman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Yaser Naser Haitham</td>
<td>+967-2-391-156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empower and qualify youth, bring awareness about their rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services center: Awareness about sexually transmitted diseases, children’s rights in markets, clinics, hotels etc. Feed undernourished babies, Encourage parents to get birth certificates for their children. Have a girl’s center that offers trainings in hairdressing, naqsh, sewing. Lessons for poor and street children. Give out schoolbags, donate food during Ramadan.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen youth meeting club: Edited brochures and posters on reproductive health. Project for women to sell their handicrafts. Organize plays on subjects such as unemployment, reproductive health.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aden</td>
<td>YEMEN YOUTH UNION ADEN [GTZ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth 3000 members</td>
<td>Al Moa‘ala Aden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Reem Abdul Hamed</td>
<td>+967-2-243-261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unify the youth movement in Aden. Develop voluntarily youth activities. Find solution for all youth matters or problems. Educate youth about diseases. Establish handicraft projects to increase the youth’s income.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training courses: first aid, reproductive health, small projects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness lectures: time management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth meetings: plan future common activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entertainment trips</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Yemen Youth Assessment Final Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Target Age Group</th>
<th>Location Details</th>
<th>Contact Person</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aden</td>
<td>YOUTH FORUM</td>
<td>Youth ages 14-24</td>
<td>UNICEF office, Khor Makser, Aden</td>
<td>Mr. Hosam Sallam +967-2-232-558</td>
<td>Inform youth about their rights, strengthen their capacity to take decisions and initiate voluntary work, raise their social and health education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[UNICEF, UNDP, Union of Yemeni Artists]</td>
<td>40-80 members</td>
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<td></td>
<td>● Peer-to-peer education in rural areas, schools and summer campaigns on HIV/AIDS, child trade, girl’s education. Activities are carried out regularly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiz</td>
<td>HAWA WOMEN’S HANDICRAFT ASSOCIATION</td>
<td>Female Youth</td>
<td>Traffic street, Taiz</td>
<td>Ms. Najat Hasan Mahdi</td>
<td>Develop women socially and professionally, improve their situation socially, economically and in terms of health.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Social Fund for Development]</td>
<td>60 members</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiz</td>
<td>LIFE MAKERS FOUNDATION TAIZ</td>
<td>Youth ages 14-18; 18-24; 25-40</td>
<td>Qureesh street, beside the National Institute for Administrative Sciences, Taiz</td>
<td>Mr. Jameel Abdulhafeth Alaghbari +967-4-268-221</td>
<td>Satisfy God through fighting illiteracy. Developing youth skills and engaging them in developmental projects for the benefit of the individual and society. Stabilize Islamic ethics and tolerance to push society to more prosperity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Happy family club, Yemen Women Union, Taiz Governorate, NDS, Taiz University, National Organization for Developing Society, National Youth Center, Orphanage, Zon Society, Education Office, Al-Thaura Hospital, Health Office, Inda Establishment]</td>
<td>600 members</td>
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<td>● Feasibility study before staring new activities</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>● Career counseling</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>● Teacher training</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>● Translation</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>● Health projects</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>● Social projects</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>● Religious courses</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>● Weekly youth meetings</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>● Summer centers</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>● Organized AL-Aqsa festival (fundraising for Palestine)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>● “Zidni Project to qualify and train individuals and families on being a good citizen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Contact Person</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiz</td>
<td>NATIONAL CULTURAL YOUTH CENTER</td>
<td>Youth over 15 300 members</td>
<td>Al Musala, Taiz</td>
<td>Make youth aware of their rights and duties. Capacity building of youth. Protect youth rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Democracy Local Fund, Microsoft, Aqtidar Organization, UN, NED, NPI]</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mr. Obed Mohamed Gamdan +967-4-251-838</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Training courses: tourism (information on Yemen, its history, geography etc) sewing, weaving, hairdressing, first aid, house management, personal development, languages, computer, private lessons for University students, sign language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Holy Quran competitions</td>
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<td>Lectures: HIV/AIDS, qat, family planning, mother counseling</td>
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<td>“Youth Court”: young people act as advocates for youth problems, talk to responsible people</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Sport competitions: chess tennis</td>
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<td>Entertainment trips to historical places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Election observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiz</td>
<td>NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR DEVELOPING SOCIETY (NODS YEMEN)</td>
<td>Youth, mosque preachers, students, women, poor and illiterate segments of society</td>
<td>Shawqi Al-Qadhi +967-7-113-3030</td>
<td>Support for high school graduates, illiteracy program, integrate role of mosque preachers in promoting human rights, democracy and conflict prevention and resolution. Vocational and technical training program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[National: Yemeni Saba Bank, Haiel Saeed Group,; International” NED MEPPI, NDI, Canadian Program, GTZ, Save the Children (Swedish)]</td>
<td>Taiz</td>
<td></td>
<td>Trainings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Public events and lectures</td>
</tr>
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<td>Networking with local and national NGOs</td>
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Appendix 9: Possible Monitoring and Evaluation Indicators

Outputs

- Number of youth that benefited in various activities with the type of benefits
- Number of youth that developed leadership skills
- Number of teachers that developed skills to design and implement projects for youth
- Number of additional community youth facilities established
- Number of new youth services implemented
- Number of youth leaders trained and initiated and supervised community-led initiatives
- Number of youth trained and produced at least one media project on youth.
- Number of staff of local organizations that became engaged in youth programs
- A sustainability structure is established and implemented.
- Number of work days for youth created throughout the program
- Number of youth that developed livelihood skills
- Number of youth employed as a result of their participation in program activities.
- Number of youth that developed and are utilizing new skills in their daily life.
- Number and percentage of youth requesting and receiving training by type of training

Outcomes

- Increased number of youth regularly engaged in outreach and community activities
- Increased participation of youth (number and gender) that initiated outreach and community-based youth projects/activities
- Increased number of youth that reported improvement in their quality of life
- Increased capacity of local partners (schools, youth organizations, municipalities) in planning and implementing quality youth-engaging community activities.
- Increased utilization of youth projects over time
- Increased job placement rates for youth;
- Increased satisfaction rates of youth and employers;
- Increased number of youth/community members with access to community-based educational, recreational and civic services activities;
- Increased involvement of parents in planning and managing youth-oriented projects.
- Increased community contribution to youth-programs.
- Increased number of youth with demonstrated livelihood, leadership and civic skills
- Increased number of youth-led community initiatives
- Increased number of organizations with youth participation in decision making
- Increased number of organizations with increased representation of youth in their executive committees

Program Indicators

- Percentage of youth served through the program.
- Percentage of youth with access to resources (information, materials, and services) that address priority needs of youth
- Percentage of youth oriented advocacy efforts
• Percentage of youth-serving organizations that provide youth with a major voice in policy development and direction-setting
• Percentage of youth-serving organizations with youth representing at least 25% of their executive committees.
• Percentage of youth-serving organizations that are managed by youth
• Percentage of national budget directed towards youth programs
• Percentage of youth (over first year) who are computer literate
• Percentage of youth (over first year) who have use internet and/or have e-mail address
• Percentage of youth (over first year) who practice at least one sport activity on regular basis
• Percentage of youth (over first year) who trained in social/civic or leadership training
• Percentage of youth (over first year) trained in business entrepreneurship/livelihood skills
• Percentage of youth (over first year) provided with internship opportunities
• Percentage of change in youth employment rate
• Percentage of change in programs targeting youth
• Presence of how current program intersects with national policy, comprehensive plan/strategy for youth
• Percentage in community based organizations with increased programs/services/budget for youth

Attitudinal and Behavioral Indicators
• Percentage of youth feeling marginalized, excluded or discriminated (levels of disaffection in society)
• Percentage of youth perceive their inability to affect political changes through legitimate and peaceful means (political representation, having a voice)
• Percentage of youth that have received harsh treatment by the security services (self or family members)
• Percentage of youth unemployed or lack of opportunities for work and education
• Percentage of youth that report religious or ethnic persecution (representation, places of worship)
• Percentage of youth that feel estranged from their families or with generational conflicts (estranged youth, possible areas for youth participation)
• Percentage of youth with a lack of access to social services (general society)
• Percentage of youth with a feeling of personal alienation, which is rarely related to their socio-economic circumstances (political, cultural).
• Percentage of youth who are not engaged in social or community activity (e.g. radicals tend to act outside traditional community bonds, such as family, mosques and other associations (how to engage those who do not get involved in groups etc).
• The scope and nature of the youth social network

Alongside these indicators, the project might include a variety of participatory evaluation instruments to ensure that youth are actively participating in the evaluation process:
• **Most Significant Change Technique** involves the collection of significant change stories emanating from the field level, and the systematic selection of the most significant of these.
These selected stories are then discussed and critically reflected on to help determine the impact of the development program or activity.

- **Outcome Mapping** is an alternative to theory-based approaches to evaluation that rely on a cause-effect framework; rather, it recognizes that multiple, nonlinear events lead to change. It focuses on people and changes of behaviour and how far development interventions have built the capacity of the local community. Outcome mapping assumes only that a contribution has been made, and never attempts attribution.

- **Participatory Youth Appraisal** encompasses a broad range of methods to enable local youth to analyze their own realities as the basis for planning, monitoring and evaluating development activities. PYA uses group exercises to facilitate information sharing, analysis, and action among stakeholders.
Appendix 10: Report on the Cairo Assessment Techniques Training
August 20-23, 2008

Executive Summary

The Yemen cross-sectoral youth assessment project changed from an assessment done by US-based experts to an assessment to be conducted by Yemeni specialists trained by EDC. The assessment was under time pressure to move ahead quickly. The new design called for an intensive training of the Yemeni team over four days in Cairo, followed by ongoing long distance coaching of the team. Among the key responsibilities of the Yemeni assessment team members was addressing critical gaps in knowledge via in-country qualitative and quantitative data collection activities. This was to be developed in large part through focus groups of youth ages 15-24 and interviews with key adult informants.

There were four goals of the training in terms of the Assessment:

1. Get the focus group facilitators trained to conduct effective focus groups
2. Get the key informant interviewers ready to conduct effective interviews
3. Get all participants prepared to write their sections of the report
4. Clarify roles and help the team work effectively together in Yemen

Training (Learning) Objectives – Help the Yemeni Team:

- Understand the relationship between the stabilization effort and this assessment
- Identify their part in the work plan and how that links to the assessment report
- Make informed decisions about selecting informants
- Effectively lead youth focus groups, conduct interviews and take essential notes
- Create high quality internal reports of discussions and findings

Training Design:

The first day focused on: team building, orientation to the project and the positive youth development and radicalization contexts, and learning how to conduct focus groups.

The second and third days focused on practicing focus groups and key informant interviews, and refining the focus group and interview tools.
The fourth day of the training focused on building the work plan, finalizing the data flow process, and identifying who would be interviewed.

**Evaluation of the Training:**

Overall, the training received high marks for preparing the focus group facilitators, building a strong and empowered team, and setting the stage for a successful assessment effort. After the field assessment, the Yemeni team members felt that with an all-Yemeni team in the field they received more honest expressions of beliefs and opinions by youth and adults alike. The main criticisms of the assessment training were that there was too much to cover in too short a time and the extended discussions about the focus group questions detracted from the learning.

**Recommendations:**

- Continue to test and explore using all local assessment teams for youth assessments.
- Provide shorter advanced readings, further in advance, that focused on the key points to be addressed: goals, roles, process and tools.
- More fully develop the focus group and key informant interview tools, and circulate them to the full group in advance for review, comment and a second review and comment if possible prior to the training.
- Add an extra half-day to the start of the training for team building and orientation so the first full day can be a full business session.
- Brief participants on the sections they are to lead in advance of the training.
Appendix 11: Assessment Fieldwork by an all Yemini Staff: Some Lessons Learned

For USAID and EDC this cross-sectoral youth assessment broke some new ground. A conventional assessment usually involves non-host country experts leading a short intensive period of fieldwork with the aid of local consultants. Report writing would begin in the field and continue back in the experts’ home countries.

In contrast, the fieldwork component of this assessment was conducted entirely by Yemeni specialists trained by EDC. EDC trained the Yemeni specialists in Cairo on how to implement youth assessments and they subsequently conducted the fieldwork in Yemen under the guidance of the US-based team. These specialists began writing in Yemen, and after the fieldwork was completed two specialists came to Washington to complete writing with the US-based EDC team. This method was recommended by the Yemen activity CTO, Raidan al-Saqqaf, as a solution to the continuing delay of the assessment due to the declining security situation for foreign national specialists in country.

The assessment report has been well received by USAID in Yemen and Washington. Feedback included: the report is well written, responds to the demands of the Section 1207 mandate, and the recommendations were specific and useful to inform programmatic decision-making.

The lessons learned are divided into three sections: preparation, fieldwork, and report writing.

Preparation
The intensive, four-day training of the Yemeni team in Cairo was designed and implemented very quickly, within just a few weeks of making the decision to do it. It was a challenge to codify expert knowledge that should be brought to the field because many factors that demand field adjustments cannot easily be put into a formula or rules.

The skills of the individuals selected for the team created a diverse and complementary group. All senior members had professional graduate academic experience outside of Yemen. They all had research and writing experience. The facilitators had experience in conducting meetings and interactive environments and the note takers were native Arabic speakers and fluent in English. Some knew each other but only two of the 6 had worked together before. The Yemeni team leader was a former professor and senior administrator at a well-regarded university. He commanded the respect of the group and had the research and management credentials. They came together well and by the time the training ended they reported they felt like a team and they felt empowered.

For the technical side of things, four days for training was not enough time to learn and practice conducting focus groups with Egyptian youth, train for key informant interviews, arrive at the best set of questions, and learn how to manage the fieldwork process. Six days would have been better.

Certain aspects of the assessment, like developing the final question routines would typically be worked out in-country with some practice sessions at the onset. In the Cairo setting, testing the focus group questions in Arabic in Cairo with Egyptian youth allowed the American trainers and the Yemenis to more
fully appreciate the kinds of data the questions would elicit and provided some insight into the types of probe questions needed. For example, to elicit more detailed information on characteristics of desired activity options, the probe that appeared to give meaningful detail was the question: “who would manage the activity?” The practice sessions also helped create a comfort level around topics considered highly sensitive such as causes of youth violence. While the information was considered integral to the assessment, all of us shared concern for the safety of those asking the questions. The process of developing the final question routines also increased the ownership of the questions and more ensured their accurate note taking.

Materials sent in advance were not read or reviewed by all members prior to the beginning of the training. There needed to be a more careful and a limited selection of materials sent and they needed to be sent more in advance. The design may have been stronger had it allowed time to review everything meaningful to the assessment during the training itself rather than rely on the pre-reading or post-training reading of materials.

Due to the late booking of hotel rooms, the group was forced to stay at a second-choice more luxurious hotel. To save on travel time in the city, some practice sessions were held in the hotel’s meeting rooms. The Yemeni team observed that the Egyptian youth who came into this luxury setting were a little intimidated. There were some off-hotel site practice sessions as well and the participants were more relaxed there.

**Fieldwork**
The team left Cairo very empowered and with high resolve. During the fieldwork, they showed strong commitment, resilience and creativity to reach high numbers of informants. They met with a total of 287 youth in 25 focus groups and 120 adults at 16 roundtables. Some long-distance coaching by telephone and Internet occurred between the US and Yemeni team leaders. This began very early after the teams entered the field. The Yemeni team leader welcomed the support and the US team leader used it to help problem solve and give feedback on early notes sent back for review. There was some limited contact with the other team members. Nearly all field notes went through the team leader who was responsible for their timely submission to the US and facilitator/note-taker responses to the US questions to clarify narrative detail. At the conclusion of the fieldwork, the US-based team leader interviewed the two facilitators on their overall impressions on the responses. That worked well to tease out “truths” that may not have been captured well on the notes. An example of this was the across-the-board level of intensity the women expressed about their lack of control over their lives. While it was envisioned that the European team member also support the local conflict specialist throughout the fieldwork process, her engagement was more focused at the end during report writing.

Culture trumped methodology at times. Due to early communications about an ideal focus group size of 10 to 12 people, invitations often went out to more than 15 to ensure group size. In some cases everyone showed up. In Cairo they were encouraged to break down large groups into smaller groups. This would have made it necessary to lengthen the time in order to do back to back focus groups. The other option was not to include everyone and let some go early to cut the size below 10. The Yemenis chose to include everyone who showed up even if they had twice the recommended number. This was the culturally right thing to do.
There were no foreigners looking on, taking notes and giving directions. This 100% Yemeni experience worked well as there did not need to be the extra noise and diversion of concurrent interpretation occurring nor the suspicions that foreigners many inadvertently provoke by their mere presence.

In the case of the more conversational roundtables among adult informants, the Yemeni specialists were particularly pleased to be of the same culture and language as their informants. They felt the conversations were more honest and less guarded. Also, the local researchers had the advantage of “thinking in Arabic” and were able to convey the respondents’ input in a more accurate manner in the write-ups, especially when interpreting regional sayings and references.

Focus group and key informant interview notes were translated into English, inputted into soft copy, and then emailed to the US-based Team Leader for review and distribution to other US-based team members. This worked well with some qualification. It took time for the readers to get a feel for the responses. The early feedback on the note taking was to include more detail and more quotes of strong observational statements. There was a feedback delay and this meant corrective action took some time. An example of this was the case in ensuring the background on the participants was adequately described and ensuring that the note taking detailed good specific contributions though more extensive quoting.

A US-based research intern sorted data into tables and matrices for analysis and report writing. This was essential. The local team benefited from the assistance an outsider who was not under field pressures in labeling, tracking and compiling the data from the raw data reports. This may have been solved through extra local staffing.

The US-based team reviewed all of the notes and most went back to the field with questions to clarify the rough wording of some sentences and to expand on the meaning of some localized references. Good note taking was praised in writing with specific mention as to why it excelled.

There was one question routine for all youth focus groups. The intention was to have at least two routines, the second routine being triggered after the response pattern became predictable. With more practice in Cairo and thus greater skill on facilitation, note-taking and comfort level with the first routine; we may have been able to introduce a second routine as EDC has done in other assessments. The other option would have been to manage this transition through remote coaching. The time delay in reading English translations did not allow enough time.

Nearly all adult informants were in group interviews and roundtables. The questions for the adult informant roundtables drew from a basic set of questions decided in Cairo with some variation that addressed specific informant groups. This was the most efficient way to enable diverse audiences to participate in providing input. Local, regional and national government figures were well represented with some private sector and NGOs represented. All-Arabic communications within an all Yemeni interviewer and interviewee context afforded familiarity and ease in communications.

**Report Writing**
Two Yemeni team specialists joined the US team in Washington, DC for 5 workdays after the assessment fieldwork was completed. They reviewed the data, discussed program options, and wrote stand-alone
Yemen Youth Assessment Final Report

reports and report sections. These follow-up face to face meetings were considered essential. The Yemeni team explained and demonstrated through diagrams what could not be communicated long distance. Importantly, away from their home base and distractions, they could focus exclusively on the report needs.

One report was written entirely in Arabic and needed to be translated so the US-based team could edit and excerpt it for the larger report. An acceptable translation was difficult to produce speedily. Translation expertise was not well anticipated and was hard to find on short notice. Reliance on other team members to provide this service would have compromised the timeliness and quality of their work.

Although there was a shift in methodology to the Yemeni-driven fieldwork, the key original report deliverables of the assessment remained the same. To complete them, more people worked in a specialized capacity and for fractions of time. For example, a training specialist substituted for the youth development specialist. After the training was completed, the youth development specialist became engaged in reading field notes and doing other relevant research and writing. The sociologist stopped work after his stand alone report was written. The Yemeni team leader was also a writer. A local conflict specialist was added to ensure that piece was addressed. There was not as much time saved for the US-based team leader as one would have expected. Even at a distance, there was daily substantive engagement through notes reviews and written comments, calls to the field, complementary research and conversations among US staff about what we were learning.

In some cases, local decisions to double-up on some tasks by the staff resulted in some activities getting less attention. This meant that instead of 1 of 2 staff observing focus groups for quality control in the beginning, 2-3 staff observed. Less attention was given to business contacts and fewer youth staff NGO interviews performed then envisioned. There were compensating mechanisms to address this, such as the recently released GTZ study of youth NGOs. That report provided a big assist in ensuring the assessment report was complete in this important aspect.

The final configuration of the Youth Assessment Team consisted of US, European and Yemen-based personnel. The US and European-based members include the Team Leader/Youth Development Specialist, Conflict Specialist, Youth Programming Analyst, Training Specialist, Project Technical Advisor, and Research Assistant. The Yemen-based members included the Team Leader/Education and Governance Specialist, Social Scientist, Conflict Specialist, two Youth Research Specialists, and two Youth Associates.

The USAID CTO committed his efforts to assist the group and was considered an ex-officio team member. This was helpful. He had easy access to his colleagues and insider knowledge on the USAID portfolio. He also had key contacts among other donors. Perhaps because of this combined with time pressures on the fieldwork, there was no donor meeting and no other broad USAID staff and Mission Director briefing.

The team members maintained that conversations among all Yemenis resulted in more genuine and frank conversations. The notes did reflect where frustrations erupted about dealing with particular people and the note takers wrote down confession-like comments about adults generally not doing well for the youth and some people admitted that they could be doing better. What got teased out of these
conversations was also some cultural meaning around words and definitions regarding types of violence. The notes also reflected that many spoke from what could be referred to as their “usual talking points”. A stronger hand in roundtable facilitation may have pushed groups to reveal deeper or more “real truths” but the trade-off may have been less ownership of the Yemeni situation by the Yemenis.

The written field reports were generated not as slotted sections of the final report but team members were contracted to write “stand alone” pieces on topics relative to their expertise. Excerpts of these reports were used to complete report sections. The positives of this direction are that it encouraged the specialists to think through their respective topics (e.g. youth and extremism) and address them in a more complete manner. Individual writing responsibilities increased individual accountability for documentation. The downside is that the Yemeni team may not have reviewed and conferred as thoroughly with each other to discover and define “extra interpreted truths” as one may have wanted. Also the writing styles varied widely and resulted in much re-writing and editing.

The report had many authors and two editors - one technical editor and one copyeditor. Separating these duties was considered sane and useful. The technical editor could keep her focus on making sure sections were completed and she with the team leader made sure they fit together so the overall needs of the assessment report were met. With fresh eyes and writing energy, the copy editor created one voice and tone from the many contributors to the document.

Final Lesson
The urgency and importance of the assessment fieldwork fell fully on the shoulders of the Yemeni team. Their learning was more significant as a result. EDC learned a lot through this process and it helped to inform an assessment performed in Somaliland very quickly thereafter.
1 As described in the UNDG-ECHA (2004), Framework for Conflict Analysis.

2 Denmark Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Countering Radicalization through Development Assistance - A Country Assessment Tool.


5 http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140

6 Amnesty International (2008), Annual Report, Yemen. Also see Global Integrity Index http://www.globalintegrity.org/reports/2006/Yemen/scorecard.cfm

7 The Fund for Peace, Yemen Country Profile

8 National Democratic Institute (2007), Research on Tribal Conflicts in Mareb, Al-jawf and Shwabwa governorates.

9 Population of North Yemen is four times the population of South Yemen.

10 Price of a sack of wheat, for example, increased by 250 percent between the end of 2007 and April 2008. http://yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=1149&p=finance&a=1


12 http://www.inteldaily.com/?c=148&a=5876

13 Economist Intelligence Unit (2008), Yemen Country Report

14 Estimates in Government of the Republic of Yemen (2005), PRSP Progress Report

15 Estimates in Government of the Republic of Yemen (2005), PRSP Progress Report

16 Yemen’s oil reserves appear to be waning with output dropping from 438,000 barrels per day in 2002 to 317,000 bpd in 2007 with a predicted 300,000 bpd in 2008. Sources: IMF, MoM


18 http://www.thewashingtoninstitute.org/opedsPDFs/4224cd7e95ec5.pdf

19 http://www.thewashingtoninstitute.org/opedsPDFs/4224cd7e95ec5.pdf

20 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep/17/yemen.alqaida

22 http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-35585620080921?pageNumber=3&virtualBrandChannel=0


27 The majority of working women (72 percent) are still concentrated in the agricultural sector as unpaid family workers. Close to two-thirds of working women in Yemen (62 percent) are unpaid workers.


29 Using an implied overall unemployment rate of 14.7 percent in 2003 and applying a multiplier of 1.7-2.0, the range of observed ratio of youth to unemployment rates measured in many countries in the world. (International Labor Organization (2004), A National Employment Agenda for Yemen Towards an Employment Strategy Framework)


33 Population, Housing and Establishment Census 2004

34 International Monetary Fund (2008), World Economic Outlook Database


36 Ibid, p. 29.


38 Ibid, p. 28.

39 Ibid, p. 28.


48 Republic of Yemen, Central Statistical Organization, Family Health Survey 2003: Table Seven

49 Maan A. Bari Qasem Saleh (May 2008), Psychology in Yemen, Psychology International (Volume 19:2)

50 Regional Youth Poll, Middle East Youth Media Initiative, Al Karma Edutainment Poll, Fall 2007

51 Regional Youth Poll, Middle East Youth Media Initiative, Al Karma Edutainment Poll, Fall 2007

52 Ibid.

53 Yemeni Media States from NationMaster.com http://www.nationmaster.com/red/country/ym-yemen/med-media&b cite=1&all=1

54 Yemeni Media States from NationMaster.com http://www.nationmaster.com/red/country/ym-yemen/med-media&b cite=1&all=1

55 Ibid.

56 Hofheinz, Albrecht, Arab Internet Use in Arab Media and Political Renewal: Community, Legitimacy and Public Life, p. 75


58 Ibid, p.75

59 Amr Khaled gained popularity in the late 1990s with a new style of rhetoric that appealed to young people, particularly from the higher classes. After being banned from preaching in Egypt in 2002, he began his website and 10% of his visitors come from the Gulf. Amr Khaled is also on the Saudi-owned Arab Radio and Television network. (from Arab Internet Use and Popular Culture in the Arab World)
Ibid., p. 77. A U.S. charity, Spirit of America, aimed at promoting freedom and democracy in Iraq developed a blogging Arabic interface and hosts at friendsofdemocracy.net.

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (2007), Assessment of Tribal Conflicts in Mareb, Al-Jawf and Shabwa.

The drug youth talked about is a mixture of qat taken with sleeping pills and an energy drink. The combination has the effect of drugs.

In Sept. 2005, a Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* published cartoons ridiculing Prophet Muhammad and indicating he was a terrorist. The cartoons created anger and mass protests throughout the Islamic world in which at least 100 people were killed. In addition, the Danish Embassies in Syria, Lebanon and Iran were set afire by protestors. For more, see [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jyllands-Posten_Muhammad_cartoons_controversy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jyllands-Posten_Muhammad_cartoons_controversy).

UNESCO (2003). Education Stat

Aden Local Councils, Fuad Al-Buraihi


Ibid., p. 12. According to the survey, only 1.2 percent of businesses reported a need for more employees. The survey identified only a minimal job creation rate of around 4 jobs per 100 for existing businesses and 2.5 jobs per 100 for new businesses.

They responded to the question, “What are the benefits and shortfalls of the top three beneficial places, activities, and programs in the neighborhood where young people like you spend time during an average week?”


Ibid. Estimate by MoSAL officials, April 2008


Under the new classification, the youth organizations must comply with the following criteria: 1) Percentage of youth on the board of at least 60%; 2) Percentage of youth among active members at least 60%; and 3) Programs
and services of the organization are directed mainly to youth. See Republic of Yemen, Ministry of Public Health and Population. 2008.


81 The information here (as well as information on YLDF in Appendix 8) came directly from the 2007 Youth Leadership Development Foundation Report and the YLDF Case Statement.

82 Education Development Center/EQUIP3. 2007. Page 21

83 Ibid, page 12

84 For a full survey of the kind of programs and the discussion, see: http://www.un.org/terrorism/pdfs/Report%20of%20the%20Working%20Group%20-%20Workgroup%20.pdf

85 http://www.aupeace.org/faculty/abu-nimer

86 MacArthur does the selection in secret by a committee. It is not a nominated or applicant-driven honor. With a little more work, one could find a sponsor to launch it as an annual event.

87 Hofheinz, 2007. p76

88 Various key informants expressed the need for coordination of donors with national, regional, and local efforts. Coordination mechanism within the project will encourage specific partnerships between community-based organizations and local and national government coordination in the oversight of program activities.